The evolution of and future prospects for distribution chain structures in the single European car market by Tongue, Andrew George
        
University of Bath
PHD









If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2021
THE EVOLUTION OF AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS FOR DISTRIBUTION 
CHAIN STRUCTURES IN THE SINGLE 
EUROPEAN CAR MARKET
Submitted by Andrew George Tongue 
for the degree of Ph.D. 




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U529747
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
0 . . H d
1 m - p H# ■*. • w 1 6  - ^ 1
HJLVG :i 0  A i lG 'J 3 A IN fl
•I IF- I"1
Please sign the copyright clause below. Until this is 
done we cannot formally accept the thesis. Please 
return to Sally Beech, Library Office.
OF AND FUTURE 
: DISTRIBUTION 
!S IN THE SINGLE 
AR MARKET
Submitted by Andrew George Tongue 
for the degree of Ph.D. 
of the University of Bath 
1997
COPYRIGHT
A ttention is d raw n  to the fact th a t  copyrigh t o f this thesis rests w ith  the  
au tho r. This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition th a t 
anyone who consults it is understood  to recognise th a t  its copyw rite rests 
w ith  the au th o r and  th a t no quo tation  from  the  thesis and no 
inform ation derived from  it m ay be published w ithou t the  p r io r  w ritten  
consent of the au tho r.
SUMMARY
This research examines the emergence of new strategies and structures in the post-factoiy 
distribution chain of the European car industry, the area of the industry widely considered 
to be the key competitive battleground of the years ahead for automobile manufacturers, 
distributors and dealers.
Recent literature and industry sources reveal that, faced with intense competition to sustain 
car sales in a mature market region, companies have been under pressure to innovate 
throughout their distribution chains. The dominant conceptual framework for reform has 
been that of ‘lean’ thinking, which provides a paradigm encompassing the entire ‘value 
stream’ from supply, through production and on to distribution. Much literature has shown 
that many car companies across the world have been re-appraising the first two phases of 
their operations in accordance with this ‘lean’ paradigm; however, the post-factory end of 
the chain, which is also evolving in this respect, has been less researched. This work 
investigates this change process against the background of a persistent period of poor 
profitability for many chain actors, and also within the framework of the EUs attempts to 
create a Single Market in cars within its borders.
This research seeks to clarify what is understood by ‘lean distribution’ in a European 
context, and to determine and rank its most important elements. The research employed a 
variety of methods to examine both the character of the European distribution chain and the 
perceptions of the manufacturers, national distributors and dealers that go to make up this 
sector. On this basis, it identifies the central components of the ‘lean distribution’ 
paradigm in Europe. These are:
• moving from stock-push to customer-pull demand systems;
• establishing integrated computer-based communications systems between dealers, 
manufacturers, suppliers and other actors to enable information and order exchange;
• developing closer working partnerships between manufacturers and dealers.
The research also revealed, however, that the implementation of these factors is not and is 
unlikely to become uniform across the European market. ‘Lean distribution’ is found to 
vaiy primarily according to the type of product or service concerned, the distribution chain 
actors involved and particularly the environmental conditions of the local market area. 
These findings have considerable implications for future scholarly research into the 
European car industry and the Single Market as well as for those directly involved with the 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"  I  think that cars today are almost the exact equivalent o f the great 
Gothic cathedrals: I  mean the supreme creation o f an era, conceived 
with passion by unknown artists, and consumed in image if  not in 
usage by a whole population which appropriates them as a purely 
magical ob ject"
Roland Barthes. 1957: "Mythologies: la Nouvelle 
Citroen"
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"The motor car is closely linked with virtually all human activities and 
forms the most powerful driving force in our modem economies.
Pun aside, there is little doubt that the automobile has become the most potent social, 
cultural and industrial icon of the developed world since its inception just over a century 
ago. Modem economies and lifestyles have become totally centred around the principle of 
individual personal mobility, a basic freedom defended world-wide even in the face of a 
potential environmental catastrophe being triggered by the burning of fossil fuels and the 
cluttering of our territories. The industry itself has developed a chameleon-like ability to 
adapt itself to changing market environments and consumer perceptions, meaning that few 
people could seriously envisage life without their car.2
As a product, the car has the ability both to fascinate and to repel. It can bring people 
together, stimulate prosperity and provide a source of joy, yet at the same time it can tear 
communities apart, kill and pollute. Despite a 20% reduction since 1975, 1991 still saw 
50,240 people killed on Europe's roads. Beyond these truisms lies the inescapable fact 
that the car dominates our everyday lives, whether as a user or as a victim of others' use. 
The world is full of car experts; as one manufacturer pointed out during one of the 
fieldwork interviews, anybody who has ever sat behind a steering wheel immediately 
becomes an expert.4 All consumers have their favourite colours, makes and models 
whether for their dynamic qualities, for the dreams of a better life they symbolise or for the 
memory of a childhood outing that the car made possible.
And yet, in popular culture, our perception of the car is dominated by the actual product 
(Williams. K. et al. 1994), the car as it is seen out on the road, with scant regard given to 
the surrounding processes of manufacturing, how it got to be there in the first place, or 
selling, the fascinating matter of how that particular size, shape, colour and model of car 
came to be united with its driver. One of the miracles of the industrial revolution is now 
taken for granted, and whilst our High Streets sell posters of gleaming Ferraris and 
Porsches, few ordinary drivers would be interested in stopping to explore the steps which 
brought these legends, and their more everyday cousins, to life.
FIA. 1989: p8
Maxton and Wormald calculate that one day’s worth of global vehicle production would produce a 
queue 400 miles long (Maxton. G. and Wormald. J.. 1994).
ACEA. 1993: "The European Automakers", September, p3
European Specialist Manufacturer. Throughout this thesis, and because of the commercially 
sensitive data made available to the ICDP project, companies that participated in the fieldwork will 
be identified according to the categories 'European', 'Japanese', American' or 'Global' referring to 
their continent of origin, and 'Volume' (or 'Generalist') or 'Specialist' according to the type and scale 
of their production. For a fuller list, see Appendix XV
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This creates a tough act for those conducting research into the industry and its related areas 
to follow. Such work will never have the same appeal as the glossy magazines which fill 
newsagents' shelves, as it inevitably has to divorce itself from the colourful, fantasy-rich 
images which sustain popular interest (Williams. K. et al. 1994). Whilst discussing cars 
themselves is a relatively straightforward exercise, the industry itself is complicated, 
multifaceted and, because of the extremely competitive nature of its market, highly 
secretive.
Tough it may be, but research into the car industry is vital. In the EU alone, the current 
pare of 135 million cars provides work for 9 million people, and it provides 6% of the 
Union's GDP. In four of the EUs car manufacturing countries, Germany, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, the industry accounts for around 10% of both manufactured exports 
and manufacturing employment.5 Taking all the advanced countries of the world together, 
the industry represents 10-25% of the manufacturing workforce, and accounts for 40% of 
the German and Japanese trade surpluses and the same proportion of the UK and American 
trade deficits.6 There is therefore a strong demand for insights into this volatile yet highly 
significant world not only from governments and public policy makers, but particularly 
from the companies actually involved in the industry.
Recent research has concentrated not so much on the importance of the industry as on the 
lengthy process of restructuring that it has been going through across the world, a process 
that is set to persist for at least another decade as the future shape of the industry and its 
markets slowly emerges. Greatly increased competition as the longer-established car 
markets reach maturity, the presence of new rivals from Japan and elsewhere (very often) 
setting the pace in the marketplace, new technology raising productivity to undreamt of 
levels and environmental, road use and other social considerations have all forced a whole 
range of mergers, alliances and rationalisations as many companies set in their ways for the 
majority of the 20th Century struggle to meet the new competitive conditions (Womack. J.. 
Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; Assemblee Nationale. 1992). The sheer scale of the stakes 
was illustrated by an announcement made during the early stages of the research that 
General Motors, admittedly the largest corporation in the world, was having to close no 
fewer than 21 plants and shed 74 000 jobs in America alone7, and nowhere is this 
competitive pressure being felt more strongly now than in Europe, home to many 
homogeneously-sized car manufacturers (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991).
There is nothing ground-breaking about an industry going through a phase of competition-
5 Shepherd. G.. Duchene. F. and Saunders. C.. 1983: pi 14
6 Williams. K. et al. 1994: p2; Bhaskar, K., 1990: plO
7 Financial Times 20/10/92
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induced restructuring, yet in the case of the car makers this has come at a time when the 
fundamental principles concerning the internal organisation of a factory, its upstream 
suppliers and its downstream distributors have been in the lengthy process of adapting to a 
new world standard (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990). Insights into the nature 
of the changes that are occurring and predictions for the likely outcome for specific 
manufacturers and regions have started to feature strongly in recent literature into the 
industry and form the central focus of this research.
The major car markets of the world are now recognised as having reached the maturity 
stage of their lifecycle (Levitt. T.. 1991; Thomas. M.. 1981; Maxton. G. and Wormald. J.. 
1994). This usually occurs as saturation points are reached and the scope for novelty and 
innovation within the product itself expires, although these criteria do not turn out to be 
strictly true for cars, as manufacturers have been obliged to innovate in order to attract or 
maintain their customers. Saturation levels have been the subject of a certain amount of 
speculation, and have been studied by many organisations, with the most reliable 
estimations being those of the OECD; 700 vehicles per 1000 people in the USA, 600 per 
1000 people in Germany and France, and as few as 500 per 1000 people in Italy and 
Japan8, although this does not take into account the fact that, in all of these countries, 
saturation points have already been reached in certain urban areas. The majority of sales in 
such a situation are to customers replacing or adding to their vehicle stock rather than to 
first-time buyers (Bellenger. L.. 1986(a); Bellenger. L.. 1986(b)), which means that they 
require a great deal more effort on the part of the manufacturers, as the focus falls more and 
more on the complementary assets and service packages that differentiate products of 
similar prices and specifications (FIA. 1989). This has resulted in an intensification of 
competition in all the major markets of the world (Bhaskar. K.. 1990), and should be 
viewed in conjunction with the parallel growth in environmental and road-use legislation 
(Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991; INSEE. 1992; Culture Technique. October 1992) that 
could be considered as the car's belated socialisation process (Maxton. G. and Wormald. J.. 
1994).
8 Assemblee Nationale. 1992: p61
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Figure 1-1
PARC OF CARS IN USE IN EC AND MAJOR EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 1967-919
Year Cars in use - EC Cars in use - 
"Big Four"
Cars per square 
kilometer - EC
Cars per square 
kilometer - "Big 
Four"
1967 45,952,454 39,575,326 20.5,0 33.6
1971 62,414,757 52,313,473 27.8,0 44.3
1975 77,007,125 62,770,844 34.3,0 53.1
1979 91,445,912 73,090,079 40.7,0 61.5
1987 116,004,474 93,379,698 52.1,0 80
1991 134,790,178 106,671,306 60.1,0 91
T3ig Four' markets are Germany, France, Italy and the UK
However, although the world's car markets are maturing, it could be said that the product 
itself is actually going in the opposite direction (Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991). 
Although in the mainstream market segments the majority of cars have grown so alike as to 
become anonymous, there now exists a plethora of market niches containing vehicles 
designed according to the use that they will be put to, and many of these are being classed 
by their makers as 'leisure' vehicles. Some have suggested that the traditional means of 
segmenting the market according to size and engine capacity is becoming increasingly 
outmoded, and that in the future, cars will be segmented according to the use to which they 
will be put, with categories such as 'leisure', 'utility1, 'city cars' etc. (Calori. R. and 
Lawrence. P.. 1991) emerging as the niche concept comes to dominate the market and 
vertical segmentation gives way to this new horizontal alternative form (Hiinerberg. R.. 
Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995)10. Such an outcome would tie in with the trend for 
Western households to own more than one car, opening up the possibility of having, for 
example, an environmentally-ffiendly commuting vehicle and a larger weekend vehicle. 
Furthermore, a vast array of new or resurrected technical solutions are being used by the 
manufacturers as they seek to meet the road-use and environmental challenges of the future 
(Culture Technique. 1992),11 involving space-age materials, new power sources etc., all of 
which suggests that, despite it coinciding with a period of intense restructuring of the 
productive process, the car makers have not lost the ability for product innovation that has
Williams. K. et al. 1994: pi 81, quoting ILO and SMMT, various years
"Mercedes changes gear on the way to a less luxurious future”, Financial Times, 27/01/93
Financial Times. 09/09/93
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so characterised the industry since its birth (Altshuler. A. et al. 1985; Womack. J.. Jones. 
D. and Roos. P.. 1990).
Nevertheless, the inescapable stage that the markets have reached means that the 
'traditional' product quality/price attributes employed by the manufacturers in their 
promotional strategies have been replaced by an interest in the whole 'bundle', that is to say, 
the product plus the service back-up, specialised knowledge, customer care and other 
hitherto peripheral benefits that the purchase of the product confers (Normann. R.. 1986; 
Nicoulaud. B.. 1989; Bellenger. L.. 1986(a); Bellenger. L.. 1990). Customer satisfaction, 
or ensuring that the buying and owning of the product is as hassle-free as possible, has 
therefore become a key factor in the 'servitization' of business (Vandermerwe. S. and Rada. 
J., 1988; Muller. W.. 1991; Bellenger. L.. 1990), and strategies usually reserved for purely 
tertiary sector companies have become a competitive necessity for manufacturers of all 
kinds of goods as the need to build up brand loyalty among their customers grows 
(Vandermerwe. S. and Rada. J.. 1988: Normann. R.. 1986: Lele. M. and Sheth. J.. 1987).
"To the potential buyer, a product is a complex cluster o f value 
satisfactions. The generic thing is not itself the product; it is merely, 
as in poker, table stakes - the minimum that is necessary at the outset 
to give its producer a chance to play the game. It is the playing that 
gets the results, and in business this means getting and keeping 
customers. "n
Some have suggested that manufacturers therefore need to adopt an integrated approach to 
all aspects of their marketing and distribution (Lele. M. and Sheth. J.. 1987), to ensure that 
the whole post-factory system functions as effectively as possible.
It therefore became very clear from the early literature survey that this whole area en aval 
of the factory, including dealers, service providers and of course the customer himself, 
despite not having been widely covered in the literature, was certainly the one that would 
play the decisive role in determining the future shape and size of the European car industry, 
and as such, would merit a considerable amount of further study.
"The next five years will put more pressure on marketing, advertising 
and retail delivery systems to come up with the differences to the 
consumer who will more than ever realise that he is in the driving seat. 
For the immediate future - as the products become more alike in
12 Levitt. T.. 1991: p67
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features and quality - the challenge will be fo r  retailers to provide the 
difference in the customer’s selection process. ”13
So, conducting this research into the European car industry has required the researcher to 
develop a new personal perception of the automobile, adding to a starting point as a simple 
if passionate enthusiast of the product, especially in its pioneering and more exotic guises, 
the critical and analytical gaze, the dispassionate understanding of 'the wider picture' so 
essential for a successful piece of research.
Following preliminary research into the industry both in Europe and globally, it was 
decided to focus the research on the post-factory end of the industry. This was because the 
literature suggested that the industry would be increasingly focusing itself on this; and also 
because very little research had been conducted into whether ‘lean’ thinking had yet 
permeated this area, and if so, how it was operating. Given the interconnections between 
different elements of the motor industry, where considering one topic in isolation proves to 
be extremely difficult (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991), it was important to 
identify how to relate the focus of the research to wider issues. The key decision taken in 
this respect was to look at whether and how there was an organisational ‘paradigm shift’ 
underway in the industry away from the ‘stock-push’ regime of mass production and 
towards the ‘demand-pull’ philosophy of lean production and lean distribution (Womack. 
J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; ICDP. 1993(b) and 1995(h)). The essential organising 
concept, to be discussed in more detail later, was that of a constantly-evolving 'production 
and distribution chain' linking component suppliers to manufacturers to distributors to 
dealers to consumers (ICDP. 1993(b)). The movement towards a Single European Market, 
both as envisaged by policy-makers and in its incomplete reality, emerged as the context 
for the study, forming, as it does, the latest step in the process of European integration set 
in motion by the Treaty of Rome. The Customs Union, Common Market and now Single 
Market represent easily the biggest event in the post-war economic history of Western 
Europe, and the completion of a free Internal Market for cars has proved to one of the 
European Commission's key goals. The research questions and the fieldwork programmes 
were then developed accordingly.
J.David Power III (of JD Power Associates), speaking at the Financial Times London Motor 
Conference, 1989












"  CONSUMERS A CONSUMERS
At the mid-point of the research programme, the researcher became aware of the work 
being conducted by the International Car Distribution Programme (ICDP), an independent 
research project looking into future directions for car retailing, distribution and after-sales. 
The project brings together motor industry specialists and academics based in Europe, the 
USA and Japan, and in its 1994 - Easter 1996 guise (ICDP 1), was sponsored by 28 
organisations, including car manufacturers, dealer associations, other distribution chain 
actors and both the UK Government and the DG IE of the European Commission.14
The aim of the 1994 - 1996 project (ICDP 1) was to provide the industry and those 
associated with it with a detailed and well researched analysis of the whole process of car 
selling and servicing - from factory to dealer to customer. The central pillar of this was an 
international comparison of franchised car distribution systems and their operation. From 
this, areas of best practice would be identified and examined, leading to the development of 
methods for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of current distribution structures, 
and also to the elaboration and evaluation of future distribution scenarios.
The research topics covered by the project were organised into three streams, two
See Appendix I
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conducted on a country by country basis, and a third taking more of a global overview, 
incorporating some of the lessons learnt at the national level and projecting them onto 
specific globally-relevant issues. The first two streams represented respectively dealer and 
manufacturer foci, and these were linked together by two overlapping topics, namely those 
looking at after sales operations and used car operations.
Figure 1-3
ICDP RESEARCH STRATEGY
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Discussions between the researcher and ICDP project managers in early 1994 revealed 
many common areas of interest, and in a way reassured the researcher that the right area of 
the car industry for study had indeed been chosen. It was agreed that the researcher would 
conduct the project on the "Role of National Distributors", part of the 'global focus' strand 
(see chart) on behalf of the ICDP. This particular topic dovetailed very neatly with the 
doctoral research objectives, as it allowed the manufacturer-level fieldwork to be expanded 
significantly, taking in a broader range of manufacturers and national distributors than had 
previously been envisaged and removing at a stroke the problems of access to material and 
respondents that can often beset the lone researcher. The project eventually ran from 
Summer 1994 to May 1995 and its driving objectives are detailed in Appendix VI.
The ICDP made available large quantities of secondary literature which previously had
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proved very difficult to obtain, as well as free access to its own research findings as they 
emerged from other areas of the programme. For the national distributor project, support 
was given with travel expenses, and contacts and interview respondents at the sponsor 
organisations were provided. The highly participatory nature of the project meant that the 
sponsor organisations were actively involved in regular ‘policy forum’ meetings and 
research briefings. These provided many opportunities for the researcher to present ideas 
and work in progress related both to the project and to the thesis, and to incorporate their 
feedback into the final results of each. Two major reports were published for the ICDP 
"Role of National Distributors" project, elements of which have been reported in this 
thesis.
Overall, this piece of research aims to provide an insight into how the emergence of ‘lean 
thinking’ has impacted on the European car distribution chain and on the manufacturers, 
importers and dealers present within it. It seeks to build up an understanding, based on 
shared knowledge, experience and grounded evidence, a firm platform from which to 
appreciate and to observe what is turning out to be a fascinating and critical period in the 
history of the industry as it enters its second century. On this basis, it also looks forward to 
how the industry could develop in due course.
The structure of the thesis henceforth broadly reflects the path taken through the research. 
It will firstly depict, through an examination of the relevant literature, the broad landscape 
of the car industry and influences present, the narrowing of focus onto the post-factory 
arena and the changes underway there, all set against the backdrop of attempts to create and 
maintain a single European market in cars. It then reviews and assesses the literature 
documenting the theory and the implementation of lean thinking in the production and 
distribution chain. Subsequent chapters outline the key research questions that emerge 
from this discussion, relating to the definition and implementation of lean distribution, and 
the chosen methodology for addressing them. There then follows the fieldwork chapters 
presenting the findings of the pilot survey, interview programmes, case studies and the 
final survey which defines the key elements of a lean distribution system, before the 
research questions are revisited The thesis then goes on to consider thoughts, criticisms 
and suggestions for future work that have emerged from the research process, and finally to 
draw these threads together, pondering the scenarios that have been formulated for the 
future of the industry and offering some thoughts on the process of European integration.
The thesis will also adopt as informal a style as possible within the constraints of academic 
necessity. The highly contemporaiy nature of the subject matter and the rapid rate of 
change in the motor industry mean that research will age very rapidly if confined to a shelf,
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and the researcher considers it important that the work be accessible to those who 
supported it from the industry, as well as to academics working in the area. It is hoped 
that, in this way, the research can have an impact on both the academic and industrial 
communities and their thinking.
"We do not make changes fo r  the sake o f making them,  hut we never 
fa il to make a change once it is demonstrated that the new way is 
better than the old way. ”15
Henrv Ford, quoted in "Ford in Europe”, published by Ford of Europe
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN 
A SPECTS OF THE CAR 
INDUSTRY
"There is no doubt this motor business will be the boom o f the next 
century. "
S.F. Edge, writing in The Autocar, 1898
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2-1 INTRODUCTION
A study of the literature, both academic and journalistic, surrounding the car industry 
reveals it to be subjected to a vast range of different trends and influences covering every 
sphere of economic activity. It could not possibly be hoped to account for all these factors, 
and indeed very few authors have ever attempted to do this since the earliest days of car 
production. Instead, the factors mentioned here are the ones which are currently, or which 
have recently generated discussion, and which are accepted as helping to shape the future 
of the industry at a time when it is undergoing the greatest period of upheaval since the 
invention of the 'horseless carriage'just over 100 years ago.
This chapter, sub-divided into 4 sections, opens with a discussion of the global 
environmental factors considered in current and recent literature to be shaping the future of 
the car industry and its markets. It then goes on to look in detail at the area of the industry 
which will feature most strongly in this research, the post-factory distribution chain, 
reviewing literature covering the distribution and marketing environments and strategies 
and structures that go to make up the post-factory networks with which the car 
manufacturers interact (Filser. M.. 1992). The final two sections introduce the further 
framework used to delimit the research; the Single European Market. The impossible task 
of one researcher attempting to evaluate even small elements of the industry at a global 
level led to the selection of the European market as a suitable entity for study, although the 
research was able to be broadened in its latter stages.1 These sections give a brief review of 
the background to European integration, putting into context the ElPs2 continued attempts 
to create a Single Market in people, goods and services within its borders, before moving 
on to consider coverage of the specific environmental factors that have been highlighted in 
the literature as constituting obstacles to the liberalisation of the EU car market; some of 
which have proved to be surmountable, some rather more complicated...
Most industry commentators, and indeed statistical records on sales figures and the like, consider the 
European market to include the 15 EU Member States plus the EFTA markets of Norway and 
Switzerland.
In general, the phrases 'EC' (European Community) and ’EU' (European Union) used throughout this 
thesis are interchangeable. Where specific facts and figures are related to the EC, this refers to the 
12-Member grouping that existed prior to the adhesion of Austria, Finland and Sweden; likewise 
figures related to the EU refer to the current 15 Member States.
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2-2 A GLOBAL INDUSTRY AND A 
GLOBAL MARKET
Ever since its earliest years, the car industry has been international in its outlook. Indeed, 
Womack et al (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P., 1990) illustrate how even the very 
first, custom-produced models were often supplied to eager new owners in foreign 
countries. As the industry has grown, and new countries have started producing and buying 
cars, so scholarly attention has evolved to consider the paths being taken and the roles 
being played by the industry across the world. Over the last few decades, one of the main 
focuses of critical attention has been the spectacular growth of the Japanese and other Far- 
Eastern economies. One of the consequences of this has been the redrawing by many 
authors of the global economic map; this has joined with the plethora of literature on 
internationalisation and globalisation that has dominated research into foreign-trading 
companies and their markets for the last 25 years. As the car industry is increasingly talked 
about in 'global' terms, it is necessary to understand exactly what is meant by these 
references to the internationalisation of industry and markets.
The rise of multinational corporations, of which the car manufacturer is a prime example, 
the progress made in the field of technology and the development of large, international 
advertising agencies all gave rise in many schools of thought to the belief that the more 
products and processes can be standardised, the greater the economic benefits that the 
resulting economies of scale will provide (Mourier. P. and Burgaud. P.. 1989; Levitt. T..
1991). This is cited by these and other authors as the driving force behind the spiralling 
internationalisation of business structures, a paradigm which can be traced right back to 
Henry Ford and the mass production methods enshrined both in his Highland Park plant 
(opened in 1913) that revolutionised the car industry overnight, and also in the mirror- 
image overseas operations (such as Dagenham in the UK) that he set up shortly afterwards 
(Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990).
"Two vectors shape the world - technology and globalisation. The first 
helps determine human preferences; the second, economic realities. 
Regardless o f  how much preferences evolve and diverge, they also 
gradually converge andform markets where economies o f  scale lead to
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reduction o f  costs and prices . "  3
The specific debate concerning the internationalisation of marketing and other distribution 
chain activities, the prime focus of this work, will be discussed in a subsequent section, and 
the leading exponent of both this field and that of'pure' globalisation was Levitt (Levitt. T.. 
1983; Levitt. T.. 1991), who argued that intensified competition and technology 
developments would drive companies to operate 'globally1, targeting the 'global village' of 
consumers all looking for reliable, good quality products at a low price, thus allowing the 
producer to ignore 'superficial' national differences and achieve their longed-for economies 
of scale.4 This is the theory of'globalisation puli', that a convergence of consumer profiles, 
desires and wealth levels will in turn pull the globalisation of the industries which supply 
them. Others have argued the case for 'globalisation push', that it is the globalisation of 
competition, the fact of companies planning their activities on a world-wide scale, that 
stimulates a convergence in the marketplace (Sheth. J.. 1986). Both these discussions have 
prompted an enormous wealth of literature both in favour and against.
Many authors have pointed out the seemingly obvious point that world markets will never 
be truly homogenous whilst we speak different languages and enjoy different customs 
(Douglas. S. and Wind. Y.. 1987; Sheth. J.. 1986), but this is not necessarily an argument 
against an international coordination of company strategy; the latter is more influenced by 
the basic similarities between countries rather than by smaller cultural differences (Levitt. 
T., 1983). More recently, such 'pure' globalisation literature has been considered to be 
over-simplistic (Douglas. S. and Wind. Y.. 1987), and a more nuanced approach has 
emerged, putting forward the idea that having a global strategy does not necessarily mean 
maintaining an identical strategy and homogeneous products in each market a company 
exports to or produces in (Douglas. S. and Wind. Y.. 1987), and considering the forces 
facing companies to 'globalise' or to 'localise' their approach as opposite ends of a sliding 
scale rather than the stark either/or choice put forward in pure globalisation (Hamel. G. and 
Prahalad. C.. 1985).
This concept has emerged as part of a concentration on actual industries as opposed to 
markets or to vague notions of competition. In the case of the car industry, it is the 
companies themselves who are becoming the driving force and the basic unit behind 
research, forever in the search for factors that might provide them with a competitive 
advantage over their domestic, and increasingly, international rivals. Porter investigated 
the notion that in a global trading situation, companies might actually have transcended
Levitt. T.. 1991: p49
Summarised in Halliburton. C. and Hunerberg. R.. 1993: p27
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nations as the key factor in the success of a region, but concluded that the clustering of 
leading companies in a select few countries points to geographical circumstances, and the 
region's endowment of factors of production, still having the upper hand (Porter, M„ 1990). 
This suggests that there is more to success in international trade than merely setting up 
factories across the world and achieving economies of scale (Douglas, S. and Wind. Y.. 
1987), and this ties in with a whole body of literature, including highly influential works by 
Porter (Porter, M., 1990), which suggests that it is necessary to examine each discrete 
operation that goes to make up the company whole, be it supply chain management, 
manufacturing, the nature of the product and its marketing, distribution and after-sales 
support, what Ohmae terms the 'business system' (see below) if one is to assess true the 
competitive position of a company, or an industry that is seeking to trade internationally 
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Company strategy in this paradigm is dictated by the trading environment in which the firm 
operates (Porter, M„ 1990; Miller, P ., 1988; Filser, M„ 1992), a consideration of which 
dictates in turn the structures the internationally-trading firm sets up, and the strategy it 
adopts with respect to the market and the competition. The results of this can then be
Ohmae. K.. 1985: p34
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observed in the company’s subsequent performance. With respect to internationalisation of 
trade, a significant element of the environment is made up of the interplay between the 
forces to globalise, harmonise, or integrate company activities for the sake of economies of 
scale and efficiency benefits, and those to 'localise', to maintain local market differentiation 
of approaches in order to respond to identified needs of that market fPorter. M.. 1990; 
Ruigrok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1991). These forces will interact with the different 
company activities, as identified above, in different ways and to different extents, 
suggesting that there will be no one solution for a company seeking to rationalise its 
activities internationally; instead there may need to be a different approach to each activity 
according to its needs and its environment, and the resulting strategies will be located at 
different points along the global - local scale (Douglas. S. and Wind. Y.. 1987; Hamel. G. 
and Prahalad. C.. 1985: Sheth. J.. 1986).
As shall be seen in subsequent sections of this chapter, the interplay of 'globalising' and 
'localising' forces dominates discussion into the internationalisation of distribution and 
marketing activities, and also finds itself replayed in the debate over the effects of and ideal 
strategies to be adopted for the Single European Market. Given the complexity of the car 
industry, this 'unbundling' approach, as illustrated above, of separating out company 
activities in order to assess the factors affecting them, is emerging as a key strategy for all 
types of operation, and for the distribution and marketing chain in particular (Mercer. G.. 
1994; International Car Distribution Programme. 1995(h)). The dealer sector, as shall be 
illustrated in section 2-3-5-2, is already seeing examples of new organisational forms and 
activity groupings emerging from a reassessment of the place of each operation within a 
corporate whole, and this research will seek to demonstrate how this 'unbundling' and 
'rebundling' approach is permeating the whole post-factory chain of the car industry.
One interesting, and for the car industry, particularly relevant offshoot from the discussion 
on the globalisation of companies and markets has been that related to the 'triad' structure 
formed by the 3 largest world markets, the US, Japan, and the European Union. Ohmae's 
concept, which has gained a great deal of attention, is that of the global 'triad' formed by the 
strong trading links and growing market homogeneity (in some products at least) of the 
three economic superpowers (the USA, Europe and Japan) (Ohmae. K.. 1985).
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Figure 2-2
THE TRIAD'
Just as with the theory of globalisation, this market convergence is largely attributed to 
education and technology in these three areas; as improvements in the former enables 
people to use more technology, which, by its nature, drives out previous country 
differences. Another factor cited by Ohmae in the emergence of the triad is the upheaval of 
factory processes, and the subsequent interaction between the manufacturing and service 
sectors in these major markets, which have both 'blurred the boundaries' of traditional 
economic wealth and power patterns.7 It is for this reason that this triad structure seems 
particularly relevant to the way the world car industry has developed in recent years 
(Womack. J., Jones, D. and Roos. P ., 1990; Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991; 
Ruigrok, W. and Van Tulder, R., 1991), with all the major manufacturers of the world 
seeking as strong a representation as possible in all three comers of the triangle. Just as 
Chapter 3 will illustrate how 'Toyotism', the Japanese-inspired collection of new 
production methods has replaced the mass-production tenets of 'Fordism' (Altshuler. A. et 
al, 1985; Commissariat General du Plan. 1990; Jacot, H.. 1990), so many companies, and 
especially the Japanese trend-setters, are now displaying a trend that goes beyond standard 
globalisation theory, and which has been termed, amongst other things, global localisation 
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Ohmae. K.. 1985: p l22  
Ohmae. K.. 1985: p8
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at a limited number of locations in the home country, thereby creating sufficient economies 
of scale to fund the task of exporting them to all the foreign markets (Womack. J . Jones. 
D. and Roos. P.. 1990). In contrast, under the new system, the companies can exploit the 
enhanced inherent efficiency of the lean production process detailed in Chapter 3 by setting 
up fully fledged facilities and dealing with independent suppliers away from their home 
country; a decentralised system that enables their most important foreign markets can be 
served from close at hand, meaning that the product can be more suitably tailored to the 
particular needs of that market (Altshuler. A. et al. 1985), whilst the companies themselves 
remain free from, or at least less vulnerable to protectionism, exchange rate volatility and 
cyclical shifts in demand. This process of building up a 'triad presence' accurately describes 
the paths taken by several of the Japanese companies in their internationalisation strategies 
over the last few years (Mair. A.. 1994). By way of an example, one only has to consider 
the number of design studios set up by these Japanese companies in California, and now in 
Europe as well, that spend their time monitoring consumer tastes, styles and fashions. 
Very often they are then allowed to design and control the production of new models, 
especially those destined for niches in the market, without any influence from the mother 
ship in Japan. This is a very different approach from that traditionally attributed to the 
'multinational enterprise', which would treat 'abroad' as if it were an extension of the home 
market (Maxcv. G.. 1981).
Several authors have sought to codify the differences between 'traditional' global 
companies and those which have adopted these newer, more decentralised forms. A study 
of this nature was carried out by Calori and Lawrence, categorising industries according to 
the degrees of globalisation and localisation forces exerted on them, in a work which 
concludes by forecasting an increase in the former and a decrease in the latter, especially in 
the case of cars (Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991). As shall be seen, the fact that the 
European car makers in general have a great deal of localisation forces tying them to their 
national markets means that their desire to establish a global (or 'globally local') presence 
will not be easy to fulfil. Porter talks about coordination and dispersal of activities to and 
from the local, regional and global levels (Porter. M.. 1990), and both Calori and Lawrence 
and Hamel and Prahalad define the process of identifying a competitive opening in a 
foreign market as a 'search for loose bricks' (Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991; Hamel. G. 
and Prahalad. C.. 1985).
Much work has also been devoted to creating new categories and names for describing 
these emerging organisational forms. For instance, Ohmae distinguishes between 
traditional 'multinational' corporations, with the headquarters very much in control, 
defining strategy for the foreign subsidiaries to follow and with very little scope for
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regional or transnational synergy; 'multilocal' companies, meaning a grouping of strong, 
highly autonomous national operations which may suffer from a lack of central 
coordination or risk 'reinventing the wheel' if the full set of business functions are present 
within each market; or 'multiregional' companies, essentially a grouping of local operations 
'bundled up' into a regional headquarters which would then interact with the other regions
p
in the triad. The most natural progression under the triad paradigm would be for 
traditional multinational companies to become multiregional, and this is indeed observable 
in the car industry (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990) with the growth of'distant' 
production facilities and regional headquarters as the major manufacturers realise that they 
cannot rely on their domestic continent, let alone their home market for survival.
"Those who will be firmly established in each o f  the three above- 
mentioned economic spaces (North America, Japan/South-East Asia 
and Europe) will no doubt be in a better position than others to come 
out o f  it all without loss in this unpredictable world. But this 
possibility will be given only to the multinational giants. The others 
will have to enter into alliances in order to pool their best technical 
assets and their distribution networks, each producing in his own 
geographic sector. "9
Under such a situation, the global company headquarters becomes more of a coordination
point for the various regional centres and decentralised manufacturing operations,
lubricating the many wheels within the corporation. Ohmae defines this role;
. . .  "by the synergy it can provide to keep its key operating units flexible 
and responsive to the marketplace. The scope o f this role is defined by 
finding out where the most value-added increment can be brought 
about by the corporate functions. "10
Wind et al and Keegan tackle the issue a different way, identifying four stages through 
which companies in the process of internationalising their operations must pass: 
ethnocentrism (concentration on the home country market), polycentrism (where 
subsidiaries in overseas markets develop their own marketing plans), regiocentrism (where 
the company treats a region as one, large, border-free market, and standardises products 
and marketing accordingly), and geocentrism (much the same, but at a global level) (Wind. 
Y.. Douglas. S. and Perlmutter. H.. 1973; Keegan. W.. 1989; Hunerberg. R.. Heise. G. and
8 Ohmae. K.. 1985: P181-185
9 Bernard Vemier-Palliez (ex-Renault) in FIA. 1989: p24
10 Ohmae. K.. 1985: p!81
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Hoffmeister. M.. 1995).
Halliburton and Hunerberg point out that a central step towards establishing organisational 
options for the future is the consideration of 'alternative integrating mechanisms' which 
enable a balance between central control and local autonomy to be reached. This implies 
the investigation of alternatives to simply shifting accountability from a national- to a 
European-level manager, and the solutions that are adopted will depend on the history and 
culture of the company and also of its different departments and units (Halliburton. C. and 
Hunerberg. R.. 1993).
Figure 2-3
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For the car industry, this ties in with the notion of the 'extended lean enterprise’ outlined in 
section Chapter 3 which would see the car maker of today become the car-making 'process 
coordinator' of tomorrow, with the task of managing the relationships with all the various 
plants and supply 'partners' and of assembling their inputs into the final product and 
accompanying service package (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991; Mever. A. de.
1992). An example of just how far the industry has gone down this global route is 
provided by a brief look at the sources of some of the inputs into Ford's Mondeo (as it is
Halliburton. C. and Hunerberg. R.. 1993: p248
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known in Europe12).
Figure 2-4
FORD MONDEO: GLOBAL STORMING13
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Of course, not all car manufacturers have yet become global or 'globally local' in their 
operations, but the fact that even niche producers such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz who 
had previously relied on an export strategy have recently set up production facilities away 
from their home continent shows that this development has had a very significant 
influence.14 It also serves to demonstrate that, with a large chunk of the world car industry 
displaying a triad structure made up of the American, Japanese and European industry and 
markets (Womack. J.. Jones, D. and Roos, P., 1990; Banville, E. de and Chanaron. J-J., 
1991), a company selling to more than one triad market will not just base its competitive 
strategy on its 'home comer' experiences, but will need to take into account and synthesise 
the factors and influences present in all 3 areas. So, despite the fact that this research
12 A similar model is sold in North America under a different name
lj Car Magazine, February 1993: p47
Both Mercedes-Benz and BMW have now established fully-fledged production facilities in the US, 
which will export to Europe and to Japan.
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concentrates on the European market, it is nevertheless essential to consider these complex 
webs of wholly-owned facilities, alliances and joint ventures that car companies maintain 
across the globe, just as it is to remember that what a company does in Europe could quite 
easily be the result of a lesson learnt in America.
Figure 2-5










Car trade in the triad in thousands of units, 1994
Many more authors have concentrated on the European market, or at least upon the impact 
that these emerging global structures will have on Europe's manufacturers. Most conclude 
that further waves of rationalisation will continue to strike the industry in the years ahead, 
and that the successful companies of the future will be those which are able to learn the 
lessons and respond to the challenges both of the lean production revolution16, and also of 
the growing web of global relationships that are shaping the future of the industry 
(Womack, J., Jones. D. and Roos. P .. 1990; Assemblee Nationale. 1992; Bricnet, F. and 
Mangolte. P-A.. 1990; Jacot. H.. 1990).
"In a global industry only the global players will survive. So far, the
European-owned mass producers have failed to become global car
Hunerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995: p l2
See Chapter 3
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makers. Given the march o f Japanese inward investment into Europe 
the pressure on the big six European makers - GM, Ford, Peugeot- 
Citroen, VW, Renault, and Fiat will intensify, and it is only a matter o f  
time before mega-alliances occur between these firms. The global 
industry is dominated by GM, Ford and their associates on the one 
hand and Toyota and Nissan on the other. Unless the West European 
firms react positively to the increased competitive pressure they will 
remain regional European producers, vulnerable to the advance o f the 
global players. ”17
2-3 GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN ASPECTS 
OF THE POST-FACTORY CHAIN
2-3-1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POST-FACTORY 
CHAIN
As has been discussed, competition in the global car industry is set to shift away from 
traditional product attributes and on to the complementary assets that the manufacturers 
provide to entice and retain their customers, including the quality of the buying experience. 
This is not coincidental, since the whole area of post-factory activity is the only one to have 
escaped the lean production' revolution, or at least until recently. This was probably due to 
the fact that rationalisation in the post-factory area is even more complicated than on the 
shop floor, but this does not imply that the distribution and selling of cars is incompatible 
with 'lean' thinking (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990). Just as few companies 
have yet adopted many of the elements of lean distribution, which include building the 
customer's tastes and preferences directly into the production process by doing away with 
the stocks of cars held by individual dealers, and instead using the customer's order of a 
particular specification of car to actually trigger its production back at the factory, so few
17 National Consumer Council 1990: pi 7-8
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authors have yet focused on this area where a great deal of change is already underway.
This area is recognised as the one to which the manufacturers have traditionally devoted 
the least amount of attention; indeed, selling and marketing techniques have gone virtually 
unchanged for the last 80 years since yearly model updates and credit facilities were 
introduced by Alfred Sloan at General Motors in the 1920s (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and 
Roos. P.. 1990: Lamming. R.. 1990; Stem. L. and Sturdivant. F.. 1987; Hunerberg. R.. 
Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995). This is despite the fact that, in 1993, 1.7 million 
people were employed in the distribution and repair of cars across Europe, roughly the 
same amount again as those employed in the manufacture of cars.18 So, it is not surprising 
that this is also the area where they have the most to lose in terms of reputation (Lele. M. 
and Sheth. J.. 1987). Only recently has it dawned on the car companies that there exists a 
tremendous potential for offering their prospective customers a less confrontational 
purchasing experience and a Tiassle-free' ownership, features that will do no harm to the 
chances of the consumer returning to the same company for their next car, something that 
certain car makers have realised before the others (Simon. H.. 1992; Bellenger. L.. 1990). 
The process of buying and owning a car, one of the most important financial decisions a 
person is likely to make in their life after buying a house (Levitt. T.. 1991); is not only very 
complex, it also involves a great deal of other elements that go to make up the 'bundle', 
such as warranties, the need for regular maintenance, special equipment options, credit 
terms etc.
"The actual process o f buying a car is inherently a stressful 
experience, particularly fo r women. It is the largest purchase that we 
make, apart from a house; it is an infrequent purchase; it is technically 
complex and there is a wide range o f  choice from suppliers o f  differing 
reputations and images. More importantly, it is a huge emotional 
decision. The car is not only an essential tool o f  everyday life - 81% o f  
motorists say they would find  it very difficult to adjust their lifestyle to 
being without a car. It is also an expression o f  our personality. So we 
need to be reassured when we buy a car that we are making the right 
decision both in terms o f the utilitarian dimensions and in terms o f  the 
image that it conveys to our family andfriends. ”19
This implies that the car industry is indeed conforming to the trend towards the 
'servitization of business' as discussed earlier (Lele. M. and Sheth. J.. 1987; Levitt. T..
18 Martin Bangemann in Hunerberg. R . Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995, p33
19 Sir Trevor Chinn. Chairman of Lex Service pic, speaking at the Financial Times World Motor 
Conference, Frankfurt, 8/9 September 1993
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1991), and also that manufacturers will therefore be obliged to play a much bigger part in 
the post-factory activities that are carried out in their name (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and 
Roos. P.. 1990: Stem. L.. Sturdivant. F. and Getz. G.. 1993; Ruigrok. W. and Van Tulder. 
R., 1991). This is seen as a further contributory factor in the rationalisation of the post­
factory sector (Gogel. R. and Larreche. J-C.. 1989; Assemblee Nationale. 1992) and also, 
as shall be discussed later, one which is likely to come into conflict with the increasing 
status of the actors in the post-factory chain themselves (Bellenger. L.. 1986(a); Assemblee 
Nationale. 1992; Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991).
"Products are always combinations o f the tangible and the intangible. 
An automobile is not simply a machine fo r movement visibly or 
measurably differentiated by design, size, colour, options, horsepower 
or miles per gallon. It is also a complex symbol denoting status, taste, 
rank, achievement, aspiration and (these days) being 'smart' - that is, 
buying fuel economy rather than display. But the customer buys even 
more than these attributes. The enormous efforts o f  the auto 
manufacturers to cut the time between placement and delivery o f  an 
order and to select, train, supervise and motivate their dealerships 
suggest that these too are integral parts o f  the products people buy and 
are therefore ways by which products may be differentiated. "20
For the manufacturers, a responsive and accurate post-factory system can only help to build 
marque loyalty, especially if the customer signs up for long-term warranties and 
maintenance agreements (Lele. M. and Sheth. J.. 1987). In this way the manufacturers will 
increasingly resemble market-driven service companies, tailoring their products and the 
accompanying services to what their customers actually want, rather than producing what 
they think they will accept (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990V The lack of this 
system in the past is put forward as one of the main reasons why the Japanese car makers 
were able to gain such a foothold in the American market in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis; 
they took the time and trouble to find out what sort of cars Americans really wanted to be 
driving, as opposed to the Big Three, who continued to chum out their fuel-thirsty 
'dinosaurs1 regardless of the fact that the tide of customer taste had turned against them 
(Levitt. T.. 1991). It is ironic that the first car maker really to employ this thinking (long 
before the oil shock) is the one generally understood to have cared the least about the 
welfare of its customers: Herny Ford. According to Levitt, Henry Ford was the pioneer of 
this market-driven approach with his Model T. Whereas it is commonly understood that 
Ford perfected a production process which meant that his cars could be sold for $500 each,
20 Levitt. T.. 1991: p66
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in fact it was the other way around: he realised that if he offered his car for sale at $500, 
then millions of potential car-owners would be able to buy one. He then developed the 
production system that could make the car at the appropriate cost, one of the consequences 
of which was that only the colour black, the cheapest and quickest-drying, could be offered 
(Levitt. T.. 1991).
2-3-2 GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
MARKETING OF CARS
A great deal has been written on distribution and marketing structures and strategies, both 
within the context of the internationalisation or globalisation of trade, and also specifically 
within the framework of the Single European Market. Whilst distribution and marketing 
constitute very different activities each involving highly specific skills, within the car 
industry they function together very much as a whole, and thus are often treated together 
(Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991).
As the mature state of the world's major car markets typifies, customer satisfaction, or 
ensuring that the buying and owning of the product is as hassle-free as possible, has 
become a key factor in an observed trend known as the 'servitization of business' 
(Vandermerwe. S. and Rada. J.. 1988; Muller. W.. 1991; Bellenger. L.. 1990). Strategies 
usually reserved for purely tertiary sector companies have become a competitive necessity 
for manufacturers of all kinds of goods as the need to build up brand loyalty among their 
customers grows (Vandermerwe. S. and Rada. J.. 1988; Normann. R.. 1986; Lele. M. and 
Sheth. J.. 1987), and many have pointed out that this means companies having to adopt a 
more committed approach to all aspects of their marketing and distribution (Lele. M. and 
Sheth. J.. 1987; Porter. M.. 1990; Stem. L. and El-Ansarv. A.. 1982), to ensure that the 
whole post-factory network functions as effectively as possible.
Some authors, such as Levitt have argued that globalisation can also apply to marketing 
and distribution strategy, and that no one regional market segment is likely to be unique, 
but will have close equivalents elsewhere in the world that can be targeted and supplied in 
a similar way, thus providing the producer with economies of scale (Levitt. T.. 1983; 
Levitt. T.. 1991). Others take a more nuanced view that, whilst global market segments 
can be identified, and indeed are growing, these are usually confined to very specific areas
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such as high value-added luxury goods (perfumes, clothes, even luxury cars), technology- 
related items (computers, video cameras) or brands which, through their exposure in films 
and on television, have successfully been exported from the US (Ohmae. K.. 1985; 
Peebles. P.. 1989; Lynch. R.. 1992; Keegan. W.. 1989; Kotler. P. and Armstrong. G.. 
1989). Douglas and Wind caution against considering even one country as a homogeneous 
entity, pointing to differences in consumer tastes and preferences across the US (Douglas. 
S. and Wind. Y.. 1987). As we shall see, this argument, however obvious, between 
homogeneity and diversity has been replayed many times over at the European level, but 
again, it illustrates the move recent literature has taken away from considering globalisation 
as an 'all or nothing' strategy and towards the conceptualisation of a global-local 
continuum, with companies adopting different points along the scale for the different 
activities, including those that are connected with distribution and marketing, that go to 
make up their corporate whole (Porter. M.. 1990; Ohmae. K.. 1985; Hamel. G. and 
Prahalad. C.. 1985). Many different approaches to the issue have been adopted: for 
instance, Quelch and Hoff suggest that strategy can be arrived at by separating out business 
functions (such as manufacturing, R&D and accounting), the actual product and the extent 
to which it is culture bound, and the size and demographic profile of the markets under 
consideration (Quelch. J. and Hoff. E.. 1986). Sheth concentrates on the product, and 
differentiates between global competition, which certainly exists in some sectors, and 
global markets, which generally do not. Instead, he develops the concept of 'multiple 
markets', which a company can target either by modifying the product slightly to suit local 
tastes (product segmentation), by aiming the product at different population segments in 
different markets (market segmentation), or by offering the product to entirely different 
markets in different countries (speciality segmentation) (Sheth. J.. 1986). Basically, 
however, the vast majority of recent literature operates from the starting point of the 
'marketing mix' (Keegan. W.. 1989), defined by Kotler and Armstrong as the 'Four Ps'; 
product (both the features of the brand itself but also the accompanying service packages), 
place (distribution networks), promotion (advertising and promotion related to the product) 
and price (Kotler. P. and Armstrong. G.. 1989), and goes on from there to discuss the 
implications of internationalisation on each of these elements. Ohmae sums this up by 
commenting that
"managing in a borderless world doesn't mean managing by averages. 
It doesn't mean that all tastes run together into one amorphous mass o f  
universal appeal. And it doesn’t mean that the appeal o f  operating 
globally removes the obligation to localise products. The lure o f  a 
universal product is a false allure. The truth is a bit more subtle.
21 Ohmae. K.. 1989: pi 55
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One dichotomy that reveals itself as particularly significant for the car industry in the 
context of this work is that between the caveats against the wholesale standardisation of 
distribution and marketing strategy across international markets that have dominated the 
literature, and of which a sample is given above, and the assumptions, based on empirical 
work, surrounding the Single European Market Programme that significant cost savings 
could be reached following the consolidation of distribution and marketing by companies at 
the pan-European level (Cecchini. P.. 1988).
Some authors have considered one of the predicted related effects of the creation of the 
Internal Market, namely an acceleration of the globally-observed convergence of consumer 
tastes and preferences into specific market niches. By way of evidence, some suggested 
that certain 'post-cultural' habits, such as shopping for frozen foods in supermarkets, 
playing computer games and watching television in the evenings and buying jeans and 
compact discs at weekends have become similar across Europe (Makridakis. S.. 1991; 
Rigoureau-Juin. A. and Kerrad. M.. 1993). However, this is only true of certain sectors of 
the population (mainly the young) and of certain purchasing decisions (usually leisure or 
technology-related), and one only has to examine factors such as the responses of different 
cultural groups to major events such as births, deaths and marriages to appreciate that the 
European population is essentially as differentiated as it ever was (Makridakis. S.. 1991; 
Scardigli, V.. 1989). Again, it can be expected that technical innovations and the advance 
of information technology (such as cable television and minitel systems), will cause an 
acceleration in this convergence, but most authors concur that, in the consumer market at 
least, Europe will remain the mosaic of different cultures and lifestyles that makes it unique 
amongst the world trading blocks (Scardigli. V.. 1989; Lvnch. R.. 1992; Halliburton. C. 
and Hunerberg. R.. 1993). Whitelock and Chung even go so far as to state that pan- 
European advertising will be the exception rather than the rule (Whitelock. J. and Chung. 
P., 1989). Local tastes and preferences are not, as Levitt might suggest, vestiges of the 
past (Levitt. T.. 1991), as the many examples of the wealth disparities between the rich and 
poor areas of the EC indicate. The Commission itself admits that the average per capita 
income in the Community's 25 richest regions is two and a half times greater than in the 25 
poorest,22 and attempts to reduce these inequalities take up a sizeable proportion of the 
Community's time and resources (Rigoureau-Juin. A. and Kerrad. M.. 1993). Nevertheless, 
it is agreed that certain market segments will support, and have been witness to the 
introduction of pan-European brands and services (Rigoureau-Juin. A. and Kerrad. M.. 
1993; Daser. S. and Hvlton. P.. 1991; Mourier. P. and Burgaud. P.. 1989). Apart from this 
increase in pan-European purchasing which will foster a greater interest in global products
Commission of the European Communities. 1991: pl2
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and brands as well as a 'made in Europe' mentality, further changes expected to occur in 
Euro-consumer behaviour include increased price sensitivity (which might lead to more 
price harmonisation), calls for better service back-up and greater mobility fVandermerwe. 
S., 1989(a); Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991).
Talk of convergence has led to work searching for different ways to frame or segment the 
European market for the construction of distribution and marketing strategies, prompting a 
move away from the traditional geocultural boundaries used by marketers.
Figure 2-6
TRADITIONAL GEOCULTURAL GROUPS23
Nordic Countries Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland
Anglo-Saxon Countries UK, Ireland
Central European Countries (Lutheran) Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Switzerland
Mediterranean Countries France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
In their place have come systems which replace the notion of nation state with other 
criteria, such as wealth, ethnic background, geographical situation, social status, etc. 
fVandermerwe. S. and L'Huillier, M-A.. 1989; Makridakis, S., 1991: Lynch. R.. 1992).
"Instead o f  either one, single homogeneous market or a collection o f  
small specialised markets, the most likely model fo r  the future mass 
Europe is a market system consisting o f  regional Euro-clusters with 
customers geographically close but not necessarily living in the same 
country. They will have the same or similar economic, demographic 
and/or lifestyle characteristics ... differences among customers will 
exist, but will not be nationally determined. "24
These attempts at new forms of market segmentation must, however, be balanced against 
the reality of the legislative framework of the European market. Even in instances where a 
pan-European approach is possible and desirable (as it is already for certain products such 
as consumer electronics, supermarket items, etc.), companies are constricted both by the 
lack of a single, supranational legislative framework governing areas such as advertising,
Makridakis. S.. 1991: p255
Vandermerwe. S.. 1993: p56
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and also by the unequal availability of marketing media in different European markets 
(Dudley. J. and Martens. H.. 1993). For instance, despite the $50bn spent on advertising 
every year, none of the 23 Directorate Generals of the European Commission actually 
specialise in the area. Legislation therefore emanates very much in piecemeal fashion 
according to whichever sector is involved or affected.
The advertising industry itself has been consistently opposed to any further attempts by the 
Commission to legislate in the area, and instead remains committed to self-regulation. 
However, this balance may be upset by the recent wave of international take-overs and 
mergers instigated by the largest advertising agencies, determined to achieve pan-European 
coverage, since this will inevitably lead to calls to level out the playing field as much as 
possible. In the meantime though, the European advertising market will remain a myriad 
of different national regulations and practices, all of which mean that the objective of 
harmonised pan-European advertising campaigns will not be anywhere near as 
straightforward, and possibly not even as advantageous, as has been predicted over recent 
years (Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991; Halliburton. C. and Hiinerberg. R.. 1993). By 
way of example, Figure 2-7 shows which promotional tactics are authorised in the general 
retailing sector in each Member State of the EC 12.
CHAPTER 2 PAGE 32
Figure 2-7
PROMOTIONAL TACTICS AUTHORISED IN EU MEMBER STATE 
MARKETS25
UK IRL E D F DK B NL P I G L
On-pack price reduction ✓ ✓ ✓ y y y y y ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Banded offers ✓ ✓ ✓ ? y y ? y y ✓ ✓ X
In-pack premiums ✓ ✓ ✓ X ? 7 ? ? y ✓ ✓ X
Multiple-purchase offers ✓ V y 7 ✓ ✓ ? ✓ y ✓ ✓ X
Extra product V V y 7 ✓ ✓ ✓ y y ✓ ✓ ✓
Free product V y y ✓ y y y y y ✓ y ✓
Usable/altemative-use packs V y y y y y y y y ✓ y y
Free mail-ins V y y X y 7 ? y y y y ?
With-purchase premiums V V y X y 7 ? ? y y y X
Cross-product offers y y y X y ? X y y y y X
Collector devices y V y X y 7 ? y y y y X
Competitions y y y 7 y 7 y y y y y ?
Self-liquidating premiums V y y ✓ y ✓ y 7 y y y X
Free draws y y y X y X X X y y y X
Share-outs V y y X ? X X X y ? y X
Sweepstake/lottery 7 ? ? X ? X X X 7 ? 7 X
M oney-off vouchers ✓ ✓ y X y 7 y y ✓ ? ✓ ?
M oney-off next purchase ✓ ✓ y X y X y y ✓ ? ✓ X
Cash backs ✓ ✓ y 7 y ✓ y y ✓ X y X
In-store demos V ✓ y ✓ y ✓ y y ✓ y y y
S  permitted x not permitted ? may be permitted
The overriding impression from the literature in this area is of the complexity of the Union 
and of its people. Whilst there is clear evidence of a convergence of lifestyles, this is by no 
means a uniform phenomenon across the market, and so any attempts to harmonise 
strategy, of instigating a pan-European marketing campaign or an integrated distribution 
system risks only pleasing part of the consumers the company wishes to target (Calori, R. 
and Lawrence, P., 1991). As with the discussion of the global arena therefore, the literature 
devoted to the European market therefore seeks to situate, to measure, or to shine a path 
through the tug-of-war between the forces to harmonise, or standardise an activity across
25 D'Arcv. Masius. Benton & Bowles. 1989
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the European market and those to localise or differentiate (Calori. R. and Lawrence. P., 
1991, Halliburton, C. and Hunerberg, R.. 1993; Reichel. J., 1989; Atamer. T.. 1993; 
Hunerberg, R., Heise, G. and Hoffmeister, M., 1995). What differs are the approaches and 
the terminology used; for instance, Vandermerwe advances the concept of 'consumer 
clusters', joining up these groupings to create three different sizes of market niche (regional 
mass-clusters, regional niche-clusters and local niche-markets) (Vandermerwe. S., 1989(b); 
Vandermerwe, S., 1993), Colchester and Buchan categorise industries according to their 
'Euro-homogeneity' or 'national distinctiveness' (Colchester. N. and Buchan. D. 1990), and 
Atamer develops the model used by Porter and Ohmae amongst others (Porter, M., 1990; 
Ohmae, K.. 1985) to situate industries on a global forces versus local forces graph, leading 
to the four categories global, transnational, mixed and multidomestic (Atamer. T., 1993). 
Attempts to apply this thinking to the car industry usually founder against the impossibility 
of pigeonholing the whole of the industry into any specific category; Colchester and 
Buchan draw a distinction between 'smart, fast cars', which they consider relatively 'Euro- 
homogeneous', and 'mass market cars', which are more prone to require modifications to 











26 Colchester. N. and Buchan. P .. 1990: p229
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This is not to suggest that splitting the industry up is not a valid approach; indeed, the 
balance of global and local forces will be different for each company, meaning that most 
attempts to consider the European market from the perspective of a specific industry are, at 
best, over-general, and also that the ideal approach would probably be to consider each 
company entirely separately.
"The firm stands at the heart o f  the process: the large internal market 
will be created with the firm or it will not be created at all. The 
elimination o f non-tariff barriers, the strengthening o f competition and 
the free entry to markets will oblige firms to change, to rethink their 
organisation, to redefine their strategy. They will have to keep pace 
with events or disappear, accept the risk in order to seize new 
opportunities fo r expansion or go under.1,27
2-3-3 GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF CARS
The notion of a chain or network of distribution actors is a well established one (Stem. L. 
and Reve. T.. 1980; Bowersox. D. and Morash. E.. 1988; Stem. L. and El-Ansarv. A.. 
1982; Andersson. P.. 1991; Filser. M.. 1992; Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; 
Ruierok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1991), and this end of company operations is now 
considered in the literature in very much the same way as the factory and pre-factory 
stages, with talk of tiered actors, specialist partners, outsourcing and subcontractors.
As well as this however, the defining feature of the chain in the case of cars needs to be 
considered, namely the system of selling cars through a system of tied dealerships not (for 
the most part) belonging to the manufacturer. The underlying theory governing the way 
cars are distributed and sold is that of markets, hierarchies and transaction costs developed, 
amongst others, by Coase and Williamson (Coase. 1937; Williamson. P.. 1975). On one 
side of the argument, the nature and extent of the transaction costs involved in the selling 
of cars, including the unpredictability of the market concerning the number of cars that the 
manufacturer can expect to sell within a given period (a situation which fits Williamson's 
definition of 'bounded rationality*), the cost of the product and the financial complexities
Jacauemin. A. and Saoir. A.. 1989: p349
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that the shifting of stock from producer to distributor and from distributor to buyer involves 
and the highly specialised knowledge needed regarding the product itself and the tactics 
employed to sell it, together suggest that the most appropriate, and lowest risk solution for 
the manufacturers would be to integrate these operations into the company framework 
(Filser. M.. 1992). On the other hand, however, it is important to consider the crucial role 
played by service back-up in the selling of cars, a factor which dictates the need for a 
network of facilities as geographically dense as possible, in order for the manufacturer to 
remain close to the consumer. This meant that, when the manufacturers were in the 
process of setting up their networks in the 1930s (at a time when the product was far less 
reliable and the need for local presence consequently greater), a system of tied but 
essentially autonomous agents, who came to be known as dealerships, was the lowest-cost, 
and also the only practical option available for manufacturers intending to sell their 
products in any significant volume. This trade-off that companies have had to make 
between the desire to have a strong influence over the selling of their product and the need 
to maintain as geographically dense a representation as possible (Andersson. P.. 1992) is 
one that has existed since the earliest days of automobile production (and indeed in many 
other industries as well) f Go gel. R. and Larreche. J-C.. 1989), but the coincidence of 
various factors means that a fundamental re-evaluation of the transaction costs involved in 
selling cars in this way has become a priority for the industry.
So, whilst the options available to a company embarking upon an export strategy would 
theoretically include appointing an agent or distributor, buying an existing distribution 
chain, building a new distribution chain, buying a manufacturing company with an 
established distribution chain, negotiating a long-term contract with a retailer or other 
distributor, an exclusive arrangement or shareholding in a regional or national distributor 
(Lvnch. R.. 1990);



















the reality of the European, and indeed global, car markets has thus far been dominated by 
the system of manufacturers selling their cars through a tiered network of (wholly-owned 
or independent) national distributors (for export markets) and franchised dealers (Gogeh R. 
and Larreche. J-C., 1989). Exceptions, such as the Korean market, where all the outlets are 
owned by the manufacturers, are rare indeed.
Adapted from Stem. L. and El-Ansarv. A .. 1982: p519, quoting Kahler. R. and Kramer. R.. 1979: 
"International Marketing", 4th Edition, Southwestern Publishing Company, Cincinnati, Ohio: p i69
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Figure 2-10















The evolution of the industry from its craft roots to its global status of today has come not 
only as a result of technological advances in the product and in its manufacture (Womack, 
J.. Jones. D. and Roos, P ., 1990), but particularly as a direct consequence of the industry 
having developed this secure and responsive means of bringing products and consumers 
together. The post-factory distribution chain as a whole, and the dealer networks in 
particular, therefore play a very considerable role in manufacturer strategy, as the following 
list illustrates;
the franchise system provides stable market representation and 
dedicated sales capability across the manufacturer's range; 
the security o f distribution and 'sales power' gives stability from  
which to plan new models;
there are few  organisational barriers to new market entry; 
dealers can help to sustain the profitability throughout the 
lifetime o f  a product;
a stable dealer network allows manufacturers to widen product
choice and to experiment with niche models;
the dealer network provides a flow  o f  future demand information
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from which production can be planned;
the dealers work with their manufacturers to resolve mismatches 
between supply and demand by absorbing stock or conducting 
promotional campaigns’'.
For instance, if one examines the history of distribution structures in the market, it is 
apparent that national distribution companies, both independent and manufacturer-owned, 
have been an accepted feature of the European car market for almost as long as the 
manufacturers themselves, and many of them can be traced right back to the formative 
years of the industry around the turn of the century (Bricnet. F. and Mangolte. P-A.. 1990; 
Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; Maves. P.. 1990). When the car companies 
first started to organise formal export programmes, as opposed to piecemeal shipments of 
individual cars to interested parties, national distribution companies became the flag 
wavers for their manufacturers abroad, the focal points for overcoming the myriad of 
linguistic, social and cultural barriers and organising the sale of their cars in the foreign 
country (Stein. R.. 1961; Lamming. R.. 1993). Many national distributors started out as 
independent traders, importing cars for individual buyers before the manufacturer became 
interested and formalised operations, sometimes even going as far as taking over control of 
the company. The next step was the setting up of a network of dealers tied to the national 
distributor to cover the sales territory starting from the urban centres, and several national 
distributors assumed ownership of certain strategic dealerships themselves. Some of them 
also further developed their activities by operating assembly facilities for their 
manufacturers, screwing together kits of cars (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990).
As the European car market expanded, the roles of national distributors became cemented. 
Whilst manufacturer headquarters retained the task of defining and developing overall 
policy with regard to corporate image, product ranges, distribution and marketing, the 
national distributors were generally accorded full responsibility for its implementation and 
monitoring on the ground. This entailed full control over the dealer network and those who 
worked within it, the handling of orders and stocks of cars and parts within their market, as 
well as the formulation of marketing strategies and promotional campaigns within a 
framework laid down by manufacturer headquarters, roles the national distributors have 
maintained unchallenged until relatively recently (Bricnet. F. and Mangolte. P-A.. 1990; 
Maves. P.. 1990). Whilst the various European markets developed at different rates, this 
was nevertheless the general pattern adopted, and copied, by car companies across the 
continent.
Adapted from International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a)
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Just as with the appointment of an independent national distributor at the start of an export 
programme, the manufacturer will select and grant a franchise to a dealer principally in 
return for the achievement of an expected level of sales and service performance by the 
latter. Viewed from the opposite perspective, the dealer entrepreneur takes on a franchise, 
agreeing to invest in a dealership premises and to conform to the manufacturer's 
stipulations in return for the chance to make a reasonable profit on its operation.
As we have seen, the globalisation of the industry's operations and the intensification of 
competition in the marketplace have brought both of these factors, the place of the 
distribution chain within the whole 'business system'30 and the 'economic bargains' struck 
between national distributors, dealers and other actors, sharply into focus. For the 
manufacturers, the need to follow the 'lean production' revolution in the pre-factory and 
assembly stages with dramatic cost reductions in the post-factory area has become urgent 
(Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P .. 1990; Stem. L.. Sturdivant. F. and Getz. G.. 1993; 
Ruigrok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1991).31 For the national distributors and the dealers, the 
issues are how to respond to and how to assimilate the changes that may be introduced by 
the manufacturers in the future and also how to maintain or even to restore a degree of 
profitability in their activities. In Europe, the situation has been exacerbated by the severe 
market downturn of the early 1990s, a recession from which many manufacturers and 
markets have yet to fully recover (if, indeed, they will ever do so).
A direct consequence of the difficult period being endured by the European industry has 
been the interest and support shown by all sides of the industry in research projects such as 
the International Car Distribution Programme. One of the early pieces of work conducted 
by the Programme sought to dispel some of the many myths surrounding the actual costs 
involved in the distribution chain.32
See Figure 2-1
See Section 3-3
International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a)
CHAPTER 2 PAGE 40
Figure 2-11
THE COST OF MARKETING CARS33










The final figure reached, showing that between 10% and 21% of the net consumer price of 
the car is accounted for by the workings of the distribution chain, helps to illustrate the 
importance for the manufacturers of the task of optimising the chain. These figures are 
lower than those usually published as they are apparently based on the true selling price 
after discount, and are adjusted tc exclude payments made by mrnufacturers that are passed 
directly or indirectly to the customer in the form of a price reduction (bonuses, credit 
subsidies, etc.); other sources, for instance, have reached figures of up to 35%.34 
Nevertheless, this range of figures illustrates the significance of the stakes at play for the 
industry, and also serves to underline the relevance of researching the distribution area, 
both for the whole ICDP project, and for this individual piece of work.
2-3-4 PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE EVOLUTION 
OF THE EUROPEAN CAR DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM
Recently, then, critical attention has indeed shifted to the post-factory area of the industry, 
reflecting its increased status in the eyes of the industry and of governments and regulators.
International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a)
Derrick. M. in The Guardian (supplement: "New Car Age"), 16/01/1992
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For instance, a significant amount of speculation has taken place into the effects of the 
Single European Market on the distribution and marketing of cars.35 The central piece of 
research which defined the non-tariff barriers, and which also made specific predictions for 
the benefits that would accrue following their removal was the 'Cost of Non-Europe' report, 
produced for the Commission by Paolo Cecchini. The car industry section of this report 
was prepared by industry consultants Ludvigsen Associates (Commission of the European 
Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 1988) and has been widely referred to both by 
independent commentators (ACEA. 1991; National Consumer Council. 1990; Assemblee 
Nationale. 1992) and by the Commission itself (Commission of the European 
Communities. 1992). Some of the possible outcomes put forward have included significant 
savings to be made from the abolition of the national importer layer of the distribution 
pyramid.
"Car marketing patterns in Community countries shift under the 
influence o f the new tax regimes and the phasing out o f  internal market 
limitations on third-country BU (Built-Up) imports. Vehicle makers 
and distributors exert central control o f  their sales and marketing for  
all o f  the Community through a single headquarters, setting up regions 
and zones throughout the EC in place o f the present sales company 
system."36
Further suggestions included the coordination and standardisation of marketing at a pan- 
European level (Ouelch. J.. Buzzell. R. and Salama. E.. 1990; Colchester. N. and Buchan. 
P.. 1990), quantified at 2.3 billion ECU by Ludvigsen Associates (Commission of the 
European Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 1988), the emergence of new structures of 
the distribution area such as large scale multi-marque dealers and the normalisation of 
mandataire activity (Bellenger. L.. 1986(a); Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990), 
elements of a stronger partnership approach on the part of the manufacturers (Bellenger. L.. 
1986(a); Assemblee Nationale. 1992) and even the integration of selling operations into the 
car manufacturers themselves, or at least a much stricter control over the downstream chain 
(Ruigrok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1991; Assemblee Nationale. 1992).
"An immediate cost reduction in sales and marketing will be a 
consequence o f the increased interpenetration o f  the market by car 
makes and models in EC92. The model ranges offered by makers 
throughout the EC will differ country-by-country less than they do in
See section 2-5 for a more detailed account of how the car industry has been affected by the Single 
Market Programme
Commission of the European Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 1988: p63
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EC85. This will allow increased pan-European advertising, promotion 
and launching o f automobiles, which in turn will allow the fixed cost 
element o f  preparing the relevant promotional material to be reduced. 
... It is estimated that a saving o f 5% in the cost o f  advertising could 
be obtained by the centralisation o f advertising/marketing budgets and 
the greater use o f  common material. This is expected to generate 
savings in the region o f42,476,000 ECU. "3?
Others have once again concentrated on the tension felt by manufacturers between this 
need to take advantage of the potential economies of scale and efficiency benefits conferred 
by the existence of a large internal market whilst at the same time trying to remain as 
responsive as possible to the individual tastes and needs of different groups of consumers 
throughout the Union (Colchester. N. and Buchan. P.. 1990; Ouelch. J.. Buzzell. R. and 
Salama. E.. 1990).
Some have taken a yet more focused approach, and have considered distribution and 
marketing separately. Possibly because of its highly specialised nature, few works on 
distribution in Europe have much relevance to the way the car industry operates, and many 
make just a passing reference to the Block Exemption governing the franchised dealer 
system. Of those that can be applied, Gogel and Larreche consider whether the European 
market will result in a shift in the balance to be struck between product strength (in the 
guise of the quality of the outlet) and geographical coverage (the number of dealerships that 
the manufacturer owns or franchises in any one market) (Gogel. R. and Larreche. J-C.. 
1989), which, as shall be illustrated throughout this research, is a particularly pertinent 
question given the lack of profitability and continued rationalisation of dealer networks 
across Europe. Calori and Lawrence predict the further re-segmentation of the car market 
into new horizontal niches, reckoning that this will lead to the emergence of distribution 
structures according to 'themes', such as leisure vehicles or sports cars (Calori. R. and 
Lawrence. P.. 1991), and Mercer suggests a reorganisation of the dealer's activities, 
separating out or 'unbundling' sales, after-sales, used cars, etc., some of which could be 
conducted elsewhere (Mercer. G.. 1994). Andersson views the whole distribution channel 
as a network of exchange relationships between the various actors, borrowing on the 
notions of the interdependency of channel actors (Stem. L. and El-Ansarv. A.. 1982), and 
of the whole network as a series of 'nodes' connected by 'marketing flows (Bowersox. D. 
and Morash. E.. 1988). He then goes on to consider the level of'connectedness' between 
the actors in terms of either 'loose' or 'tight coupling' (Andersson. P.. 1992). Gadde et al
Commission of the European Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 1988: pi 50 
The Block Exemption is covered in more detail in section 2-5-3
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take a similar perspective, but considering instead the variables of stability and change 
(Gadde. L-E. et al. 1988). Filser combines the historical background to car distribution, 
namely the manufacturers having put the system in place by delegating distribution 
activities to intermediaries who could carry out them out at a lower cost whilst at the same 
time being able to regulate the flow of products into this distribution system and thereby to 
dominate its actors (despite the recent growth of dealer groups) with the political economy 
'environment - strategy - structure1 paradigm (Porter. M.. 1990; Miller. P.. 1988; Stem. L. 
and Reve. T.. 1980) to create an internal and an external political economy model. 
Numerous authors, including Goeudevert, Lawrence et al, Brown et al and Chao and 
Rajendran (Goeudevert. P.. 1990; Lawrence. C.. Marr. N. and Prendergast. G.. 1992; 
Brown. J.. Light. D. and Gazda. G.. 1987; Chao. P. and Raiendran. K.. 1993) have gone on 
from this to consider the role that country-of-origin criteria play in the consumers' 
purchasing decision. Together, they suggest that Levitt was mistaken when he claimed that 
national preferences had ceased to be an important factor in company strategy (Levitt. T.. 
1991). One only has to consider the psychology of car ownership in different Member 
States to appreciate that these factors are very real. In Southern Europe, for example, the 
car is an ostentatious display of social standing as well as a means of displaying 
masculinity, and as such local driving styles are completely in harmony with a value system 
which encourages the outward expression of sentiments and sensations. This is in sharp 
contrast with the Northern attitude to be found in countries such as Denmark, Sweden and 
the UK, where the car is viewed more as a functional piece of equipment. There are signs 
that these attitudes are converging, partly as a result of this new ’Euro-awareness', but also 
because of the increased congestion on the roads and Europe-wide clamp-down on such 
anti-social behaviour as drunk driving and speeding (Scardigli. V.. 1989).
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Figure 2-12
CUSTOMER PROPENSITY TO WAIT FOR VEHICLE DELIVERY39
FRANCE GERMANY ITALY UK
■  LESS THAN 7 DAYS □ 7 TO 30 DAYS □  OVER 30 DAYS
One can hopefully conclude from this study of the literature that the gradual emergence of 
the Single European Market in cars is not making the nature of the market any less 
complex, in fact, it is constantly becoming more so (Calori, R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991). 
The emergence of new Europe-wide consumer clusters, each with specific taste preferences 
and needs, implies for some that it will prove impossible for car manufacturers to 
harmonise their marketing totally (Maves, P ., 1991). Different linguistic, cultural and 
wealth groupings will, we are told, require individually targeted campaigns; at the same 
time as these new splits emerging, the product itself is breaking free of its traditional model 
range segmentation according to size and spawning a whole new selection of niche 
categories according to vehicle use (Calori, R. and Lawrence, P., 1991).
Whilst these represent just some of the ideas that have been put forward, they are the most 
generally accepted. However, because of the interdependencies present in the post-factory 
network (Andersson, P., 1992), these potential marketing developments cannot be 
considered in isolation. Central to any company strategy towards the Single European 
Market is the trade-off between product strength (which is covered in the above argument), 
and geographical coverage (which as we have seen for cars means the relationship between 
the manufacturer and their dealer network) (Gogel, R. and Larreche. J-C„ 1989). It has
ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation
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already been suggested that manufacturers will seek to implement pan-European 
distribution structures and strategies, thereby ensuring the most efficient possible coverage 
of the European market (Commission of the European Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 
1988), and if this is done in combination with the differentiated marketing strategies 
mentioned above, it would again suggest that the emerging strategy for the new Europe 
involves separating out different strands of company post-factory activity, a concept often 
referred to as 'unbundling' (Bowersox. D. and Morash. E.. 1988; Mercer. G.. 1994), and 
relating global/local, or harmonisation/differentiation considerations to each one (Calori. R. 
and Lawrence. P.. 1991). The central question in this respect is therefore whether the links 
that join the manufacturer to the distributors and to the dealers are going to strengthen or 
weaken as a response to the Single Market. Some, for the reasons already cited regarding 
image and the nature of the competition in a mature market, consider that the 
manufacturers will seek to strengthen these ties (particularly those 'globally local' 
companies which seek to have a wholly-controlled presence in each of the triad regions), 
and to employ only exclusive dealers, possibly even owned (or at the very least strongly 
supported) by the company itself (Ruigrok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1991; Assemblee 
Nationale. 1992). Others, as already explained, see the gain in power on the part of the 
dealerships themselves as going hand in hand with the growing importance of the buyer in 
the whole process, and therefore as an inevitable phenomenon which should be responded 
to by the development of more balanced manufacturer/dealer relationships based on the 
principles of long-term partnerships already employed elsewhere in the industry (Bellenger. 
L., 1986(a); Assemblee Nationale. 1992). Finally, some conclude that both of the above 
will have implications for the national distributor level, the key interface, whether it be a 
subsidiary of the manufacturer or independent, between manufacturer and dealer, and take 
on the notion from the 'Cost of Non-Europe' project that this link in the chain may become 
superfluous, or at the very least, may need to be rethought (Maves. P.. 1991; Halliburton. 
C. and Hunerberg. R.. 1993; Mattsson. L-G. et al. 1989; Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 
1991). As shall be seen in Chapter 3, all these issues figure strongly in the emerging lean 
distribution paradigm.
Nevertheless, this does not tally exactly with what the Commission was led to believe 
would be the outcome of the Single Market Programme (Commission of the European 
Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 1988), but would provide evidence for the view that 
the legislation governing the Single European Market is only partly responsible for the 
major changes underway in car manufacturer distribution and marketing strategy (Calori. 
R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991).
"In reality, the single market will have a built-in paradox: becoming
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more culture-free and homogeneous on the one hand\ yet still complex 
and with diverse local markets and highly fragmented specialised 
niches. What executives expect to see is less differences between , than 
within, national boundaries in many product/markets. ... For them, 
the challenge will be to produce and deliver either mass-standardised 
goods and services or core standard offerings with customised features 
and services. ,f4°
Far from simplifying matters, it would seem that the Single Market Programme has 
actually complicated the dilemma facing marketers by multiplying the number of cases 
where a trade-off has to be made between the desire to adopt a standardised approach for 
the sake of consistency and economies of scale, and the need to retain differentiation of 
strategy in an attempt to appeal to the many targeted groups of consumers (Calori. R. and 
Lawrence. P.. 1991; Makridakis. S.. 1991; Mourier. P.. and Burgaud. P.. 1989; Reichel. J.. 
1989: Ouelch. J.. Buzzell. R. and Salama. E.. 1990: Vandermerwe. S.. 1989(b)).
2-3-5 RECENT TRENDS IN EUROPEAN CAR 
DISTRIBUTION STRUCTURES
Leaving aside the theoretical basis of the selling and marketing of cars for a moment, it is 
possible to construct, using some of the sizeable volume of available secondary data, an 
overview of some of the observable marketplace characteristics and recent developments in 
the post-factory sector.
2-3-5-1 DEALER AND NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR DIVERSITY
The overriding feature of the dealer sector in Europe, as established in the literature, is its 
diversity. The table below illustrates that, whilst 3 of the 'Big 4' European markets sell 
roughly the same volume of cars (as did Germany prior to reunification), they differ 
markedly in a number of other measures.
Vandermerwe. S.. 1989,(a): p52
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Figure 2-13
MARKET AND FRANCHISED DEALER STATISTICS FOR THE 
EUROPEAN 'BIG 4' MARKETS, 199341
France Germany Italy UK
Sales (private cars): 










Japanese makes market share:
1993 calendar year 78,589 479,111 87,118 225,423
% national market 4.6% 15% 4.6% 12.7%
Dealer structures 1992:
Direct 5355 17,105 5293 6052
Indirect 18,896 8022 15,928 1462
Total 24,251 25,127 21,221 7514
Light vehicle sales per direct 434 249 468 287
Light vehicle sales per outlet 99 177 172 239
Manufacturer/importer owned 176 175 57 72
Dealers owned by top 10 groups 132 n/a n/a 663
% total direct dealers 2.5% 11%
Cars in use per dealer 982 1413 1192 2921
Population per dealer 2335 3149 2721 7651
Differences in the penetration of Japanese makes is, as shall be discussed in section 2-5-2, 
largely due to the legacy of quantitative restrictions against their importation in that 
particular market (prior to the Europe-wide agreement) (Gandillot. T., 1992; De Banville. 
E. de, and Chanaron, J-J., 1991; National Consumer Council 1990), but many of the other 
structural variations can be attributed to the geocultural character of the market in question 
(Colchester, N. and Buchan. P .. 1990). For instance, the high numbers of indirect dealers 
in the French market, as well as the low number of prospective customers available to each 
dealer, reflect the dispersed nature of much of the population, with indirect dealers having 
grown up as the only practical means of assuring complete territorial coverage.42 The UK
41 International Car Distribution Programme. 1995(a)
Direct (or primary, main or first-tier) dealers are defined as those which have a direct franchise
contract with the manufacturer or national distributor, and may be sub-divided into branch 
(manufacturer- or importer-owned) or independent and full-facility, sales only and service only. 
Indirect (or second-tier or sub-) dealers are those who hold a franchise contract through a direct
dealer only, and who are usually supplied by them. Again, these can be sub-divided into full-facility,
sales only and service only. Just to complicate matters further, some service-only dealers may also
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market, by contrast, has by far the fewest number of dealers and the concentration of cars 
and consumers per outlet; this is not only the result of its more compact size and population 
spread, but also due to its position as the most mature and developed of the European 
markets in terms of distribution structures.
Some of these themes will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, and it will also 
become clear that developments in the UK market set the pace for the rest of the region by 
a considerable margin. In the meantime, this European diversity can further be shown by 
looking at overall dealer numbers across the whole of Europe, for these figures also 
demonstrate great variation.
Figure 2-14
FRANCHISED CAR DEALERS IN EUROPE, 199343
Country Total direct dealers Total indirect dealers Total all dealers
Austria 2212 975 3187
Belgium 3,294 2484 5778
Denmark 1389 180 1569
Finland 1013 1108 2121
France 5355 18896 24251
Germany 17105 8022 25127
Greece 1303 666 1969
Ireland 765 24 789
Italy 5293 15928 21221
Netherlands 3318 554 3872
Norway 1145 173 1318
Portugal 1007 645 1652
Spain 2994 7897 10891
Sweden 1673 1833 3506
Switzerland 2354 4331 6685
UK 6052 1462 7514
Europe 56,272 65,178 121,450
order new or used cars for their customers. Definitions from Harbour Wade, 1993; Tongue. A. in 
International Car Distribution Programme. 1996(q)
International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a). The dealer numbers refer to all franchised dealer 
points for the 32 major makes, offering sales or service or both. Allowing for the multifranchising o f  
dealer sites, the total number o f  dealerships in Europe is probably around 104,000.
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The single biggest issue currently facing dealers, both in the UK and in the rest of Europe, 
is their lack of profitability.44 The number of dealers in Europe has been falling constantly 
over the last few years as dealers have gone bankrupt or manufacturers have rationalised 
their networks to save money; again however, the rates of decline have varied between 
countries. In the UK for instance, the number of outlets has decreased by 13.3% since 
198545, and in France, the number of dealers has continued to decline despite the arrival of 
new players in the marketplace (Ssanyong, Tata, Kia, Suzuki, Subaru, Hyundai and 
Daihatsu have all entered the French market since 1992). This process of rationalisation 
still has a very long way to go in many of the European markets, a fact demonstrated by the 
gap that already exists between the pioneering UK market (where the rationalisation is 
furthest advanced, but still far from complete) and the others. Overall, around 80% of 
Europe's dealers and about 75% of actual franchise points (some individual dealers may 
have a separate service facility located elsewhere within his territory, etc.) are still 
exclusive, independent 'owner-driver' operations, a figure which is very significant when 
viewed in the light of the evolution of structures and ownership styles in the UK, which has 
seen the rapid growth of dealer groups, many of them publicly-owned, operating many sites 
and many different franchises. For instance, at the end of 1993, the ten biggest groups 
alone controlled 632 dealerships in the UK market (up from 531 at the end of 1992).
Figure 2-15
THE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH DEALER STRUCTURES46
1988 1993 Variation
Manufacturer-owned outlets 176 172 -2.3%
Dealers 5220 5185 -0.6%
Sub-dealers 22200 18900 -17.5%
Total 27596 24257 -12.1%
A similar degree of diversity is apparent at the higher level in the distribution chain 
amongst the national distributor operations. For instance, Figure 2-16 below illustrates the 
different numbers of wholly-owned and independent distribution arrangements across a 
selection of European markets. The number of manufacturer-owned operations has 
increased between 1993 and 1996, but, as the next figure shows, the percentage of
Financial Times, 17/08/1995
International Car Distribution Programme. 1995(a)
International Car Distribution Programme. 1995(a), from Journal de L'Automobile - Auto Infos
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manufacturer-owned operations as a proportion of the whole has not; this being due to new 
arrivals in the European marketplace, notably the Korean makes, starting out with 
independent distributors.47
Figure 2-16
NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR STATUS BY MARKET, 1993 AND 199648
Number of National Distributors 




















A further reason for this difference is that figures for more makes were collected for the 1996 survey 
than for the 1993 survey. The latter survey allowed makes such as Ferrari and Maserati to be 
included; such specialist makes tending to have more independent national distributors than their 
volume counterparts
Harbour Wade. 1993; International Car Distribution Programme. 1996(n), own calculations
T
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Figure 2-17
MANUFACTURER-OWNED NATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS BY 
MARKET49
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■  1993 B1996
Nevertheless, the German market, Europe's largest, has the highest proportion of 
manufacturer-owned national distributors, followed by several other of the more 
prosperous European markets such as Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. The 
difference between the largest proportion, 82.76% (Germany - 1993), and the smallest, 
13.79% (Greece - 1993) illustrates the diverse stages of development of the European 
market.
Figure 2-18 below splits these figures according to the type of manufacturer, and reveals 
that the volume manufacturers in general have a greater proportion of manufacturer-owned 
national distributors than the specialist and Asian makes.50 Conversely, the Asian 
manufacturers, many of whom inevitably arrived in the European market without a great 
deal of experience of local conditions, demonstrate a much greater share of independent 
and also of joint venture operations, relying on bought in local expertise to gain them a 
firm foothold in the marketplace. Many of the more experienced Asian manufacturers 
seem to be approaching or have reached the point where they are able to manage their
Harbour Wade. 1993; International Car Distribution Programme. 1996(n), own calculations
For a list o f  which manufacturers are categorised into which type, see Appendix XV
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operations themselves, with Honda and Nissan leading the way, as the following figure 
shows. Compared to comparable figures for 1993,51 the volume makes have increased the 
proportion of wholly-owned operations from 56.3% to 62.2%. The specialist makes, 
however, now display a greater proportion of independent distributors; as already 
mentioned, this can be accounted for by the new arrivals in the marketplace and by the 
greater number of small, specialist makes who participated in the 1996 survey.
Figure 2-18




■  Manufacturer-owned ■  Independent □  Joint venture
Figure 2-19 below splits these figures according to manufacturer. Here it is apparent that 
Ford and General Motors are alone in owning all their national distributors, a situation 
which has existed for a number of years, and are followed by Volvo and the French 
manufacturers. It is interesting to note that, of this ‘top five’, GM and Ford are both 
American in origin (but have been in Europe for many years) and Volvo is from Sweden, a 
market until recently not part of the European Union. These three are also the only 
manufacturers to have thus far operated ‘European headquarters’ facilities (separate from 
corporate headquarters or the ‘home base’) to oversee the whole European market and to 
gain a foothold within the Union. Apart from some of the Japanese makes which are 
starting to follow this lead, all the other manufacturers still treat Europe very much in terms 
of ‘home’ and ‘export’ markets, and this is reflected in the diverse nature of their national
Harbour Wade. 1993
International Car Distribution Programme. 1995(n), own calculations
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distributor structures.
Figure 2-19
% OF MANUFACTURER-OWNED NATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS, 
1993 AND 199653
% of manufacturer-owned National Distributors 
20 40 60 80 100
-
■  1993 B1996
Harbour Wade. 1993; International Car Distribution Programme. 1996(n), own calculations. Only 
manufacturers where figures for both years are available have been included, so as to avoid some 
makes erroneously appearing to have had no wholly-owned national distributors in 1993
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Overall, then, it is clear that the current strategies adopted by the car manufacturers for the 
national distributor and dealer levels of the distribution chain show the multiplicity of 
different national arrangements that have evolved since the dawn of motoring. There is 
little indication that the innovations that will be introduced in these strategies to meet the 
challenges of the European car market in years to come will be any less diverse, thus 
contributing still further to rich tapestry of the car industry as it moves into the 21st 
Century (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991: Maves. P.. 1991).
2-3-5-2 DEALER SECTOR TRENDS
It is possible to relate many of the evolutions observed above to a specific set of trends and 
influences which are currently shaping the sector. The following list summarises some of 
the basic trends, all of them observable in the secondary literature on the industry, that have 
become apparent over the last 10 years (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; Europe 
2000. 1991; Gadde. L-E. et al. 1988; Harbour Wade. 1993). Almost all of them originated 
in the UK market, and some have yet to spread to continental Europe, although it is widely 
agreed that all of them will inevitably do so in the years to come.
•  "Dealer numbers have reduced, particularly in the specialist
franchises;
•  Multiple ownership o f dealerships and multiple franchised sites 
have increased in number;
•  The level o f  investment needed to establish a dealership has 
grown;
• Dealer gross margins have been cut, and replaced with bonus 
schemes fo r  meeting performance criteria;
•  Customer satisfaction levels have risen;
• New systems o f stock management, removing stock from the
dealers, have started to be introduced (lean distribution);
•  There has been an increase in the volume o f cars bought by 
major customers (such as rental companies). This has forced  
concessionary terms out o f  the manufacturers in the form of 
price rebates or discounts, which in turn has disrupted 
franchised dealers9 activities;
•  The volume o f new car sales to private buyers has fallen;
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•  There has been a growth in independent multi-make leasing 
companies;
•  Manufacturer marketing campaigns have increasingly started to 
push finance or leasing packages, or used car schemes;
•  Dealer service business has been eroded by competition from  
non-franchised fast-fit' chains, although manufacturers have 
responded to this with schemes for their own franchises;
• There has been a growing manufacturer interest in the financial 
health o f  dealers. ”54
Four of these particular aspects are now considered in a little more detail:
• Dealer groups and multifranchising
• Branch dealers and direct sales
• Rethinking territorial coverage
• Alternative retailing options
Dealer groups and multifranchising
Two major developments have characterised the dealer sector in the UK over the last few 
years, developments which now, thanks to the liberalisation measures of the new Block 
Exemption55 as well as the environmental pressures facing dealers, look set to spread 
rapidly across the rest of Europe. The first, group ownership of dealers, is hardly a new 
phenomenon, having been a feature of the UK market since the 1930s, but has seen a rapid 
expansion over the last decade. The second is multifranchising, a departure from the 
traditional exclusive mode which has seen one dealer site starting to sell 2, 3 or even 7 or 8 
different brands. Again, multifranchising has been pioneered in the UK, but looks set to be 
taken up by dealers across Europe (International Car Distribution Programme. 1995(a); 
Europe 2000.1991).
In the UK market, dealer group numbers and sizes have grown rapidly over the last few 
years, and never more so than during the market downturn of the early 1990s, when they 
were able to buy up ailing individual dealerships relatively easily. The table below shows 
the top 10 groups in the market in 1994 according to their new car and light commercial 
vehicle sales.
Adapted from International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a)
See section 2-5-3
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Figure 2-20
UK TOP 10 CAR DEALER GROUPS BY SALES, 199456
Group New car sales No. o f franchises No. o f outlets
Lex Retail 63,000 28 122
Hartwell 30,003 14 59
Evans Halshaw 20,607 22 58
Robins and Day 17,131 1* 26
Camden Motors 16,731 7 7
Henlys 16,601 15 33
Ferry Group 16,031 12 22
AFG 15,001 11 74
Arnold Clark 14,161 16 33
Greenhous Group 13,254 2 5
* Wholly-owned subsidiary o f  Peugeot UK
NB. Some potentially high-selling groups have not made their sales figures 
available, so this ranking is for guidance only
This ranking of UK groups according to their sales is given in order to make possible a 
comparison with the situation in France.57 However, this measure is possibly not the most 
appropriate means of depicting the development of the UK sector, as some groups may 
have a significant proportion of their sales accounted for by fleet sales, or instead have a 
limited number of localised sites, but big sales figures due to their high rate of local 
penetration. A more usual measure is that of group turnover, the Top 10' according to 
which are listed below.
Lloyds Bowmaker AMI 00, Automotive Management, 1994. Situation at June 1994.
See Figure 2-22
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Figure 2-21
UK TOP 10 CAR DEALER GROUPS BY TURNOVER, 199458
Group Turnover
£million
No. o f  franchises No. o f outlets New car sales
Lex Retail 1300 28 122 63,000
Inchcape Motors 
Retail
975 est. 18 72 n/a
Hartwell 774 14 59 30,003
Cowie Group 518 11 40 n/a
Appleyard Group 490 est. 24 79 n/a
Sanderson Bramall 
Group
420 est. 16 35 n/a
Evans Halshaw 484.7 22 58 20,607
Lookers 363.3 15 49 n/a
Bristol Street 
Motors
360 est. 10 26 13,000*
Henlys 345 15 33 16,601
* 1993 figure
These figures are a long way ahead of the rest of the European market, where groups (in 
some cases UK groups moving to internationalise their operations) are only now starting to 
develop (International Car Distribution Programme, 1995(a); Europe 2000, 1991). France 
is the second largest market in Europe in terms of group ownership, but the lack of accurate 
financial data means that it is not possible to construct a turnover comparison here. 
Instead, a comparison of sales figures with the UK situation can be made, as the following 
table illustrates.
Lloyds Bowmaker AMI 00, Automotive Management, 1994. Situation at June 1994.
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Figure 2-22
FRENCH TOP 10 DEALER GROUPS BY SALES, 199459
Group Type New car 
sales 1994
No. o f  
franchises
No. o f  outlets
PGA (Guenant) Multifranchise 22,000 8 36*
Cica Multifranchise 17,000 13 31
Gueudet Multifranchise 13,000 3 14
Marani Multifranchise 11,000 5 12
Schumacher Monofranchise 11,000 Renault 8
Zodo Multifranchise 10,000 2 12
Bernard Multifranchise 10,000 2 11
Lame Multifranchise 10,000 4 18
Luchard Monofranchise 9,000 Peugeot 6
So/co Multifranchise 8,000 19 23
* 27% held by Lex
The advantages and disadvantages of the group operation of dealerships have been widely 
debated in much of the work carried out by the ICDP (International Car Distribution 
Programme, 1994(b) and (d); 1995 (h) and (m)), but for the purposes of this research it is 
sufficient to acknowledge that ownership of dealerships is slowly migrating from 
individuals to groups in many areas of the European market.
The second significant trend to emerge in the UK market over the course of the last few 
years has been multifranchising, the situation whereby one dealer site may sell 2, 3, 4 or 
even 7 or 8 different makes. Again, the UK has led the rest of Europe, but multifranchising 
is set to expand rapidly on the continent both as a result of the new Block Exemption, 
which now makes it easier for dealers to take on another franchise of a competing make,60 
and also because of the advent of lean distribution systems, which remove much of the 
dealer's traditional stocks of cars,61 thus freeing up room at his site which can be used to 
house another showroom (Europe 2000, 1991; Bellenger, L., 1986(a)). Currently in the 
UK, the vast majority of multifranchise sites sell only 2 makes, and overall multifranchise 
operations account for 18% of sites; however, this is predicted to rise to 30% by the year 
2000 (International Car Distribution Programme, 1995(a)).
International Car Distribution Programme sources, including L'Observatoire de L'Automobile
See section 2-5-3
See Chapter 3
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Multifranchise operations come in many different forms, from dual-franchise dealers 
(usually small operations where the 2 makes are sold from the same building but from 
separate showrooms), right up to large out-of-town franchise cluster sites selling maybe 6 
or 7 different makes.62 As with dealer groups (who are usually the operators of the larger 
multifranchise sites), ICDP research has debated the advantages and disadvantages of the 
multifranchising form (particularly in the light of the discussions surrounding the renewal 
of the Block Exemption in Europe), and an assessment is summarised below.
Figure 2-23
SOME ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
MULTIFRANCHISING63
Advantage Disadvantage
Increased chain ownership could encourage 
large operators to work on the efficiency o f  
the system and improve customer value; large 
operators would also provide a counterweight 
to prevent the manufacturers from dominating 
the system
Multiple ownership may dilute the attention 
given to promoting one franchise and 
therefore weaken the manufacturer-dealer 
link
Multifranchising operates in harmony with 
the principles o f lean distribution and the end 
of'stock push'
A multifranchise dealer might put the most 
effort behind the brand with the biggest 
customer 'pull'
More cluster sites will allow multi-make 
facilities to grow, which will enhance 
customer convenience
Reduced dedication to one brand may lead 
to lower standards o f expert service
Clustering and dualling helps weaker brands 
to achieve territorial coverage
Common control o f competing makes in a 
local market may lead to a local monopoly 
situation, reducing competition and keeping 
prices higher
For a fuller set o f definitions o f  multifranchising types, see Tongue. A. in International Car 
Distribution Programme. 1996(q)
Adapted from International Car Distribution Programme. 1995(a)
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Branch dealers and direct selling
The subject of branch (manufacturer- or distributor-owned) dealers has proved to be a 
controversial one in the UK market in recent times although, as the following two graphs 
illustrate, they are a long-standing feature of the European market, particularly in France 
and Germany. Such operations often arouse animosity amongst independent dealers, who 
fear that the ‘factory outlet’ is operating on special terms, gets the cars it wants faster and 
can offer deals that the independent cannot match.
The following figure shows the diversity of network structures across Europe, with the 
clear dominance of the French and German markets in terms of numbers of branch outlets. 
This reflects both the history and the particular trading conditions of both markets. It is 
also worth considering here how the numbers of branch outlets are never constant, but 
fluctuate year-on-year as dealer networks are continuously optimised and rationalised.
Figure 2-24
BRANCH DEALERS PER COUNTRY, 1993 AND 199664
Number of branch dealers 


















■  1993 11996
Similarly, looking at the number of branch outlets by manufacturer, it is clear that there are
Harbour Wade. 1993; International Car Distribution Programme. 1996(n), own calculations
CHAPTER 2 PAGE 61
significant differences between manufacturers, with Mercedes-Benz and the French 
manufacturers having the largest number of branch outlets. Conversely, some 
manufacturers (which do not figure on the following graph), do not have any branch 
outlets.
Figure 2-25
BRANCH DEALERS IN EUROPE BY MANUFACTURER65























Harbour Wade. 1993; International Car Distribution Programme. 1996(n), own calculations. Only 
manufacturers for whom meaningful figures for both years were available have been included. For 
instance, Daewoo has been included because it has gone from scratch to 40 outlets since 1993. Land 
Rover, etc. are not included because no figures for 1993 were available. VW, Skoda, Audi and Seat 
are not included because the 1993 figures were for the whole group rather than separate brands. 
Ford and GM are not included because o f problems o f  definitions. Manufacturers with no branch 
outlets have also been omitted.
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Although these figures are significant, it is important to keep them in perspective, as 
manufacturer-owned dealers number just 1166 out of the 62,258 main dealers in Europe.66 
In the UK, they usually exist in the high cost centres of major urban areas where 
independent dealers would be unable to make a profit; indeed, many branch outlets are not 
really profitable either, but are seen as essential 'shop windows' for the brand in high profile 
areas, and as such constitute a cost that the manufacturer has to bear (International Car 
Distribution Programme. 1994(d)). In many instances, the manufacturer or national 
distributor has actually had to step in to rescue an independent dealer in financial 
difficulties, and, on not being able to find another independent taker, has been obliged to 
operate the dealership itself. In some other examples, the manufacturer owns the site, 
which it then leases out to private operators.
Latterly, and, as shall be argued, partly due to the increased transparency of post-factory 
operations brought about by the adoption of some of the principles of lean distribution to 
be discussed in the next chapter, the place of these branch outlets within the system has 
been clarified. For some manufacturers, they remain a necessary, but expensive, evil for 
retaining a presence in certain locations. For others, they may increasingly become a viable 
alternative to independent franchise holders, particularly as fewer outlets become needed in 
any one network as roads and reliability improve. The critical jury is still very much out on 
the extent to which manufacturer ownership of retail outlets will evolve in the future, and 
this is a topic which will be returned to later in this thesis.67
Rethinking territorial coverage
The evolution of the dealer sector in Europe towards group ownership and multifranchise 
sites therefore brings with it new network decisions for the manufacturers and choices for 
the dealer entrepreneurs. At the same time as deciding whether to allow their franchise to 
be represented at a multifranchise site, manufacturers are provided with an opportunity to 
address the more fundamental question of territorial coverage and dealer profitability.
As mentioned earlier, many industry commentators see a further decline in dealer numbers 
across Europe as inevitable, and many manufacturers are therefore actively seeking to 
reduce the size of their dealer networks by shedding some dealers and enlarging the 
territories worked by the remaining ones68 (International Car Distribution Programme.
66 International Car Distribution Programme. 1996(n)
67 See Chapter 6
68 Financial Times, 17/08/1995
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1995(a); EuroEe2000, 1991).
"In the medium term, the number o f outlets will inevitably decline; the 
marketplace will realise that it is illogical to have selling points on 
every street corner."
C hief Executive, U K  trade federation
A smaller number of dealers with larger territories would theoretically mean a larger 
business opportunity for each dealer, a sufficient 'footprint’ across a local market to restore 
their profitability (International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(d); 1995(h)). Many 
manufacturers also believe that this increased opportunity would be sufficient for the dealer 
to be able to remain exclusive, avoiding the need to take on another franchise and reducing 
the risk to the manufacturer of its market presence being diluted. This in turn might also 
mean that the dealer will be able to maintain better levels of customer service. The other 
incentives to enlarge territories include a significant reduction in intra-dealer competition, 
considered to be a major factor in the lack of dealer profitability as customers trade off the 
discount offered by one dealer with another to get a better deal, and thus an increase in unit 
profits. The downside might be a loss of volume in the more marginal (which usually 
means the more remote) markets, as customers might turn to another make whose dealer is 
located nearer to them, but this could be compensated for by a move to establish satellite 
operations across the territory.
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Figure 2-26
HUBS AND SATELLITES
TRADITIONAL HUBS AND SATELLITES
•Relatively small territories 
•One main dealer per territory
•Larger territories 
•One main dealer per territory 




As has been seen from the above, there has already been a significant amount of 
experimentation with new variations on the selective and exclusive car selling system 
within the UK market. Nevertheless, many critics, and in particular consumer pressure 
groups, have debated the possibility of radically different selling methods being operated in 
the industry (ACEA, 1991; Calori. R. and Lawrence, P., 1991). The most commonly- 
suggested idea has been that of ‘supermarket-style’ selling, with different makes of car 
being lined up against each other in large outlets; it being presumed that this would bring 
increased choice and reduced prices for the consumer. If computers or consumer 
electronics could be successfully sold from large 'supermarket-style* out-of-town retail 
operations, why not cars?
Such schemes have thus far found very little support within the industry (certainly as far as 
new cars are concerned), and many more rigorous studies, such as those conducted by the 
ICDP, have demonstrated that the current system of franchised dealerships is actually the 
optimal one in terms both of delivering economic benefits to manufacturers, dealers and
CHAPTER 2 PAGE 65
customers and particularly of providing support for the unique purchase that the car 
represents and the demanding use to which it is put (International Car Distribution 
Programme, 1994(d); 1995(a) and (h)).
Figure 2-27
ASSESSMENT OF MULTIFRANCHISING OPTIONS69
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Limited except for 
funding
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dependent
Disadvantageous
As shall be discussed in the next chapter and demonstrated later in this thesis, the advent of 
the whole package of changes together termed lean distribution will bring a considerable 
amount of change to the way the current system operates. Nevertheless, the rapid pace of 
technological developments, and in particular the Internet, are opening up new retailing, 
marketing and customer-contact possibilities undreamt of only a few years ago. Some of 
the implications of this will be considered later in this thesis.
ICDP 1994(b)
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2-3-5-3 A SECTOR IN CONSTANT EVOLUTION
This brief look at some of the features of the car dealing sector in Europe has served to 
back up the opinions expressed in the vast majority of literature on the subject; the car 
European market is highly complex and, because of its constantly changing nature, highly 
interesting.
The ICDP research paper "Competition in Car Distribution" sought to draw up a list of 
trends that would continue to mark the dealer sector throughout the next decade. This list 
includes the following points
•  "continued consolidation o f dealer numbers will occur, driven 
by the need fo r profitability, with marginal dealers being driven 
out and larger territories for the remaining stronger dealers;
•  sub-dealer networks may appear in rural areas, or alternatively 
regional structures of'hubs and satellites';
•  the growth in multiple ownership o f dealers will continue;
•  more customer pull demand systems will develop;
•  used car marketing will emerge as a major profit centre;
•  there will be a strong growth in personal leasing packages
•  the product itself will be more technological in its content, but 
will require less servicing. This will lead dealers to adopt 
'customer-convenient' approaches such as no-appointment fast 
service operations, etc. ;
•  dealerships will have more team-based organisational 
structures, using multidisciplinary working and more 
information technology. "70
This research seeks to demonstrate that underscoring all these trends, and many of the 
others touched upon in the preceding section, is a fundamental paradigm shift in the 
organisation of the entire industry value chain from manufacturer to consumer. Lean 
thinking, having already permeated the manufacturing side of the industry, is now being 
applied to the post-factory side as well. The twin concepts of lean production and lean 
distribution will are covered in detail in the next chapter.
70 Adapted from International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a)
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2-4 THE EUROPEAN UNION: ASPECTS 
OF INTEGRATION
As outlined in the introduction, a look at the background to European integration and the 
Single Market Programme is an essential part of any study into the European car industry, 
particularly as the attempts that have been made to introduce a Single Market between the 
Member States of the Union represents the biggest single force for change in the post-war 
economy of the region, and maybe even of the world, with the possible exception of the 
erection and demolition of the Iron Curtain.
The vast majority of literature examining aspects of the Single European Market takes as 
its foundation the theory of the 'Customs Union' on which the Treaty of Rome establishing 
the European Community was based, a theory which is usually attributed to Viner71 
(Jacquemin. A. and Sapir. A.. 1989). Economic integration has been variously defined as 
the removal of economic frontiers between two or more economies, with an economic 
frontier being constituted by any barrier to the mobility of goods, services and production 
factors (Pelkmans. J.. 1934; Emerson. M. et al. 1988), although with a distinction between 
negative integration, or the elimination of obstacles to trade (liberalisation and 
deregulation) and positive integration, the creation of equal conditions for the functioning 
of integrated parts of the European economy (harmonisation and coordination) (Tinbergen. 
J., 1954). Many have argued that, whilst there has been plenty of the former, moves to 
achieve the latter have been much less successful (Molle. W.. 1990). There is no particular 
reason why these economic frontiers need necessarily to coincide with national territorial 
frontiers (Pelkmans. J.. 1984).
The removal of barriers to free trade within a defined area to create a Customs Union, be 
they physical, technical or fiscal barriers or tariffs, quantitative restrictions or market-entiy 
or-distorting barriers (Emerson. M. et al. 1988) would lead to once-and-for-all or 'static' 
economic welfare benefits for the whole of that area thanks to improved utilisation of 
resources and increased specialisation, factors classed as 'trade creation' which have to be 
assessed in conjunction with the mitigating 'trade diversion' effects which occur when the 
creation of a privileged trading area causes trade to be switched away from the most 
efficient producers who now lie outside the Union (Lintner. V. and Mazev. S.. 1989; Molle.
71 Viner. J.. 1950: "The Customs Union Issue", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New 
York
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W.. 1990). The net effect of the creation of the Customs Union is therefore dependent on 
the balance of these trade creation and trade diversion effects (Pelkmans. J.. 1984; Molle. 
W.. 1990); this neoclassical approach which explains trade in terms of comparative 
advantages and factor endowments has become known as ‘comparative static customs 
union theory’ (Lintner. V. and Mazev. S.. 1989).
As well as these static effects, it has been theorised that the creation of a Customs Union 
also brings about a number of dynamic benefits (dynamic customs union theory) which 
would continue to be felt over the course of time (Emerson. M. et al. 1988). These would 
include economies of scale resulting from the need to provide for a larger market (with 
scale economies for the European market estimated by Cecchini at 2.1% of Community 
GDP or 61 billion ECU) and a consequent reduction in costs (Cecchini. P.. 1988), 
increased company efficiency as a result of a rationalisation of industrial structures caused 
by increased competition (Emerson. M. et al. 1988), an improvement in the EC's trade 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the rest of the world, a better framework for the coordination 
of Research and Development and increased growth (Lintner. V. and Mazev. S.. 1989; 
Swann. P.. 1984).
If the theory of the Customs Union was persuasive in its straightforwardness as far as the 
'founding fathers' of the European Community were concerned, the reality brought with it 
political motivations, and thus a whole raft of complications. Indeed, one of the primary 
driving forces behind the instigation of European cooperation in the post-war years was the 
perceived need to reign in the economic might and thus the military potential of Germany, 
a motive that persists to this day. Right from the start, and the inauguration of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950s, it became clear that the presence 
of the supranational institutions needed to oversee the process of tariff removal within the 
Community and the maintenance of a common external tariff at its frontiers would
constitute a constant debating point, and sometimes also a thorn in the side of the different
10national governments.
Nevertheless, in the years immediately following the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the process 
of tariff barrier removal advanced at a pace, with the original 6 Member States (the 
Benelux countries, Germany, France and Italy) having essentially achieved a Customs 
Union between themselves by 1968. However, political disputes over the supranational 
involvement of the new Brussels institutions in areas such as defence and agriculture had 
not gone away, and when these arguments coincided with the economic downturn of the
Davidson. I.: "It started with coal, iron and steel' in the Financial Times supplement "The European 
Single Market", 19/01/1993
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early 1970s, a profound Euro-pessimism' set in. It became clear to Community policy­
makers that the Customs Union by itself was not enough to guarantee economic well-being 
for its participants, as the Member States were compensating for the poor economic 
situation with measures such as state subsidies, national regulations and industrial policies, 
all of them protectionist in nature. What was needed was to reach the stage of a true 
Common Market by combining the achievements of the Customs Union with the removal 
of these 'non-tariff barriers’ (Molle, W.. 1990; Jacquemin. A. and Sapir. A.. 1989).
According to the theoretical literature, if the commitment to the free movement of goods 
and services between the participant countries serves as a definition of a Customs Union, 
then a further undertaking to achieve the free movement of labour and capital defines the 
next step on the scale of integration; the Common Market (Lintner. V. and Mazev. S.. 
1991). A predicted consequence of this economic 'clubbing together' in Europe would be a 
gradual convergence in the political tendencies of the Member States (Swann. P.. 1984), 
although this was seen very much as a parallel development and a welcome side-effect to 
the more immediate goals of economic integration.
So, whilst the static benefits that followed the removal of internal tariffs and quotas 
between the Member States quickly became apparent (internal trade growing twice as fast 
as world trade and quadrupling in the decade following the founding of the Community, 
although the exact extent to which this was due to the operation of the Customs Union can 
never be proved conclusively) (Lodge. J.. 1989; Colchester. N. and Buchan. P.. 1990), 
some of the dynamic benefits were taking longer to develop, and Europe was falling behind 
in the third industrial revolution, that of information technology and microprocessors. It 
was generally agreed that Europe's growing lack of competitiveness by the end of the 1970s 
was due to the failure to eradicate the many non-tariff barriers that continued to fragment 
the European economy into national markets (Molle. W.. 1990; Jacquemin. A. and Sapir. 
A., 1989). As mentioned above, these included the state aid given by governments to prop 
up otherwise uncompetitive industries, restrictive practices concerning public procurement, 
controls on capital movements, differing product specifications and technical standards, 
differences in indirect taxation regimes and the persistence of border controls (Swann. P.. 
1984; Lodge. J.. 1989; Colchester. N. and Buchan. P.. 1990; Commission of the European 
Communities. 1991). As an example, it was estimated by Cecchini that it was costing a car 
manufacturer an additional ECU 286 million to develop a volume car that could be sold in 
each Community county.73
Despite the need to move from a simple Customs Union to a true Common Market being
73 Cecchini. P.. 1988: p27
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acutely perceived both by the European institutions and by many commentators, the long 
recession and sustained political opposition meant that many years passed before much 
could be done about it. Calls to move swiftly through the Common Market stage and on to 
full Economic and Monetary Union were not acted upon, apart from the introduction of the 
European Monetary System which linked exchange rates together, and it took a lengthy 
campaign on the part of the Commission to rekindle interest in European integration in the 
early 1980s.
As the European debate turned to what could be achieved to bring about the economic 
welfare benefits that the incomplete Common Market had thus far failed to deliver, authors 
set about postulating the outcome of the European Commission's planned liberalisation 
programme. Certainly the most influential study was the European Commission's own 
'Cost of Non-Europe' project coordinated by Paolo Cecchini, which quantified the effects 
of the removal of the identified non-tariff barriers in each sector of the European economy, 
and whose contributors were heavily drawn on in the formulation of the legislative package 
that became the 1985 Single European Act (Cecchini. P.. 1988), with many of their 
calculations being employed as 'publicity material' by the Commission in an attempt to gain 
public backing for the Programme.
Figure 2-28
THE BENEFITS OF THE INTERNAL MARKET74
Cost savings arising from the abolition o f frontier checks 
and other formalities
ECU 13 to 24 bn
Gains arising from the opening-up o f public procurement 
markets
Approx ECU 17 bn
Employment (figures overtaken by events) 2 to 5 million new jobs
Scale gains arising from larger production units 2% o f  GNP
The overall economic effects were examined by Emerson et al who predicted, amongst 
other things, a significant reduction in costs, the removal of constraints on economic 
activities imposed by the small size of markets and a consequent rise in economies of scale, 
an increase in demand and therefore competition as new products became available to 
some for the first time, leading to downward pressure on prices, improved and rationalised 
organisational structures and more opportunities to introduce product and process 
innovation (Emerson. M. et al, 1988).
74 Commission of the European Communities. 1991: p7
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The programme to remove as many of these barriers as possible was laid down in the 
White Paper produced by Lord Cockfield and implemented in the 1985 Single European 
Act, with a target deadline set for 31 December 1992. Once the Single Market Programme 
became public, the rush of literature treating every conceivable aspect of the new 'Internal 
Market' turned into a veritable torrent of works of all types, from academic studies (Cutler. 
T. et al. 1989; Fahv, J.. 1993; Lodge. J.. 1989) to guidebooks and articles for managers 
outlining strategic opportunities (Dudley. J. and Martens. H.. 1993; Lynch. R., 1990; 
Magee. J., 1989). Almost all of these works adopted a descriptive approach, basing 
predictions for the future on the extrapolation of trends they had already identified. Molle, 
for instance, followed these stages of integration through and drew implications for firm 
organisation at each point (Molle, W„ 1990).
Figure 2-29
PRODUCTION AND TRADE PATTERNS OF MULTINATIONAL, 
MULTIPRODUCT COMPANIES UNDER DIFFERENT TRADE 
REGIMES75
Trade regime Location of production 
units for each product
Dominant part of firm
Free trade One plant (usually home 
base)
Production and export
Protectionism Numerous plants, one in 
each major national market
National companies
Integration Limited number o f plants at 
good locations
Matrix o f  national and product 
organisations
Free Internal Market One optimal location International product divisions
Colchester and Buchan pointed out the continued validity of this approach; as many of the 
liberalising measures took or are still taking a long time to be completed, there is no reason 
why predictions concerning the economic welfare benefits that would accrue and strategic 
options that would be available following the completion of the Single Market in 1992 
should cease to apply simply because the mythical starting date of 1992, more a public 
rallying point than anything else, has actually passed (Colchester. N. and Buchan. P ..
1990).
75 Molle. W„ 1990: p282
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Figure 2-30
THE IMPACT OF THE REMOVAL OF NON-TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
THE VALUE ADDED CHAIN76
Component of value added Possible nature of the impact
Research and development Growth in the number o f  joint projects
More homogeneous environment at European level
Supplies Wider range o f  suppliers 
Lower prices
Logistics Lower transport costs
Relocation o f  storage facilities (better adapted to an integrated 
market)
Production Increased production at each plant 
Reduction in the number o f  production plants
Marketing and distribution Centralisation o f  product management at European level 
Community-wide marketing campaigns
Consumers Availability o f  a wider range o f  products
Increased demand (growth effect) and lower product prices
The Single European Act certainly entered the consciousness of the European citizens, 
based around the reiteration of the four 'basic freedoms' (free movement of people, goods, 
services and capital) through such symbolic advances as the removal of border controls and 
the simplification of customs documentation. And yet, the Act was no mere publicity 
stunt, as it also added to the Treaty of Rome new supranational commitment to Research 
and Development, to the protection of the environment, to health and safety in the 
workplace and to a more concerted regional policy (Colchester, N. and Buchan, P ., 1990). 
It also enshrined the principle of Qualified Majority Voting which since the mid-1980s has 
accelerated decision-making and institutional procedures and which has brought the 
Community (now Union) through the Maastricht Treaty and on to the threshold of concrete 
steps towards Economic and Monetary Union. Few would deny that the Single Market 
Programme has fulfilled the role of 'kick-starter' for the Common Market that its instigator 
Lord Cockfield intended even though, as shall be discussed in the next section, there are 
still today many areas where liberalisation remains incomplete.
"Europe stands at the crossroads. We either go ahead - with
resolution and determination - or we drop back into mediocrity. We
Maves. P .. 1991: p l4
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can now either resolve the complete integration o f the economies o f  
Europe or, through lack o f  political will to face the immense problems 
to be solved, we can simply allow Europe to develop into no more than 
a free-trade area. "77
Thanks in part to the new supranational powers granted to the Commission by the Single 
European Act, and the momentum of economic integration that built up in the latter half of 
the 1980s, ‘Europe’ has become the basic parameter around which business strategies and 
initiatives are based (Lodge. J. 1989; Colchester. N. and Buchan. P .. 1990). However, this 
phenomenon seems to operate quite independently of the general levels of public support 
for the principles of European unity or for the workings of the common policies. It is taken 
for granted now that a company’s strategy will be formulated around a consciousness of the 
European marketplace (Lodge. J. 1989; Hufbauer. G.. 1990). For a global industry such as 
cars, the existence of a single European marketplace is considered to be more important 
than the supranational legislation-producing institutions that police it (Calori. R. and 
Lawrence. P.. 1991). All the European manufacturers sell the majority of their cars to the 
European market (including the EFTA countries); as we have seen, the internationalisation 
of the car industry predated by a long time the formation of the European Community and 
would arguably have continued to develop even if the Community had never existed. It 
would also continue should the Union crumble tomorrow. Therefore, even if there is room 
for debate here as to the actual importance and influence of the European Community's 
institutions, the concept of a Single European Market is very much central to company 
strategy, as the number of mergers and alliances occurring between all sorts of industrial 
actors testifies. What is open to question is whether these companies view the market in 
their own sectoral terms or terms of the Single Market as Brussels would like them to. 
This makes it virtually impossible for the researcher to be able to differentiate whether 
certain developments were brought about by the advent of the Single Market, or whether 
they would have occurred anyway as part of the general evolution of the industry. 
Nevertheless, many items of legislation concerning the car companies emanating from the 
Union have had a very significant effect on the European industry, and the level of 
dependence on their home markets that many of them display demonstrates that they are 
not as 'global' as they would like us to believe (Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991).
"Through the internal market, we intend to create competitive 
structures in the European Community. The opening-up o f  national 
markets is an important step in that direction, since it is compelling 
firms to think more in European terms. And ye t this is merely an
Lord Cockfield, speaking in 1986, quoted by ACEA. 1993
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intermediate step towards being able to compete successfully on the 
truly relevant market, the world market. ”78
2-5 THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN 
CARS
Given the significance of the car industry within the European Union, it is understandable 
that much has been written regarding the barriers to free trade in cars across the territory, 
and on the prospects for the industry following their removal. As we have seen, the 
European motor industry is one still very much caught up in the process of rationalisation 
as it seeks to adapt itself to new levels of global competition and new ways of organising 
company activity, with the post-factory area set to be the scene of the future struggle for 
market share, and even for survival. The attempts that have been made by the Commission 
and others to open up a Single Market for cars within the European Community are often 
viewed as just a further complication.
"The future o f  the European motor vehicle industry is to be seen as one 
o f  substantial structural change, including a reorganisation o f links 
with upstream and downstream industries and the regrouping o f
n79companies.
Many of the non-tariff barriers legislated for in the Single European Act were directly 
applicable to the car industry, and as such have been the subject of much attention 
concerning the progress of their removal.
"One major contribution to the process o f  industry-wide modernisation 
o f  structures is the completion o f  the single market: the fragmentation 
o f  the European car market, which considerably hampered our car 
industry's prospects, will come to an end once technical and 
environmental standards are harmonised and indirect taxation and
Martin Bangemann. quoted in Commission of the European Communities. 1991: pl9 
Commission of the European Communities. 1992: p5
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charges are brought closer together. Furthermore, the single market 
will stimulate intra-Community collaboration compatible with 
competition requirements, a process already underway. "80
Many authors have recognised the European car industry as having two categories of 
barrier to free trade; internal and external (Commission of the European Communities. 
1992; Hufbauer. G.. 1990; National Consumer Council. 1990; Perrin-Pelletier. F.: Tongue.
C.. 1991; Maves. P.. 1991), and both have yet to be eradicated conclusively. Many of the 
internal barriers have now been legislated for, but continue to provoke debate in various 
ways.
2-5-1 INTERNAL BARRIERS
The persistence of national Type Approval Regulations and other technical standards 
provided the manufacturers with an easy means of segmenting the market by producing 
cars of differing specifications for the different national markets (Commission of the 
European Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 1988; Dudley. J. and Martens. H.. 1993), 
and therefore their removal was one of the Commission's priorities.
"In general terms technical harmonisation is the prerequisite for the 
completion o f the internal market, whether one is referring to the 
\Europeanisation' (which does not prevent differentiation) o f  
production, which is over-geared towards national markets, or to the 
effective movement ofproducts without difficulty at frontiers.,f81
The creation of an EC-wide Whole Vehicle Type Approval proved to be fraught with 
political difficulties. Since a single standard implies the need for consistent monitoring of 
goods both produced within and imported into the Community, the link to issues of 
external trade was unavoidable (Assemblee Nationale. 1992). Smith and Venables 
describe the moves towards a harmonised standard as being 'a hostage of external trade 
policy (Hufbauer. G.. 1990), as the protectionist countries such as France and Italy 
maintained their stance that different technical standards were an effective means of
Commission of the European Communities. 1992: pi 9 
Commission of the European Communities. 1992: p7
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controlling imports from outside the Community. What these countries also recognised, 
but were loath to admit, was that these standards helped to protect national component 
manufacturers from free competition, as few European equipementiers could warrant the 
costs of tooling up to produce, say, yellow headlight bulbs just for the French market. 41 
of the 44 identified technical differences between markets were agreed relatively quickly, 
but the 3 outstanding ones, relating to glass, weights and measures and dimensions, were 
stalled for years for the reason given above.
When a Community-wide system was finally agreed in early 1992, the political 
compromise was such that the system was only made optional; manufacturers could choose 
whether to homologate the car according to either the European or to national regulations. 
So, this did nothing significant to stop the manufacturers from producing essentially 
different cars for each market, something which also contributes to the maintenance of 
price differentials (one of the Commission's avowed targets) or to stop them from 
producing different specifications to meet the tax regimes of each market.
Similar arguments raged over the setting of an EC exhaust emissions standard, with the 
French and Italian companies not wishing to see their German competitors profit from the 
head start they enjoyed in catalytic converter technology. The industry's trade associations 
became totally bogged down over the issue, and the companies turned to their respective 
governments to champion their cause. The result was a standard watered down to the 
lowest common denominator, and the EC emissions standard is consequently much less 
severe than its American equivalent, which is forcing the pace of electric car development 
by requiring that a certain proportion of cars sold in California must be emissions-free (i.e. 
electric) by 1998 at the latest (Arp. H.. 1993; Fafard. P.. 1995; Bricnet. F. and Mangolte. P- 
A., 1990). This means that the European manufacturers have little incentive to raise their 
game to the world's best practice, limiting their chances of being competitive in the 
American market (which now of course includes Canada and Mexico following the 
NAFTA agreement) and penalising the European consumer. A further complication here 
concerns the interpretation of environmental legislation by Member States. As has been 
backed up by numerous cases brought before the European Court of Justice, Article 130 of 
the Single European Act allows Member States to introduce environmental legislation (and 
even the complementary tax regimes) more stringent than the EC norm (Commission of the 
European Communities. 1991; Bricnet. F. and Mangolte. P-A.. 1990). This is to prevent 
products from countries with a long tradition of tough environmental and other legislation, 
such as Denmark and Germany, being put at an unfair cost disadvantage by those from the 
laxer countries in the Community. When this facility is related to cars, and especially 
given the lack of any enabling legislation to guide the Member States, it becomes clear that
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individual countries are free to set higher emissions standards or to introduce fiscal 
measures such as purchase taxes, carbon taxes or road pricing, tactics that would inevitably 
lead to further market fragmentation and price differentials. Again, this was considered to 
help each market maintain its own unique technical requirements, something which would 
help to stave off foreign competition, especially from the Japanese, but which could hardly 
be considered to be in the consumer's best interest fBanville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J..
1991).
A further illustration of the entrenched nature of the Member State car markets is the 
continued variation in vehicle examination regulations. In 1994, the European 
Commission finally issued a guideline that all new cars should be tested for roadworthiness 
after 4 years, and then once every 2 years. A look at the many different systems in 
operation across Europe shows that even a relatively simple requirement such as this will 
cause a significant amount of upheaval and therefore opposition in each market.
Figure 2-31
CAR ROADWORTHINESS EXAMINATIONS IN EUROPE82
Country First test 
after...
Thereafter every... Additional comments
France 5 years 3 years This test has only started 
recently - previously, cars were 
only tested when sold
Italy 10 years 5 years The system is widely abused
Great Britain 3 years 1 year
Germany 3 years 2 years Cars must be inspected if  they 
are involved in an accident
Spain 5 years 2 years Cars over 9 years old are 
checked every year
Luxembourg 3Vi years When the car changes 
hands
Sweden 3 years Next test after 2 further 
years, thereafter every year
Test coincides with insurance 
and road tax renewal
EU guideline 4 years 2 years
The European, 29/07/94
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The issue of varying tax regimes in the Member States (BEUC. 1989; ACEA. 1993 and 
1995) is another one to have ensured the continued fragmentation of markets, enabling the 
manufacturers to maintain different price regimes, and indeed model ranges, in different 
Member State markets (Maves. P.. 1991; Colchester. N. and Buchan. D. 1990; Mertens. Y. 
and Ginsburefa. V.. 1985). This is an area which seems to be converging gradually of its 
own accord, almost independently of the EC's attempts to legislate for it, although progress 
is still painfully slow, as definite progress in the convergence of some areas such as VAT 
rates has often been compensated for by further 'hidden' taxes on ownership and motoring 
that restore the status quo (ACEA. 1993). These include special purchase taxes, import 
duties, registration taxes, special consumption taxes and duties paid on fuel, servicing, 
parts and even on insurance premiums. It has been estimated that the overall tax burden on 
the acquisition and registration of new cars as a percentage of the pre-tax price still ranges 
between 12% in markets such as Luxembourg or Germany and 215% in Greece or 
Denmark (ACEA. 1993). These differences condition the pre-tax price that the 
manufacturers must charge if the final selling price of their product is to remain 
competitive in the marketplace, with margins in the profitable markets doubtless being 
raised to compensate for the tax-heavy markets. This also helps to explain the 
phenomenon of parallel imports, under which individual customers or private companies 
shop abroad for their cars in the cheapest markets; in order to maintain their incomes, 
manufacturers and governments like to leave obstacles in the way of such customers in the 
form of technical differences and complicated administrative procedures. Commission 
legislation in this area has been very limited, partly due to the need for unanimity, and 
partly because of the political storm that an attack by Brussels on a national government's 
revenue raising opportunities would bring. The single biggest spur to convergence in this 
area would be a parallel commitment to move towards a single currency (ACEA. 1994).
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Figure 2-32











TAXES ON CAR ACQUISITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION84
■ VAT at 1/1/91 BVAT at 1/1/93 □ VAT at 1/1/95




Belgium 21% based on cc + age 
e.g. 1.8 litres: 5000 BF
none 2500 BF
Denmark 25% 105% up to 34,400 Dkr, 
180% on the remainder
95% 1000 Dkr
Germany 15% none none 54 DM
Spain 16% <1.6 litres: 7% 
>1.6 litres: 12%
none 8950 pts
20.6% none none 95 FF-195 FF and 
parafiscal charge
Greece 18% new: 10%-75% new: 0%-30% 8%-16%
21% <2.5 litres: 23.2% 
>2.5 litres: 29.25%
13.3% for light CVs, 
otherwise £40-£100
19% none transfer taxes new: 230,000 Lire 
used: 210,000 Lire
Luxembourg 15% none none 1128 Flux
Netherlands 17.5% petrol: 45.2% minus 3394 
Dfl




Source: ACEA Tax Guide: Motor Vehicle Taxation in Europe, 1995 edition
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■ -■ ■ ■ VAT SALES TAX 
_______________________________________________________ - S a g -
Portugal 17% based on cc
e.g. 1.6 litres: 907089 esc
none 5000 esc
UK 17.5% none none none
Austria
■
20% based on fuel consumption 
7%-14%
Finland 22% 100% of taxation value 
minus 4600 Fmk
none
Sweden 25% excise tax based on weight 
and pollution
excise tax
Further complications in this area have been provided in the form of national scrappage 
incentive schemes introduced by several governments ostensibly to help remove older, 
more polluting cars from the roads. In France the Baladurette and Jupette schemes (nick­
named after the Prime Ministers responsible for them) which ran over the 1994-1996 
period helped to stimulate new car sales, particularly small models, by providing a bonus to 
customers who traded an old car in. The schemes played into the hands of the national 
manufacturers Renault and PSA and then the importers of small cars respectively, and were 
responsible for an alleged additional 250,000 sales in the first 8 months of 1996 alone.85 
Although undeniably successful in their objective of removing old cars from the roads, 
such schemes inevitably increase the fragmentation of national markets by artificially 
stimulating sales. Similar schemes are also running in countries such as Ireland and Italy, 
ostensibly with the aim of removing older, less environmentally-friendly cars from the 
roads, but also with the welcome side-effect of boosting the car market.
Overall, however, it is clear that the single largest remaining obstacle in this field to the 
achievement of a true internal market is the lack of a single currency. A significant body of 
industry opinion considers that the continued lack of a single currency acts as a tax on their 
highly international business, and that the industry will only be able to take full advantage 
of the Single European Market when both tax harmonisation and monetary convergence 
have been achieved (EKJ, 1995; VDA, 1996). Whilst this argument undoubtedly holds true 
from a purely industrial perspective, the political situation is, of course, far more 
complicated ...
The granting of state aid to car and component manufacturers, heavily policed as it is by 
the Commission's competition policy regulations contained in Articles 85 to 92 of the 
Treaty of Rome, is one that has been much analysed and commented on (Bhaskar, K., 
1988; Bhaskar. K.. 1990; Jones. P ., 1981), and this interest has been further encouraged by
Source: Automotive News Europe
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a number of highly public cases. In 1988, both Renault and Rover fell foul of Competition 
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan. Renault was ordered by the Commission to cut its car 
capacity by 15% and its truck capacity by 30%, otherwise it would be required to pay back 
FF12 billion out of a FF20 billion aid package it had received from the French government 
to clear some of its debts prior to being readied for privatisation. Similarly, Rover's then 
new owner British Aerospace was ordered to repay £44.4 million it had received in 
'sweeteners' from the British government to take the ailing company off its hands; both 
these cases were widely publicised and created political storms in the respective countries, 
thus setting a precedent that endures to this day for decisions of this nature to be pounced 
upon by anti-Europe media and politicians as evidence of 'meddling from Brussels'. Such 
is the strategic importance of the industry to the European economy, and such is the 
tradition of governments propping up ailing 'national champion' companies, together with 
the many instances of alleged double standards on the part of the Commission (refusing 
one company's requests to receive state aid whilst awarding Community funds to another) 
that many commentators suggested that Europe should have an equivalent to the Japanese 
government's M ill agency that coordinates policy to ensure that the best interests if the 
industry are catered for (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991; Lehmann. J-P.. 1992; 
Jones. P.. 1981). This proves once again the need to analyse the industry from a global 
perspective, taking into account all the different actors that go to make up the network. 
The matter of state aid is not merely a competition policy one; it is inextricably linked with 
the EC's regional and social policies, especially since the loss of a car plant means many 
thousands of redundancies, usually in long-standing industrial regions that are already in 
decline, and also to external trade policy, as part of the question of how to get the European 
industry into a situation where it will be able to defend itself against the competitive 
challenge of outsiders, especially the Japanese (Commission of the European 
Communities. 1992; Bhaskar. K.. 1990). More recently, the Commission's stance with 
regard to competition policy implementation has toughened, partly due to incidents such as 
those mentioned above and the character of the then Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, and 
partly due to the drive towards the Single Market. At the same time, however, consistency 
has improved and a shift of emphasis has crept in. A specific threshold now exists, with 
aid packages exceeding ECU12 million (£9.88 million) required to be submitted to the 
Commission for approval prior to being distributed (as was the case in a recent example 
involving the Spanish government and Seat.86 The aid has to form part of a genuine 
restructuring package rather than just keeping the ailing firm afloat, and the use of state aid 
together with Union funds to further regional policy objectives has become more explicit; 
despite opposition, Ford and VW were granted aid to set up their joint 'people-carrier' 
factory in rural Portugal, and a similar scheme allowed Fiat to receive £2.5 billion for a
Financial Times, 6/6/1995
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factory in the Mezzogiomo region of Italy, despite the fact that it added 450,000 units to an 
already over-capacitised market. Overall, the Commission has increasingly started to add 
stipulations to the aid packages it approves, using the opportunity to induce restructuring 
by means of a 'back-door' industrial policy.88
2-5-2 EXTERNAL BARRIERS
The external barriers to trade have in general been the more polemical of the two, at least at 
a political level. Much has been written, particularly by consumer organisations, on the 
subject of national import quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs - 'voluntary1 
hardly being used in its dictionary sense given the threats of more drastic action in the 
event of non-compliance that usually accompany these 'agreements') on Japanese cars 
entering the Union, and most commentators have concluded that restrictions on the 
importation of Japanese cars actually play into the hands of the companies that produce 
them, enabling them to charge higher prices than they would otherwise have been able to in 
Europe thanks to their products' rarity value, and also to fill up their quotas with the more 
upmarket models of their ranges, models which provide them with greater profit margins 
(National Consumer Council 1990; Morris. J.. 1991), whilst at the same time allowing the 
European manufacturers to rest on their secure domestic markets, providing them with little 
incentive to raise their competitiveness (Gandillot. T.. 1992; Banville. E. de and Chanaron. 
J-J.. 1991). One estimate put the annual cost to the European consumer of restricting 
imports to be in the range of 2.4 to 2.8 billion ECU, reckoning that this could well have 
accounted for the 20% gap between EC car prices and the notional world average.89 
Overall then, they are seen as doing little more than severely distorting competition, and 
costing the European consumer in terms of both price and choice (National Consumer 
Council. 1990; Perrin-Pelletier. F.T
The debate concerning the advantages and disadvantages of import restrictions and the 
presence of transplant factories, necessarily linked to questions relating to the EC's 
External Trade and (non-existent) Industrial Policies reached its peak in the immediate 
aftermath of the signing of the 1991 agreement 'Elements of Consensus' between the 
Commission and the Japanese government (the tortuous negotiations are chronicled by
87 Financial Times, 10/12/1992
88 Le Nouvel Economiste, 05/02/93
89 National Consumer Council. 1990: p23-4
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Gandillot and Mason) (Gandillot. T.. 1992; Mason. M.. 1994). Some, such as Lehmann, 
predicted a repeat of the scenario that had been played out in the USA since the mid-1970s, 
with the indigenous producers being brought to their knees by the Japanese companies (he 
lists six major threats hanging over the European industry, Japanese imports, Japanese 
transplant production in Europe, the prospect of gaining the same market share here (30%) 
as they enjoy in the USA, Japanese exports from their American plants, Japanese 
technology and European impecuniosity and labels them the 'Six Horses of the European 
Automotive Apocalypse') (Lehmann. J-P.. 1992). Many in this category have failed to 
appreciate the realities of a global industry, in which a car produced by a Japanese 
company in Europe is worth many more jobs than a car produced by a Japanese company 
in Japan and exported to Europe (FIA. 1989). Others conclude on the need for a common 
policy at EC level, if not classical interventionism, then certainly a coordinated sectoral 
approach (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991; Jones. P.. 1981; Tongue. C.. 1991). 
Finally, a third group, and this includes the ever optimistic Commission publications, 
demonstrate their faith in free competition and the fighting spirit of those European 
manufacturers that have the will to survive the expected Japanese onslaught (National 
Consumer Council. 1991; Hufbauer. G.. 1990; Commission of the European Communities.
1992), albeit with a certain reserve concerning the need for greater coordination of 
Research and Development.
"It is wrong to believe that Japanese cars can be kept off the European 
market through import quotas or ban o f local production. ... The 
Japanese car is beaten only by manufacturing a better product. It is 
not a race between two commercial powers, but a competition to 
produce the best car for the consumer. "90
Whilst discussion on the nature of trade with Japan continues, the emerging focus of 
current attention is Korea, another highly restricted market harbouring extremely ambitious 
producers who are in the process of accelerating their European presence dramatically. The 
current global trading climate has moved away from quotas and other quantitative 
restrictions, but it remains to be seen how, in the face of increasing pressure from its 
domestic manufacturers, the European Union will achieve its aim of ensuring reciprocity of 
access to the Korean market for European cars.
Martin Bangemann in La Repubblica (20 May 1990) reported in Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991: 
pl22
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Figure 2-34
THE ‘ELEMENTS OF CONSENSUS’ AGREEMENT91
From 1993:
• Japanese manufacturers agreed to limit the total number of 
cars exported to the EU to 1.23 million until 2000
• Specific national ceilings were imposed for France, Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and the UK, to prevent these formerly 
restricted markets from being overrun with imports
• A monitoring system for these markets and the EU 
generally was set up so that modifications to the limits 
could be arranged if necessary
• BUT this monitoring is dependent on market projections, 
which have proved very difficult to agree
From 1999:
• The EU market will be fully opened to Japanese imports
2-5-3 THE BLOCK EXEMPTION
The final, and, for the purposes of this research, the most relevant of the barriers to free 
trade within the European Union is the issue of the selective distribution system operated 
by all the car makers. Although the 10 year Block Exemption (EC Regulation 123/85) 
from Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome's competition articles allowing manufacturers to 
segment their sales territories and to appoint exclusive dealers for each did not originally 
form part of the Single Market legislative programme, the period leading up to its renewal 
in 1995 saw a fierce debate centred essentially on the widely-publicised detrimental effects 
the arrangement was presumed to have on consumer welfare, including a restriction of 
freedom of choice (Perrin-Pelletier. F.: National Consumer Council. 1990), and the issue of 
its role in the significant price differentials observed between the various Member State 
markets (Mertens. Y. and Ginsburgh. V.. 1985; BEUC. 1989; National Consumer Council. 
1990; Commission of the European Communities. 1992).
91 Butt-Philip. A. and Porter. M.. 1995
CHAPTER 2 PAGE 85
In the UK, the matter was further brought into focus by an investigation into the workings 
of the car industry launched by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1990. 
Prompted by a leaked report to the press in May 1991, the findings of the enquiiy were 
made public prematurely; they identified the existence of at least 2 'complex monopolies'. 
One was the persistence of the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' voluntary export restraint operated 
between the UK and the Japanese Manufacturers' Associations, and the other was the 
selective and exclusive distribution system92 (Ruigrok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1991). A 
'complex monopoly1 is considered to exist when two or more persons or companies supply 
or are supplied with at least one quarter of the goods or services of a particular description 
in the market, and when they conduct their affairs in such a way as to restrict or distort 
competition in connection with this supply. If the market shares of the two largest 
manufacturers in the UK market are added together, they exceed 25%; the same situation 
would be true at a European level. However, despite this label, the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission considered that the high level of competition present in the industry 
demonstrated that the matter was not as clear-cut in practice as it was in theory. This ruling 
effectively 'passed the buck' to the European Commission, who were considering the matter 
themselves in the build-up to the renewal decision.
Many argued that the system should be abolished completely, and, until the final stages of 
the debate leading up to the renewal date, it had largely been left to the manufacturers 
themselves to point out the other side of the argument, namely that Selective Distribution 
provides them with the stability they need to invest in the considerable expertise and 
infrastructure needed to support the product during its lifetime, thus enabling them to 
ensure that the consumer receives the best possible quality of service and the utmost 
convenience (International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a)). Furthermore, the image 
of the manufacturer is heavily dependent on the quality of this after-sales support provided, 
and so it was argued that it is only reasonable to expect that they will want to be able to 
dictate certain standards and practices to those charged with carrying out these services on 
their behalf (Ludvigsen. K.. 1994).
One of the central pieces of work of the first phase of the ICDP sought to unravel the 
debate and to inform both the industry and its regulators. Given that the outcome of the 
Block Exemption renegotiations would have the potential to transform the operation of 
every dealer in Europe (International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(a)), it was 
important to establish exactly what a 'selective and exclusive' system meant for them 
beyond the principle of an allocated sales territory. Exclusivity can be taken to mean many
92 Financial Times, 06/02/1992; Daily Telegraph, 17/02/1992
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different things in the dealer sector, and it was not always clear during the renegotiation 
phase that the European Commission fully understood which interpretation it was using 
(ACEA. 1995; International Car Distribution Programme. 1994(c)). It can mean 
exclusivity of the dealer outlet, meaning that only cars of that make can be sold from that 
specific premises (again, this is open to interpretation as we shall see in the case of 
multifranchising). Secondly, it can mean exclusivity of dealer ownership or territory, or a 
restriction imposed on the dealer principal or company from operating other outlets for 
another franchise (or even for the same franchise) elsewhere. Several manufacturers 
considered such a limitation essential to prevent any one dealer from becoming responsible 
for too large a proportion of the manufacturer's sales in any one region; they did not want to 
'put too many of their eggs into one basket' in case the dealer should fail or abandon the 
franchise abruptly. Finally, it can mean exclusivity of channel, or an undertaking that cars 
shall only be officially sold through the franchised dealers and not through other outlets 
(such as mandataires or directly from the manufacturers).
All of these interpretations can be observed as forming part of manufacturer strategies 
towards selective distribution. For the franchised dealer however, exclusivity relates to the 
facility, to the management and to the running of the business (International Car 
Distribution Programme. 1994(d)). Under the heading of facility is included the 
requirement to have a dedicated showroom and service facility for the make in question. 
As shall be seen, manufacturers are increasingly tolerant of franchises sharing sites and 
even workshops, but showroom sharing is only sanctioned in exceptional circumstances, 
usually when it is the only means to maintain marque representation in the territory. 
Manufacturers usually insist on separate dealer principals or general managers for each 
make the dealer might represent, along with separate sales and service staff, who will have 
been trained by the manufacturer or national distributor . Finally, the manufacturers will 
expect their franchise to operate as a separate business unit with its own profit and loss 
accounts, so as to prevent financial or other difficulties encountered by the dealer with one 
of his other franchises from spreading to affect the performance of the rest. This brief 
explanation only skims the surface of the subject, but it is clear that the vast majority of 
European dealers do conform to these definitions of exclusivity.
All through the renegotiation discussions, the European manufacturers stuck to their belief 
that the maintenance of the selective system was in the best interests of the European 
consumers, and through this conviction they sought to ensure that they got their way 
regarding what could be permitted under the notion of exclusivity (ACEA, 1995). Their
The term dealer here encompasses both individual 'owner-driver' entrepreneurs and public or private 
groups
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chief concerns could be divided into 4 categories; firstly their corporate image. They 
believed that customers expected to have the full range of products available at the dealer's 
premises, to have a knowledgeable and competent sales and service staff, with the 
manufacturer standing fully behind the dealer in case things go wrong (warranties, etc.). 
To back this up, they would point to the huge outlay that the purchase of a car meant for 
the average consumer, and thus to the need for there to be a formal mechanism to provide a 
link for the customer back to the manufacturer. Furthermore, the high value of the product 
and the demanding use to which it is put by the consumers is such that they considered it to 
be only reasonable for them to expect to have control over how the car is presented and 
sold in the marketplace. The second category of manufacturer concern related to their 
desire to maintain an exclusive dealer network. Again, the belief was that a solus dealer 
would deliver better performance because of its focus on selling one make; it would have 
dedicated sales staff and local advertising devoted to just one make (International Car 
Distribution Programme. 1994(a) and (c)). However, it is clear that exclusive networks 
will be increasingly hard to maintain unless a way can be found for them to become more 
profitable. The third concern related to the technical knowledge and expertise required to 
service and repair the increasingly complicated modem car, not forgetting the important 
need to consider the safety aspect of a product used at high speeds and over long distances. 
Finally, the manufacturers expressed worries about how to ensure the continuity and 
cohesion of their territorial coverage if dealers were able to swap franchises at will or to 
build up competition between the different brands they might represent at one site in a 
multifranchise operation. Behind these concerns of course was the desire not to lose any 
elements of control that they held over their dealer networks, although, as one of the 
interview respondents pointed out, this belief was not necessarily their best course of 
action.
" Ultimately,  it would be daft fo r  the manufacturers to oppose changes 
to the Block Exemption, as they will need strong dealer partners in the 
future . "
Pilot interview with policy director of UK trade
federation
The renewed regulation finally passed through the European Commission stage in June 
199594, and contained new or revised clauses which:
• allow and encourage dealers to take on additional franchises, provided that they occupy
The new Block Exemption is enshrined in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95, published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 145/25,29/06/1995
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separate premises (although they may be on the same site) with separate management 
and 'no possible confusion between the makes'. Manufacturers will have the facility to 
terminate a dealer's contract if the latter decides to sell another make, but only if the 
termination is based upon 'objective criteria', with arbitration being used in the event of 
disputes;
• ensure that sales targets may only be set by mutual agreement between manufacturers 
and dealers, rather than the former imposing their own objectives. Arbitration has again 
been provided for;
• permit dealers to obtain spare parts from independent sources, provided that they are of 
'equivalent quality*;
• require manufacturers to pass on technical information to suitably-qualified independent 
garages and repairers;
• gives dealers the freedom to prospect for sales outside their allocated territory;
• extends the minimum duration of manufacturer-dealer contracts from four to five years 
and the minimum notice of termination from one to two years;
• outlaws anti-competitive clauses in contracts, and also practices which may have the 
effect of discouraging consumers of one EU country from buying their car abroad, such 
as differences in the manufacturer's remuneration of dealers depending on the sale 
destination.95
The new Block Exemption will run from 1 July 1995 to 30 September 2002, with the 
Commission promising to draw up an evaluation report by the end of December 2000 at the 
latest. The industry has already been warned that this will pay particular attention to the 
issues of price differentials and to the quality of the service being given to the final end 
users.96 However, the renewal does not mean that the argument surrounding selective 
distribution it is about to cease. Whilst some, including the Commission, feel that the 
overall balance has successfully been shifted slightly in favour of dealer freedom, others 
feel that the powerful manufacturer lobby has got its own way almost entirely, and that the 
modifications amount to a 'tinkering when a radical approach was needed instead'.97 Quite 
apart from this, the fact that the renewal was for another 10-year period, with a review 
planned after 7 (2002), means that the debate will not have time to die away in the interim. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s more general exemptions covering retailing, franchising, 
etc. are also due to expire at the end of 1997; the stance that the Commission is to adopt 
towards vertical restraints in general will emerge over the next couple of years, and will 
certainly condition how the car industry is viewed in the run-up to 2002. The Block 
Exemption forms an important backdrop to this research, as its stipulations influence not
95 Financial Times, 22/06/95; ACEA, 1995; various ACEA and ICDP sources
96 EC Regulation 1475/95, Article 11, published in the Official Journal No. L 145/25,29/06/1995
97 Financial Times, 30/05/95
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only the way the distribution chain between manufacturer and customer is organised, but 
also the nature of the relations between the different elements of the chain.
2-6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed a wide range of literature covering the global nature of the 
modem car industry, the importance of the current critical interest in its post-factory sphere 
of operations and the European legislative environment within which it operates.
It has found an industry dominated by manufacturers operating on a multinational level, 
particularly within the main car trading triad formed by Europe, Japan and the USA. In a 
situation of growing competition in this global marketplace, these companies are faced 
with the task of optimising all elements of their corporate and affiliate structures and 
activities.
Recently, critical attention has turned to vehicle distribution and customer-facing activities 
in the search for competitive advantage, at the same time as competitive pressures are 
forcing a parallel rethinking of activities and structures in this area of the distribution 
chain; national sales companies, dealers and other chain actors.
Within Europe, these developments are occurring against the backdrop of continued 
attempts being made to establish a true single market between European Union member 
states in a territory still displaying a plethora of local tastes, requirements and regulations.
Chapter 3 now goes on to detail how many of the changes underway throughout the 
industry are being driven by an emergent business paradigm relating initially to production 
organisation, and now to distribution organisation as well; the twin concepts of lean 
production and lean distribution, an examination of which forms the focal point of this 
research.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE 
LEAN REVOLUTION
"English engineers will soon produce fa r better engines and carriages 
than anything that our Continental neighbours have yet seen. "
John Henry Knight, Notes on Motor Carriages, 1896, 
quoted in The Motor Industry of Britain Centenary 
Book, published by the SMMT, 1996
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3-1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the most dominant strand of recent debate in the car industry, 
namely that concerning the changing organisation and methodology of car production, in 
particular the paradigm shift from the 'Fordist' principles of mass production to the so- 
called 'lean production' scheme pioneered by the Japanese manufacturers in the period after 
the Second World War (Altshuler. A. et al. 1985). The principles of lean production and 
their gradual implementation across the industry are covered, before the second half of the 
chapter moves on to consider the most recent development, namely the application of this 
lean thinking to the post-factory area of the industry. It is these efforts to define and to 
achieve lean distribution in the car industry which form the centrepiece of this research.
3-2 THE LEAN PRODUCTION
REVOLUTION
3-2-1 THE LOGIC OF LEAN PRODUCTION
Traditionally, the vast majority of studies into the car industry have been contained within 
the framework of applied economics and the theory of the firm (Williams. K. et al. 1994). 
These have concentrated on the economics of production, the factory and its assembly 
processes as the key to measuring industry fortunes, selecting either specific companies 
(Williams. K.. 1987; Mair. A.. 1994), markets (Rhvs. P.. 1972; Shimokawa. K.. 1994) or a 
more worldwide perspective (Maxcv. G.. 1981), and were usually essentially descriptive in 
nature. As the levels of internationalisation in the industry have risen since the Second 
World War, so attention has become increasingly drawn to the search for means to 
compare the performances of the different companies and trading regions, with the most 
common measure being either those of factory productivity, the striving to reduce costs
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whilst improving performance (Abernathy. W.. 1978; Schonbereer. 1982; Hall. 1983) or 
trade figures between markets and regions (Hocking. R.. 1980; Owen. N.. 1983). More 
recently, thanks partly to the dominant role the industry now plays in the economies of the 
developed world, and particularly due to the severe economic circumstances of the 1970s, 
discourse on the industry grew more mainstream as it became adopted into managerial 
disciplines, and as the car manufacturers started to throw off their traditional veils of 
secrecy and to team up with universities, business schools and other consultancies in the 
search for successful strategies for the future.
The entire industry, and not to mention those observing it, received a severe jolt around the 
end of the 1960s, and especially in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, when it 
became apparent that the Japanese car makers, at one time the laughing stock of their 
Western counterparts, had become a very considerable force to be reckoned with. The 'Big 
Three' American car makers realised that their catastrophic loss of sales in the US market 
in favour of imported Japanese 'compacts' was no short term blip in their fortunes due to 
particular circumstances, but rather the emergence of a dominant new force in the industry 
(Altshuler. A. et al. 1985). Critical attention quickly turned Eastwards in an attempt to 
explain the Japanese economic phenomenon, to demystify the rumours that the Japanese 
car industry functioned in a completely different way to its Western counterparts.
By far the most influential work in this respect has been that produced as part of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's 'International Motor Vehicle Programme', a 
research project that itself emerged out of a highly successful book, "The Future o f the 
Automobile" (Altshuler. A. et al. 1985). Since its launch in 1984, the project has grown to 
achieve global coverage, has spawned a worldwide best-seller, "The Machine that Changed 
the World' (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990), and has encouraged the 
development of numerous related research projects, of which the International Car 
Distribution Programme (ICDP) is one.
The IMVP, and not to mention the many other authors investigating the area, combined 
history and contemporary research by focusing their attention on the so-called 'Toyota 
Production System' put in place in the company of the same name by two of its engineers, 
Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno, in the decade following the Second World War (Wulff. H.. 
1994; Lamming. R.. 1993; Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990). Japan's fledgling 
industry prior to the war had been based upon assembly plants set up there by Ford and 
General Motors, and also on a copying by Japanese engineers of American mass production 
principles gleaned during visits to the giant Highland Park and Rouge complexes in Detroit 
(Shimokawa. K.. 1994). The crushing defeat suffered in 1945, however, forced the whole
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of the Japanese economy to start again from scratch, and high priority was given to the 
development of an autonomous car industry. To this end, a policy was developed by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (M1T1) which forbade all kinds of foreign 
direct investment in the car industry, and which also encouraged the 12 car-producing firms 
to coordinate their model ranges in order to achieve economies of scale, although the latter 
was ultimately thwarted by each firm's desire to produce a full range of products itself 
(Lamming. R.. 1993; Shimokawa. K.. 1994). However, numerous structural obstacles 
faced the companies, like Toyota, which held such ambitions:
•  "The domestic market was tiny and demanded a wide range o f  
vehicles;
•  The native Japanese workforce . . .  was no longer willing to be 
treated as a variable cost or as interchangeable parts;
•  The war-ravaged Japanese economy was starved fo r capital and 
foreign exchange,  meaning that massive purchases o f the latest 
Western production technology were quite impossible;
•  The outside world was full o f  huge motor vehicle producers who 
were anxious to establish operations in Japan and ready to defend 
their established markets against Japanese exports.
Toyota's young engineers realised that, in such a situation, a copying of American mass 
production was no longer enough, and that its techniques were fundamentally unsuited to 
the concept of range and model differentiation that looked set to dominate the industry and 
its markets. This thinking paved the way for the development of the pioneering Toyota 
Production System, to be refined and codified by the IMVP under the title of 'lean 
production' (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; Lamming. R.. 1993).
Two immediate characteristics emerged during this period. Firstly, inventory levels were 
reduced significantly in a burst during the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially those 
controlled by the suppliers of Toyota (Lieberman. M.. Demeester. L. and Rivas. R.. 1995). 
Indeed, on average, Japanese suppliers cut their work-in-progress inventories by a bigger 
margin than the manufacturers (Lieberman. M.. Demeester. L. and Rivas. R.. 1995; 
Lieberman. M. and Demeester. L.. 1995). These reductions in inventory levels exposed 
defects in the manufacturing processes and forced companies to work to eliminate these 
sources of production variability (Lieberman. M.. 1995).
Secondly, these suppliers were ‘quasi-internalised’ by their manufacturers into semi-
Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990: p49-50, summarised in Lamming, R., 1993: pl7
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exclusive keiretsu partnership groupings with cross-shareholdings, involvement in the 
product planning process and long-term supply commitments (Helper. S. and Hochfelder. 
a ,  1995).
It was as a result of the IMVP’s investigation of these particular aspects of the Japanese car 
industry that the lean paradigm emerged. According to Jones, the term ‘lean production’ 
was coined to describe the logic behind this management system that had proved 
particularly successful for the Japanese industry (Jones. P.. 1995). It referred to the way in 
which the production system developed by Toyoda and Ohno apparently used the bare 
minimum of all productive inputs; space, labour and materials, when compared to mass 
production. Lamming (Lamming. R.. 1993) uses a boxing analogy of reducing body fat to 
reach fighting weight.
"The mass-producer uses narrowly skilled professionals to design 
products made by unskilled or semiskilled workers tending expensive, 
single-purpose machines. These churn out standardised products in 
very high volume. Because the machinery costs so much and is so 
intolerant o f  disruption , the mass-producer adds many buffers - extra 
supplies, extra workers, and extra space - to assure smooth 
production. Because changing over to a new product costs even more, 
the mass-producer keeps standard designs in production fo r  as long as 
possible. The result: the consumer gets lower costs but at the expense 
o f variety and by means o f  work methods that most employees find  
boring and dispiriting. The lean producer, by contrast, combines the 
advantages o f  craft and mass production, while avoiding the high cost 
o f the former and the rigidity o f  the latter. Toward this end, lean 
producers employ teams o f  multiskilled workers at all levels o f the 
organisation and use highly flexible, increasingly automated machines 
to produce volumes o f products in enormous variety. Lean production 
is lean' because it uses less o f  everything compared with mass- 
production - half the human effort in the factory, half the 
manufacturing space, half the investment in tools, half the engineering 
hours to develop a new product in half the time. Also, it requires 
keeping fa r less than half the needed inventory on site, results in many 
fewer defects, and produces a greater and ever growing variety o f  
products.
Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990: p i3
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Lamming splits the concept of lean production into three constituent elements; a new 
production paradigm, a corporate strategy model (referring to the global nature of the 
industry and its markets, which has already been considered in Chapter 2) and an 
integration model (Lamming. R.. 1993).
The production paradigm, referred to in the quotation given above, considers concrete 
methods such as:
• Zero stocks and just-in-time delivery systems for components ('kanban'), meaning 
that buffer stocks of bought componentry within the factory and alongside the 
production line can be significantly reduced or removed altogether, saving both 
money and space and allowing more flexible production planning and quicker 
change-overs;
• Small batch production. Traditional manufacturing thought was that it was cheaper 
to make long runs of an item rather than small batches. Evidence fiom Japanese 
industry has shown that this is not the case, with increased precision and attention 
to removing faults meaning better quality and less waste (Jones. P.. 1995).
• Tight control of processes and constant improvement through the removal of task 
demarcations and the empowering of workers ('kaizen'). This can only achieved by 
bringing all skills in the organisation together, and by returning responsibility as far 
down the organisation as possible (Jones. P.. 1995).
“JIT’s3 approach is commonly pictured as a travelling boat (the value- 
adding process) on a river (the production site). JIT’s philosophy is to 
lower the water level (inventory or time-slack waste) until the boat hits 
a rock (bottleneck in the process like a capacity or quality constraint). 
Then take away the rock and lower the water level until it hits another 
rock. Continue the sequence until the bottom o f the river is without 
rocks and perfectly smooth so that no water is required any more. 
Now most people think . . .  that it is impossible to move the ship without 
water. It is this attitude that leaves Porsche needing help from  
Toyota. ”4
A wide body of literature has grown up dealing either with the theory behind such methods,
‘Just-In-Time’
Car Magazine, June 1996
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or with the effects that their permeation is having or will have on other regions or 
companies (National Consumer Council 1990; Assemblee Nationale, 1992, Bricnet F.. 
and Mangolte, P-A., 1990; Jacot H.. 1990).
“Lean production organisations achieve much greater productivity, 
quality and flexibility than traditional mass production methods. The 
key to a lean operation is an integrated and uninterrupted work flow, 
exposing redundant activities and eliminating buffer stocks. ”5
The effects of these measures were quantified by the IMVP in the form of a highly- 
publicised benchmarking operation which assessed the performance gap, in terms of 
productivity and other indicators, between manufacturers of the three 'triad' markets, with 
the 'lean' Japanese manufacturers leading on every score (Womack, J., Jones, P., and Roos.
D., 1990).
Figure 3-1




Defects per 100 cars traceable to 
the assembly plant (cars sold in 
the US only)
Japanese-owned plants in Japan 16.80 52.10
Japanese-owned plants in North 
America (including joint ventures)
20.90 54.70
American-owned plants in North 
America
24.90 78.40
American- and Japanese-owned 
plants in Europe
35.30
European-owned plants in Europe 35.3* 76.4**
Plants in newly industrialising 
countries (Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan 
and Korea)
41.00 72.30
* Productivity levels at the 13 plants visited varied between 22.8 and 55.7 hours/vehicle. 
**Quality levels for the 5 producers sampled varied between 63.9 and 123.8 defects/100 vehicles.
ICDP. 1993(b): p.D.1.1
Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P .. 1990: p85-6
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Overall then, the benefits of these lean methods were agreed to include increased 
flexibility, faster product development and higher quality, at lower cost, with less human 
effort, needing less space, inventory and investment (Maxton, G. and Wormald, J., 1994); a 
highly attractive recipe for the rest of the global industry to aim for.
Figure 3-2
SOME INGREDIENTS OF LEAN PRODUCTION 
AS MENTIONED IN THE LITERATURE
• Just-in-Time
• Zero buffer stocks
• Building quality in
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Leaving the corporate strategy model aside for a moment, the third element of the so-called 
'lean revolution', the integration model, has also received considerable attention, centred 
around aspects of the Toyota Production System such as integrated design and 
development processes involving staff from all areas and levels of the company, vertically- 
tiered layers of suppliers becoming the fully-fledged partners of the manufacturers, and 
'keiretsu' family groupings of companies with cross-shareholdings and mutual assistance 
mechanisms. A wide body of literature has considered the implications of the increased 
status of component suppliers in the productive process for the nature of the relationship 
between assembler, subsidiaries and external suppliers (Lamming, R., 1993; Odaka, K. et 
al, 1988; Shimokawa, K., 1994), including the replacement of the traditional vertically- 
integrated system of autonomous manufacturers and dependent suppliers by networks of 
partnerships with infinitely variable power relationships (Richter, F-J. and Wakuta, Y„
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1993; Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991). Others have predicted a rationalisation in 
the number of component producers in each of the triad markets (Ruigrok. W. and Van 
Tulder. R.. 1991), or have considered the suitability of promoting 'keiretsu' groupings in the 
European Union as a backdoor form of Industrial Policy that would encourage working 
together to improve competitiveness (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991). Finally, 
some works, including "The Machine that Changed the World', have started to explore the 
future beyond lean production, suggesting that, given the continued progress in electronics 
and advanced materials, specialist suppliers will increasingly become responsible for 
coordinating the lower levels of the supply chain and for producing complete 'component 
modules' which the manufacturer merely has to drop into the car (Womack. J.. Jones. P.. 
and Roos. P.. 1990). Traditional manufacturing operations conducted by the car producer 
will be replaced by assembly tasks (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991), a concept 
which, taken to its logical extension, leads to discussions of the 'virtual factory* or the 
'virtual company1, under which the car producer acts merely as a supply coordinator and 
facilitator, coordinating the inputs from the various partner operations (Mever. A de. 1992) 
and affixing the badge of the 'umbrella organisation' to the bonnet of the final product.
“Upstream o f car assemblers, lean principles require new methods o f  
working with suppliers, involving a close, shared destiny relationship 
from new product development right though to supply. ”
This lean logic demands different ways of looking at what organisations do and how they 
relate to the customer (Jones. P.. 1995). The traditional manufacturing operation divided 
specialist tasks into functions and departments with little or no link to the outside world. 
The lean system starts with the customer, for whom it is totally irrelevant how many 
organisations and transactions were involved in making the car. What matters to the 
consumer is the cumulative sum of all the activities which add value to the product and its 
support and the cost at which this is delivered (Jones. P.. 1995).
7 ICDP, 1993(b): p.D.1.1
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Figure 3-3







An ideal lean system would therefore involve an uninterrupted flow of activities adding 
value to the product, with all non-contributing elements removed. Such a system would be 
organised around key processes irrespective of functional or corporate boundaries, and 
would be driven by customer orders and not stock (Jones, P ., 1995). This notion of the 
extended enterprise would apply wherever the manufacturer located its production 
facilities; they would form lean-style relationships with suppliers and other actors (either 
indigenous or joining them from elsewhere) in that market area. This lean approach 
complements the emerging global nature of the industry as discussed in Chapter 2, which 
has seen the major players move to locate dedicated production facilities in as many of the 
major trading regions as is practical; these facilities not only produce tailored products for 
that region, but where appropriate they can also be called on to export them to the other 
regions, including back to the homeland. This 'multiregional' approach is also observable 
in microcosm at the European level, with many manufacturers operating an integrated 
network of production facilities located throughout the Union.
ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation








This chapter can only skim the surface of the enormous body of literature now devoted to 
the techniques and implications of these Japanese-inspired production methods. However, 
it is safe to conclude from the above that this debate, and in particular the IMVP-defmed 
concept of lean production has infiltrated not only all areas of the car industry, but has also 
seen its buzzwords become an accepted part of business worldwide. Both of the above 
concepts, namely the paradigm shift from mass to lean production and the breakdown of 
the vertical dependency structures between different industry actors have profound 
implications for the post-factory area. Transforming the factory was the first stage; now the 
task is to establish lean distribution across Europe, which no one manufacturer has yet 
achieved (Jones, P ., 1995; Maxton, G. and Wormald, J., 1994).
“Lean production is not just about production, it also includes design 
and development, distribution and sales, suppliers and customers. ”10
So, the following table summarises the historical development of lean thought from the 
emergence of the Toyota Production System in the 1950s, through its refinement and 
measurement at the hands of the IMVP, to its widespread recognition as a management
Adapted from Womack, J., Jones, D. and Roos, D., 1990: p.206
10 Peter Wickens, Director o f Personnel and Information Systems, Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) 
Ltd.
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system and the emergence of the new paradigm of lean distribution, to be discussed in 
detail in the second half of this chapter.
Figure 3-5
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEAN PHILOSOPHY11
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3-2-2 STUDIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEAN 
PRODUCTION
Part of ICDP’s work analysed the implementation of lean thinking in the European industry 
(International Car Distribution Programme, 1995 (b) to (f)). The following figure shows 
lean production at its most simplistic.
Adapted from Seeba. H-G. in Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister, M.. 1995: p521
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Figure 3-6
BASIC LEAN PRODUCTION
PAINTW ELDBody  — 
A s s e m b l y
However, in reality, it is necessary to examine the entire value chain of which the 
production stage is part, and here it is clear that even the most advanced of the European 
manufacturers have generally only partially achieved ‘leanness’ in their chains as their 
suppliers are still producing large batches of components on long lead times. Sometimes 
this is because of factors such as the distance between the supplier and the factory, 
particularly in the case of major components such as engines coming from overseas.
Figure 3-7
IMPERFECT LEAN PRODUCTION (1)
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As shall be discussed in the next section, this imperfect production stage is usually matched 
by inefficiency in the distribution stage, as the chain is driven by the needs of the factory 
and the speed at which it must run to keep the supplies flowing. This results, as shall be 
seen, in large volumes of unsold stock being produced, for which buyers then have to be 
found by the dealers.
Looking from the perspective of the whole system, it is apparent that certain modifications 
could be made which would improve the functioning of the chain. In the short term, this 
may involve sacrificing the aim of having absolutely zero stocks in the factory so as to give 
the production line more flexibility to match orders. This would dramatically improve the 
post-factory stock situation.
Figure 3-8








As shall be shown, however, these are only incremental steps on the path to a fully lean 
system. Many authors believe that the lean distribution system outlined in the next section 
will provide the final link in the chain, and will also help the remaining supplier and 
factory stages to become fully lean as well by allowing order flows up through the chain 
and product flows back down through the chain to be matched as efficiently as possible.
FLEXIBLE ASSEMBLY
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Figure 3-9
BALANCED EVOLUTION12
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Generally, however, whilst increasing numbers of authors are starting to write about the 
lean production phenomenon,13 some borrowing the concepts and applying their own 
labels, as mentioned in section 3-2-3 below, and others place the current thinking within 
the historical context of the development of production methods (Shiomi. H. and Wada. K. 
(eds.k 1995), the vast majority of implementation studies applying the notion of lean 
production have, until recently, been carried out by researchers associated with the IMVP 
programme where the paradigm was nurtured. For instance, MIT’s Professor Cusumano 
highlighted a number of practical problems associated with the development of lean 
methods in Japan (Cusumano. M., 1994). He pointed out that the growth in Just-in-Time 
component supply was causing increased traffic problems on the already-crowded Japanese 
roads, that the industry was facing a shortage of blue-collar workers (due to an ageing 
workforce whose younger elements were increasingly unwilling to conduct manual tasks), 
that the proliferation of model variations possible under a lean system was leading to a 
large number of small, infrequent orders that were difficult for factories to manage, and 
that the high value of the yen was causing a shortage of available funds for new model 
development. Whilst not questioning the basic tenets of lean thinking, the work concluded
12 ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation
lj Such as, for example, Sachwald. F.. 1994; Maxton. G. and Wormald. J.. 1994; Hiinerberg. R.. Heise.
G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995
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that a more flexible approach to its implementation was desirable to take account of local 
economic conditions. This view has been backed up in a number of other works, such as 
Katayama and Bennett (Katavama. H. and Bennett. P.. 1996), which have reevaluated the 
Japanese production system in the light of the country’s recent economic downturn and the 
ensuing fluctuations in demand for finished products.
Other examples of the more recent proliferation of studies into the implementation of lean 
production include Sohal (Sohal. A.. 1996), who looked at the successful adoption of lean 
methods (including JIT, kanban, cross-functional new product development teams, etc.) by 
a component manufacturer in Australia, leading to the firm growing despite the poor 
economic context; Winfield and Kerrin (Winfield. I. And Kerrin. M.. 1996) showed how 
the lean practices operated by Toyota at its UK factory near Derby were being adopted by 
other firms, both Toyota suppliers and others, in the same region; and Levy (Lew. P.. 
1997), who analysed the obstacles to the achievement of a global production and 
distribution system, such as long order and delivery lead times and the problems of 
international communication in issues such as new product design, quality control and 
production scheduling. Whilst lean production methods cannot offer a miracle cure to 
issues such as these, it can help mitigate their effects by reducing the number of defects, 
reducing change orders and stabilising the supply chain.
3-2-3 CRITICS OF THE LEAN MODEL
This is not to suggest that the lean philosophy itself has been accepted uncritically by all 
industry commentators. Indeed, a small yet distinct body of literature has emerged 
challenging both the basic thinking and the findings of the IMVP’s and others’ work. This 
is particularly true of the measures such as plant productivity cited above;14 these figures, 
and the methodology behind them, have sparked a fierce debate, and a degree of 
opposition, particularly from authors who dispute the rigour with which the research was 
carried out, and who also question the omission of other variables such as stock turns 
labour costs, and even data available in company accounts (Williams. K. et al. 1994; 
Williams. K. et al 1992). The latter work concludes that Toyota's phenomenal success, and 
also that of Henry Ford with his Highland Park complex, was the result of their being 
fortunate beneficiaries of favourable circumstances rather than being due to any inherent
14 See Figure 3-1
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superiority of a newly-introduced production paradigm.
Sandberg et al (Sandberg. A. et al. 1995) concentrate their criticism on the IMVP’s alleged 
neglect of the social and worker welfare aspects of car production. In this respect, they 
argue, lean production is not far removed from Taylorism in that it involves short, 
repetitive job cycles and standardised, detailed work procedures.
“Lean production can never be the ultimate goal and form for human 
productive activity. Some fa t ’ is needed to make the workplace a 
decent place fo r  human activity, a place where you can unfold as a 
human being. ”15
They argue that it is impossible for a company to achieve true social responsibility in the 
harsh cost-cutting environment of lean production, which in turn passes a heavy social 
burden on to the public sector. They also point the ironical situation in Japan, where 
supposed Just-In-Time producers are now starting to stockpile components because the 
country’s road congestion is making it impossible for suppliers to deliver on time 
(Sandberg. A.. 1995). Overall, they maintain that the lean production paradigm represents 
a rather simplistic view of the industry and, as the following two figures illustrate, it 
neglects many of the aspects of the production system which are integral to its correct and 
successful functioning.
Sandberg. A.. 1995: p.ix
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Figure 3-10
SANDBERG ET AL’S CRITIQUE OF LEAN PRODUCTION (l)16
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Figure 3-11
SANDBERG ET AL’S CRITIQUE OF LEAN PRODUCTION (2)17
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Sandberg et al’s argument is illustrated by through the case study of Volvo’s Uddevalla 
plant in Sweden, some details of which are summarised here because it represented a very 
interesting experiment in factory organisation and, more significantly for this research, in 
distribution chain organisation very much along the lines of the Swedish ‘social model’.
• Volvo’s pioneering Uddevalla plant was opened in 1989 and closed only 4 years 
later following company-wide cut-backs. Recently, it has reopened to produce 
niche vehicles for the Volvo/TWR Group combine. Sandberg et al describe in 
detail how the plant operated, and how its ‘human-centred’ philosophy fitted in 
with a long Scandinavian tradition of job redesign.
• The Uddevalla system replaced the traditional hierarchies and serial flow of cars 
through the plant with a organisation of work groups assembling cars in parallel. 
Each group worked autonomously, using a prestructured flow of assemblies and 
components. No intermediate buffers were needed, as all cars were ‘assembly 
active’. Less tooling was needed as expensive items could be shared between 
groups. Less technical support was needed for the groups once they had grown 
familiar with all their tasks. Work could be scheduled more flexibly, with shorter 
lead times.
• The approach shared with lean production the aims of customer orientation, quick 
delivery and worker involvement and learning (Sandberg. A.. 1995), but unlike 
“The Machine that Changed the World’ did not neglect the employee welfare and 
societal aspects of car-making.
• In terms of productivity, according to the IMVP scale, the plant had overtaken the 
other European luxury car producers but still lagged behind the Japanese at the time 
of its closure. However, Sandberg et al claim that this underestimated the plant’s 
performance, and also that it could not really be measured according to the IMVP 
system because of the lack of standardised tasks in the assembly processes 
conducted there.
• But it was for its post-factory arrangements that the Uddevalla plant was 
particularly interesting. From October 1992 onwards, the plant only produced sold 
customer orders, with a 4 week delivery lead time, as opposed to the Swedish 
average of 2 months. Production mix was scheduled 7 weeks ahead of build. In 
November 1992, the system was extended to include all European markets (for the 
models produced at Uddevalla) and the response from distributors was
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overwhelming. No delivery time was promised for scheduled stock build, but 
delivery of customer orders was promised in 4 weeks.
• Uddevalla’s parallel system also enabled the work groups to fit accessories in a 
third of the time, more cheaply and more accurately than the dealers, during the 
assembly process. This also pleased customers no end, as they were often unhappy 
to see their new car cut up by a dealer in order for the tow bar to be fitted.
So, whilst the debate over the productive aspects of the Uddevalla experience rumble on in 
the literature, potentially the most successful innovations employed there correspond very 
closely to some of the elements of lean distribution now being introduced across the board 
by the European industry, as shall be discussed in the next section
Many other authors have pursued similar 'lean' ideas to the IMVP, but using different 
frameworks and different terminology. Piore and Sabel, for instance, identify what they 
call a revival of a craft form of production based on 'flexible specialisation', a strategy of 
permanent innovation based on flexible, multi-use equipment and skilled workers,18 a line 
of thinking followed by Morales, whose 'flexible production' signifies the organisation of 
production and markets through the joint actions of companies and governments to 
establish a suitable breeding ground for innovation.19
Nevertheless, the IMVP's work in this area has continued, and their conclusions have been 
by far the most influential of all those to have commented on the industry. Since they were 
first published, the results such as those cited above have stirred several manufacturers into 
adopting many of the lean principles that the authors of "The Machine that Changed the 
World" espoused, meaning that more recent, but as yet unpublished measures are now 
reflecting a much reduced performance gap between the best and the worst performers, at 
least in the main triad markets.20
Piore. M. and Sabel. C.. 1984: pl7
Morales. R.. 1994: p6
Graves. A.: "Global Trends in World Class Manufacturing: Training and Education for Lean 
Production", Inaugural lecture given at the University of Bath, 20/06/95
CHAPTER 3 PAGE 110
3-3 THE EMERGENCE OF LEAN 
DISTRIBUTION
The following sections discuss the major themes to have emerged so far from the literature
examining the application of this lean thinking to the post-factory area of the car industry.
These include:
• A fundamental shift away from the traditional ‘stock-push’ mechanism or distribution 
chain organisation towards a system ‘pulled’ by the customer;
• Attempts to apply this thinking to physical supply and stocking systems;
• The need for manufacturers to rethink the number of model and specification variants 
they offer;
• The emergence of partnerships between manufacturers and retailers;
• The need to think in terms of the whole distribution ‘chain’ rather than just separate 
elements of it;
• The implications of this thinking for marketing strategies (including the examples of 
Saturn and Volvo).
3-3-1 FROM ‘STOCK-PUSH’ TO ‘CUSTOMER-PULL’
As mentioned earlier, it is apparent that areas such as manufacturing and purchasing, the 
‘low-hanging fruit’ have been the first to benefit from the lean revolution, whereas 
distribution has remained largely unchanged for 75 years. However, the pressure for 
change was accelerated in the early 1990s by the global recession causing a drop in sales 
volumes, by production overcapacity in all the major producing regions and the challenge 
from Japanese and Korean makes and finally by excessive intra-brand competition 
(Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995). Recently, then, a certain amount of 
critical attention has started to focus on this post-factory area where the adoption of a good 
strategy will be the key to survival (Bellenger. L.. 1986(a); Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 
1991), and in particular on how lean thinking developed in the context of manufacturing 
can be applied to the post-factory network to achieve these aims.
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“The first manufacturer to implement a ‘lean distribution ’ solution will 
command a major strategic advantage in the marketplace. ”21
However, although lean terminology has now become the buzzwords of the industry, 
literature which seeks to define the key concepts of the lean distribution philosophy and to 
debate its implementation is still noticeably thin. The majority that has appeared so far has 
concentrated on aspects of the physical supply process (ICDP, 1995(b) to(f)) and on 
evaluating the costs and inefficiencies tied up in traditional and lean distribution systems. 
For instance, Hiinerberg et al comment that, if lean production contributed the notions of 
team working, quality circles and constant improvement to the overall lean philosophy, 
then lean distribution adds an awareness of the costs involved in the distribution chain 
(Hiinerberg, R., Heise. G. and Hoffineister, M.. 1995). From their perspective, the 
implementation of lean distribution therefore involves moving activities in the distribution 
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As is clear from this figure, the largest single element of mudct23 in the system is the 
continued presence of stock at all levels of the distribution chain. 60% of the costs of the 
traditional stock-push system are estimated to be related to sales volume, i.e. stock. A 
further 20% is accounted for by management and supply inefficiency costs, and 11% is due 
to discounts given to customers in order to shift wrongly-specified vehicles, late deliveries 
and over-age stock (ICDP sources). ICDP research has demonstrated that reducing 
stocking costs by taking stock out of the system24 would mean £1 billion in interest savings 
per year, and a further £0.5 billion in direct and management costs. Reduced discounts for 
‘wrong’ specifications and overage cars would amount to a further £1 billion per year. 
The total potential saving could therefore be £2.5 billion per year. Furthermore, moving 
from this to a fully lean supply system could save the European industry $15 billion in 
released working capital and $3.8 billion in annual costs (ICDP. 1993(b); 1995 (b)-(f)). 
This would also help to offset the greater marketing costs being encountered by 
manufacturers and National Distributors as they struggle to develop brand image in an ever 
more competitive marketplace.
Thus it is the recognition of these potential savings which has forced commentators such as 
Gadde and Mattson below to comment that
"the changes in distribution to come w ill be o f  such a m agnitude that 
they afterw ards m ight be regarded as the fo u rth  transform ation o f  the 
industry. ”25
One key element of the lean philosophy is that the whole system is driven by the customer 
(Womack. J.. Jones. P.. and Roos. P.. 1990; Womack. J.and Jones. P.. 1996). For the car 
distribution process, this initially means ensuring that they get the car they want in the right 
place, at the right time and at the right price. However, this cannot be achieved under the 
traditional ‘stock-push’ distribution systems which currently dominate the sector (ICDP. 
1993(b); 1995 (b)-(f)). Customers are persuaded to accept a car that the dealer has in stock, 
even if it is not what they really wanted, usually at the cost to the dealer of a discount. If 
they insist on a customer order, then the traditional system is not usually geared up to 
deliver it in an acceptable time. So, lean distribution seeks to overcome this by running the 
chain from the customer end to ensure that their needs are met. The customer interface is 
therefore critical for a lean system (Jones. P.. 1995), and it is the dealers’ job to maintain a
23 The concept of muda, the Japanese for ‘waste’ is put forward as a central pillar of the lean
philosophy by Womack and Jones in their book “Lean Thinking\  Muda therefore applies to all 
activities in the value chain which are wasteful and inefficient, i.e. which do not add definite value 
for the final consumers at the end of the chain.
24 Reducing the total stock required, dealer costs, storage and transport costs
25 Gadde. L-E. and Mattsson. L-G.. 1989: pi 8
CHAPTER 3 PAGE 113
close and continuing relationship with the customer; they thereby become the front end of 
the lean value chain linking manufacturer to customer (Htinerberg, R., Heise. G. and 
Hoffineister, M.. 1995).
3-3-2 IMPLEMENTING LEAN SUPPLY AND STOCKING 
SYSTEMS
As was mentioned above, attempts to install this lean value chain have thus far been 
dominated by the need to optimise the single largest source of muda, the supply and 
stocking process. Under the traditional system, as summarised below, the vast majority of 
sales are met out of dealer stock, either at the dealer where the sale was concluded or, in 
many cases, by the costly practice of transferring the car from another dealer.
Figure 3-13







In the first stages of a leaner supply process put forward by ICDP and others (ICDP.
ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation
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1993(b); 1995 (b)-(f); Womack, J., Jones, P., and Roos. P ., 1990), stock is removed from 
the dealers and held at suitably located distribution centres, from where it can be 
dispatched to individual dealers only when they have a definite sale. The natural corollary 
to this, on the right hand side of the figure below, is the open order pipeline, under which 
dealers with a particular customer order in mind can scan the stock-holding centres and the 
forward production and shipping programmes from their computer terminals to find, order 




DISTRIBUTION CENTRE OPEN ORDER PIPELINE
'c  ;
Traditionally, manufacturing plants would always prefer to have their products ‘sold’, that 
is to say committed to move out of the factory gates and onto a dealer or distributor before 
they were built, thus maintaining a certain level of stock in the marketplace to meet 
demand and keeping the factory output as stable as possible so that equipment, supplies 
and labour could be matched to plant capacity (Womack, J., Jones, P., and Roos. P .. 
1990).
“One thing is fo r certain, having agreed our factory production, then 
we know that that is the number everything has to add up to! ”
ICDP manufacturer NSC interview
27 ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation
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As was illustrated in the first half of this chapter, the logic of lean production has 
superseded much of this thinking, and the effects of those areas of the industry where it has 
been implemented are easy to observe. For example, in 1994, the European car market 
overall had a finished vehicle stock objective of 50 days, compared with 3 days for factory 
component stock levels, which have already been through the lean revolution. This 
finished vehicle stock level makes the whole distribution process very inefficient, and 
undermines the marketing efforts of the manufacturers (ICDP source). So entrenched was 
the stock-push mentality that ICDP research found manufacturers admitting that they 
would not trust their dealers to sell the cars if they did not give them regular stock 
assignments that they were committed to ‘get rid o f  (ICDP. 1993(b); 1995 (b)-(f)).
“I f  we don’t present the dealer with a supply plan, and ask him for a 
forecast, then he won't see the rationale and we won't get the 
commitment "
Manufacturer NSC interview
Regular stock orders from dealers, defined for the dealers in advance by their manufacturer 
or national sales company would therefore ensure that production was moved on from the 
factory to the marketplace. The result was a lack of trust between manufacturers, and a 
generally adversarial relationship based on conflicting objectives and motivations on both 
sides. The supply system task of lean distribution, according to work conducted by ICDP 
and others, is therefore to match the upstream flow of orders with the downstream flow of 
products before the latter leave the pipeline and become stock. This demands, amongst 
other things, more accurate forecasting, a different relationship with customers, and the 
ability to respond late and quickly to demands for specification changes (Jones. P.. 1995); 
in other words a more flexible and responsive system than was available with stock-push.
Traditionally, the industry has also operated to long order lead times dictated by the needs 
of the factory. Production programmes and market allocations were usually inflexible, 
generally being reviewed monthly and fixed 2 months ahead of build. However, with lean 
thinking catching hold, research is reporting that some makes are now reviewing market 
allocations of their products weekly and the best performers are conducting market 
allocations 14 days ahead of build. Actual order lead times are typically 40 to 50 days for 
the European makes, compared to 90 for the Japanese (for products being shipped from 
Japan). However, the best performance of 15 days had been achieved by at least one 
volume and one specialist manufacturer by 1994 (ICDP source). As for actual delivery 
times, these can vary widely, even within a market, from 2 to 28 days. Under a lean
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system, however, the customer focus means that delivering the car accurately, i.e. on the 
day (and at the time) that was promised is more important than whether the car takes 5 or 7 
days to arrive (Womack. J., Jones. P.. and Roos. P ., 1990).
As was mentioned earlier, this achieving this time reduction and accuracy increase involves 
making the production and supply pipeline open, or transparent to the dealers and national 
sales companies, so that they can see precisely what cars are where in the system. Dealers 
can then reserve a car if it fits their customer’s needs, or raise a customer order if no match 
is found. ICDP research produced the following scenario to illustrate how the dealer’s 
chances of finding the car his customer wants increases in an open system.
Figure 3-15
TRADITIONAL VERSUS OPEN PIPELINES28








= 8,000 UNITS 
(400 dealers 
x 20 units each)
...IF 25% CUSTOMER ORDERS
= 6,000
...IF 75% CUSTOMER ORDERS
=  2,000
Currently, ICDP estimates that only 15% of makes in the European market have moved to 
a variation of this open ordering model; the remaining 85% are still using closed systems, 
under which dealers can only amend or prioritise their own allocated orders (ICDP. 
1993(b); 1995 (b)-(f)).
However, extrapolating these ideas and their rate of implementation, ICDP has estimated 
that, by 2005, those manufacturers with a lean supply system will be able to (ICDP.
ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation
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1995(f)):
• deliver the specification of the customer’s choice to 95% of customers within 15 days 
anywhere in Europe;
• run a totally stockless system, except at peak times;
• satisfy 90% of customers from factory build-to-order.
From a critical point of view, this notion of lean distribution, and particularly what appears 
to be its most tangible immediate application, namely the development of lean supply and 
stocking systems, is in a comparable yet even less advanced situation than that highlighted 
for lean production at the end of section 3-2-2. Whilst increasing numbers of authors 
comment that distribution chains are starting to experience the same form of revolution 
which has swept through the production process, and not before time (Htinerberg. R.. Hese. 
G. and Hoffineister. M. (edsA 1995; Maxton. G. and Wormald. J., 1994), actual attempts 
to codify and quantify the phenomenon, its potential impact on and its degree of 
implementation within the car industry have been left to specialised research projects such 
as ICDP and IMVP, and to professional industry consultants. As shall be seen below, other 
aspects of the lean distribution paradigm have become more established in the literature, as 
they also constitute developments which are firmly underway in the industry.
3-3-3 CHANGES TO MODEL AND SPECIFICATION 
VARIANTS
One further barrier to this however is the multiplicity of trim and specification variants 
offered for each model. A typical medium-sized car from a European manufacturer may 
have upwards of 40,000 different colour, trim and specification combinations, and quite 
often this figure runs into millions. As the typical small dealer can only ever stock 5 or 6 
of these variants at any one time, it is clear that the customers’ chances of getting the car 
that they want from stock is very slim indeed.
Currently, only 40% of customers receive the exact specification that they initially wanted. 
It is estimated that this would increase to 77% with only minimal application of lean 
principles and the removal of stock (ICDP source). As can be seen from the following 
graph, only a few of the specification combinations will usually account for a significant
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majority of sales, with many of the more unusual combinations only serving to satisfy a 
tiny minority of customers, usually at a disproportionate cost to the system. This over­
proliferation of specifications, and the accompanying cost and logistical problems are all 
targets for rationalisation under a lean system (Womack. J.. Jones, P., and Roos. P .. 1990; 








Reducing the number of specification variants offered would also, according to the lean 
proponents, enable the distribution chain to improve its forecasting of what customers will 
actually want to buy, as compared with the traditional system where the unusual variants 
also figure as successful sales (and so continue to be built), but only because a discount 
was given (Jones, P., 1995).
3-3-4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURER - 
RETAILER PARTNERSHIPS
All these predicted developments would have a significant impact on the dealer and their 
relationship to the rest of the chain. Many have commented that the strengthening of the 
ties between manufacturer and dealer will inevitably mean that fewer dealers will be
ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation
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needed, and those that do remain will have to be capable of managing this new, more 
tightly integrated relationship and the ‘shared destiny’ (Diez. W.. 1995; ICDP. 1995(a); 
Shioii. H.. 1995; Hunerberg. R.. Hese. G. and Hoffrneister. M. feds..). 1995).
As far as the average dealer is concerned, removing stock means that the manufacturer is 
removing his insurance policy against sales fluctuations, thus forcing him to share his 
destiny with others in the chain (Jones. P.. 1995). Conversely, the manufacturer must now 
trust the dealer to meet his sales targets without the pressure of stock-push hanging over his 
back, and the dealer must trust the manufacturer to make available the cars that his 
customers want to buy. Such a change would not be possible with the current arms-length 
relationship that exists between manufacturer and dealer (Jones. P.. 1995, ICDP. 1995(a)), 
but only with the formation of new partnerships not only between manufacturer and dealer, 
but also between all the actors in the chain (Maxton. G. and Wormald. J.. 1994).
3-3-5 ADOPTING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WHOLE 
DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
One of the central emerging features of a lean system is that is cannot be applied 
piecemeal, but instead will ultimately involve the entire value chain from suppliers to 
factoiy to distributors, dealers and consumers. Because this chain is highly complex and 
fragmented in the car industry, so the task of applying lean thinking will not be an easy one 
(Womack. P.. Jones. P. and Roos. P.. 1990; ICDP. 1993(b)). As the following graphic 
illustrates, the system currently has to accommodate order banks and forecasting 
mechanisms at national distributor, sales department and factory level, to manage the 
inputs of many suppliers, and then to organise the movement of product stocks back to the 
national level and ultimately to the dealers.
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Figure 3-17













In summary, according to the International Motor Vehicle Programme, 'lean distribution' 
treats the car owner as part of the post-factory chain, as the latter's tastes and preferences 
can be registered and fed directly into the process of developing new models that the 
consumer wants. As is the case for the factory itself, the dealers and distributors hold only 
the bare minimum of stock, and instead it is the ordering of a specific model by the 
customer which triggers its production back at the factory (Womack. P.. Jones, D. and 
Roos. P ., 1990).
Removing stock from the system is therefore only possible if the supply chain is managed 
as a single entity involving all the different actors as partners. Factories, suppliers and 
distributors would have to shorten their lead times, dealers would no longer be allocated 
cars for stock, most orders would be customer orders, assembled on a reliable build 
schedule with the order status visible to the dealer and customer throughout the system; in 
other words the chain becomes single entity within the extended lean enterprise (ICDP, 
1995 (b) to (0)- Under such a system, optimising the performance of the whole chain will 
take precedence over optimising individual parts of it under local management control. For 
instance, this will mean that manufacturers will need the production of certain critical 
components sufficiently flexible to be able to match customer requirements and therefore
30 ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation
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reduce the stock of finished vehicles. Dealers will, as mentioned above, have to learn to 
live without stock and trust the system to get the car their customer wants to them within a 
reasonable time; they will have to learn to ‘sell to customers’ rather than ‘buying from 
manufacturers’ (ICDP. 1995(a)).
3-3-6 IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKETING STRATEGIES
It has also been predicted that, under a stockless system, dealers would need to conduct less 
outlet-level marketing in order to shift ageing stock. Attention could therefore be turned to 
more national or regional customer retention programmes and advance order generation. 
Manufacturers would therefore gain more control over promotional activity than they have 
had in the past, but they would be more obliged to take their dealers’ views into account 
(ICDP. 1993(b)). Dealers would also be rewarded on the standards they met, rather than on 
how many cars they sold.
Some authors, particularly those citing the Saturn example given below, also argue that a 
lean system will able to offer completely fixed price selling, with non-negotiable trade-in 
prices and no discounts offered on new car purchases (Hunerberg. R.. Heise. G. and 
Hoffineister. M. (eds..\ 1995; Koenders. J. and Chu. W.. 1993). Others argue that fixed 
price selling will prove very difficult to get established and to police across a network 
simply because of the number of trade-ins conducted by dealers. Some dealers will 
inevitably be more cost-effective than others, and so if the no-haggle price is set at the 
network average, it will be in their interest, and they will be able to undercut it. Also, in an 
industry where supply is ultimately constrained by manufacturing considerations and 
demand is highly volatile, being able to move prices is the best means of balancing supply 
and demand and maximising profits (ICDP. 1996(o)). Overall then, the predicted 
marketing benefits of moving to the lean system outlined can be summarised as follows.
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Figure 3-18
THE LEAN MARKETING SYSTEM31
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3-3-6-1 THE SATURN EXAMPLE
“Sa turn ’s success has become somewhat o f  a modern-day auto fab le  
... the car's mystique as G M ’s answer to the form idable competition 
fro m  Japan has made Saturn a new symbol o f  American
32
competitiveness. ”
When it comes to illustrating how elements of this lean thinking have been implemented in 
the marketplace, one example is employed over and over again; Saturn. It is worth 
examining the Saturn case in some detail, as it has been heralded by many as a model for 
the future of the industry.
Saturn’s history dates back to 1981, the year General Motors in America posted disastrous 
financial losses. The project was the brainchild of Roger Smith, then GM chairman, who
ICDP European New Car Supply and Stocking System Presentation 
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conceived the new Saturn brand as a means of breaking the mould of manufacturing and 
retailing in the American industry, and as a direct response to the challenge of the Japanese 
manufacturers. It was a clean start at creating a new brand of car, including all aspects of 
production and distribution, from scratch. Key to the new philosophy of the company was 
the belief that it would only be successful if it met the needs of its customers, its staff 
(known as Saturn ’members') its suppliers, its dealers and its neighbours.
. .  To meet our suppliers' and dealers' needs:
•  We will strive to create real partnerships with them;
• We will be open and fa ir in our dealings, reflecting trust,
respect and their importance to Saturn; 
•  We want dealers and suppliers to feel ownership in Saturn's 
mission and philosophy as their own... "3S
Particular characteristics of the Saturn distribution approach34 that have been discussed in 
the literature (Hiinerberg. R.. Hese. G. and Hoffineister. M. (eds..). 1995; Koenders. J. and
Chu. W.. 1993; Rubinstein. S.. Bennett. M. and Kochan. T.. 1994; Power. J.. 1992)
include:
• relatively few dealers with large, exclusive territories, and consequently very little 
intra-brand competition As of January 1993, Saturn had 174 retailers (operating 232 
outlets) covering the whole of the United States. This is a tiny amount compared with 
the market average size of 1219 dealers for a US dealer network (2734 for the ‘Big 3’), 
632 in Japan and 389 in Germany.35;
• a Tiubs and satellites' approach by these dealers, with the main dealer Tiub' supporting 
'satellite' operations and facilities across the dealer's territory;
• the dealers, who are appointed as a result of a very rigorous selection procedure, all 
display the same appearance and layout, and no brand name identification of their own, 
according to specially-designed architectural plans approved by Saturn;
• dealers are considered part of the extended Saturn enterprise, and are empowered and 
consulted on all major decisions. For instance, when problems arise, such as a period 
of over-supply, Saturn and its dealers work together to reach a solution;
• retail decision-making is conducted by the Franchise Operations Team, consisting of 8 
Saturn staff and 8 dealer representatives; this takes decisions regarding warranties,
Extract from the Saturn philosophy, quoted by David Beck, then Managing Director of Lex Retail 
Group
Many elements of lean thinking were also incorporated into Saturn’s greenfield production facilities, 
including JIT component supply and a refusal to accept traditional union arrangements 
Source: Automotive News
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retail margins, dealer agreements, the selection and allocation of territories, the 
allocation of advertising funds, product specifications and vehicle allocations;
• the company does not conduct discounted fleet sales;
• the dealers do not have any compulsory vehicle stock allocations, and order on line 
with a system named POMS (Production Order Management System). Order 
amendments are possible 6-10 days before delivery;
• a limited model range, with a much smaller range of trim and specification options than 
is usual in the US market;
• consumers can browse through the cars without being put under pressure by the salaried 
sales consultants. Thereafter, the purchase experience is as hassle-free as possible, with 
transparent pricing and no ‘haggling’.
“I f  one word can summarise the Saturn culture,  it is partnership. ”36
From a standing start, it is undeniable that the Saturn brand has been a major success. In 
the union-dominated American car industry, Saturn represented a unique partnership 
between management and labour, it applied new technology in design and manufacturing 
and a new approach to selling (Koenders. J. and Chu. W.. 1993). The market area 
approach demonstrated a manufacturer actually showing a concern for the health and 
profitability of its dealers, along with a desire to reduce the intra-brand competition that is 
such a feature of an aggressive stock-push system. As a result, dealers are very profitable 
and satisfied, and this in turn has led to satisfied customers.
According to Power (Power. J.. 1992), the Saturn approach was well illustrated in February 
1991 when the car was subject to a recall to fix faulty seat recliners. Many Saturn dealer 
staff drove out to customers’ homes at their own expense to carry out the necessary repairs. 
In another incident, a Saturn dealer actually paid to repave some customers’ driveways 
after a fault with their car’s cooling systems had leaked coolant. This customer focused 
approach seems more than adequately to compensate for the product itself having a 
reputation for being competent rather than revolutionary.37
Saturn is now more or less universally accepted by the rest of the industry as the first car 
company to embrace and to attempt to implement lean thinking throughout its value chain 
(Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995).
“The automotive distribution system in this country (USA), beset on all
Saturn President Richard LeFauve in Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995, p529
Source: Automotive News
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sides by harsh new competitive realities, under critical and sometimes 
cynical scrutiny by an increasingly powerful customer base, and 
economically squeezed everywhere, is not going to survive in its 
present form . . . .  Saturn is . . . a  living laboratory fo r most if  not all o f  
the strategies and concepts that have arisen to meet this extraordinary 
challenge.  ”38
However, so far, there have been very few attempts by other manufacturers to imitate the 
Saturn approach. The main reason for this is the entrenched nature of the current system 
throughout the world; it is simply not possible for manufacturers to abandon existing 
factories, distribution arrangements and dealers overnight. And, even if this were possible, 
the costs of doing so would be prohibitive. For instance, it has been estimated that if a 
major UK brand (such as Vauxhall for example) copied the Saturn approach exactly, it 
would only need 4 dealers to cover the whole of the UK market, compared to the 500-odd 
it has today .. ,39 Consequently, this 'greenfield' start achieved by Saturn is simply not an 
option for the European manufacturers, and would appear to be restricted to the new 
arrivals in the marketplace, such as the Koreans. Nevertheless, as shall be demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, many manufacturers have studied the Saturn approach, and are 
adopting elements of its and other lean ideas into their distribution chains wherever 
circumstances make it possible (Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995).
3-3-6-2 THE VOLVO EXAMPLE
A further example to appear in the literature of a manufacturer who successfully banished 
stock from its distribution chain is Volvo with its Uddevalla plant already mentioned in the 
context of lean production. Sandberg (Sandberg. A.. 1995) relates how, from October 
1992 onwards, the plant only produced customer orders, with a 4 week delivery lead time, 
as opposed to the Swedish average of 2 months. Production mix was scheduled 7 weeks 
ahead of build. In November 1992, the system was extended to include all European 
markets (for the models produced at Uddevalla that is) and the response from distributors 
was overwhelming. No delivery time was promised for scheduled stock build, but the 
factory committed to getting customer orders to the dealer in 4 weeks.
Power. J.. 1992: p56
ICDP Source
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As result of this, Swedish dealers found that they no longer needed to offer discounts, as 
the customers were able to get the exact specification of car they wanted and it would 
arrive in a reasonable period of time.
“The change to customer order assembly with short delivery times 
represented cost savings o f  a magnitude unparalleled by any 
programme directed at reducing assembly hours, the favourite object 
o f media interest and managerial effort. ”40
3-4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented the lean paradigm as it is being applied in the literature to the 
production and distribution phases of the industry. The concepts of lean production are 
found to have become widely accepted both in the critical academic literature and in the car 
industry itself, which has been implementing them on a wholesale basis for many years in 
the production phase of operations.
Both academic and industry attention is now turning to the post-factory area of the industry 
and to the emergence of a lean distribution paradigm. Studies in the area have postulated, 
and are starting to observe, a move away from ‘stock-push’ towards ‘customer-pulP 
distribution systems, which has major implications for the way distribution networks will 
be organised in the future, and which looks likely to signify a large improvement in both 
the efficiency of the system and its effectiveness in providing the levels of service 
customers increasingly demand.
The most immediate area of impact for this thinking has been thought to be the physical 
distribution aspects of the sector, the vehicle supply and stocking systems linking 
manufacturers, national distributors and dealers. However, emerging studies have shown 
that the application of lean thinking in the distribution sector is likely to impact on many 
other areas as well, including the model range and specification policies of manufacturers, 
the relationships dealers have to manufacturers as well as the activities they conduct, and
Sandberg. A.. 1995: pi 12
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also the evolution of marketing strategies throughout the distribution chain.
The next chapter distils the discussions contained in this chapter and Chapter 2 into the key 
questions which defined the research fieldwork. These seek to explore the concept and the 
implementation of lean distribution as it has been outlined above, where a simple overall 
definition for lean distribution based on the above might be
getting the right car to the right place at the right time using the least 
resources and at the least cost,  with the ‘right car’ being the 
customers ’ rather than the factory’s decision.
Is it possible to identify a clear set of factors which will go to make up the lean distribution 
paradigm and which, as highlighted above, will impact on the whole range of distribution 
activities across the chain? And furthermore, will these factors be consistent across the 
European market, or will other influences lead to a watering down of the ‘ideal solution’ 
into a ‘mixed and matched’ situation dependent on the specificities of manufacturer and 





"Whatever rightly done, however humble, is noble. "
Frederick Henry Royce, quoted in The Motor Industry 
of Britain Centenary Book, published by the SMMT, 
1996
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4-1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to outline the specific research questions which emerged from 
the secondary research phase, and which drove the rest of the study.
4-2 THE RESEARCH CONTEXT
The context which helped to define the research questions and indeed the research design, 
to be discussed more in the next chapter, emerged from the examination of secondary 
material looking at the recent fortunes of and future prospects for the industry contained in 
the previous three chapters, and relates to the car industry itself, including the ways in 
which it organises its activities, and also to its place within the wider context of the Single 
European Market.
The preceding literature review section of this work can be summarised into 3 key factors 
which form the foundations for the research questions, and which are reviewed below. 
These are:
• the strategic importance of the post-factory area and the inevitability of change;
• the market-based environmental forces for change;
• the forces to implement ‘lean thinking’ throughout the production and distribution value 
chain.
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4-2-1 THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE POST­
FACTORY AREA AND THE INEVITABILIY OF 
CHANGE
As has become clear from the preceding chapters, the post-factory area is of crucial 
strategic importance to the future of the industry; as competition in the marketplace 
continues to intensify, a manufacturer’s fortunes will depend more and more not only on 
the quality and integrity of its core products, but also on the way they are marketed and 
sold, and on the additional features which accompany them (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. 
J-J., 1991; Bellenger. L.. 1986(a); FIA. 1989; Womack. J.. Jones. P., and Roos. P.. 1990). 
Manufacturers will therefore devote more strategic attention to this area, and will introduce 
changes to their distribution chains with the intention of improving service and, crucially, 
at cutting costs, is inevitable (Mayes. P.. 1991; Gadde. L-E. and Mattsson. L-G.. 1989). It 
is expected, as is detailed below in section 4-2-3, that these changes will be inspired by the 
emerging paradigm of lean distribution, and will see distribution chains becoming 
increasingly driven by customer orders from the bottom as opposed to stock pressure from 
the top. This will have wide-ranging implications for all chain activities, not least of which 
physical supply and stocking systems, where it has been estimated that the introduction of 
lean systems alone could save the European industry £2.5 billion per year (ICDP. 1993 (b); 
1995 (b>(f)).
4-2-2 THE MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL 
FORCES FOR CHANGE
The strategies that are adopted throughout the distribution chain across Europe will be 
influenced by a whole range of global, EU- and national-level environmental factors which, 
in the context of international trade, throw up competing forces either to standardise 
approaches across markets, or to differentiate them (Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 
1991; Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991; Colchester. N.. and Buhan. P.. 1990; Goeel. R. 
and Larreche. J-C.. 1989. Halliburton. C. and Hiinerberg. R.. 1993).
The debate in the literature concerning the interplay of global and local forces has received 
very wide coverage, both in works looking at the global trading environment (Porter. M..
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1990; Douglas. S. and Wind. Y.. 1987; Hamel. G. and Prahalad. C.. 1985; Keegan. W.. 
1989; Levitt. T.. 1983; Mair. A. 1994; Ohmae. K.. 1985; Sheth. J.. 1986; Ruigrok. W. and 
Van Tulder. R.. 1991), and in studies which take as their focus the European market, where 
the same -forces are present, albeit possibly with slightly different names (Assemblee 
Nationale. 1992; Atamer. T.. 1993; Banville. E. de and Chanaron. J-J.. 1991; Calori. R. and 
Lawrence. P.. 1991; Colchester. N. and Buchan. D. 1990; Dudley. J. and Martens. H.. 
1993; Gogel. R. and Larreche. J-C.. 1989; Halliburton. C. and Hiinerberg. R.. 1993; 
Kapferer. J-N.. 1993; Lynch. R.. 1992; Mourier. P. and Burgaud. P.. 1989; Vandermerwe. 
S» 1989(b)).
As not even the most specialised car manufacturers (with the possible exception of some 
'kit car' producers) would be able to reach sufficient economies of scale to survive by 
relying on their home market alone, this global/local dilemma will be relevant for all 
significant manufacturers present in the European market. This trade-off applies both to 
the more ‘back-office’ distribution and logistics activities and to the more ‘front-office’ 
areas of marketing and customer contact, and will be assimilated by manufacturers, dealers 
and other actors according to their individual circumstances. Of particular interest to this 
research is an examination of these factors with regard to the implementation of lean 
distribution. Will both the perception and the implementation of lean distribution be 
influenced by this global/local dilemma, and what are the impediments to its wholesale 
implementation across the European market?
4-2-3 THE FORCES TO IMPLEMENT ‘LEAN THINKING’
The dominant notion in recent literature is one of the post-factory activities of a car 
manufacturer, including distribution actors and dealers, operating together as one long 
distribution chain, regardless of whether they are vertically integrated into the manufacturer 
corporation or independent (Stem. L. and Reve. T.. 1980; Bowersox. D. and Morash. E.. 
1988; Stem. L. and El-Ansarv. A.. 1982, Andersson. P.. 1991, Filser. M.. 1992). The chain 
contains both vertical and horizontal links, each of which will be either directly or 
indirectly affected by changes that will be introduced at other points.1
Current lean thinking defines this chain in terms of a series of value-adding processes. In
See Figure 1-2
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doing so, it extends the chain to include both the entire production system (removing, 
wherever possible, the distinction between production and distribution) and, crucially, the 
customer at the end of the line, in whose terms alone this value can be assessed (Womack. 
J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990: Womack. J. and Jones. P.. 1996).
Books like “The Machine that Changed the World99 and research programmes such as 
IMVP and ICDP are seeking to establish this ‘lean philosophy’ throughout the car industry. 
Many manufacturers have moved to introduce practices associated with lean thinking 
throughout their supply and production systems over the course of the last decade, and 
more recently, elements of this thinking have been observed as entering the post-factory 
distribution chain. Because of the many competitive pressures facing the sector, it is 
widely believed that further changes associated with lean thinking will be introduced, 
particularly in the distribution sector, in the near future as manufacturers and other chain 
actors seek to improve their competitiveness and to ensure their longer term survival in a 
mature marketplace.
4-3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Having narrowed down the context of the study, it is possible to pick out three key 
questions that form the hypotheses of the research. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
which covers the research design and methodology in detail, the first question relates 
largely to the first section of the research fieldwork, namely the exploration of the research 
concepts through surveys and interview programmes, and the second and third questions 
relate more strongly to the development of the research model dealing with the concepts of 
lean distribution, and to its validation and testing.
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4-3-1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1
The first question which comes out of the literature review is to assess whether the 
comments and predictions made in the literature concerning lean distribution are accurate. 
Are the developments that have been associated with the paradigm actually occurring in the 
European marketplace, or are alternative routes being followed by certain manufacturers or 
in certain markets? If these lean distribution developments are indeed occurring, this 
means that it will be possible to identify, to observe and to categorise evolutions and new 
developments in:
• distribution chain structures and relationships across the European market;
• industry perceptions of and attitudes towards the post-factory sector
which correspond to the philosophies expressed in the literature on lean production and 
distribution, taking into account the context of the (still imperfect) Single European Market 
in cars.
4-3-2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2
As has been suggested in the literature,2 the emerging paradigm of lean distribution has the 
potential to impact on many areas and activities in the car distribution chain. Research 
question 1, above, seeks to pick out these key areas and activities.
However, it is expected, because of a number of factors including the following:
• the hitherto fairly undefined nature of the lean distribution paradigm and its novelty;
• the complex nature of the industry and its distribution chain in particular;
• the presence of many specific environmental factors across the European market and 
within its companies,
that perceptions of the lean distribution paradigm and rankings of these key areas in terms 
of their perceived importance to the paradigm will display a significant degree of variation
See Section 3-3
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across a sample of the car industry. As it is predicted above that lean distribution will 
constitute a variety of distribution chain developments,3 so it is hypothesised here that the 
industry itself will assign differing priorities to each of them.
By ranking these ‘factors’ of lean distribution relative to each other according to how 
central to the notion of lean distribution the industry perceives them to be, it will be 
possible to define the key elements of what the industry feels to constitute lean 
distribution.4
4-3-3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3
This question moves on to consider the state of implementation of these factors which, it is 
hypothesised above, go to make up the core of lean distribution.
It is hypothesised that, according to the perceptions of a high-level cross-industry sample, 
the current and future implementation of these lean distribution factors is and will not 
continue to be uniform across European, or even global, markets.
As a result of their local needs and conditions, in other words the interplay of global and 
local forces as mentioned in section 4-2-2, certain markets will be more advanced and face 
an easier task than others in the implementation of both the overall notion of lean 
distribution and of these factors individually.
The research will also seek to further the discussion, as reported in Chapter 2, of what these 
key environmental factors are and how the industry feels they will evolve in the future.
Expressed in this research as the ‘factors’ of lean distribution
As is explained in Chapter 5, the vast majority of the research fieldwork was constructed around 
samples of high-level executives from many areas of the European car industry. For reasons of 
commercial sensitivity and because of the forward-thinking nature of the research, these respondents 
were not asked to represent their company’s interests in their responses, but to give their own 
personal views on the matters under discussion based on, in the vast majority of cases given their 
positions, many years of experience of the workings of the industry. Consequently, this research 
does not seek to draw firm conclusions which compare either specific manufacturer or categories of 
manufacturer policies or strategies. Instead, it seeks to measure elite-level attitudes regarding the 
emergence of lean distribution. Given that most of the respondents occupied highly influential 
positions within their organisations, it can be expected that their opinions will go on to play a major 
role in the definition of policy and strategy in the areas which were researched.
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4-4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
As well as presenting the findings of the work which address these three specific questions, 
the research will, based on the knowledge base built up throughout the secondary and 
primary research phases5, also examine some of the likely implications of these findings for 
the future of the industry. For instance, looking at the first and second research questions, 
what conclusions can be drawn regarding the sector’s perceptions of itself, lean thinking 
and its future? How might these attitudes be reconciled with the many other challenges 
emerging from the market environment (such as pollution and congestion issues for 
example). Looking at the third research question, if this picture of diversity is proved to be 
the case, what are the potential gains and disbenefits for the industry? Some of these issues 
will be considered in Chapter 10.
4-5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has narrowed down the context that emerged from the preliminary secondary 
research phase, to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It then outlined the three 
central questions which constitute the hypotheses of the research. In summary these seek, 
in turn, to:
• verify the existence of predicted lean distribution developments and to categorise these 
observed developments and attitudes towards the future of the sector and lean 
distribution in the European market;
• measure the levels of association with and acceptance of these categories across a high- 
level sample of the European industry;
• measure attitudes towards the implementation of these categories across the various 
European (and a selection of global) markets and to discuss the environmental 
background to this implementation.
See Chapter 5
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The research material gathered to address these questions will be presented in Chapters 6 to 
8, before the questions are revisited in the research conclusions chapter, Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
"In research the horizon recedes as we advance, and is no nearer at 
sixty than it was at twenty. As the power o f endurance weakens with 
age, the urgency o f  the pursuit grows more intense ... And research is 
always incomplete. "
Mark Pattison, 1813-84 (English Educationalist) in 
Isaac and Casaubon, 1875: Ch. 10
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5-1 INTRODUCTION
A critical element of any research project is the methodology used to conduct it. The 
selection of a suitably tailored set of tactics and their rigorous application to the subject 
matter will condition not only the quality of the insight that the researcher is able to gain 
into their chosen area, but also the likelihood of the findings being reliable and credible and 
therefore valuable to others. Bryman considers it vital to use both an appropriate and a 
fully-considered research method if the resulting study is to demonstrate its validity 
(Brvman. 1989). For this reason, a section showing the selection the researcher has made 
from the many different techniques on offer and the reasons for doing so forms an essential 
part of the presentation of the research.
This chapter will therefore present the various designs and methods considered for this 
study, and will show how the final methodology design was reached. It opens with a 
consideration of the nature of research into the car industry, an area which throws up some 
specific problems for a researcher to overcome. The following section presents the 
secondary and primary research methods adopted, and situates them within the general 
framework of academic research. Details of the respondent samples are also given at this 
point. The chapter ends with a discussion of the possible shortcomings of the selected 
methods, a treatment of the concepts of triangulation, validity and reliability and an 
explanation of how the research findings were disseminated to the sections of the industry 
which had participated.
It is worth pointing out that, whilst a wide body of literature exists covering all the different 
methodological approaches available to the researcher, it is rare for a researcher to embark 
on a piece of work having defined precisely from the very outset the techniques to be 
employed. It is more often the case that the final methodology emerges gradually 
throughout the course of the study, as the researcher grows more familiar with the area and 
develops the theories which underpin the work; the most appropriate tactics will often 
'suggest themselves'. In this way, the research theory and methodology emerge and grow 
together, demonstrating that it is impossible to separate the two at any stage of the research 
process (Bulmer. M.. 1984), and also reminding the researcher that one of their ultimate 
goals must be to produce a piece of work that is both individual and unique. Such was the 
case in this study, which developed a varied portfolio of research methods to suit the 
constantly emerging and expanding nature of the topic under examination.
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"Be a good craftsman: avoid a rigid set o f  procedures. Above all, seek 
to develop and to use the sociological imagination. Avoid fetishism o f  
method and technique. Urge the rehabilitation o f the unpretentious 
intellectual craftsman, and try to become a craftsman yourself. Let 
every man be his own methodologist."1
5-2 RESEARCHING THE CAR INDUSTRY: 
PERSPECTIVES AND SHORTCOMINGS
Salvadori (Maves. P.. 1991) underlines the weakness of traditional theoretical and 
empirical tools for the study of the European automobile industry. Whilst macro-economic 
measures allow the long term effects of cyclical or structural developments to be gauged 
over time and through the weight of many examples, he points out that the starting point 
when looking at the effects on a particular firm's strategy must be the impermanence of its 
behaviour. With the ensuing analysis based on scenarios, it is therefore hard to establish a 
formal causal link between the implementation of, say, an EU regulation, and a change in 
company behaviour. The task of determining whether the factors influencing the evolution 
of the European car industry and its post-factory operations are due to the workings of the 
Single Market Programme, or whether they are merely the twists and turns of a global 
industry is therefore a problematical one.
"There is no evidence that behaviour would not have changed if  the 
measures had not been taken; equally, there is no evidence that the 
measures adopted are solely responsible for these changes in 
behaviour."
Bearing this in mind, the task of researching the car industry is made all the more 
complicated because of its sheer enormity. It proves almost impossible to separate out any
Tavlor. S. and Bogdan. R.. 1984: pl07, quoting Mills. C.. 1959: "The Sociological Imagination", 
Oxford University Press, London: p224 
Maves. P.. 1991: p29
CHAPTER 5 PAGE 140
one topic without being obliged to consider all the other factors intertwined with it. For 
instance, one cannot fully understand the Selective Distribution Agreement operated in the 
European market without looking at issues such as service packages, spare parts supply, 
corporate image, differential pricing, the non-existence of a harmonised EU tax regime, 
parallel imports and attitudes towards Japanese cars produced both within and outside the 
Union, logistics and product specifications.
Therefore, the complex nature of the subject under discussion, along with the fact that it 
does not constitute an area where conclusions can be drawn from irrefutable evidence, 
together demand a careful choice of research instruments in order to build a valid piece of 
research. The highly secretive nature of the companies under examination, combined with 
the inescapable fact that, even if this secrecy were not the case, it would still not be 
possible to collect an exhaustive quantity of data due to the sheer enormity of the task, 
together force the researcher to accept from the outset these potential pitfalls and to seek to 
overcome them as far as possible. In this respect, this research largely follows the 
qualitative axiom outlined below of seeking not to establish formal truths, but to build 
understanding by offering an illustrative investigation of the subject area, albeit backed up 
with harder data where appropriate. Given that the aim of the research is to examine a set 
of constantly evolving phenomena, it is inevitable that ideas, analyses and conclusions that 
go to make up the research will not necessarily be clear-cut, but will themselves evolve 
gradually as more evidence comes to light.
Although the key focus of the research was the post-factory area of the European car 
industry, an examination of the perspectives of as many different actors within the 
distribution chain as possible was important not just to gain a full picture of the interactions 
and developments taking place, but also to compare them against each other. This led to 
the decision to involve dealers, manufacturers and other distribution chain actors in the 
study, fulfilling the aim of using multiple sources of evidence to bolster the trustworthiness 
of the work, providing insights both from the perspective of the head of the chain looking 
down (the manufacturer) and from the bottom looking up (the dealer). As all the various 
actors in the chain, separated by massive differences in power and status, have very 
different conceptualisations of the relationship that links them all together, this format 
allowed these to be compared and contrasted in order to achieve a holistic understanding of 
the subject area.
No one research methodology was considered sufficient for a study of this nature. Instead, 
the research attempted to combine a variety of different methods, and to remain as flexible 
and responsive to the ever-changing nature of the subject matter as possible.
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5-3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY DESIGN
The following figure illustrates the logic and the process followed by the research, split 















The most usual division of research methods is into secondary and primary research 
fEasterbv-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991). Secondary research entails the examination of 
existing documentary information and data, usually in the form of company reports, 
newspaper and journal articles, etc., and allows the researcher to explore the broad context 
of the area they are researching. As well as informing the research throughout its course, 
secondary research can also reveal to the researcher the gaps in current knowledge that they 
can go on to address in their work. Primary research involves the researcher in gathering 
new and original data and information upon which the research hypotheses can be built and 
tested, and can be conducted in a number of different ways, including unstructured and 
structured interviews, focus groups, telephone and postal questionnaires, participant and 
non-participant observation, etc.
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Broadly speaking, these techniques are usually categorised into one or other of the two 
opposing philosophical schools; the phenomenological or the positivist. Quantitative 
methodology involves an essentially positivist approach, with the researcher setting out to 
rationally prove or disprove a set of established hypotheses by systematically collecting and 
analysing empirical data, from which conclusions can be deduced (Berger. R. and Patchner. 
M., 1988; Bulmer. M.. 1984; Yin. R.. 1993). This positivism can be traced back to the 
thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, who strove to explain social phenomena 
using methods borrowed from the natural sciences (Tavlor. S. and Bogdan. R.. 1984; Yin. 
R., 1993). Common tactics in the positivist field included questionnaires and fully- 
structured interviews.
As opposed to being logical and deductive, the qualitative approach is phenomenological 
and inductive, and uses a corpus of established research on the relevant subject area as a 
basis for drawing conclusions relating to the specific focus of attention (Bulmer. M.. 1984). 
Using a qualitative approach, no external structures are imposed on the data as is the case 
with a quantitative methodology (these structures usually forming part of the hypotheses 
which the research seeks to test); the structure is instead derived or emerges itself from the 
data, with the process and the theory being inextricably linked (Glaser. B. and Strauss. A.. 
1967; Bulmer. M.. 1984). Typical methods include unstructured interviews or 
action/enquiry, and one of the key aspects of the approach is therefore its flexibility. Being 
inductive by nature, the method aims to develop concepts, insights and especially 
understanding from patterns identified within the data, as compared to the deductive 
quantitative approach where data is collected to assess preconceived models or theories 
(Tavlor. S. and Bogdan. R.. 1984).
Despite the persistence of doubts in some quarters as to the ultimate validity of qualitative 
methods when it comes to drawing conclusions, many authors have nevertheless 
demonstrated that an inductive approach is no less valid than a deductive one. Under the 
positivist paradigm, if the premises that framed the research are valid, then the conclusions 
reached must be true and must be the only conclusions possible. Using induction however, 
many possible conclusions can be reasonably applied to a certain set of premises. The 
most appropriate outcome usually emerges as a result of a process of negotiation between 
the researcher and the respondent; since it is the respondents' interpretations of and 
perspectives on reality that the researcher is trying to reconstruct, their input is an essential 
part of the analysis procedure (Lincoln. Y. and Guba. E.. 1985).
Arguably more important than an allegiance to any one methodological school is ensuring
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that the evidence that is presented in the research is substantiated from as many different 
perspectives as possible (Yin. R.. 1987). For this reason, as was mentioned earlier, this 
study employs a selection of methods from both the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, which together aim to ensure the adequate triangulation of the research, a 
concept to be mentioned in more detail later in this chapter.
5-3-1 SECONDARY RESEARCH
As is illustrated in the above figure, the secondary research phase was conducted by means 
of a continued parallel examination of secondary literature and background material on the 
subject of the car industry relating specifically to marketing and distribution issues or more 
generally to the evolution of the industry as a whole. The data drawn from this literature, 
which included books, newspaper and journal articles, consultancy and company reports, 
European Commission papers and conference material, served to help in the formulation of 
topics and questions for both the interview, case study and survey phases, to fill in some of 
the background and the context for the issues under consideration that forms an essential 
part of the emerging picture of the topic, and to provide useful comparisons both with other 
companies within the sector and with parallel developments in other areas of the European 
economy. Throughout the course of the study, the researcher also had access to the 
ongoing work being conducted for the other ICDP projects with which findings could be 
compared and contrasted.
5-3-2 PRIMARY RESEARCH
The primary research phase of the study can, as illustrated in Figure 5-1, be divided into 
two halves, firstly concept exploration and model development and secondly model 
validation and testing.
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5-3-2-1 CONCEPT EXPLORATION AND MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT
Pilot interview
Following the initial phase of the work examining the background to the industry and 
narrowing the overall focus of the study down to the post-factory distribution chain, a pilot 
interview was carried out to gauge the extent to which the concepts developed so far were 
accurate and salient to be pursued in the subsequent work.
The respondent was the then Public Policy Director of the Retail Motor Industry Federation 
in the UK, the trade body representing the interests of UK vehicle dealers both franchised 
and independent. This respondent was felt to be appropriate in the light of their in-depth 
knowledge not only of the dealer sector, but also of manufacturer-related issues and overall 
industry developments. The meeting took the form of an open-ended discussion session, 
and lasted two and a half hours.
Pilot questionnaire -  UK and France
Following this pilot interview, it was decided to gather an initial body of fairly general 
industry opinion on the emerging issues of the study, again so as to confirm the emerging 
conceptual framework of the study. Given the problem at this stage in the research of 
gaining access to manufacturer respondents, it was felt appropriate to advance the research 
by targeting the level in the distribution chain most likely to be immediately affected by 
any change; the dealers.
The overriding problem to be addressed in conducting research into the dealer body is one 
of scale; the total number of franchised outlets in the European market (including service- 
only facilities) has been estimated at 121,000, of which 107,000 actually sell cars 
(International Car Distribution Programme, 1994(a)). This figure was brought down to 
more manageable proportions through the selection of focus markets. For practical reasons 
including time and cost limitations, the markets selected for the dealer focus work were 
limited to two - the UK and France; two of Europe's five major car markets and also 
countries which display some very different characteristics in terms of car retailing 
structures and trends.
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The easiest means of obtaining both basic facts and figures and also opinions on selected 
issues from dealers was by means of a postal questionnaire addressed to the dealer 
principals of a sample of their number. The postal questionnaire is seen as a means of 
obtaining a significant volume of information relatively easily, and opens up the possibility 
of drawing inferences about a large group of actors based on the study of a relatively small 
number of individual actors from within the group (Yin. R.. 1984; Tavlor. S. and Bogdan. 
R.. 1984). Furthermore, the choice of a postal questionnaire eased the problem that the 
geographically diffuse nature of the dealer networks might otherwise have caused.
The respondent sample was constructed from a selection of dealers of Renault and PSA 
(Peugeot-Citroen) vehicles in the UK and France. Despite strong, modem product ranges 
and competitive standings in the European marketplace, both Renault and PSA remain 
highly vulnerable to further fluctuations in market fortunes (as indeed do all the European 
generalist manufacturers), especially as they are both heavily reliant upon the large market 
shares they enjoy in their home country (43.8%, 41.9% and 45.5% for Renault, Citroen and 
Peugeot respectively).3 Furthermore, both have adopted very different strategies with 
regard to the nature and positioning of their products in the European marketplace, with 
Renault having used the adoption of some of the principles of lean production as a trigger 
to the development of a strong range of niche products and PSA having trodden a more 
cautious path, sticking to the traditional market segments (indeed Peugeot and Citroen cars 
compete directly with each other in many of them). Both have also expressed very 
different opinions regarding aspects of the Single Market Programme and the liberalising 
of their sector. Together, they typify all the strategic dilemmas that Europe's car makers 
will need to face up to and overcome over the course of the next few years, and as such are 
highly characteristic of their labels as European generalist car producers. Despite their 
strong cultural heritages, the significant presence both companies enjoy across the 
European market was seen as adequate to overcome any particular bias that might emerge 
in the research from their both being of French origin, particularly as the dealers sampled 
were in the vast majority of cases independent (as opposed to manufacturer-owned) and 
were also questioned as to their opinions on the wider European car market as well as on 
their relationship to their particular manufacturer.
The sheer number of dealers representing Renault and PSA in the two selected markets was 
such that a random sample of their number was the best means of making the pilot survey 
feasible. For the UK dealer questionnaire, likely to be quicker and less expensive, it was
Williams. K. et al. 1994: pi 69, quoting SMMT, 1992 (Motor Industry of Great Britain, London) 
figures for the European passenger car market in 1991.
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decided to send out 200 questionnaires, 60 each to Renault and Citroen dealers, and 80 to 
Peugeot dealers in reflection of their greater number in the UK market. As the 
questionnaire was not intended to be a quantitative one, the number of questionnaires was 
not tied precisely to the number of dealers. The dealers themselves were selected at 
random from the alphabetical listings published by the manufacturers and readily available 
to prospective customers. The questionnaires were accompanied by a covering letter. For 
the French dealer questionnaire, resource limitations meant that only 70 questionnaires 
could be sent out; included this time were pre-paid return envelopes, considered essential if 
dealers were to respond to a questionnaire sent 'cold' from abroad. The breakdown of the 
questionnaires distributed and the replies received is given below.
Figure 5-2



















Renault 370 60 8 7274 24 4
Peugeot 401 80 17 4449 23 4
Citroen 244 60 12 4553 23 4
- Dealers include branch, independent and second-tier outlets, but not service-only operations
- Some Peugeot and Citroen dealers may be dual-franchise: in this case they would be counted 
twice
- Dealer figures correct at the start o f 1993 (Source: Harbour Wade, 1993)
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Figure 5-3
RESPONSE RATES FOR UK AND FRENCH PILOT DEALER 
QUESTIONNAIRES
UK France UK and France 
combined
Renault 13.33% 16.66% 14.28%
Peugeot 21.25% 17.39% 20.4%
Citroen 20% 17.39% 19.27%
Overall 18.5% 17.14% 18.15%
The questions were listed according to a funnel process commencing with broad, general 
questions regarding their dealership, such as its size and its scope, before leading into more 
specific matters such as the nature of the relationship between the dealership and the 
manufacturer, and finishing on the respondent’s personal perception of selected issues such 
as Selective Distribution or the evolution of the distribution chain, including invitations for 
them to conduct in some 'crystal-ball gazing' and suggest future scenarios. A discussion of 
the findings is included in Chapter 6.4
Interview programme 1: UK and Europe
Following this pilot stage, the primary research turned to the first of two interview 
programmes involving elite respondents from within the industry. As was outlined in the 
Introduction, this was conducted within the framework of an ICDP research project looking 
at the future role of national distribution companies across the European market, and 
adopted a manufacturer focus.
In gathering the dealer perspective, the chief problem to overcome was the sheer size of the 
dealer body in the European market. Now however, this situation was reversed, with the 
number of suitable respondents at manufacturer-level both able and available to provide the 
data requested extremely limited. From the perspective of a car manufacturer, with many 
hierarchical layers and activities subdivided into innumerable departments and different job 
descriptions, the focus of the research was a broad one, covering many aspects of their 
marketing and distribution activities, and required respondents who had both broad
Examples o f  the questionnaire are given in Appendices III and IV, and a selection o f  responses is 
contained in Appendix V.
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experience of the industry and also sufficient detailed knowledge of all these areas. With 
there being usually very few people within an organisation capable of giving both a 
comprehensive overall view of company strategy, and also suitable contextual accounts of 
company structures, histories and future plans, the research inevitably had to target these 
few elite executives to participate in an interview programme.
Once again for the practical reasons of time and resources, it was necessary to select a 
sample of companies to participate in the national distributors project interview 
programme. This sample was chosen deliberately from among the ICDP sponsor 
organisations according to six predetermined categories. The background literature 
strongly suggested that the car distribution chain might evolve in different ways according 
to the type of manufacturer involved, so it was decided to survey a selection of volume, 
specialist and Japanese manufacturers. To this were added three further categories of 
manufacturer-owned and independent national distributors and specialist service providers, 
meaning other distribution chain actors well placed to comment on the topic in question. 
The 11 companies that participated are listed in Appendix VII, the discussion topics are 
summarised in Appendix Vm, a selection of transcriptions are presented in Appendix IX, 
and the findings are discussed in Chapter 6.
The qualitative interviewing technique adopted here was ‘semi-structured, semi­
standardised and open-ended’ (Yin. R.. 1984). In this respect, it is 'modelled on a 
conversation between equals' (Tavlor. S. and Bogdan. R.. 1984), and is considered an 
appropriate method when, amongst other things, the research interests are relatively clear, 
when the respondents would not otherwise be accessible, when there are restraints on the 
researcher's time and resources, and when the research depends on a broad range of settings 
and respondents (Tavlor. S. and Bogdan. R.. 1984).
13 in-depth discussion sessions were held, each lasting at least 2 hours. These were 
arranged through the ICDP sponsor contacts, who themselves occupied senior positions 
within the distribution and marketing areas of their companies, and would usually involve 
both them and other, usually more senior, colleagues who had been invited to attend 
because of their superior expertise on the subject. Examples of the respondents' job 
descriptions are given in examples where their contributions are quoted. The sessions were 
semi-structured, with the respondents having been sent a topic list prior to the meeting. 
The questions were open-ended in nature, inviting the respondents to reflect on the issues 
that form the backdrop to their everyday work, and again moved from general information 
including the historical background to that company's current distribution chain structure 
on to more specific questions probing for the respondents' personal convictions as opposed
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to the official company line concerning the future direction of the sector and the prospects 
for the evolution of lean thinking, and culminating in as much time as the respondents 
might like to take in conducting some crystal-ball gazing. More often than not, the 
respondents were interested to hear the researcher's ideas and opinions, and the ensuing 
discussions proved both interesting and fruitful.
Each session was transcribed from tape recordings and written notes, and then themes and 
suitable quotations were picked out. Similar themes from other interviews were then 
grouped together to be formed into the narrative of the research. So as to maintain 
confidentiality, and in keeping with the principles of the whole ICDP programme, 
information gathered during these meetings which was not readily available in the public 
domain was anonymised, with sources being identified only according to the company’s 
category (volume manufacturer, specialist manufacturer, etc.) and the respondent’s job title 
where appropriate.
Interview programme 2: UK
Subsequent to the first interview programme, an opportunity was made available to 
conduct a further series of interviews with manufacturers, national distributors, dealers and 
trade federations in the UK. Through the ICDP, the researcher was called upon to assist 
Professor Hiromi Shioji of the Faculty of Economics at Kyoto University in Japan with the 
UK element of a comparative study of car retailing systems in the UK, the USA and Japan. 
A short interview programme was constructed, again consisting of open-ended discussion 
sessions, conducted by the Professor and the researcher. Free rein was given to include 
relevant questions and to relate findings to this particular work, and the topics that were 
discussed matched the conceptual framework and research hypotheses of this study.
In-depth discussion sessions were conducted with senior-level executives at 10 
organisations; 4 manufacturers (2 operating as domestic producers and 2 wholly-owned 
national sales companies), 2 publicly-owned dealer groups, 1 privately-owned dealer group 
and 3 national trade federations. In addition to this, 3 impromptu interviews were carried 
out, one with a dealer principal from a publicly-owned dealer group, one with a Marketing 
and Customer Services Manager for a private dealer group, and one with a customer-facing 
member of staff at a manufacturer-owned retail outlet. The companies that were involved 
in all these interviews are listed in Appendix X, a summary of the discussion topics is 
given in Appendix XI, a selection of transcriptions is presented in Appendix XII, and the 
results are discussed in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 5 PAGE 150
5-3-2-2 MODEL VALIDATION AND TESTING
As will be reported later in this thesis, the pilot and qualitative interview phases of the 
research provided a wealth of evidence and opinion which both substantiated and 
countered the material emerging in parallel from the secondary research activities. The 
next step in the research was to distil these concepts into a model which could then be 
tested by more experimental means back on the industry itself. This model, which is 
outlined in more detail in Chapter 8 consisted of a checklist of what appeared to the 
researcher from the previous primary and secondary research to constitute the key 
structural developments that are being instigated as a result of the implementation of the 
‘lean thinking’ paradigm across the car distribution chain. The research then sought to 
validate this model in terms of:
• the extent to which the industry concurred that these concepts were salient to its future 
evolution;
• the industry’s estimations of the progress of and prospects for implementation of these 
concepts.
This was conducted firstly by means firstly of two small case studies and secondly, and 
more importantly, by a quantitatively-based survey.
Case studies
The case study approach (and especially the case-based reporting mode), was outlined by 
Yin (Yin. R.. 1984; Yin. R.. 1993) and defined as an enquiry that
"investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident and in which multiple sources o f  evidence are used".5
The use of a case-based approach is also advocated when the topic is defined broadly and 
not narrowly, when the researcher has no direct influence over the events being examined, 
and when the aim is to cover the contextual conditions as well as the actual phenomenon 
under study (Yin. R.. 1984; Yin. R.. 1993). In this respect, it was considered that the
Yin. R.. 1984: p23
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inclusion of two case studies, one involving a company not involved in ICDP, would serve 
to bolster the research by allowing the concepts elaborated in the research model to be 
viewed in their real world contexts in a little greater detail than was possible in the other 
phases of the fieldwork.
Two case studies were conducted, one on the arrival of South Korea’s Daewoo Corporation 
in the European market, and the other on the UK-based Rover Group’s ‘Distribution 
Efficiency’ programme for the European market. Both companies display very different 
characteristics and situations, and the case studies sought to illustrate elements of their 
thinking and strategic approaches to the European market.
The Daewoo study was compiled totally from secondary sources,6 and their case is 
certainly well-documented across Europe. As a major new player in the marketplace, they 
have adopted an innovative (and potentially risky) approach to marketing and distribution 
in the UK, an approach which has aroused a great deal of comment in the industry and a 
not insignificant amount of opposition from the UK dealer sector. This approach may also 
in time be applied to other continental markets. The publicity their strategy has generated 
made the prospects of gaining access to primary research respondents very difficult, and the 
company was unwilling to be judged until its strategy had been given the time to become 
fully established (the company only started selling cars in the UK in the spring of 1995). In 
any case, this case study sought not to judge the success or failure of the venture, but to 
examine its characteristics from the perspective of the research model, something which it 
was possible to achieve using the many secondary sources available.
The Rover study was compiled from both primary and secondary sources. The history of 
Rover is a well-known one in the industry, involving in more recent times a vast 
rationalisation from a multi-brand nationalised monolith into a two- (and now three-) brand 
manufacturer (Rover, Land Rover and MG), an alliance with Honda and now a fully- 
fledged marriage to German luxury manufacturer BMW. For the purposes of this study, it 
is sufficient to situate Rover as a company which, having fundamentally rethought both its 
product and its production strategies in order to face up to new competitive conditions, is 
now generally recognised by the rest of the industry as being at the forefront of the ‘lean 
revolution’ in terms of rethinking its distribution and marketing value chain across the 
whole European market. Mr Peter Bailey, one of the ‘Distribution Efficiency’ project 
managers at Rover, has been involved in this process from the outset, and was able to share
6 Including publications such as the Financial Times, Car, Autocar, Automotive News Europe, 
Automotive Management, Motor Trader, Le Journal de l’Automobile, L’Argus de l’Automobile and 
company literature produced by Daewoo’s headquarters as well as its UK, French and German 
subsidiaries. Also, conference speeches delivered by executives from the UK operation.
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some of the company’s thinking, experiences and future plans for this study. The two case 
studies are presented in Chapter 7.
Postal survey -  The Concepts o f Lean Distribution
The primary research phase of the study was then completed with a further postal survey, 
entitled “The Concepts of Lean Distribution”. As mentioned above, this sought to test the 
model developed throughout the study by measuring both the degree of industry association 
with these concepts and also industry perceptions of progress and future prospects at the 
implementation stage. Kirk and Miller argue that qualitative observations identify the 
presence or absence of a phenomenon, in contrast to a quantitative observation which seeks 
to measure the extent to which the phenomenon is present (Kirk. J. and Miller. M.. 1986). 
This was the aim of the survey; to move the study forward from establishing the existence 
of a number of sectoral developments which could be termed Tean distribution’ towards 
assessing the extent of their presence across the European market.
Again, restrictions of time and resources meant that a postal survey was the most 
appropriate means of data gathering, and the sample was made up of all sponsors and non­
sponsor industry contacts on the ICDP database. This gave a broad base of extremely high 
level respondents from within or concerned with the industry right across Europe, 
including governments, manufacturers, national distributors, dealers, trade federations, 
parts suppliers, oil companies, other service providers (computer systems specialists, 
distribution and logistics specialists, etc.) consultants and academics. Many sponsoring 
organisations have a number of ICDP contacts located within different functional areas and 
even in different countries, so survey distribution was not limited to one per company, 
which further helped to broaden the perspective of the study7.
In total, 150 surveys were distributed; these were posted, along with a covering letter, 
inside an issue of the monthly ICDP newsletter. 44 responses were received, which equals 
a response rate of 29.33%. Prior to distribution, copies of the survey were pilot-tested on 
other members of the ICDP research team, and their comments and suggestions were 
incorporated into the final version. A sample of the survey is included in Appendix Xm, a 
flavour of the types of respondent is given in Appendix XIV, and the survey is presented in 
more detail in Chapter 8.
The survey consisted of two questions which required respondents to tick boxes on a table.
7 A list of ICDPl sponsor organisations in given in Appendix I. However the final distribution for the 
survey was wider than this, as it included many non-sponsor contacts who also receive copies of the 
monthly newsletter.
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Each question occupied one piece of A4 paper, and an additional sheet was included at the 
end for comments and suggestions. The whole survey was designed to be faxed back, 
which ensured quick responses for the researcher and a minimum of inconvenience for the 
respondents.
The survey was conducted anonymously. Respondents were not required to insert either 
their name or that of their company. This was because it was not the intention of the 
survey to compare different categories of industry actor or types of manufacturer; this had 
already been conducted elsewhere in the research; but rather to measure overall industry 
opinion of the chosen topics. It was also felt that respondents would be more interested in 
the survey if they were invited to give their personal opinions based on their industry 
experience, rather than to repeat their company’s official stance on the matter which would, 
in most cases, be known to the researcher anyway. Nevertheless, despite this anonymity, it 
was often possible for the researcher to observe anecdotally, from the incoming fax headers 
and cover pages, which individuals from the sample were responding. This observation 
was used to ensure that responses were arriving from a broad spread of different types of 
organisation, and this indeed turned out to be the case.
The survey was analysed statistically using parametric ANOVA tests to look for 
statistically significant levels of variances between the responses. Greene and D’Oliveira 
advocate the use of such parametric tests where possible as they are more powerful than 
their non-parametric equivalents, making exact calculations of variance as opposed to the 
simple rank ordering of a Friedman test (Greene. J. and D’Oliveira. M.. 1982). The authors 
list three requirements for parametric tests; experimental scores measured on an interval 
scale, a normal distribution of scores and a homogeneity of variance, meaning that the 
variability of scores for each experimental condition should be roughly the same. It was 
felt that the data collected satisfied all these criteria. As all the distributed surveys were 
identical and no attempt was made to differentiate the respondents according to their 
company or job title, this meant that the survey design was a related one; all the subjects 
responding to the same questions throughout. This, together with the number of 
experimental conditions (factors) within each question, made possible the use of related 
ANOVA tests, although slightly different types were employed for each question. As is 
covered in more detail in Chapter 8, the data was tabulated in a spreadsheet, and the tests 
were conducted using Microsoft Excel.
Following confirmation by means of these quantitative analyses, the researcher could go on 
to pick out themes and trends from the data. As was the case with the earlier phases of the 
fieldwork, these were then combined with pertinent comments and quotations submitted by
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respondents and worked into the narrative of the research.
5-3-3 ISSUES OF VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
As has been made clear throughout this chapter, research methods cannot exist and operate 
in isolation. It is vital therefore for the researcher to ensure that the variety of research 
methods chosen fit together to form a valid and coherent whole, and that they are jointly 
and severally valid and reliable (Easterbv-Smith. Thorpe and Lowe. 1991).
The driving philosophy behind the construction of this study has been to employ multiple 
methods to approach the same problem from a number of different perspectives, thus 
increasing the likelihood that erroneous findings would spring quickly to light. For 
instance, the qualitative methodology used for a significant proportion of the work cannot 
ever be considered to be completely impartial. As it is the researcher who has chosen to 
look at the particular problem, who has framed it for study and who will be responsible for 
identifying concepts and categories within the qualitative data that has been collected, it is 
unavoidable that the whole process is subject to his values and frames of reference 
(Lincoln. Y. and Guba. E.. 1985; Tavlor. S. and Bogdan. R.. 1984). Therefore, the more 
quantitatively-based final survey and, to a lesser extent the case studies, serve to increase 
the objectivity of the whole by providing more ‘hard’ evidence. This approach is supported 
by Yin, who points out that findings that can be reached using more than one approach can 
logically be considered to be more convincing and more accurate (Yin. R.. 1984), and 
using multiple sources of evidence for an essentially qualitative piece of research, the 
researcher is able to tackle a broader range of historical, attitudinal and observational 
issues, and is also able to achieve triangulation through the development of 'converging 
lines of enquiry1 (Yin. R.. 1984; Maves. P.. 1991).
"Consider the difficulty o f  establishing the occurrence o f  an event. 
You would be more confident in saying that the event actually had 
occurred if  your study showed that information from interviews,  
documents and your observations all pointed in the same direction. ,l8
If the use of multiple sources of evidence helps to build the validity of a study, then the
8 Yin. R.. 1993: p69
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parallel concept of reliability is defined by Easterby-Smith et al as basically a question of 
stability; if the instrument is administered to the same individual on more than one 
occasion, will the outcome be the same (Easterbv-Smith. Thorpe and Lowe. 1991)? 
Quantitative research, being essentially concerned with verification, has a whole range of 
well codified procedures for establishing that the measuring instruments employed are both 
valid and reliable (Berger. R. and Patchner. M.. 1988). For instance, checks can be made 
on the internal validity and the external validity of the research by reordering or 
recalculating the experiment, or by repeating the measure on another sample. Absolute 
rigour in this form is simply not available to the qualitative researcher working with the 
liuman instrument’, who must instead work to a strategy of damage limitation, of plugging 
holes by being as open and objective as possible (Lincoln. Y. and Guba. E.. 1985). Yin 
(Yin. R.. 1984) talks of the importance of 'maintaining a chain of evidence' in order to 
increase the reliability of the information, so that the reader is able to follow the research 
through easily from questions to conclusions.
Each of the chosen research methods brings with it a particular set of problems and pitfalls 
that need to be considered by the researcher. For instance, it is ultimately very difficult to 
remove all potential for bias from the interview format as the whole process is subject to 
the researcher’s frames of reference. In this study, this potential problem was mitigated by 
the distribution of a sheet of prepared interview topic areas a few days prior to each 
interview so as to ensure that all respondents were able to prepare their thoughts in 
advance, thus minimising the researcher’s need to steer respondents in the desired direction 
during the interviews themselves. As the researcher’s knowledge of the subject area grew 
throughout the work, so it became easier to frame the topic areas in advance so as to 
stimulate respondents to talk freely. Finally on the matter of interviews, a further potential 
source of bias is the sole use of ICDP sponsor organisations as interview respondents. As 
with the individuals who have elected to act as sponsor contacts, it might be considered 
that these companies will be the most progressive and research-friendly in the industry. 
This may have been the case if the ICDP only had the backing of a limited proportion of 
the industry, but a look at the sponsor list reveals that it would have been hard to select a 
major company not involved with the project, such is the interest that it has aroused.
Similar concerns regarding the survey elements of the work were addressed firstly by 
piloting the survey on other ICDP researchers (all bar one of whom spoke English as a 
second language); this process picked up any inconsistencies or bias in the survey 
formulation, and secondly through the use of the statistical tests outlined above.
In his seminal work on the matter, Yin points out three potential criticisms of the case
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study method:9
• “It lacks rigour, meaning that equivocal or biased views can influence the direction o f  
findings and conclusions. ”
In the case of this research, this issue was addressed by restricting the case study element to 
a relatively small proportion of the work, using it as an opportunity to explore some of the 
themes raised by the rest of the work in more detail, rather than as a critical part of the 
hypothesis testing.
• “There is little basis for scientific generalisation. ”
This argument can be accepted by the research without contradiction, as one of the aims of 
the work was to show how the responses to the competitive challenges examined by the 
study will be individual to each car manufacturer or distribution chain actor, and not 
general across the whole industry.
• “Case studies tend to be too long, resulting in massive, unreadable documents. ”
Again, the use of the case studies as but one element in the overall research strategy, and 
the space limitations imposed by the thesis form, together mean that only the key aspects 
from each case were used to contribute to the presented fieldwork. Both cases would, 
however, warrant more detailed study on their own as both constitute worthwhile and 
interesting examples.
As mentioned earlier, this overall approach of using multiple sources contributed greatly to 
the validity, consistency and reliability of the work, and enabled similar questions to be put 
to both ends of the distribution chain, thus helping to build an overall understanding of the 
sector. It also helped to prevent bias creeping into the research; all the findings that came 
out of the questionnaires and interviews could both be reflected directly back to the 
hypotheses and could be employed in the formulation of subsequent stages of the 
fieldwork, with any alternative explanations for the phenomena under study that might 
emerge not being rejected, but instead being examined within the context of the hypotheses 
as contributory evidence to the understanding and illustration of the issues. Finally, the 
appropriateness and sensitivity of each measure (such as the survey or interview questions) 
could be reassessed following each stage of the fieldwork process to ensure that the 
methods employed were resulting in the collection of a suitable volume and quality of data,
9 Yin. R.. 1987, p21-2
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and detail elements of the survey, cases study and interview methods could then be 
modified as necessary prior to the next stage.
5-3-4 DISSEMINATION OF THE RESEARCH AND THE 
FEEDBACK PROCESS
The open and participatory nature of the ICDP meant that the sponsor organisations were 
given regular updates on the progress of the work and ready access to the findings, with 
comments and suggestions being welcomed. The "Role of National Distributors" project 
included the publication of two large reports10 and two major presentations to the 
assembled sponsors at ’Policy Forum' meetings. Both of these invited comments and 
suggestions from all the sponsors, not just those who had participated in the interviews, and 
the presentations were followed by open discussion sessions. This sponsor feedback 
process, combined with a similar input from the other researchers involved in the 
Programme, played an important role in building the trustworthiness of the work by 
confirming that the data was being portrayed accurately and that the ideas being developed 
were not too far wide of the mark. This dissemination process also helped to generate 
interest within the industry, which constituted a useful base for seeking further interviews 
and developing new ideas.
Figure 5-4
MAJOR RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS TO ICDP SPONSORS
Autumn 1994 Oxford, UK
Spring 1995 Perugia, Italy
Autumn 1995 Mougins, France
Spring 1996 (Daewoo study) Divonne, France
Tongue. A.. 1995: "Environments and Activities o f National Distributors" and "Trends and 
Prospects for National Distributors", both published by ICDP Ltd., January and July
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5-4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has outlined, explored and justified the methodology chosen for this research. 
It has shown the logical progression of the work through pilot interviews and surveys, two 
interview programmes, two case studies and finally a survey to test and validate the 
findings. Secondary research has continued in parallel alongside this primaiy work.
The next three chapters now present the findings from the pilot survey and interview 
programmes, the short case studies and the final survey respectively, after which Chapter 9 
draws the research conclusions together.
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CHAPTER 6
PILOT SURVEY AND 
INTERVIEW PROGRAMMES
"At the moment, it's like a war. The dealers are at the front, facing the 
enemy. The manufacturers stand at the back, looking through a 
telescope . "
Distribution strategies manager, European volume 
manufacturer
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6-1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present thematically some of the material which resulted 
from the pilot interview and dealer survey and also from the two interview programmes. 
The chapter is split into three sections, as follows:
• Physical distribution activities;
• Distribution chain organisation;
• Selling and marketing activities.
Each section brings together the material gathered from manufacturer, national distributor, 
dealer and other chain actor respondents, and thus seeks to examine the developments 
underway in the sector from a multitude of perspectives both within the context of the 
development of lean distribution and also that of the emerging single European market.
Further details of the construction of both the pilot survey and the interview programmes 
are given in Appendices III and IV (pilot survey) and VII, VIII (first interview programme), 
X and XI (second interview programme).
"The EU has had quite a big effect on the need fo r  us to control our 
sales and marketing presence in the Member State markets. "
Director of European dealer operations, volume 
manufacturer, UK (Interview programme 1)
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6-2 PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES
6-2-1 THE CLIMATE FOR LEAN SUPPLY AND 
STOCKING FACILITIES
All phases of the fieldwork asked respondents to evaluate the climate for the 
implementation of the physical distribution, or supply and stocking system aspects of lean 
distribution, considered in the literature to be the most immediately manageable area of 
change.1 There was almost universal agreement that the ‘leaning’ of the car supply system 
has the potential to alter significantly the ordering and selling procedures for dealers. 
However, at the time of the pilot survey, which was early on in the research, the dealers did 
not consider that very much change had yet taken place.
Consequently, comments from the postal questionnaire dealers on this matter were centred 
around two concerns associated with the changes that their manufacturers might require 
them to make as part of a move towards lean distribution. Firstly, the industry-wide trend 
for manufacturers to cut dealer margins on new car sales, and to replace them with bonus 
payments for meeting performance or quality targets; this was seen as being part of the 
move away from the stock-push mentality towards a more customer and quality focused 
approach. Some of the dealers were concerned that this represented a threat to their ability 
to trade, and to make a deal with their customers.2 One UK national federation also 
pointed out that, with reduced margins, the manufacturers are now retaining more of the 
selling price of the car for themselves than used to be the case. For instance, a typical gross 
margin in 1989 was 17.5%, meaning that the manufacturer theoretically took 82.5%. With 
the 7% margins being operated today, the manufacturer keeps 93%; it was wondered 
whether this situation was one which the dealers would be prepared to put up with over a 
period of time.3 Secondly, dealers from both the UK and France expressed reservations at 
the capital outlay that would be involved in acquiring the new computer equipment, etc. 
that the manufacturers would demand.4
See sections 3-3-1 and 3-3-2 
Interview programme 2 
Interview programme 2 
Pilot questionnaire
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As the research progressed, talk of lean distribution and supply system changes in 
particular came to occupy centre-stage as a focus for the whole industry. By the time the 
first interview programme was conducted, the respondents wanted to talk about little else. 
So, had the dealer questionnaire been conducted just a few months later, it is probable that 
the issue would have filtered down to occupy the minds of even the most remote dealers. 
However, all the dealer respondents who mentioned it nevertheless concurred that the 
reversal of the traditional stock system to use the customer order as the trigger for the 
production and distribution process would constitute a major factor in the search for more 
partnerial relations between manufacturers and dealers.s
"Lean distribution requires a major increase in trust between 
manufacturers and dealers. ”
Pilot interview with policy director of UK trade 
federation
6-2-2 MOVES TOWARDS LEAN SUPPLY AND 
STOCKING SYSTEMS
As has also been confirmed by many other areas of the ICDP research programme 
(International Car Distribution Programme. 1993(b) and 1995(b-e)), moves towards the 
'leaning' of the physical distribution process and the introduction of activities such as direct 
dealer ordering and pan-European logistics emerged during the fieldwork as being 
underway in the distribution chains of many manufacturers, and these look set to improve 
radically the performance of the whole post-factory area.
6-2-2-1 THE 'LEANING' OF PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION 
PROCESSES
Fieldwork respondents agreed with the notion, as discussed in Chapter 3, that the process 
of ‘leaning’ the physical distribution processes in the chain involves radical changes in
Interview programmes 1 and 2
CHAPTER 6 PAGE 163
both the directions of flow present in the chain; not only the downward flow of finished 
products into the markets, but also the upward flow of orders and other data from the 
markets to the producers (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990). The latter is realised 
by having the dealers placing their orders, both for stock, although this is gradually being 
weeded out of the system, and sold customer orders, directly with the factory or 
headquarters, with the information flow potentially bypassing the national distributor level.
"It is important both for the dealer and fo r the people in the factory to 
see exactly what the dealer is selling . "
Sales company director, European specialist 
manufacturer (Interview programme 1)
In the downward direction, the developments mentioned included the introduction of 
integrated distribution involving pan-European logistics, new distribution centres suitably 
located for the forwarding, rather than the storage of products (which therefore usually 
means in the interior of markets rather than at the ports of entry as before), and the 
redistribution of post-factoiy activities such as PDI6 or special model preparation to these 
centres or to the dealers were all confirmed by the interview respondents as making 
significant inroads into everyday company activity. However, several of these respondents 
also confirmed the view gathered during the pilot fieldwork that the introduction of lean 
distribution is not straightforward, but will require a major shift in mindset for the 
manufacturers away from the traditional 'stock-push' system, and also a significant increase 
in trust throughout all levels of the chain.
"Adopting lean distribution is dependent on the manufacturers 
completing the cultural shift from being production-driven to being 
marketing-driven."
Pilot interview with policy director of UK trade 
federation
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6-2-2-2 THE 'LEANING' OF THE PARTS SUPPLY CHAIN
Three manufacturer interview respondents reckoned that the same trend has been applied at 
an even faster rate to the ordering and supply process for parts, with change driven for the 
manufacturers by the desire to improve the speed and quality of service for the dealer and 
customer, thus building the loyalty of both.7 Direct ordering by dealers has been coupled 
with integrated pan-European logistics carried out either by the manufacturer or its 
subsidiary, or by a specialist partner, and the results for the companies questioned have 
been universally positive. For example, one French manufacturer confirmed that its parts 
for the French, German, Benelux and Italian markets are now all supplied directly from 
France, and also that they are moving rapidly towards shared parts warehouses for the two
Q
makes of car that the group produces. These respondents thought that parts were both an 
easier product stream to manage than cars, having fewer specification combinations, and
Interview programme 1
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were also less culturally-bound; together, they thought that this meant that a pan-European 
strategy would be easier for companies to reach. Nevertheless, parts still constitute a major 
activity and revenue-eamer for the national distributors, and so some manufacturer 
interviewees admitted to having encountered opposition from national distributors who do 
not wish to lose control over their parts activity.9
6-2-3 THE GRADUAL HARMONISATION OF 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Fieldwork respondents considered one essential element of the lean distribution process to 
be the information technology network that connects all actors in the distribution chain 
(Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990). Ensuring that the same system is in operation 
in all a manufacturer's markets is the key factor in being able to exchange information, such 
as vehicle orders, and their position within the pipeline, between the various levels who can 
act on such information. Such systems constitute a major integrating factor, as the 
technology installed today will have to meet the needs of the whole market, and its 
performance will condition the quality of the information flow received by both ends for 
the years ahead.
Changing information systems across the European market has, however, turned out to be a 
slow and expensive process, with each national distributor, and especially the independent 
ones, tending to have built up their own computer networks in accordance with their local 
needs. Whilst such equipment is performing efficiently, the cost and confusion involved in 
switching to another system is not always easy to justify. One national distributor 
interview respondent highlighted a potential problem for the national distributors and for 
the dealers, both of whom need to be of a certain size in order to be able to afford and to 
justify the new equipment. However, he pointed out that their size may not be an accurate 
reflection of their local market penetration, which may be significant enough to warrant the 
manufacturer's full attention and the latest equipment.10 It can therefore be assumed that 
new equipment will therefore tend to go to the bigger, more important, and especially to 
the manufacturer-owned markets (national distributors and dealers) first, with the smaller 
markets likely to operate older arrangements for longer, even though this may be a less than
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6-2-4 A REDUCTION IN SPECIFICATION 
DIFFERENCES AND MODEL VARIANTS
As identified in the literature,11 potentially the single biggest element in making pan- 
European supply and stocking systems function is the harmonisation of equipment 
specifications and model ranges across Europe, allowing vehicles, either in the form of 
orders or as finished articles, to cross the remaining national boundaries; cars meeting 
orders and vice-versa (Commission of the European Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 
1988; Maves, P .. 1991; Banville, E. de and Chanaron, J-J., 1991). The continued lack of 
common specifications not only reduces the significant efficiency benefits which could be 
reached, but also removes the opportunity to stimulate a convergence of marketing.
n See section 3-3-3
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Despite the agreement of a unified Type Approval regulation after years of disputes, 
progress in this area has, in the words of one manufacturer, been 'painfully slow\ with 
manufacturer respondents pointing to differences in technical regulations, tax laws and in 
local market preferences for the persistence of specification discrepancies.
"Each country has its reason, or its excuse, to be different. ”
Distribution strategies manager, European volume 
manufacturer (Interview programme 1)
Some other respondents claimed that manufacturers are deliberately dragging their feet, as 
separate specifications allow the manufacturers to maintain different prices in each market, 
and that they are guided in this by the level of competition in each market.
"The lack o f  pan-European equipment specifications is as much a 
function o f  what the opposition is doing in that particular market as 
anything else. ”
Marketing director, global volume manufacturer 
(Interview programme 1)
However, all the manufacturers interviewed admitted that they are currently moving to 
reduce the number of variants of each model range on offer, which suggests that an over­
proliferation of models is the real obstacle to change. In the future, once the platforms and 
actual base specifications of the cars have become common (or as close as possible), what 
will change will just be the equipment option packages, although, as one company 
interviewed pointed out, if a North European customer wants a feature normally seen on 
South European cars, not only will their car have been engineered to receive the option, 
under a lean distribution system they will be able to receive it with a minimum of delay.12
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"Whereas in the past manufacturers were more or less forced into 
producing national specifications, what we are trying to move to now 
is a regional specification. We are trying not to constrain availability 
by region; if  a North European customer wants air conditioning, the 
car will have been engineered fo r it, so he can have it. In essence we 
want to take all the barriers away, and let the customer have what they 
want, even if  it means they have to wait fo r it. "
■European Office' representative, volume manufacturer, 
UK (Interview programme 1)
This scenario corresponds to the principles of lean production; a product assembled to the
individual consumer’s specific needs on a common base, and two manufacturer respondents
pointed out that it could be used as an argument for those operating imperfect distribution
systems for actually lengthening the time between the customer placing his order and
11taking delivery of the car. One respondent pointed out that the comparison with other 
custom-made products reveals much longer lead times, and also greater consumer 
acceptance of the need to wait for their personal product to be made (the example was 
given of major items of furniture, where the customer might be prepared to wait a 
considerable length of time for his purchase to be delivered). Such a lengthening of the 
time taken to fulfil customer orders, combined with the removal of as much stock as is 
possible, would, in their opinion, not only enable a more stable production schedule to 
function, but would also mean that the actual delivery date promised could be adhered to.14
The achievement of common specifications across Europe, and the potential to ship cars 
across markets would therefore appear to be especially crucial for those manufacturers 
producing elsewhere and shipping their cars to the European Union on long lead times. 
Because the long period of time the car must spend on the boat is absolutely unavoidable, 
interviewees from such companies admitted that they need to do everything within their 
power to ensure that the rest of the system runs as efficiently and as flexibly as possible. 
By the same token, they thought that this competitive handicap was something that the 
domestic producers should be in a position to exploit, but until they achieve common 
specifications, this will not be the case and this opportunity may soon be missed.15
One of the more progressive respondents reckoned that this should lead manufacturers to 
question the extent to which local market needs and preferences really do differ, and, as in 
the above quotation, to move wherever possible away from national specifications which,
13 Interview programme 1
14 Interview programme 1
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under a lean system, prevent the supply chain from working at its utmost efficiency and 
which constrain availability for the consumers.
"Specification differences do little more than irritate the consumers. "







6-2-5 CENTRAL NEGOTIATION STRUCTURES FOR 
FLEET AND MAJOR RENTAL PURCHASES
One further trend observed here during both the manufacturer and the dealer sections of the 
fieldwork is the introduction in some instances of mechanisms enabling major customers 
such as fleet operators, rental companies, etc. who operate internationally, to negotiate 
centrally with the manufacturer rather than each of their national subsidiaries talking to the
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national distributor for that market. One respondent from a specialist manufacturer thought 
that this single point of contact might allow the customer to achieve a better deal with 
regard to supply conditions and mean greater volumes for the manufacturer overall.16
However, most manufacturer interviewees stressed the need to involve the national 
distributors in this process, as the cars supplied in this way will inevitably have to return to 
the dealer network in their country of use. One pointed out that there would otherwise be 
little incentive for the dealer or for the national distributor to offer their best level of 
personal service or care, "particularly at 5pm on a Friday", to a car they have never seen 
before, and whose sale and supply they were not involved in, even though the service 
revenue will be welcome. None of the interviewees really wanted to consider the 
possibility in the future of manufacturers moving on from this to direct selling, with major 
international orders invoiced and dispatched from the centre. Such a move would risk 
alienating the national distributors and the dealer networks completely, but as one 
manufacturer respondent pointed out, it would make serious economic sense if a single 
currency was in place ... Under such a scenario, even if it is a long way off, this respondent 
thought that manufacturers may well choose to retain the involvement and goodwill of the 
dealers, who after all would still be called on to maintain the car, by supplying through 
them. For the moment, such a route may be fraught with pitfalls, but that is not to say that 
one of the newer manufacturers in the European marketplace, for whom the cultural 
obstacles to introducing innovative ideas may be fewer, could not attempt it in the not-too- 
distant future.17
6-2-6 THE NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR LEVEL 
BYPASSED
So. most of these developments in distribution activities have the potential to allow the 
national distributor level to be bypassed by electronic transactions in one direction, and by 
centrally-coordinated logistics flows in the other. This process is in harmony with the logic 
of lean distribution as presented in the literature,18 allowing the manufacturers to gain full 
sight of customer demand by introducing transparency into the ordering chain, so essential 
to them being able to produce the cars that their customers want in the right quantities, and
16 Interview programme 1
17 Interview programmes 1 and 2
18 See section 3-3-2
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also providing a rationalisation of supply operations, bringing gains in efficiency as well as 
cost savings by reducing the duplication of activities (International Car Distribution 
Programme. 1993(b): Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990).
"We are on the edge o f  a revolution. The dealers want to change,  so it 
is up to the manufacturers to lead them. "
Independent sales company director, European volume 
manufacturer (Interview programme 1)
Nevertheless, manufacturer and national distributor respondents felt that this will not result 
in the latter being left out of supply and stocking activities completely, as it will still retain 
the vital function in taking care of the financial transactions involved in the supplying of 
cars and parts, certainly in the medium term. The continued fluctuation of different 
national currencies across the European market, combined with the sheer volume, small 
average size and financial precariousness of the dealers to be supplied, are together 
sufficient to make the possibility of the manufacturer handling all invoicing of dealers and 
other treasury activities centrally too risky a strategy. That is not to say that such a 
centralisation will not be possible once a single currency is in place, nor that it might not be 
a target for potential outsourcing to specialist subcontractors ...19
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6-2-7 THE EMERGENCE OF TWO-SPEED SYSTEMS
Respondents warned that the practicalities of introducing change in this area mean that 
things cannot be achieved overnight.20 This therefore seems to be leading many 
manufacturers to adopt a two-speed approach; concentrating on introducing change and 
integrating operations in the bigger, more mature, more central and consequently usually 
the wholly-owned distributor markets first, where the opportunities are greater and the 
return on investment likely to be more immediate. The smaller and more peripheral (which 
usually means the independent) markets are therefore left to follow in the slow track, to be 
upgraded at a later stage. This means that, for several manufacturers, the smaller 
independent markets will continue to run 'traditional' supply and stocking systems for some 
time yet
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" . . .  in these markets, dealers will continue to put their wet fingers out 
o f the window"
Chairman, manufacturer-owned national distributor 
(Interview programme 1)
with regard to establishing demand and with the national distributors bargaining with the 
manufacturer on their behalf to secure more or fewer cars for any given month. Generally 
though, it was clear from the interview programmes that moves towards lean supply and 
stocking systems are underway in virtually all the respondents’ companies.
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6-3 DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
ORGANISATION
6-3-1 NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR STRUCTURES
This section looks at the evolution of channel structures throughout the distribution chain, 
including the national distributor, regional sub-unit and dealer levels.
6-3-1-1 A GROWTH IN MANUFACTURER OWNERSHIP OF 
NATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS
Looking at the general organisation of the national distributor level within the chain, the 
fieldwork revealed a gradual growth in manufacturer ownership of national distributors 
across all types of manufacturers present in the European market.21 However, the rate of 
take-overs, particularly for the domestic volume and specialist makes, seems to have 
slowed when compared to the past couple of decades, as the most European manufacturers 
now have the majority of their larger customer markets under full ownership. Historically, 
change in ownership was triggered by markets reaching a suitable size and strategic 
importance, and also by the smaller makes merging into the larger ones, although some, if 
not all manufacturers maintained separate national distributors for each make they 
controlled (Ruierok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1993; Harbour Wade. 1993).
However, despite a few examples to the contrary, the majority of recent ownership changes 
seem to have occurred either when the independent national distributor's contract expires, 
or when they have got into financial or other difficulties and actually need to be bailed out 
by the manufacturer. Most manufacturer respondents did admit that, in an ideal situation, 
they would like to control all their national distributors, certainly in the major markets, but 
that they are happy to leave the present incumbents in place for the moment if the system is
Harbour Wade. 1993; ICDP. 1996(n) and Interview programme 1
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performing adequately.
"Over a period o f time . . .we  would prefer to own our own importers 
rather than stick with an independent. "
•European office representative, volume manufacturer, 
UK (Interview programme 1)
In contrast, instances were discovered of manufacturers actually off-loading their wholly- 
owned national distributors in some of their smaller, more difficult markets, turning them 
back to independent control. In one case, this was done as a cost-cutting measure, it having 
been decided that independent operators could manage these markets more efficiently and 
effectively than the loss-making manufacturer subsidiary.
6-3-1-2 THE INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN HEADQUARTERS 
OPERATIONS
One fairly recent development has been the introduction by the non-European, and 
particularly the Japanese manufacturers of headquarters or coordination centres for whole 
of the European market (Ruigrok. W. and Van Tulder. R.. 1991). These operations replace 
the previous interface between the national distributors and the manufacturer headquarters 
in, say, Japan, and often coincide with the build-up of autonomous production facilities in 
the region and a dedicated European model range. Whilst this development was to be 
expected of the growing manufacturers, these European centres have nevertheless not been 
without teething problems of their own. Several of them have found that it has taken time 
to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the national distributors and of the dealer networks. 
Two respondents from national distributors admitted that they were unsure as to what the 
actual functions of these operations were, and where their roles were clear, were often 
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"It is not always clear to us what the people at Euro-HQ are actually 
doing fo r  us."
Managing director, independent national distributor 
(Interview programme 1)
6-3-1-3 A DECLINE IN STAFFING LEVELS AND REGIONAL 
SUB-UNITS
A further organisational trend identified during the interviews was the general reduction in 
staffing levels at the national distributors, especially those owned by the manufacturers. 
This has come as a result of new computer technology, improved communications, etc. 
replacing human skills in certain tasks, and also reducing the need for regional outposts of 
national distributors in certain countries, notably the larger and more mature markets. 
These reductions have often gone hand in hand with a rationalisation of the national 
distributor's field staff, with several having moved from narrow, functional divisions, 
meaning that the dealer would be visited by a large number of representatives, each 
covering a different activity, to a more generalist approach, where the dealer interacts with 
a limited number of people competent in the whole range of activities, thus fostering 
stronger ties and building trust.
6-3-2 PROSPECTS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF 
NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR STRUCTURES
6-3-2-1 ‘BACK’ AND ‘FRONT OFFICE’ ACTIVITIES
Looking at the organisation of distribution chain activities across the European markets 
involves taking account of two key aspects, firstly the integration of activities across 
functional areas and reporting lines to the company's European headquarters, and secondly
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the harmonisation of these activities across all the European markets. It is to be expected 
that both the integration and the harmonisation elements will occur faster in some areas of 
activity than in others. The most readily apparent split that emerged in the fieldwork was 
between 'back' and 'front' office activities.
• Anything which does not directly or visibly affect the final selling process or the 
customer interface, activities which are not culturally bound nor dependent on local 
modification to meet market needs and which are essentially systems- as opposed to 
people-based can be termed 'back office' activities, and as such were viewed by the 
respondents as more likely targets for integration at a pan-European level, being 
taken care of either by manufacturer headquarters or by specialist subcontractors. 
This was observed with activities such as logistics and physical distribution of cars 
and parts.
• On the other hand, those activities where the local touch and local response are still 
crucial, 'front office' or more people-based activities, would seem to be more suited 
to being conducted at the national level by the national distributor, or at the local 
level by the dealer.
For instance, a lean ordering system as outlined earlier would enable the customer to 
receive the exact specification they want within a more accurate timeframe, and the 
processes involved are no longer dependent on linguistic or cultural factors, but rather 
depend on 'back office' logistical skill. These are therefore activities which could be 
considered suitable to be handled centrally or coordinated on a pan-European basis if this 
would prove more efficient than leaving them up to each national distributor, and this was 
confirmed by all the manufacturer respondents as indeed being the case. In contrast, it 
would seem that a highly visible factor such as a dealer's knowledge of the market and 
ability to respond is something which can only be instilled locally by the national 
distributor, and an activity such as dealer training is therefore something which could not 
realistically be conducted centrally by the manufacturers as long as market differences 
persist. However, the discussions revealed that it would be wrong to assume that all 
distribution chain activities will fit neatly into either the pan-European or national 
organisation categories. Four interviewees pointed out that certain activities could most 
usefully benefit from being further sub-divided into their constituent elements, with each 
one then being redistributed to the location in the distribution chain best suited for 
delivering what is needed.26 This is a trend which has already been observed elsewhere,
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such as in manufacturing, with sub-components often being manufactured and supplied by 
subcontractors, with the manufacturer itself only taking care of final assembly (Womack. 
J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; Lamming. R.. 1993). The same process would now seem 
to be spreading down into the post-factory chain, with activities such as PDI, special model 
preparation or the fitting of exhaust systems being relocated away from the factory to 
distribution centres and even to dealers (International Car Distribution Programme. 1993(b) 
and 1995(a)).
"The potential does exist fo r  many national distributor activities to be 
subcontracted to independent specialists,  especially in the case o f  the 
smaller national distributors. Almost anything could be handled by 
specialists ,  as long as the dealers are healthy and making money. "
Managing Director, independent national distributor 
(Interview programme 1)
6-3-2-2 CULTURAL INERTIA
However, it became immediately clear during the fieldwork interviews that moving 
activities within the distribution chain from one level to another in the search for a lean 
solution would be a far from straightforward process, indeed it would be one fraught with 
pitfalls. If there is one thing that the national distributors questioned did not like, it was 
what they perceived to be unexplained meddling in their activities on the part of company 
headquarters. One national distributor respondent commented that
"Most o f  the manufacturers who try to interfere with their national 
distributors fa il . "
Chairman, manufacturer-owned national distributor 
(Interview programme 1)
It therefore became clear that inertia at all levels in the chain should not be underestimated, 
especially if the operations are likely to have activities taken away from them. After 
having held a responsibility for several years, it seems inevitable that national distributors 
and dealers would fight "to retain their business cards". Respondents from three different 
manufacturers related how they had initiated grand schemes to reorganise their distribution 
activities, only to be forced to abandon them completely in the face of channel resistance.
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Other respondents pointed out that, whilst convergence in customer habits and market 
trends may occur unconsciously, changes in organisational structures necessarily constitute 
discrete step changes, which inevitably demand the approval and commitment of the 
people involved.27 So it can be assumed that, while the introduction of change in systems- 
based activities such as computer networks or ordering procedures is a relatively 
straightforward, if slow and costly process, pushing through innovations in more people- 
based activities is not only slow, it is also fraught with pitfalls and complications, reflecting 
the significant obstacle sometimes constituted by the culture of the whole distribution 
chain.
6-3-2-3 IS INTRODUCING CHANGE EASIER FOR CERTAIN 
TYPES OF MANUFACTURER?
One interviewee thought that the inherently more flexible nature and smaller size of the 
specialised manufacturers would mean that they would have fewer cultural obstacles to 
change within their organisations, even though they might find the initial investment levels 
required to instigate, for instance, a fully lean supply and stocking system, more onerous 
than their volume counterparts. The same respondent considered that the dialogue between 
the specialist manufacturer and its independent national distributors was more one of 
equals, with the specialist manufacturer more reliant upon the quality of the latter as it may 
not have the resources to consider taking over the operations itself. For this reason, he 
thought that the specialists tend therefore to be less aggressive when introducing change, 
meaning that it is easier for them to form new partnerships with distribution chain actors.
It would seem that even the relative newcomers to the European market such as the 
Japanese manufacturers are now finding themselves handicapped by the weight of their 
corporate histories in certain markets when it comes to introducing change. For instance, 
one of their number had found that national distributors who stood by them in their early 
years when the product was possibly less than fully competitive are now understandably 
reluctant to cede their franchise to the manufacturer now that their market share has grown 
and the new European-made models have come on stream 29 By the same token, some 
manufacturer respondents agreed that, theoretically at least, it should be easier for the really 
new arrivals, such as the Korean manufacturers, to set up the structures that will best suit
27 Interview programme 1
28 Interview programme 1
29 Interview programme 1
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their future needs and aspirations across the European market. This is expected to include 
a high degree of integration of national distributors and dealers, as there will be fewer 
cultural obstacles to doing so and this is, indeed, what is emerging for Daewoo in the UK, 
with a network of wholly-owned sales outlets,30 as will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 7. Nevertheless, some respondents from the European companies found it 
surprising that other non-European manufacturers had not made the most of this 
opportunity; instead of taking advantage of their lack of a historical legacy to set up ideal 
'greenfield' organisational structures, the majority appear to have chosen to take the 
conservative, traditional route, meaning they will have to upgrade to new systems at the 
same time as everybody else.31
6-3-2-4 PART OF A VARIABLE-SPEED APPROACH TO 
DIFFERENT MARKETS
This point about different types of manufacturer or channel reflects an observation made 
with regard to the implementation of change in supply systems and other back office 
activities, namely the emergence amongst some of the respondent manufacturers of a multi­
speed approach.32 For instance, looking at national distributor ownership and activity 
changes, efforts are being concentrated on the biggest, more important, more central 
markets first, targeting them for manufacturer ownership where this is not already the case, 
and putting them top of the list for the integration of their back office activities.33 Again, it 
can be induced that the smaller, strategically less important and more peripheral markets 
will be left off this fast track process, and independent ownership will be maintained where 
it functions effectively. Back office activities will not be integrated as fast, leading to the 
persistence of a system of trading partners. In this way, the independent national 
distributors would seem to almost take on the guise of a specialist subcontractor, 
conducting activities in cases where the manufacturer prefers not to do so itself. This 
serves to confirm the belief that the decision to introduce change, particularly in the smaller 
markets, is not driven by the current status of the national distributor, for example, by a 
manufacturer not wishing to pass on all its latest equipment and techniques to an 
independent, but by the size and the potential of the market. It can reasonably be assumed 
from the above that, in markets or at points in the business cycle where the manufacturer is
Financial Times, 11/10/1994; Daily Telegraph, 04/04/1995
Interview programmes 1 and 2
Interview programme 1
Interview programme 1
CHAPTER 6 PAGE 181
strong (such as a market where its share is significant or where sales have been increasing), 
its cultural influence over independent operators in the chain will be more powerful, and 
changes therefore easier to push through.
6-3-2-5 THE NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR LEVEL OF THE 
FUTURE
The fieldwork respondents were split over whether they thought that the national 
distributor level in the distribution chain would actually need to be maintained in the longer 
term ‘lean’ future. Some, and particularly those from the manufacturers operating on a 
global level, predicted a further increase in centralisation or 'Europeanisation' in the 
internal market.34
"Nothing that the national distributor currently does could not 
ultimately be conducted centrally, with local delivery where 
necessary. "
ICDP honorary advisor, retired from a global volume 
manufacturer
However, all the respondents stopped short of saying that the national distributor level or 
its equivalent would disappear completely; the overriding consensus was that some form of 
national representation will still be needed in the European market of the future.
"The manufacturer will always need somebody, wherever they are 
sitting, to look after the dealers, an expert who understands both them 
and their local market."
Sales company director, European specialist 
manufacturer (Interview programme 1)
Many respondents also agreed that the national distributor level of the future will certainly 
be smaller than currently. The need to concentrate on core competencies, together with 
continued advances in communications and computer technology and general 
rationalisation will inevitably mean that less staff are needed. As the quotation below
Interview programmes 1 and 2
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illustrates however, the biggest change for national distributor staff would therefore appear 
to be one of character, as the operation moves away from a traditional trading and more 
towards a facilitating and monitoring role.
"The place o f the national distributor in the chain is unavoidable,  even 
if  its role must and will change. It will not really be involved in the 
ordering or distribution processes, but will concentrate more on 
marketing, collecting information and gearing and steering the dealer 
body."
Chairman, manufacturer-owned national distributor 
(Interview programme 1)
Respondents were encouraged to comment on the scenarios, suggested strongly in the 
literature,36 which predicted a move away from national in favour of trans-national ‘Euro- 
regional’ distribution structures (in instances where manufacturers own the national level in 
the chain), much in the same way as has been already observed for some chain activities 
(such as logistics). Their feedback revealed two primary obstacles to this being achieved; 
the nature of the dealer network itself and the lack of monetary union between European 
member states:
• The dealer body: one European volume manufacturer respondent thought that, despite 
the inevitable further rationalisation of their number, the sheer volume of dealers present 
in the European market would render any plans to regroup them enormously 
complicated, and therefore expensive. Opposition could therefore be expected to be 
considerable, particularly so as dealers have long-standing and very close ties not only 
with their national distributor, with whom they may have been dealing for several 
generations, but particularly with their local area of operation. One of the manufacturer 
respondents interviewed also suggested that such a regional operation would need to 
operate under the control of somebody of a different nationality from the countries 
represented, otherwise there would be arguments ...
• The lack of a single currency and Monetary Union in Europe: many respondents 
agreed that the single biggest obstacle to the removal of national divisions in any 
commercial sector in Europe is the continued lack of full monetary union between the 
Member States. The resulting lack of fiscal harmonisation constituted, in their opinion, a 
major burden both to the achievement of true pan-European pricing and to the 
harmonisation of equipment specifications, both of which would help to stimulate a
See section 2-3-4
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convergence of marketing activity. Equally, they pointed out that the lack of a unified 
accounting practice also negated the possibility of manufacturers taking over the 
invoicing of their dealers for cars and parts to the central or 'Euro-regional' level, 
although they disagreed over whether it would actually be beneficial to do this.
Almost all of the respondents were, however, convinced that once moves towards a single 
currency have become more solid, it is inevitable that experiments along these 'Euro- 
regional' lines, particularly of back office activities, would follow.37 Many manufacturers 
have experimented with such set-ups in the past, and they already operate for numerous 
activities such as logistics, or even technical support phone lines organised along language 
divisions. The segmentation of certain activities on this linguistic basis emerged as the 
most obvious scenario.
"Anything which does not relate to the customer directly, where the 
customers may still have a national preference, you could really do on 
a regional basis. Once the Single Market, single currency, etc. is in 
place, it would make sense to do things on a language basis, if  the 
countries get together, which is not always the case. ”
Distribution manager, global volume manufacturer 
(Interview programme 2)
6-3-3 DEALER NETWORK MANAGEMENT
6-3-3-1 A CENTRALLY-DEFINED FRAMEWORK
The fieldwork programme quickly confirmed the view that dealer network management 
remains the prime responsibility of the national level, with the national distributors being in 
sole charge of appointing and maintaining the dealer network. This is conducted within a 
framework of standards and operating conditions laid down by the manufacturer which 
apply to all markets (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P.. 1990; Andersson. P.. 1991). No 
manufacturers have really sought to increase their involvement in network management,
37 Interview programmes 1 and 2
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with the majority of manufacturer respondents feeling that this is not their area of 
expertise.38
"We never interfere if  everything is going well."
Independent sales company director, European volume 
manufacturer (Interview programme 1)
However, the central level, and especially the new European coordination centres of the 
non-European manufacturers, appear to be playing an increasing role in the development of 
tools for the shared use of the national distributors, such as dealer signage or training 
programmes, new model training, etc. Three manufacturer respondents admitted that they 
have developed central dealer planning functions, which add to rather than replacing the 
national functions.39
"Our principal role in this area is in establishing and maintaining the 
policies that apply, they become the operating rules within which the 
local companies operate. ”
Distribution strategies manager, global volume 
manufacturer (Interview programme 2)
6-3-3-2 THE SUB-CONTRACTING OF SOME ACTIVITIES
One trend that emerged has been the subcontracting of certain aspects of network 
management to outside specialists. This would appear to apply especially to the non-value- 
added activities such as dealer business and financial management. Respondents reckoned 
that it has proved more efficient and cost-effective to outsource in this way, and in many 
instances the same specialist may cover more than one market, thus improving the 
information flow to the manufacturer and allowing cross-national comparisons to be 
made.40 As information technology makes many of the systems-based activities more 
straightforward and more transparent, so the value actually added by the national 
distributor's staff declines, opening up the possibility for further outsourcing to specialist 
subcontractors. Three interview respondents, including one from a national distributor 
therefore thought it possible that many further activities such as aspects of dealer
38 Interview programme 1
39 Interview programme 1
40 Interview programme 1
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representation, or technical liaison, could be outsourced in the future, especially in the 
smaller, less profitable markets. Again, one specialist might conduct these tasks in more 
than one market (such as the Scandinavian region for example), or indeed work on behalf 
of more than one manufacturer in a particular market, carrying one set of infrastructure 
costs that used to be duplicated at each national distributor.41
Figure 6-5






6-3-4 DECLINING DEALER NUMBERS
The fieldwork programme quickly confirmed the suggestions in the literature concerning 
the dramatic reduction in dealer numbers across Europe. Several of the French dealers 
surveyed were pessimistic about the future prospects for the smaller dealers, with one of 
their number commenting that the operations which did not streamline their organisational
Interview programme 1
See section 2-3-5-2
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structures would be the first to suffer and possibly to fold.43 Most agreed with the 
comment that
"dealer numbers will decline significantly but progressively".
Main dealer, Paris (Pilot questionnaire)
British dealers were more optimistic that the rate of decline in the UK market has passed its 
peak, but warned that the rationalisation process still had a long way to go. There was a 
strong body of opinion that it should be the manufacturers' responsibility to help their 
dealers become profitable by helping them to conduct all their activities better, to raise 
their parts turnover, their service penetration, their customer satisfaction, etc.44
However, the most logical approach to restoring profitability would be for the 
manufacturers to reduce the number of dealers by rethinking the quality/coverage balance 
that has to be struck in the maintenance of a distribution network45 (International Car 
Distribution Programme. 1995(d)). The options for achieving this that were mentioned 
included:
• having larger dealer territories; this would mean having fewer dealers but giving each 
one a larger potential customer base and profit opportunity;
• encouraging dealers to move to occupy their territory in the most suitable way for 
improved customer service; this may mean adopting a ‘hubs and satellites’ structure of 
peripheral showrooms or, more likely, service-only facilities (including ‘fast-fit’ 
operations) located away from the central core;
• rationalising the second tier of dealers where they still exist into this ‘hubs and 
satellites’ structure, where they might operate a facility on behalf of the main dealer.46
These ideas were underpinned by the notion that the loss of some territorial coverage could 
be compensated for by an increase in the quality of the remaining dealers. The final 
interview programme confirmed that all of the dealers surveyed were well aware of this 
scenario; some saw it as a challenge, others as an opportunity to blame dealer groups for 
squeezing them out of business.
"This is a sensitive issue; all the dealers think that they will be one o f  
the chosen few  when shake-out day comes, and telling them otherwise
4j Pilot questionnaire
44 Pilot questionnaire
45 Financial Times, 21 /02/1995
46 Interview programmes 1 and 2
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is not very easy . "
Distribution strategies manager, global volume 
manufacturer (Interview programme 2)
Inextricably linked to these suggestions addressing the current lack of dealer profitability 
was the debate over the evolution of variations on the franchised dealer theme and 




• alternative retailing formats, including car supermarkets, pure franchising and direct 
sales
6-3-5 DEALER GROUPS
As was mentioned in the literature,48 many channel developments, such as the hubs and 
satellites form and the removal of the sub-dealer tier, are closely linked, especially in the 
UK, with the growth of large public and private dealer groups. Respondents were quick to 
detail what they felt to be the advantages and disadvantages of the dealer group format.49
"The big groups have the investment power, the sales performance and 
the quality premises the manufacturers want. ”50
Their responses were fairly consistent with the above quotation. The advantages of the 
dealer groups were reckoned to be their financial strength and access to investment capital, 
the career ladder they can provide for their staff in order to retain them (a major problem 
for the individual dealers where good staff inevitably want to move on), the marketing and 
dealer business expertise they can assemble and employ, and their greater perspective on 
the industry and thus ability to respond to or pre-empt environmental factors. The 
disadvantages listed were those that could be associated with any major company; as they
A dealership wholly-owned by the manufacturer or national distributor
See section 2-3-5-2
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Geoff Dale, Managing Director of Evans Halshaw, quoted in the Financial Times, 17/08/1995
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grow, they run the risk of alienating themselves from the marketplace and their customers, 
and also of developing burdensome layers of management. The publicly-owned dealer 
groups were criticised by one respondent for inevitably having to be more concerned with 
the needs of their shareholders than with selling cars.51
"Big groups start from the premise o f  how they can avoid losing money 
rather than how to start making it; their whole culture is consequently 
based on mistrust which permeates from the top down, and which has 
nothing to do with customer service . "
Chief Executive, privately-owned dealer group 
(Interview programme 2)
Some of the manufacturers also criticised the 'short-termism' of big group strategies, and 
the fact that they inevitably have different agendas from the manufacturers.
"One o f the disadvantages o f  groups is the suspicion amongst the 
independent dealers that the groups have a hidden agenda and that 
they want to swallow up the whole network; highly unlikely, and they 
could not afford it. "
Policy director, UK trade federation (Interview 
programme 2)
Opinion diverged, however, regarding the optimal operating style for a dealer group. Most 
are run in the form of a collection of individual dealerships, which appears to be the most 
logical option considering the need for each franchise to operate as a separate business unit 
There was a strong belief amongst the interview respondents that the successful groups in 
the future will have a much tighter regional focus, concentrating on operating a number of 
dealerships and building up a brand image within a closely defined area so as to develop a 
loyal, local customer base; this was described as “thinking big but acting small".52
nDealer groups are mostly run like a collection o f  solus dealers; no 
good models showing how a group should be operated have emerged 
yet . "
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6-3-6 BRANCH DEALERS
A further retailing format discussed in the fieldwork was the branch dealer, and here again 
opinion diverged over their role within a lean distribution chain. Branch outlets currently 
tend to exist in major urban areas where the overheads would make it impossible for an 
independent dealer to make a living and where the manufacturer or national distributor has 
often had to intervene in order to maintain territorial coverage and maintain representation 
for the brand (Maves. P.. 1991; Europe 2000. 1991). The problems mentioned by 
respondents, which were considered to be particularly relevant for those actually owned by 
the manufacturer, are that such operations are often very costly items of central investment 
which seldom make a profit, they are prone to the same union disruption that can affect the 
factories, and also that they draw suspicion from the rest of the dealer network who often 
assume that these dealers are getting a privileged deal from the manufacturers.53
In France, these succursales have been an accepted feature of the marketplace in urban 
areas, and respondents did not appear to have too many axes to grind about the branch 
dealers. Although a third of their number thought that manufacturers would have more 
branch dealers in the future, they nevertheless remained confident in the future of the 
independent dealer.54 In the UK, independent dealers have long been waiy of branch 
dealerships, harbouring a belief that they receive preferential treatment, sales terms, supply 
lead times, etc. from the manufacturers. Recently, as shall be seen, branch dealers have 
been implicated in the direct selling tactics of the manufacturers (International Car 
Distribution Programme. 1995(a)). The pilot survey respondents confirmed that these 
suspicions are still very much active, as did equally the interview programmes.
"Nothing undermines dealer confidence more than the suspicion that 
the manufacturer is favouring one dealer,  one group o f dealers or one 
area more than the others."
Policy director, UK trade federation (Interview 
programme 2)
Some called for the manufacturers to bring greater transparency to their relations with the 
branch dealers, so as to reassure their dealers that they were not being disadvantaged.
"Manufacturing and retailing should be kept separate; manufacturers
Interview programmes 1 and 2
Pilot questionnaire
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should either own all their outlets outright, or ensure that they all 
receive exactly the same treatment. "
Dealer planning director, volume manufacturer, UK 
(Interview programme 2)
Others thought that branch dealers should be outlawed, something which some of the 
manufacturer respondents protested would be an unfair restriction of practice, with one 
national federation reckoning that some manufacturers operated branch dealerships purely 
as a means of channelling their fleet sales to their best advantage. Many manufacturer 
representatives interviewed maintained that they would rather not operate dealerships if 
they could avoid doing so, as retailing is not their area of expertise and as such is a 
distraction from the business of making cars.55
"Our philosophy has been that we do not believe we know the retailing 
business, and that we should consequently concentrate on the 
manufacturing and wholesaling business. "
Distribution strategies manager, global volume 
manufacturer (Interview programme 1)
However, as dealer profits are squeezed still further, as the competition in the marketplace 
becomes ever fiercer, and as lean production and distribution together increase integration 
and strengthen the links between manufacturer and dealer, with the dealer becoming the 
first stage in the production process, several manufacturer and national distributor 
interviewees wondered whether increased manufacturer ownership of dealers would 
become an inevitability in the longer term as shall be illustrated in the next chapter. One 
new arrival in the UK market has already followed this route, albeit at great expense, and 
some respondents found it hard to imagine how other new arrivals would be able to attract 
independent dealers in expensive urban areas in the future, forcing them down the path of 
branch selling.56
Interview programmes 1 and 2
Interview programmes 1 and 2
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6-3-7 MULTIFRANCHISING
The multifranchising format was much debated by the fieldwork respondents, particularly 
in the UK. The advantages mentioned by respondents centred around the potential for the 
format to improve dealer profitability by developing dealer skills and expertise and also by 
having a site that will be a larger draw for the consumers.57 Several of the UK dealer 
questionnaire respondents, and particularly the smaller ones, commented that, because of 
the ever-increasing financial demands they face in the implementation of their 
manufacturers' wishes, a move to multi-marque distribution may be the only way they will 
be able to remain financially viable in the future. Dealers in the French market, where 
multifranchising is less common, were more circumspect; whilst many reckoned that 
multifranchising would become a major factor, few seemed keen to consider the possibility 
of their taking on another brand in the short term. Generally, the Paris dealers were more 
progressive than their rural counterparts in this respect, but it should be remembered that 
the dealers surveyed represented the two domestic French manufacturers, and are therefore 
the least likely to need to consider multifranchising.58 Even the manufacturers interviewed 
acknowledged, albeit sometimes reluctantly, that allowing their dealers to become 
multifranchise would be in their interest if it meant that the dealer would be stronger and 
more successful as a result.59
The major disadvantages mentioned included the additional cost burden for the dealer in 
terms of taking on extra staff (manufacturers insist that the sales and service staff are 
dedicated to one make only) and having to invest in new repair equipment, dedicated 
computer terminals, etc. Small dealers reckoned that the investment would be beyond their 
means, and the rewards potentially minimal.60
"Some o f my salesmen here struggle to sell one make, let alone more 
than one. "
Dealer principal, UK (Interview programme 2)
One of the UK trade federation representatives backed this up, saying some small dealers 
might be able to sell the space at their premises that would be freed up as a result both of 
the removal of stock as their manufacturer adopts lean supply and stocking systems and
Interview programme 2
Pilot questionnaire
Interview programmes 1 and 2
Pilot questionnaire and Interview programme 2
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also of a review of their facilities (now that cars are more reliable and require less 
servicing, fewer bays are needed). It was thought that this might prove to be a better option 
for them than taking on another brand. Otherwise, this land could be put to a new use, such 
as a dedicated used car operation.61
"It is hard enough for us to understand the idiosyncrasies o f  one 
manufacturer, let alone us having to learn to live with another. "
UK main dealer (Interview programme 2)
Both dealer and manufacturer respondents of the final interview programme wondered how 
multifranchising could be reconciled with the idea of the two parties working together in a 
closer partnership. Would the manufacturer withhold information from the dealer lest it 
got passed on to the 'other' manufacturer? Would the dealer be able to play one 
manufacturer off against the other in an attempt to gain favourable trading terms? Whilst 
these concerns were voiced, and left largely unanswered, at a theoretical level, none of the 
respondents could name any particular instances of their having come to pass in reality.
The interviewees who did not favour the development of dedicated multifranchise sites 
nevertheless admitted that the dealer businesses of most towns in the UK tend to resemble 
an unofficial special car trading area. Because of the cost of land in town centres and the 
restrictions on noise and emissions in these areas, dealers now tend to be grouped together 
along main roads at the outskirts of towns, forming a kind of 'motor alley1. This benefits 
customers, who have the possibility of visiting a number of dealers within a short space of 
time, and also the dealers, who have a greater chance of being visited by a consumer 'on the 
off-chance'. One step on from this are the dedicated 'autoparks' trading areas being built 
by some property developers in the UK, a form of 'motor alley in a designated industrial 
estate. Here, respondents were less favourable, reckoning that the consumers might not 
respond well to the prospect of buying cars at a kind of 'regional shopping centre'. Two 
final interview respondents thought that the autopark would need to contain something 
special to draw the consumers in from a wide distance, and even then the suspicion would 
remain that consumers would only browse at such facilities, possibly obtaining quotations 
which they would then go home and ask their local dealer to match. Few would want to 
buy from a dealer located many miles from their home, as the distances required to take the 
car to be serviced or repaired would be unacceptable.
Interview programme 2
Interview programme 2
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6-3-8 ‘SUPERMARKET’ SELLING
Survey and interview respondents were asked about the potential for the ‘supermarket- 
style’ selling of cars, much advocated by consumer groups, which would see different 
makes competing directly with others of the same type at large-scale outlets.63 There was 
little support for the concept, with only 8.6% of the UK dealer pilot survey respondents 
backing it as a viable option. The rest thought that it was too extreme, and also that the 
degree of specialisation needed by a car dealer nowadays is such that it could not be easily 
acquired by new actors entering the sector and attempting to offer many different makes of 
car. Several dealers commented that customers prefer, and indeed need to be able to 
differentiate between the different makes of car and service packages on offer, and that 
they would therefore be uneasy with large-scale multi-marque selling.
"Customers would be frightened o f total multi-marque retailing in 
cars."
Pilot interview with policy director of UK trade
federation
The respondents also identified other disadvantages of the car supermarket option; because 
of space limitations, they would only be able to stock a limited range of products (to stock 
the whole of even one manufacturer's range would require an enormous site), leading to 
cherry picking by these retailers.64 In the long run, this would mean that it would become 
untenable for the manufacturers to continue to produce full model ranges. The sites would 
require enormous investments in service equipment and facilities if they were to be able to 
support the products effectively. Furthermore, as has been touched on already, they 
pointed out that supermarket economies of scale come from being able to push down 
production costs, not through any inherently lower operating costs; with producer prices in 
cars being constant, customers would therefore be unlikely to get dramatically lower retail 
prices. Distribution costs would inevitably rise if manufacturers had to retain 'shelf space' 
against opposition makes at such sites through heavy advertising.65 Finally, these 
supermarkets would cluster in major market areas, driving out smaller retailers and causing 
customers to have to travel further. The decline of the small independent operations would 
most likely lead to local monopoly situations of higher margins and increased consumer 
prices.
63 Pilot questionnaire and Interview programme 2
64 Interview programme 2
65 Interview programme 2
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"The manufacturer is trying to create an individual personality and 
proposition for the product,  and personal service fo r  the consumer; 
together an unique environment,  which would he totally incompatible 
with the supermarket fo rm a t"
Chief Executive, manufacturer-owned national 
distributor (Interview programme 2)
So, any significant moves away from the franchised dealer format were dismissed by nearly 
all the respondents,66 even though other actors, including the consumer groups, continue to 
push the idea as a viable alternative. The overriding impression from the wider secondary 
research phase67 is that this matter is not as closed as the manufacturers would like it to be. 
Ideas were thus sought in the final interview programme concerning how the current 
system could be further optimised, or indeed, customised. Considerable support was 
expressed for the possibility of strongly differentiated approaches depending on the type or 
size of the manufacturer concerned. Some interview respondents suggested that it will only 
be the manufacturers who can give their dealers a sufficient business opportunity who will 
be able to insist that they remain exclusive, the others will be obliged to accept the fact that 
their dealers will need to be multifranchise to survive. The consensus was that the 
manufacturers in the former category would include the best of the specialist makes and the 
biggest of the volume players.
"The luxury end o f the market will continue to have stand-alone 
dealerships; the customers are happy to pay a premium price for a 
premium brand and premium levels o f  service. This is like the 
difference between shopping at expensive designer outlets in 
Knightsbridge or going to Marks and Spencer's,  where the whole 
range o f  clothes is stocked at a reasonable price. The customer is 
paying the higher price for these cars,  so they have a right to expect 
some segregation . "
Director, publicly-owned dealer group, UK (Interview 
programme 2)
This is probably accurate, but for the volume players the situation is not so clear cut. One 
volume manufacturer interviewed insists on exclusivity at all its main dealer sites across 
Europe; this is successful in the UK where it has a very strong market position, but by its
Pilot questionnaire and Interview programme 2
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own admission, in markets where its share is smaller, this policy means that its exclusive 
sites are not always in the ideal location or as profitable as it would wish.
One further option considered during the final interview programme was pure franchising, 
a situation under which the manufacturers would issue very stringent conditions, and all the 
dealerships would be essentially identical, with no distinguishing dealer signage. It is 
interesting to note that several manufacturers insist on this latter point, with a number of 
dealers just named after the town where they are located ('Citroen Birmingham'). This 
franchising option has been outlawed under the current Block Exemption,69 but one of the 
trade federations interviewed insisted that this was an unlawful restriction on practice and 
had been inserted into the new regulation without consultation. They also commented that 
several makes might be interested in experimenting with this retailing form if it became 
permissible again. Generally, the respondents were at best lukewarm on this idea, and 
wondered how attractive it would be for the consumer. One interviewee commented that 
customers felt reassured that all cheap roadside motor hotels belonging to the same chain 
would be identically equipped and laid out, but that this was not what was expected of a car 
dealer, where the local touch is often essential. On the other hand however, the 
manufacturer representatives interviewed were very wary of the other extreme; namely of 
the dealer groups starting to build up their own brand images in the minds of the consumers 
to the detriment of the manufacturer's brand. Some respondents predicted that some of the 
manufacturers might well respond to the suspicion that more and more of the market was 
coming under the control of the dealer groups by moving to branch dealerships.70
One final alternative that came to light throughout the fieldwork concerns the potential for 
a different approach to car dealing depending on the population density and manufacturer 
penetration of the local area. Only one of the French dealer pilot survey respondents really 
took the trouble to acknowledge the very different circumstances facing metropolitan and 
provincial dealers, and to come up with a prediction that the sector might well fragment in 
the future into different solutions for different population densities, but the UK dealers 
were more forward-thinking, with a number of them writing comments to the effect that the 
manufacturers might, quite apart from legislative pressure, have to become more lenient 
towards dual or triple franchise operations in the future, especially in rural areas where the 
low-volume dealers are coming under increasing pressure, but where their survival is 
essential for a manufacturer wishing to maintain the geographical coverage of their 
network.71
Interview programme 1. This practice is now outlawed under the new block exemption regulation.
Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 145/25,29/06/1995
Interview programme 2 
Pilot questionnaire
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In summary, the majority of manufacturer and dealer respondents maintained that, in an 
ideal world, maintenance of the exclusive dealer system would be the best solution, as they 
thought that consumers show a strong preference for the small, stable, independently- 
owned dealer, and in return the dealer is protected by the territorial exclusivity they enjoy.72 
Multifranchising has, however, emerged as an option and group ownership as an 
inevitability because of the lack of profitability smaller dealers are now confronted with, 
and many dealers commented that they would be careful to chose manufacturers with 
complementary instead of competing model ranges to represent. This issue of dealer 
profitability is one that appears set to continue to play a major role in the reshaping of the 
sector; some respondents related this topic to wider issues affecting them, and commented 
on how this inevitable structural change was being accelerated not only by the progress of 
the product itself, meaning the reduction in service profitability caused by modem cars not 
needing to be serviced so often, but also by some of the activities of the manufacturers, 
particularly the direct sales to company fleets at large discounts.73 Respondents from 
manufacturers, dealers and other chain actors all remained typically sceptical of the 
prospects of new retail actors entering the industry, even if the Block Exemption is not 
renewed again in 2002, as they would find that the system in place is actually the most 
suitable, and furthermore, coming from other sectors of commerce, would find the profit 
margins currently available in cars unacceptably low. However, they all accepted that car 
retailing structures are already in the process of fragmenting into a myriad of different 
formats as all involved attempt to improve the quality and efficiency of the link to the 
consumer.74
6-3-9 DISTRIBUTION CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS
The common factor between all of these issues and trends outlined above is their 
dependence on the quality of the relationship between manufacturer, national distributor 
and dealer. This was one of the central predictions to emerge from the literature, namely 
that, despite the growing importance of direct contact with the marketplace and some of the 
integrating features of lean distribution, manufacturers will need to enter into more 
partnerial relations with their distribution chain actors if they wish to reach the optimal
72 Pilot questionnaire and Interview programmes 1 and 2
73 Interview programmes 1 and 2
74 Interview programmes 1 and 2; also some comments from the pilot questionnaire
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strategy for the future.75 The fieldwork, both in the pilot survey and interview stages, 
therefore devoted attention to investigating whether respondents thought this relationship 
was indeed changing, and if so, how.
More than half (58%) of the French dealer questionnaire respondents thought that they now 
had less control over the day-to-day running of their dealership than in the past as a result 
of the manufacturers strengthening their influence, and only a third of them actually 
thought that the manufacturers were now paying more attention to the needs and concerns 
of their dealers than they used to. The rest thought that nothing had changed, with some 
commenting that this was despite many promises they had received that things would 
improve. During the interviews, a dealer of a franchise that has recently been enjoying an 
upturn on fortunes after a long slow period commented on how the company headquarters 
had suddenly become far more receptive to the needs and wishes expressed by its UK 
national distributor. Several dealers commented that, despite significant improvements in 
recent times, their national distributor and company headquarters still seem to listen, but 
not to hear what they are saying, with the result that they are still presented with policy 
decisions which affect their operations, but without their ever having been consulted during 
the formulation.77
Respondents were also asked about other forms of dialogue between manufacturers and 
dealers, such as dealer councils and trade federations. Respondents from both ends of the 
chain were often enthusiastic about their dealer councils, many of which now operate in co­
decision structures with the manufacturer. One national distributor called their system "our 
shadow government” and several dealer groups reported that the presence of the branch 
dealers in the council was a step forward in improving the relationship and proving to the 
smaller dealers that they were not receiving inferior treatment. Two dealer group 
respondents commented that their dealer councils for their franchises were dominated by 
the branch outlets, with the result that the interests of the smallest dealers were not 
sufficiently considered, but the general consensus was that the introduction of more 
democratic decision-making structures including councils had been possibly the most 
significant step forward in improving manufacturer - dealer relations over the last few
78years.
See section 3-3-4 
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6-3-10 PARTNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The pilot survey asked dealers to evaluate further this potential for closer working 
partnerships within the predicted context of increased manufacturer control over the 
distribution chain and as a result of developments such as integrated supply and stocking 
systems. The majority of dealers saw an increase in direct involvement and control by the 
manufacturers over their distributors as inevitable, especially given the levels of investment 
in dealer facilities and customer service that are now required. As might be expected, the 
larger dealers were more convinced that they would be able to maintain or increase their 
status vis-a-vis the manufacturers. The dealers were split into a majority, who thought that 
manufacturers had finally realised the need to have a successful and strong dealer network 
as the only means to retain, let alone to increase, market share, and who therefore think that 
some form of partnership will play a part in the future, and the rest who were more 
sceptical, considering that partnerships will only ever operate when it suits the interests of 
the manufacturers, something they could not foresee happening for the moment,
7Qparticularly given the current system, which some likened to a 'dictatorship'.
The issue was then examined in more depth during the interview programmes. Several 
respondents here suggested that, in the short term at least, the manufacturers who reduced 
the number of their dealers and succeeded in keeping them exclusive would increase their 
control, but this would be balanced out as these dealers started to make money and to work 
more closely with the manufacturers, at which point a partnership style would be able to 
emerge. Another respondent backed up the point made about market share by commenting 
that the quality of the relationship will vary significantly according to how well that
A A
particular make is selling in the marketplace.
"In good times, the value o f the franchise increases, so the risk fo r  the 
dealer in walking away is higher. Therefore manufacturers are more 
able to oppose their dealers who want to take on another franchise. In 
hard times, the value o f  the franchise falls, and the power balance 
shifts in favour o f the retailer as the manufacturers rely on them for  
their sales; this is when the good retailers become better in the eyes o f  
the manufacturer. "
Chief Executive, UK trade federation (Interview 
programme 2)
Pilot questionnaire 
Interview programmes 1 and 2
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Many also insisted that it should be the manufacturers' responsibility to improve the dealer 
relationship by helping to restore some profitability into their operations; profit targets and 
efficiency improvements for the dealers should be permanently on the manufacturers' 
agenda. Others suggested that greater regional decision-making autonomy for the sub-units 
of the national distributors and manufacturers might help, as this level in the chain is, when 
present, much closer to the dealers on the ground.81
Much debate arose here surrounding the future shape of the manufacturer - dealer contract, 
especially as these agreements were then in the process of being rewritten to comply with 
the new Block Exemption.82 One trade federation thought that, if the manufacturers were 
serious about forming partnerships with their dealers, they should move to open-ended as 
opposed to fixed term agreements. The respondent saw this as part of reducing as much as 
possible the entry and exit costs for dealers of holding a franchise. A potentially greater 
turnover of dealers and franchises changing hands more often would, in his view, be a good 
thing from the dealers' perspective, as it would teach the manufacturers to respect them 
more. If the system were truly lean and efficient, there should therefore be no need for long 
term contracts, as the good dealers would be able to shop around until they found the best 
manufacturer to work with for the sake of satisfying the needs of their local market. 
However, he thought it unlikely that the manufacturers would be happy with such a 
scenario, as stability is seen by them as absolutely essential for the building-up of trust 
between the two parties. Furthermore, many respondents from the manufacturers 
mentioned that, in order for them to protect their brand, they have to retain the ability to 
terminate their dealer's contracts if they fail to meet pre-agreed conditions.84 Ultimately, 
the best solution would appear to be a compromise between the two extremes, and a system 
or contract which ensures that the manufacturer cannot obstruct a dealer from seeking a 
better or complementary business opportunity if their full potential is not being realised 
with the current franchise, whilst at the same time affording the manufacturer a degree of 
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"The dealer agreement should reflect the quality o f the relationship 
between manufacturers and dealers. The manufacturers have a right 
to expect to have good dealers, and a dealer has a right to be well- 
supplied and cared for by the manufacturer. "
Policy director, UK trade federation (Interview 
programme 2)
This was indeed the emerging trend, at least as far as the UK-based respondents were 
concerned.85 As the selling process and the quality of the information flow back to the 
manufacturer become ever more vital, the skills, financial solidity and overall quality of the 
dealer come into focus. The reduction in dealer numbers and the enlargement of territories 
should lead to stronger, more skilled dealers, who will really be able to work with their 
manufacturer; closer partnerships should thus develop as a result. There is also no real 
reason to doubt that this development will spread, at least to the other major car markets of 
Europe. However, none of the respondents could fully reconcile this scenario with the 
growth of multifranchising and group ownership of a portfolio of franchises; the suspicion 
still remains that both multifranchise dealer and manufacturer would have things they 
would wish to withhold from the other in such a relationship.86 For all the promises and 
shared objectives, the gap between the producers and sellers of cars seems still to be a wide 
one.
6-4 SELLING AND MARKETING 
ACTIVITIES
This section examines the area of selling, marketing activities and customer contact. It 
opens with a synthesis of the manufacturer- and national distributor-level material, and 
then goes on to consider the issues that emerged from the dealers’ perspective.
Interview programmes 1 and 2
Interview programmes 1 and 2
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6-4-1 MARKETING ACTIVITIES
The fieldwork programme quickly confirmed the problematic nature of trying to organise 
marketing activities across the European market. Two respondents pointed to the lack of a 
unified legislative base and to the myriad of local market characteristics and consumer 
habits and consequently dismissed all attempts at pan-European coordination as doomed to 
failure.87
"Marketing cannot be fulfilled on a Europe-wide basis; it will be 
another 30-40 years before Europe is sufficiently establishedfor this. "
Chairman, manufacturer-owned national distributor 
(Interview programme 1)
Other companies, however, said the exact opposite but admitted that this might not be in 
the traditional sense of perceiving 'pan-European' as involving one single integrated 
approach across the whole of the territory.
6-4-1-1 MORE CENTRAL INVOLVEMENT IN AND CONTROL 
OVER BRAND AND PRODUCT IMAGE
One trend observed here from the interviews was that the manufacturers; not just the 
specialist manufacturers for whom consistency is arguably easier to achieve, but the 
volume producers as well, are exerting a greater influence in and control over their overall 
brand and product range image across Europe. It was considered that this has become an 
inevitability not necessarily because the European consumers are now more receptive to 
such approaches, but because of the institutional stability and maturity of the 
marketplace.88 Manufacturer respondents commented that, whilst their companies have 
realised and accepted the fact that their company history in each market means that the 
products will be perceived differently there, they are nevertheless trying to ensure that the 
company message projected in each area is as consistent as possible. This was confirmed 
by the respondents connected with the Japanese companies, who thought that these 
manufacturers are now able to take advantage of their European coordination centres to
Interview programme 1
Interview programme 1
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gain an overall perspective on the European market and the strategic approach that is 
needed, something which therefore appears to be harder for the domestic companies which 
are more tightly bound to the culture and history of their home market, and which possibly 
have a stronger sense of inertia within their own distribution chains.
6-4-1 -2 A REDUCTION IN DUPLICATION AND SUPERFLUITY IN 
MARKETING ACTIVITIES
One result of this increased attention has been attempts by companies to harmonise 
elements of marketing activity wherever possible, with the aim of reducing duplication and 
superfluity in campaigns across Europe.
"Our ambition is to reduce the amount o f  unnecessary additional work 
involved in the creation o f a marketing campaign for the European 
market."
Director of European dealer operations, volume 
manufacturer, UK (Interview programme 1)
Manufacturer and national distributor respondents confirmed that this has led to certain 
activities being shared between markets, and with others being produced centrally for 
common use wherever possible. One pointed out that this increase in central development 
work may mean that the manufacturers are spending more 'up fiont' on a specific campaign, 
but they then are able to reap the benefits of not having to duplicate things numerous times 
in the markets. Trends observed in this area during the interviews included:
• Companies moving to reduce as much as possible the number of different films, 
both for television advertising and for training, shot for the European market.
• The rationalisation of the number of advertising agencies used, including dealing 
with European networks of agencies.
• The sharing of market intelligence between markets wherever possible.
• Moves to achieve economy of scale benefits by conducting media buying centrally, 
although for many companies, the benefits of this latter tactic appear to be marginal 
given the lack of homogeneity of the European media, restricting the room for 
manoeuvre of each national level.
• Companies trying to ensure a greater consistency in new model launches, with the
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aim of achieving as uniform an image as possible across Europe at the start of the 
car's life.
• More central coordination of direct marketing tactics, which look set to increase in 
all markets as the more traditional methods, such as television and print advertising, 
lose their effectiveness.89
The key to bringing marketing activities as close together as possible whilst still respecting 
and responding to the needs and preferences of each local market would therefore seem to 
be ensuring the quality of the dialogue and the information flow both between the 
manufacturer, national distributors and dealers and also amongst the national distributors 
and dealers themselves (Assemblee Nationale. 1992). Some respondents reckoned that this 
is the area in which the European coordination centres of the Japanese manufacturers have 
a real potential to add value, and could provide not only a supranational perspective on the 
large internal market, but also a forum that could establish a culture of dialogue amongst 
the national and regional sub-units, free from the home market bias which dominates many 
manufacturers.90
However, interviewees pointed out that, even if the manufacturer headquarters now 
benefits from vastly improved access to market intelligence thanks to the improvement in 
information systems, there is still no substitute for the national distributor's and dealer’s 
final local market knowledge in the marketing area.91 It seems logical that this knowledge 
will only increase in importance as a particular model range gets older, as these levels will 
have detailed knowledge of the car's fortunes in that market, and therefore of what is 
needed in marketing terms in order to sustain its sales.
So, there was consensus that, as changes to supply and stocking systems are starting to 
reduce the stock-push pressure on dealers to ‘move the metal’, so the nature of marketing is 
slowly evolving away from price-led local campaigns towards more image-led national and 
regional campaigns aimed at advance order generation and customer retention for after- 
sales business and repeat sales.
Interview programme 1
Interview programme 1
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6-4-2 THE DEALERS’ PERSPECTIVE
In the pilot survey, dealers were asked to assess the balance of power between themselves 
and their manufacturers concerning the marketing and promotional activities they 
conducted, with the aim of discovering how the local and corporate levels interacted. Are 
the strategies that are decided nationally always suitable for the dealers and their 
territories? Are the dealers frustrated by the lack of room for them to develop local 
initiatives, or are they happy to be presented with complete marketing packages that have 
not cost them anything to develop?
In general, the UK respondents appeared to be happy with their current levels of freedom to 
manage their marketing and promotional activity within their allocated territory. When 
asked what they thought could be improved, the most common mentions included a greater 
involvement for the dealers over the content of national advertising campaigns, particularly 
where new model launches were concerned, in response to the need perceived by dealers to 
tailor the launch programmes so that they are better suited to the specific local market 
needs of a particular region.
"We would like to have more influence over the launch programmes fo r  
new cars through our dealership. We would like to choose the models 
fo r  the launch,  and also to have better prior information on the launch 
so that it can be better coordinated with other local activities."
Succursale, Paris93 (Pilot questionnaire)
Pilot dealer survey respondents were asked to assess the effects on customer loyalty of 
recent sectoral developments. Comments from the UK dealers pointed to a split between 
rural and urban dealerships. Rural garages tended to have a much more stable and loyal 
customer base, many of whom have been purchasing cars from that particular garage over 
many generations. Hence these customers are more loyal to the dealership than they are to 
the makes of car it offers, and some dealers commented that their customers would buy 
from them almost regardless of which manufacturer they represented. This contrasts with 
urban dealerships selling much larger volumes, where the customers are more likely to 
know in advance the make and model of car they wish to buy, and who therefore shop 
around at various dealers in the area in search of the best deal. A rural French dealer 
pointed out that the customer's essential loyalty in a country area is to the person who 
repairs the car, and a Paris counterpart reckoned that it is harder for a dealer to build up
93 A succursale is a branch dealership.
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customer loyalty in the capital because of the ease with which customers can switch 
dealers. Whilst this is largely logical and self-evident, it does raise the question of whether 
manufacturers should operate a more differentiated strategy for urban and rural areas, as 
customer needs and expectations appear to be very different in each.94
6-4-3 SELLING STRATEGIES
64-3-1 VOLUME DISCOUNTS AND DIRECT SALES
One further scenario concerning car supply was put to the respondents in the interview 
programmes; this concerned the potential for a volume discount for car sellers. In every 
other area of retailing, volume discounts are offered relative to the size of the purchase; 
why could this not happen for cars? The respondents were unanimous in confirming the 
logic of this suggestion, but equally convinced that its introduction would destroy the 
franchised dealer system as it operated today. Volume discounts would cause the dealer 
groups to grow rapidly, further concentrating the sector, and making complete territorial 
coverage impossible to maintain. Respondents pointed out that this would not be in the 
manufacturers' interests at a time when they are trying to limit group ownership of their 
franchises; nor would it be in the consumers' interests as it would lead to local monopolies 
with high prices and high margins.95
"The industry as it is today could not continue to function if  selected 
groups gained more buying power than the rest o f  the network."
Director, publicly-owned dealer group, UK (Interview 
programme 2)
However, particularly in the UK market, this is effectively precisely what is happening in 
the case of direct sales conducted from manufacturers or national distributors to major fleet 
customers, who are reputed to receive significant price discounts. A great deal of debate 
has surrounded this issue; it has been widely reported that private car buyers are having to
Pilot questionnaire
Interview programmes 1 and 2
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compensate for these volume discounts in the form of higher prices than they would 
otherwise expect to pay96 (National Consumer Council. 1990). This suspicion in itself has 
been enough to damage private new car sales, with one interviewee claiming that the recent 
rising trend in new car sales in the UK is entirely due to the growth in the fleet market and
07therefore in direct sales as opposed to private purchases. Even if the actual number of 
cars accounted for by direct sales is debatable, all the interview respondents confirmed that 
the issue is a very major concern, and has grown to the point where major fleet operators 
now expect to deal directly with the manufacturer and receive a significant discount as a 
matter of course. As the regular custom is there, and as these sales represent a means of 
keeping the cars flowing out of the factory gates, the manufacturers are not going to give 
them up overnight.
"Direct sales are like a drug; the manufacturers have become 
dependent on them."
Chief Executive, privately-owned dealer group, UK 
(Interview programme 2)
Many of the manufacturers have seemingly come to terms with the fact that opposition to 
these sales from their dealers and others is not about to go away, and so they have resolved 
to improve matters. Respondents confirmed that one major step towards reducing friction 
surrounding direct sales and branch dealerships is for them to be more open in their 
dealings with these operations, demonstrating to the rest of the network that special favours 
are not being granted.98
"We try not to work behind closed doors and in secrecy any more."
Sales director, manufacturer-owned national distributor, 
UK (Interview programme 2)
Most respondents were understandably unwilling to comment on the possibility of one 
manufacturer breaking ranks and starting to sell cars directly to private buyers . . ."
Car Magazine, July 1991
Interview programme 2
Interview programme 2 
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6-4-3-2 FIXED PRICE SELLING
The UK dealer questionnaire respondents confirmed that the trend for franchised dealers is 
now firmly in the direction of fixed-price 'no-haggle' selling, and that discounting, the 'self- 
imposed curse' of the trade, is practically a thing of the past. However, they see this tactic 
being perpetuated by the manufacturers themselves, in the guise of direct selling to fleet 
and other large volume customers. They pointed out that it is unfair for dealers to have to 
cut even further into their slim margins to continue to offer discounts or reasonable trade- 
ins to private customers whilst at the same time fleet customers are reputedly getting 
discounts of up to 40% by buying direct from the manufacturer. Many interview 
respondents reported that customer satisfaction had risen significantly as a result of 
reducing this reputedly unpleasant aspect of the buying process as much as possible. 
However, others pointed out a number of problems in this area, particularly the need for 
manufacturers and dealers to be able to respond to both unexpected fluctuations and 
seasonal cyclicity in the market (for which price is often the most appropriate weapon) and 
also the need for dealers to be able to negotiate trade-in prices with customers (particularly 
when they claim to have been offered a better deal elsewhere).100 The overall impression 
here was that the manufacturer respondents’ companies were publicly in favour of moves 
towards fixed-price selling, but maybe not quite so convinced privately.
6-4-3-3 EVOLUTION OF SELLING STYLES
There was almost universal agreement amongst both pilot survey and interview 
respondents that the customer’s actual car buying experience was changing for the better, 
and that this was as a direct result of moves to drive distribution chains in a customer-pull 
rather than in a stock-push fashion.
The reduction in stock-push pressure in certain chains was slowly leading to a different, 
less ‘pushy’ selling style on the part of salesmen, which immediately helped to mitigate 
possibly the most commonly cited reason for customer dissatisfaction with the buying 
process. This was being accompanied by moves to motivate selling staff to work towards 
longer term customer relationships rather than just to meet a sales target by replacing their
Interview programme 2
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traditional commission-based wages with a proper salaries and by expanding the roles they 
fulfil within the dealership. Many reported that the task of changing the mindset of ‘died in 
the wool’ car salespeople was a slow one, particularly given the character that many of 
them needed to have in order to be successful in their traditional role, but that the benefits 
in terms of customer satisfaction were well worth the effort.101
6-5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has presented the fieldwork material collected during the pilot surveys and the
two interview programmes.
The major themes which emerged included:
• moves underway within the industry to implement more lean-style supply and stocking 
systems, including changes to physical distribution arrangements, computer systems and 
product ranges and specifications;
• the emergence of different rates of change in different European markets;
• gradual changes in the role of national sales companies within the distribution chain;
• the emergence of variations to the traditional franchised dealer system, including 
manufacturer-owned retail outlets, the growth of large dealer groups, multifranchising 
and the rethinking by manufacturers and dealers of territorial coverage;
• changes to, and in some cases, improvements in the nature of relations throughout the 
chain
• the growth of more consumer-friendly marketing and selling techniques.
Many of these themes will be combined with the insights gained from the two case studies
presented in the next chapter and explored further in the development and subsequent
testing of the research model in Chapter 8.
Interview programme 2
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CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDIES
"The greatest enemy o f the car is the ship. Had no manufacturer ever 
begun to export, none would have ever dared to make as well as 
market abroad, and we should all be happy with locally made cars 
which suit our own localities."
LJK Setright, Car Magazine, November 1995
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7-1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the case studies carried out for the research; Rover’s Distribution 
Efficiency programme and Daewoo’s arrival in the UK market.
For the sake of brevity, both are distilled from a wide range of interesting material 
available and, in the case of Rover, from discussions, to cover the essential points relevant 
to the research agenda.
7-2 ROVER’S DISTRIBUTION EFFICIENCY 
PROGRAMME
7-2-1 INTRODUCTION
Developments at the Rover group are being watched by the rest of the industry with 
considerable interest, and this not just because of their turbulent recent history up to and 
including their ‘marriage’ to BMW, but particularly because despite this backdrop of 
uncertainty, the company has continued to push ahead with an innovative programme to 
rationalise and improve the efficiency of the supply and stocking activities in their 
distribution chain, initially in the UK, and subsequently across their major European 
markets. The programme contains many of the elements associated with lean distribution 
that emerged through both the primary and the secondary research phases, and so 
constitutes a prime case for a more in-depth investigation.
As was mentioned in the research methodology, this case study was assembled from 
discussions with Peter Bailey, one of the key ‘lean thinkers’ behind the programme at 
Rover, who related the story behind Rover’s moves to lean distribution and gave a frank
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assessment of its successes, failures and future prospects. Further input came from another 
senior-level distribution manager at Rover interviewed for the ‘National Distributors’ 
project. Additional secondary material was sourced from Peter Bailey’s chapter “The 
Evolution o f Rover’s Distribution Logistics” in “Internationales Automobilmarketing'*1, as 
well as from ICDP material and industry news sources.
7-2-2 A STOCK-PUSH STARTING POINT
Like so many other manufacturers, Rover’s distribution chain was traditionally dominated 
by a wholesale-push philosophy. 90% of customer orders were fulfilled through dealer 
stock, meaning that true customer preferences were not known either to the dealer or to the 
manufacturer; the system operated on the premise that stock pressure on the dealers was 
sufficient to ensure that they would find customers for the vehicles being produced. 
Production plans were therefore based on inaccurate medium term sales forecasts, which 
were themselves based on dealer order ‘guesses’. During the late 1980s, this situation 
became exacerbated in the UK as Rover’s market share came under pressure, leading to the 
dealers being unwilling to over-order their cars, which also led to different stocking 
policies, distortions in stock coverage across the market and therefore ageing problems. If 
a customer really wanted to place a specific order, they would have to wait 12 weeks for 
their car to be built and delivered.
Whilst similar supply and stocking arrangements were operated for virtually all the other 
makes in the UK market, Rover was the first to decide that they had to be changed. They 
realised that the key to future success, or even survival, was being able to give the customer 
what they wanted when they wanted. Nevertheless, they realised that they faced many 
problems in modifying their distribution system, not least of which their product range, 
which spanned small, mass-market cars, luxury models and the Land Rover brand, which 
was essentially operated in a craft manner, with the vehicles being customised off the 
production line to suit individual customer requirements.
Rover therefore set out to understand the true nature of the stock-push system they had
Hunerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995: “Internationales Automobilmarketing: 
Wettbewerbsvorteile durch marktorientierte Unternehmensfuhrung”, Gabler, Wiesbaden 
Generally unpublished as it is company-specific
Particularly Automotive News Europe, Automotive Management and Motor Trader
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been operating for so long, and to gauge its impact on consumers. They learnt a number of 
lessons which have now received widespread coverage in the industry and in its literature.4 
These included the following:
• Manufacturers were operating stock-push to favour the needs of the factory, with retailer 
bonuses linked to the movement of ageing stock rather than to customer orders taken;
• Delivery suppliers and other actors in the physical distribution chain were load- rather 
than individual order-driven, meaning that they too lacked a customer focus;
• Dealers were compromising customer choice by pushing them to buy from stock (either 
theirs or another dealer’s). They were also bidding for popular models (even though 
they had no idea whether they would sell them) just to stop rival dealers getting them. 
They were also discouraging customers from placing specific factory orders, were 
selling cars as commodities with ever-increasing discounts, and were devoting a large 
proportion of their facilities to storing unsold stock. Furthermore, they were highly 
unprofitable. Rover calculated that roughly 400 main dealers were operating with an 
average annual cushion of 150 vehicles in their consignment stock, which represented a 
£500 million investment. These cars accounted for 90% of sales, although 35-40% of 
them were transferred between dealers at least once before sold (mostly this would mean 
2 vehicles moving as the dealer would swap one of his against the car he wanted). 
These transfers alone were costing the customer and the dealer £100 per sale, and 
overall unsold stocks accounted for 50% of the dealers’ uncovered site space;
• Customers were increasingly dissatisfied with the process, causing some to even 
postpone their new car purchase or to buy a used car instead.
These lessons were viewed against some of the changes Rover had already introduced in an 
attempt to make the system function more efficiently, such as introducing amendable 
‘mirror image’ orders into the dealer’s wholesale order bank and sale or return conditions, 
and together this thinking was incorporated into the process of defining the new lean 
distribution philosophy which was to underpin the new Just-in-Time/Distribution 
Efficiency programme.
See section 3-3
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7-2-3 THE DISTRIBUTION EFFICIENCY PROGRAMME
The first phase of Rover’s Just-in-Time/Distribution Efficiency (JIT/DE) programme was 
launched in late 1990 with the overall aim of
“combining the inbound aspects o f the logistics chain including 
supplier management with the key outbound-focused, customer-driven 
elements o f  product development and distribution. ”5
This was to be achieved in two phases, both working towards the goal of allowing any 
customer in Western Europe to be able to order a car and have it delivered within 14 days. 
Complementary goals to this included:
• offering customers the exact product specifications they want;
• being able to make the customer an acceptable and predictable delivery promise in the 
showroom;
• ensuring that Rover and its retailers provide clear information to consumers throughout 
the buying process.
7-2-3-1 PHASE 1
The overriding objective of the first phase of the programme was to remove all planned 
unsold stock from the dealers and to stop all dealer forward ordering for stock; in other 
words to turn to a customer order-driven system. This would demand considerable changes 
in not only in stock management, ordering systems and distribution processes, but also in 
design, engineering, material procurement and assembly towards a fully integrated chain 
from dealer to factory. This thinking had been elaborated across many of the traditional 
functional boundaries within the company, reflecting the idea that the distribution function 
could no longer operate autonomously, but was instead tightly linked into other areas of 
operation. Rover considers this breaking of functional boundaries to be a major step 
towards the creation of an ‘extended enterprise’ involving all actors in the production and 
distribution chain. Achieving this cooperation alone was not an easy task. To start with, it
Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995, p.342/3
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involved the 3 manufacturing business units, small/medium, large cars (meaning the Rover 
and MG brands) and Land Rover, all of which have different business rules and systems 
development. For instance, Land Rover is a business unit in its own right, and has a 
different production scheduling and MRP system to the cars division.6 Within each of 
these, the programme had to consult with supplier relations staff, production staff, sales 
and marketing staff and logistics planners amongst many others. Finally, this process 
involved staff from 2000 dealers of all shapes and sizes. As shall be illustrated, in the 
second phase this process had to be extended to include staff at the national distributors as 
well.
Phase 1 was launched in September 1992 in the UK, and between January and December 
1995 in Belgium, Holland, Germany, France, Spain and Italy. It introduced significant 
changes in the stock-based distribution and retailing processes. Inventory was brought 
under much tighter control, with all stock apart from showroom and demonstrator cars 
being removed from the dealer to regional distribution centres, where it was managed by 
Rover for the benefit of all dealers. Straight away, this meant...
" . . .  setting up different types o f order to differentiate between sold, 
showroom and demonstrator orders and effectively killing, except in 
extremis, the concept o f dealers being able to order volumes o f  
vehicles fo r stock. The whole thing is a lot more controlled in that 
way. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
A new ordering system allowed dealers to view what vehicles were on their way through 
the factory process or were held in the distribution centres, and then place an order for the 
one that matched their customer’s needs.
“The way the dealer actually orders is very important as the front end 
o f the system, how, what and when he can order - how do you let the 
dealer know what he can order and when? No longer can you tell him 
3 months in advance that he can only order this and that -  the system 
needs to be more dynamic - this is what you can order today, this is 
what your availability is, this is where the car is in the chain. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
Material Requirements Planning systems, pioneered in the 1970s, provide a computerised means of 
keeping track of production inventory, ordering materials and sending out instructions on what to 
make next. For more details, see Womack. J. and Jones. P.. 1996.
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The benefits of this system were summarised as follows:
• The customer can have a wide choice of factory fresh cars, with minimal wait and with 
full knowledge of lead time;
• The dealer knows what cars are available at any moment and how long it will take one 
of them to reach him; they can then plan for customer hand over, and can make more 
productive use of their space and time;
• The manufacturer can make savings in inventory costs whilst retaining service levels, 
can tighten stock management disciplines and can move from deferred payment of 
dealers to rapid payment for sold orders. They also get a better view of true customer 
demand.
Indeed, elements of this regional stocking and open pipeline approach have been adopted 
by many other manufacturers in the European market, and the outcomes have been 
universally successful. However, the Rover programme goes further in that it sees this as 
merely one step towards the ultimate goal of true build-to-order which is expressed in 
phase 2. Phase 1 was therefore seen as a preparatory step, an attempt to create the 
foundations on which the true lean system of the future would be built.
“The ultimate objective relates to a lean, highly reactive, total logistics 
system, so what Rover was doing in phase 1 was staking out the 
ground, creating the right environment in advance o f the technical 
capability o f being able to deliver what we really wanted to. So, the 
experiment backed into a lot o f existing processes and systems; it was 
adaptive rather than revolutionary. The end result will be a lot more 
revolutionary ...”
Interview with Peter Bailey
7-2-3-2 PHASE 2
The more long-term phase of the programme revolves around the implementation of a new 
computer-based system for manufacturer-supplier-dealer communications. Named 
‘Discus’, the system extends from multimedia screens in showrooms to allow customers to 
explore option and specification combinations, and to take their order right up to the 
production planning function at the factory if necessary. On the way back down the chain,
CHAPTER 7 PAGE 216
the system interfaces allow the tracking of cars through the logistics stage to provide 
delivery dates, instructions for distribution centres, shippers, etc. Once fully working, 
Discus is intended to usher in higher levels of build to order, greater efficiency in the open 
supply pipelines outlined above and a new selling style based around a ‘customers for life’ 
rather than a ‘single sale’ mentality. Discus systems are currently being introduced across 
UK dealers, although the whole process is not yet operating fully interactively.
7-2-4 CHANGING THE DISTRIBUTION PROCESS
The following figure summarises Rover’s distribution chain in the UK.
Figure 7-1
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With the inability to achieve phase 2 objectives overnight, primarily due to the need to 
further refine the computer technology, Rover and its dealers were concerned that sales 
volumes would be under threat from high-stock competition if the bulk of specifications 
normally ordered (the popular colour and trim combinations) could not be delivered
7 Source: Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffmeister. M.. 1995, p.361
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quickly from the regional distribution centres to meet customer requirements, so a solution 
to ease the transitional period was needed. However, holding all the specifications in stock 
would bring back all the old problems, and using historical sales patterns to assess which 
models should be produced would be flawed since these figures were generated in the 
stock-push environment which masked true demand. So, the company used figures for 6 
months rather than the more usual 12, and with them built up a list of regular stock items. 
Sales volumes were measured at model derivative and option combination level; this 
enabled Rover to define the 20% of specifications which accounted for 80% of sales. This 
short-list was then put forward to the dealer council for their approval and updated where 
appropriate. This list would then constitute the number of stocking lines to be produced; 
the rest of the production would be build to order only. This second category would also 
constitute a learning exercise for the moves to increase the build to order proportion later 
on in the programme.
Initially, so as to help build up dealer confidence in the new system, it was also planned 
that these agreed regular stocks held at distribution centres should be ‘tagged’ to individual 
dealers and that other dealers could still negotiate a ‘transfer’ if they wanted one of these 
cars. However, it was realised rapidly that this tagging hindered the free movement of 
stocks to meet customer orders, and so it was phased out after 6 months. 7 regional 
distribution centres were established for regular stock storage and local forwarding 
operations. In addition, the ordering system was adapted to give an estimated delivery date 
against each vehicle enquiry or order depending on the physical status of the vehicle 
concerned, and a 3 working day delivery guarantee from the distribution centre, whether 
national or regional, to dealer, was given. In advance of the true ‘on-line’ system becoming 
established, the need for delivery information from the distribution centres regarding their 
stock status was met by a daily Supply Bulletin giving general stock availability and lead 
times for a week at a time; with this dealers could give indications of delivery dates to 
consumers.
“If  stocks are going to be taken away from the dealers, you need to be 
able to improve the delivery process, have to be able to start making 
commitments on the delivery o f  vehicles from stock and from pipeline 
that were not done before. There has had to be a lot o f focus on how 
the delivery mechanism works. Saying that vehicles will no longer be 
wholesaled was a big part o f having as open a pipeline as possible, to 
allow the dealer freedom to order against a definite customer 
requirement. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
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So, the new system meant a different set of trading terms between the manufacturer and 
deliverers and dealers towards one based on partnership, with all parties working together 
to speed the distribution process to customer at lowest possible cost. The dealers got 
adjusted payment terms and conditions to reflect the move to sold order supply. There was 
also an extra contribution built into the wholesale cost of each vehicle to fund the new 
distribution centre infrastructure. Consignment periods were reduced from 180 to 30 days, 
with only the limited volume of showroom cars being given extended periods.
Nevertheless, the system needed to remain sufficiently flexible to be able to respond to 
special events in the model lifecycle, and to fluctuations and cyclicity in the marketplace. 
This was achieved through stock capacity at the distribution centres, rather than at the 
dealers, an essential strategy if the dealers were to learn to base their strategies around zero 
on-site stocks.
“The system is not 100% watertight. Looking at circumstances such as 
new product run-in and old product run-out, these are situations where 
you might like to preallocate vehicles to dealers (to get a new car into the 
showrooms where it will be seen). Also, there are structural things within 
the business that will dictate periodical stocks (such as the UK annual 
registration letter change). Now matter how pull-oriented you want to be, 
you are building into a world o f push. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
7-2-5 FEEDBACK FROM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE 
UK
The introduction of the distribution centres and the new delivery infrastructure, the revision 
of delivery company and dealer trading terms and the establishment of measurement and 
monitoring systems got underway in September 1992. The revised delivery process took 3 
months to stabilise, mainly whilst the new computer system was bedded in. From March 
1993 onwards, stocks at distribution centres were no longer tagged to dealers. The 
multimedia Discus computer-based sales and ordering system was introduced into 
dealerships during 1995 in readiness for the interactive link with the manufacturing
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pipeline. Actual vehicle ordering through Discus now underway, but the system is not yet
fully interactive. Results and feedback observed by Rover so far include the following:
• Quoted supply bulletin lead times are being achieved in 90% of cases, and targets are 
now being set to bring delivery lead times from build down;
• The overall proportion of cars built for customer order has increased from under 10% in
1992 to approximately 30% in 1994. From 1 January to 31 October 1994, 60% of 
customer sold orders were supplied from distribution centre stocks with the remaining 
40% being built to order in an average of 3.9 weeks. Since then, however, these figures 
have not evolved significantly; this is thought to be a result of continued market 
pressure in the UK to build products and then to market them aggressively;
• Deliveries from distribution centre stock to dealer take an average of 2.5 days, with a 
98% achievement of the 3 day commitment to the dealer;
• Finished vehicle stock turn is up from 4 to 5 times per annum;
A
• Published CSI results show average delivery lead times down from 3.9 weeks in Q3
1993 to 2.7 weeks in Q3 1994. 78% of customers took delivery of their new car within 
1 month, and only 5% had to wait longer than 8 weeks. More recently, with the 
introduction of the Discus system and the increase in build to order, it has been very 
important for the company to prevent customer satisfaction levels from suffering an 
adverse reaction to the new system; in other words to prevent any short term decline that 
would result from some customers having to wait a while longer for their car which was 
not available from stock. At the same time, the company was in the process of 
launching a raft of new models, all of which would be initially in short supply, so they 
was concerned that people might be dissatisfied with the delivery times; they hoped that 
their long term intentions for the system as a whole would not create short term ordering 
dissatisfaction until it became fully established. The initial outcome of this will not be 
known until complete figures for 1996 are available some time into 1997, and the 
careful monitoring by Rover of dealer and customer satisfaction with the delivery 
process will therefore continue to be a key activity in the development of the system;
• Following the introduction of the first elements of change, the ranking of Rover dealers’
tfisatisfaction in Sewell’s Dealer Attitude Survey up from 15 place in 1992 to 2 place 
behind BMW in 1993;
“In 1992, all the dealers thought that the company was mad. Now they 
admit they were stupid to fight the changes, and want the perfect 
system  -  rapid build to order from scratch  -  yesterday. However,
Customer Satisfaction Index, a popular measure used by the industry to assess the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a make’s dealer network.
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achieving this relates to the way the product is engineered from its 
inception, and so will take a number o f product generations to refine 
fully. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
• The dealers have also apparently been very pleased with the new Discus system, which 
they find much easier than the old system. All they have to do is choose the model a 
list, look up the options and trim combinations, etc. compared to the old system under 
which they had to know in advance what they were allowed to order, then they had to 
look up lengthy product codes and insert them into the relevant boxes, with a significant 
potential for errors creeping in;
7-2-6 FEEDBACK FROM IMPLEMENTATION IN 
EUROPE
The first phase of the programme, including all the basic elements of the UK approach but 
with some detail differences, was implemented between January and December 1995 in 
Belgium, Holland, Germany, France, Spain and Italy. Peter Bailey and Rover feel that it is 
still to early to be able to draw any firm conclusions from this process, although several 
immediate points of interest emerged during discussions for this research:
• The position of the wholly-owned national distributors under the new system is evolving 
into one of managing supply by exception rather than one of preallocating cars to 
dealers by whatever means possible. The dealer makes the order choice and presses the 
button on his computer; he then knows straightaway whether the vehicle is in the supply 
pipeline and where it is, and is then given a delivery date. If the vehicle is not in the 
pipeline, the dealer can still place a build order and get an estimated date. It was 
emphasised that the continental dealer is given the delivery date commitment the 
moment he confirms the order, so even though the order might not run through the UK 
computer until the early hours of the following morning, the commitment is already 
locked in place. The number of order duplications and other problems due to computer 
systems failure has been minimal;
“The national sales companies are really an electronic 
communications post box. Orders still come into them, but they let
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things happen, and interfere only by exception. They might add any 
orders they might want fo r their own fleets, but thereafter the order 
feed is automatically sucked to the UK once per day. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
• At the moment, all the supply pipelines are national, and the only opportunity that exists 
to juggle between nations is outside these national pipelines at the headquarters level. 
Rover intends to move on to consider the potential for marketing a more universal 
product offer across Europe, which would enable these pipelines to be combined and 
shared across markets wherever possible;
• The basic consumer profiles, including customer-acceptable delivery timescales and 
satisfaction are broadly similar across the chosen markets, with the exception of 
Germany, where there is a much greater tradition of build to order and longer lead times. 
Customers order their cars well in advance and expect the manufacturer to be able to 
build their individual specification combination. Peter Bailey believed that this market 
characteristic was slowly in the process of changing, mainly under the influence of the 
increasing penetration of foreign makes in the German market.
• Despite the inevitable complications of introducing pioneering change into foreign 
cultures, Rover now reckons to have achieved exactly the same ordering system in all 6 
of its major European markets, something which it feels very few, if any, other 
manufacturers have yet come close to matching.
“It is a lot more complicated than people think; it is a lot easier to 
track what is going on within your own borders ... and there remains a 
lot o f  work to be done. We would not claim to have reached utopia, 
and our dealers in Europe would certainly have some interesting tales 
to tell, but it is the principle o f  what we are trying to achieve that is so 
important. We want to offer our continental customers a firm delivery 
date - some other manufacturers think this is impossible. Rover's 
dates are currently tied to a production week - many others could not 
tie it to less than a month - but when the system becomes more 
interactive and more robust, they ought to be tied to a single day. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
CHAPTER 7 PAGE 222
7-2-7 ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE PROGRAMME
Two important issues which have emerged from the programme were identified during the 
research discussions; firstly the importance of common specifications across Europe and 
secondly a shift away from outlet-level towards national-level marketing strategies.
7-2-7-1 COMMON SPECIFICATIONS AND A REDUCTION IN 
MODEL VARIANTS
If supply pipelines are to be able to handle more than one market, it is essential to engineer 
common specifications and to reduce the number of model variants produced wherever 
possible.9 This will involve striking a balance between high-selling specifications for 
which a specific national production may be justified, and lower volume sellers where 
transnational or pan-European specifications may be more advantageous. Like many other 
manufacturers, Peter Bailey confirmed that, as part of the programme, Rover had been both 
reviewing its existing product range in the hope of cutting out unwanted specifications 
(weighing up sales against manufacturing and logistics complexity) and also engineering its 
new models to be as ‘distribution-friendly’ as possible. For instance, the result of this 
process for the Rover 200/400 range was the retention of 5 body types, 4 trim levels, 8 
engines and 5 equipment options.
Figure 7-2
ROVER 200/400 RANGE - UK RETAIL ‘CHOICES’10





For Rover, this process was made much easier as a result of the cross-functional reach of
This point was reflected strongly in the literature on lean production - see section 3-2-1 
Source: Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995, p.353
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the Distribution Efficiency programme; marketing, sales, engineering and logistics 
departments were able to work together to understand the ‘cost of complexity’ of models 
which were rarely ordered, and to monitor the consumption of specification permutations 
in relation to cost.
7-2-7-2 EVOLVING NEW MARKETING STYLES
Peter Bailey and Rover perceived that, despite advances such as being able to offer the 
customer a definite delivery date and the specification of their choice, the European market 
in general is not yet at the stage to move to fixed-price selling. However, the new stock 
control systems were opening up some possibilities of changing the way marketing is 
conducted. With greater stock control, it ought to be possible to run marketing in a more 
targeted way at a regional or national level instead of relying on dealers’ local campaigns 
aimed at moving cars from their storage yards. However, it is likely that exceptions will 
still be needed for tactical instances, such as the end of a model’s life, when cars need to be 
‘shifted’ Under these scenarios, the dealer’s local market expertise will still be vital.
7-2-8 LESSONS FOR THE ‘LEAN’ AGENDA
Three final points were raised by Peter Bailey during the research discussions as being 
possibly the most important lessons to be learnt from what Rover still calls its 
‘experiment’.
7-2-8-1 THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE WHOLE VALUE CHAIN
The distribution chain and the larger the number of actors within it, the greater the potential 
for ‘mudcf (Womack. J. and Jones. P.. 1996) or slack to become built in. The only way to 
avoid this is to retain a view of all aspects of the chain and a particular focus on the 
elements which add value, as the following two examples illustrate.
CHAPTER 7 PAGE 224
“It is easy to say that you will deliver the car within 3 days within the 
UK. But if  the car is going abroad' it has to be got to Southampton, or 
to another port, then there are only so many sailings, you have to 
allow fo r  the weather, etc.. The average sailing time to Spain may be 7 
or 10 days, Japan may be 6 weeks or whatever; if  you only have 2 
sailings a week to Germany, you have to quote 5 days to the customer 
in order fo r the promise to be (safe', because you don’t know whether 
the car will get on the first boat or the second. All these conditions 
create slack in the system, before the car even gets to the distribution 
centre. Similarly, once it has arrived, the distribution centres may 
have check-in processes, check-out processes, PDI, preparation, 
dispatch, load building, etc.; all slack, and this before you can even 
say that the car has left the centre and will be at the dealer in x number 
o f  days. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
The same problem was described at the manufacturing level:
Many current manufacturing systems rely on detailed forecasting over 
long periods set against components with long, fixed lead times. 
Production stability is thus only possible by means o f inflexible 
schedules balanced by exceptional actions with suppliers to meet short 
term volume and mix changes; suppliers respond by holding excess 
stocks themselves in order to meet these situations. The irony is that 
fluctuations in orders coming up the chain are usually due not to 
absent customers but to dealers overreacting to perceived demand and 
supply levels; these fluctuations get amplified along the chain. Lean 
thinking here should centre on internal and external suppliers building 
rapid response with minimal waste into their own business 
management processes, removing supplier constraints which prevent 
component procurement times from being compatible with customer 
required lead times. For the manufacturer, this could provide 
flexibility o f  scheduling along with the ability to configure the final 
customer specification as close to build as possible, in other words to 
reach the true build to order target o f  assembling ‘batches o f one ’. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
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7-2-8-2 THE NEED TO ADAPT TO LOCAL MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTS
It was also emphasised that the ability to introduce new strategies such as Rover’s will 
always be conditional on the suitability of the market environment in which the make is 
selling.
“The market is not necessarily going to change in the way you are 
seeking to change it, and the market is not going to change as a result 
o f you. Given that the European market has a lot o f  overcapacity and 
is intensively competitive, so the systems that are being put in place 
are somewhat affected by the external environment. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
However, it is interesting to note that, despite the extended lead times caused by their 
sources of production being thousands of miles away, Rover Australia and Japan have 
nevertheless successfully introduced phase 1 of the programme on their own initiatives.
7-2-8-3 THE IMPORTANCE OF VISION
One final quotation summarises Rover’s whole attitude towards changing its distribution 
chain across Europe, and perhaps hints at why the company is generally considered to be at 
the forefront of implementing at least the supply and stocking aspects of lean distribution.
“The process is highly complicated, and a very major commitment for  
a company to make. There is still a lot o f work to do; we are not even 
sure if  the end goal is in sight, but we have a vision. I f  you don't 
experiment, if  you don’t try things, then there are all sorts o f  things 
you will never know even existed until they hit you in the face. The 
concept o f  being able to come up in advance with a comprehensive 
plan that covers everything is ju st not feasible. ”
Interview with Peter Bailey
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7-3 DAEWOO’S ARRIVAL IN THE UK 
MARKET
7-3-1 INTRODUCTION
It is rare for the arrival of a new manufacturer in the UK market to arouse as much 
comment as has been the case with Daewoo. Prior to their very public launch campaign 
and the establishment of their novel distribution network, very little was known about the 
company. Since the start of 1995 however, the rest of the industry has been watching them 
very closely. Some claim to be waiting for their distribution system to fail, whereas others 
are examining closely which elements might be able to be copied ...
Because of the intense nature of the scrutiny they have been under, and because the 
company was unwilling to assess itself publicly or to be judged only on the basis of its 
opening months of activity, it proved impossible to establish sufficient contacts to enable 
primary research to be carried out within the desired timeframe. Therefore, this case study 
is constructed from secondary material issued both by the company and in newspapers and 
industry journals.11
7-3-2 THE DAEWOO CORPORATION
In only 29 years, Daewoo has emerged as one of the most potent corporations in the global, 
let alone the Korean economy. The company was founded in 1967 by current chairman 
Kim Woo-Chong, and was initially involved in textiles and clothing. Chairman Kim, 
considered in his home country as a real entrepreneur, claims not to have taken a day off 
work since he was 15 - he is now 59. Daewoo has now grown to become the world’s 33rd 
biggest industrial conglomerate and includes 22 companies, 74 international offices, and 
over 30 foreign factories. It employs over 100,000 people, and manufacturers over 3000
n See section 5-3-2-2
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different products; group sales for 1995 amounted to $57bn, and the current growth rate is 
around 30-35% per annum. The target turnover set by Chairman Kim for 2000 is $200bn; 
by way of comparison, the figure for GM is currently around $134bn. The group now 
manufacturers a wide range of products and is involved in a variety of economic sectors; 
these include cars, trucks, planes, helicopters, heavy plant equipment, ships, railway 
carriages, defence and aerospace, oil production equipment, construction, 
telecommunications, home electronics, computers, clothing and textiles. Daewoo is now 
South Korea’s second biggest car manufacturer in terms of units (behind Hyundai). The 
company name means “the whole universe” in Korean and, thanks to the character of its 
chairman, Daewoo has a reputation as the most adventurous and risk-prepared of the 
Korean chaebol, and has been particularly strong at moving into developing markets.12
7-3-3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DAEWOO MOTOR
Motor vehicle production is one of Daewoo’s more recent developments, and originated in 
1972 with the establishment of GM Korea, a joint-venture between GM and the Shinjin 
Motor Company, which had been producing GM vehicle designs under licence. Daewoo 
gained a management stake in the operation in 1976, and took over control in 1983. The 
terms of the GM agreement prevented Daewoo from exporting its cars to other markets, 
until the two sides divorced somewhat acrimoniously in 1992. Under the terms of the 
separation, Daewoo was allowed to start exporting to Europe in 1995, and to North 
America in 1996. Consequently, between 1992 and 1995, Daewoo Motor moved strongly 
into developing markets in South-East Asia, and in particular into Eastern Europe. These 
investments are summarised later. From this perspective, Daewoo’s beating of GM to win 
control of Poland’s FSO during 1995 was therefore particularly poignant for the company.
Daewoo is without doubt the most ambitious of the Korean manufacturers. It is aiming to 
be one of the world’s top ten vehicle producers by the turn of the century, producing two 
million vehicles per year, of which over half will come from its foreign plants. At home 
the company is investing $150m in a new test track complex in Kochang, not far from its 
new Kunsan production complex on Korea’s west coast. This is part of its commitment to 
invest over 7% of total annual sales into R&D. Globally, Daewoo’s motor division alone 
has already committed S5.5 billion of investment into its car production operations, of
Daewoo company information
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which $3 billion is for its Eastern Europe-based operations. 1,169,000 units will be
manufactured outside Korea, of which 605,000 will come from these Romanian, Polish and
1 ^Czech Republic facilities.
Figure 7-3
DAEWOO’S INVESTMENT IN OVERSEAS VEHICLE 
PRODUCTION14
Country Company Investment Capacity Product
India DCM Daewoo $l.lbn 240,000 Cielo, J100, LCV
China $70m 10,000 Bus
Vietnam Vidamco $32m 21,000 Cielo, Espero, Prince
Philippines Transfarm $20m 20,000 Racer, Cielo, Espero
Indonesia Starsauto $20m 23,000 Espero, Cielo, Bus
Iran Daewoo Kerman $600m 50,000 Racer, Espero
Uzbekhistan Uz-Daewoo $635m 200,000 Cielo, Tico, Damas
Romania Rodae $960m 200,000 Cielo
Poland FSO $l.lbn 220,000 T100, new FSO
Poland FS Lublin $740m 90,000 Nexia, LCV
Czech Republic Avia $200m 95,000 LCV, Truck
Total $5,447bn 1,169,000
NB. Cielo = Nexia
Daewoo has recruited Arnold Ostle as its worldwide chief for styling, quality and quality 
control. He was previously in charge of Mazda’s design centre in Germany, and before 
that was head of interior design, colour and trim at Porsche. Ostle is the second European 
executive to go to Daewoo following Ulrich Bez, former Porsche executive, joined as head 
of R&D in September 1994. Uniquely amongst the Korean manufacturers, Daewoo has 
also established 2 European R&D facilities. The larger of the two, at Worthing in the UK, 
is the former IAD operation taken over from the Mayflower Group. Daewoo is investing 
£7 million in the site, which now employs 700 people concentrating on design and 
development, the reduction of production lead-times and prototype manufacturing. The 
second facility, concentrating on engines and transmissions, is at Munich, and Daewoo also 
has a further arrangement with Austria’s Steyr-Daimler-Puch, which will lead amongst 
other things to the production of diesel engines. In early 1996, the company also got close 
to acquiring Lotus from its troubled owner Romano Artioli, who also ran the revived
Source: Financial Times, 19/10/94, 6/9/95, Automotive Management, 22/1/96, Korean Automobile 
Manufacturers Association 
Source: As above
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Bugatti company until its collapse in 1995.
7-3-4 DAEWOO’S PRODUCT RANGE
One of the major criticisms from the rest of the industry and the motoring media 
surrounding Daewoo’s arrival in Europe has been their decision to launch with a limited 
range of models based on borrowed GM technology:
• The Nexia is essentially the previous edition Opel Kadett / Vauxhall Astra;
• The Espero has as its underpinnings the Opel Vectra / Vauxhall Cavalier of the early 
1980s.
However, in certain European markets, this has actually worked to Daewoo’s advantage, as 
these models had good reputations when they were sold by GM. Furthermore, Daewoo’s 
decision to sell the cars with very high specifications means that they offer more standard 
equipment than most of their immediate competitors. In the UK, the high product 
specification was seen as part of the strong customer service philosophy that was adopted 
by Daewoo deliberately because of the lack of a brand new model range. The UK 
motoring press, highly sceptical at the outset, has since then grudgingly come to 
acknowledge the strengths of the model range on offer.
“The styling is anonymous hut not unattractive . . .  this need not bother 
buyers whose expectations and resources will be modest. They are 
only looking for a brand-new small/medium or large/medium car, 
laden with what are normally extras, that promise to deliver trouble- 
free motoring at a down to earth price  . . .  the Espero is not a great car; 
just a competent one, astonishingly well equipped and sold at a most 
affordable price. ”15
The indications are, however, that this is set to change, and scoop pictures of the next 
generation of Daewoos are now starting to appear in the motoring press.16 The company is 
investing SI billion over the next 5 years on the development of new models alone; this
Source: Financial Times, 13/05/1995
See, for instance, Car Magazine, February 1997, p26-7
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does not include the costs of building up, for example, the East European production.
7-3-5 DAEWOO’S EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTION 
STRATEGY
7-3-5-1 A HIGH PROPORTION OF WHOLLY-OWNED 
NATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS
Instead of starting off in the European market with independent importers as most new 
entrants do, Daewoo has chosen to operate its own subsidiary National Distributors in all of 
the major markets. The reason for this has been given as the company’s desire to establish 
lean distribution.17
“By investing directly, the manufacturer avoids having to deal with an 
intermediary and has more control over the market, meaning more 
efficiency. ”
Chief Executive, Daewoo France
Daewoo currently has 10 wholly-owned National Sales Companies (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, UK) and 6 independent 
importer operations. By way of comparison, Kia was launched into the European market in 
1991 (starting with the UK), and currently only has one wholly-owned National Distributor 
(in Belgium).
7-3-5-2 EUROPEAN DEALER STRUCTURES
Along with the ground-breaking UK arrangement to be discussed later, Daewoo has 
selected different dealer network structures to respond to the specific needs of each market.
Source: conference speech by Marketing Director Pat Farell
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For instance:
• Germany: Daewoo launched in February 1995 with 20 wholly-owned branch 
operations in major towns and cities, backed up by 100 independent dealers. This 
network had grown to 291 dealers by the end of 1995. A total of 400 sales outlets are 
planned by the end of 1996.
• France: It was felt that a system of small independent dealers was more appropriate 
for the French market, where costs and risks are higher, and 66 were operating by May 
1995. Daewoo France operates 3 succursales, in Paris, Marseille and Metz, and will 
also develop a network of 100 service-only facilities, operating like fast-fit outlets. 
These are planned to display new cars, and maybe to sell them as well at a later date. 
The network will increase to 150 dealers, of which 50% will be exclusive.
• Italy: From launch in early 1995, the network numbered 60 dealers and 24 sub-
dealers. Many of these are multifranchise operations. By the end of 1995, the dealer
1 8count had grown to 102. The aim is for 80% of the dealers to be exclusive.
7-3-5-3 1995 SALES PERFORMANCE
The following table gives the results of Daewoo’s first few months of operation in a 
selection of European markets. As they did not start selling until around March at the 
earliest in any of these markets, both targets and sales figures refer to the remaining months 
of 1995. As can be seen from the table, the sales performance is generally a positive one, 
but not universally so. Targets were beaten in France, the UK and Holland, but unfulfilled 
in Italy, and especially in Germany, despite the significant volume of dealers that had been 
signed up.
Source: L’Argus de L’Automobile, 12/1/95, Motor Trader, ZDK
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Figure 7-4
DAEWOO BY THE END OF 199519
Target Units sold Market share Main dealers
France 5000 6207 0.25% 106
Germany 1% 14,190 0.43% 291
Italy 6500 4011 0.25% 102
Netherlands 4000 6100 1.5% 82
UK 10,000 13.169 0.68% 18*
* 6 Motor Shows and 12 Car Centres. Also 136 Halfords Service Centres
So, perhaps Daewoo’s most significant contribution to these European markets so far in 
terms of sales has been to the increase in overall Korean make penetration. The end-of- 
year figures for 1995 showed the Korean makes to have sold 178,000 units for a 1.5% 
market share, up from 0.9% at the end of 1994. However, to keep things in perspective, 
the year-end 1995 figures for the Japanese makes were 1,278,254 units and a 10.6% market 
share, so the difference is still a very significant one.
In the UK, Daewoo have virtually overtaken all the other Korean manufacturers after only 
9 months. In January 1996, their penetration had reached 1.6%. As shall be illustrated 
later in this chapter, they have achieved this with only a fraction of the usual number of 
retail outlets.
Compiled from Automotive Management, Financial Times, Sewell’s Dealer Principal and 
Observatoire de la Distribution, No. 5/96
Source: Automotive News Europe and Observatoire de la Distribution, No5/96
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Figure 7-5
UK SHARES OF KOREAN AND MALAYSIAN MAKES 1982-199521
Daewoo
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N.B. Daewoo only 9 months sales in 1995
7-3-6 DAEWOO’S UK DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
In the UK, Daewoo have established a network of branch (wholly-owned) retail outlets 
which sell new and used cars, backed up by a service deal with the Halfords chain of car 
service and accessory superstores (owned by Boots).
7-3-6-1 PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE APPROACH
It is perceived that there have been five principal motivations which have driven Daewoo’s 
approach to their UK distribution network:22
Compiled from SMMT data 
Researcher’s categorisations
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• The need for a novel solution
As a new arrival, Daewoo needed to achieve a high volume of sales quickly, but in 
the longer term their ambitions centred around creating mass appeal for a mass 
brand. The constraints of the highly mature and slow-selling UK market, 
particularly in the case of private sales, meant that a novel approach was needed if 
the company was to make a real impact. Furthermore, as already mentioned, 
Daewoo knew in advance that it would be potentially disadvantaged by its lack of a 
new product range.
• A desire to be customer focused
Prior to launch, Daewoo analysed the strategies of their competitors. They 
concluded that the majority of the opposition had either a strong brand but little 
product generosity or vice-versa. Daewoo needed to build both from day one. 
They also reckoned that, whilst every brand now declares that it wants to be 
customer focused, no one company has yet emerged as market leader in customer 
service.
“Our whole w ay o f  doing business was borne out o f  concern fo r  the 
cost o f  ownership experience. ”
David Gerrans, Customer Operations Director, Daewoo 
UK
A strong focus on customer service (including the high standard specification of the 
cars) would help to divert attention from the weaknesses of the actual model range. 
It would also serve the company in good stead for when the new models arrived.
• A perception of customer dissatisfaction with the traditional selling format
Partly so as to establish the company’s credentials regarding customer focus, 
Daewoo conducted the ‘Daewoo Dialogue’ consumer research campaign, 
incentivised for the public by the offer of 200 free cars for a year. The results gave 
the company a database of 200,000 interested motorists, and allegedly constituted 
the biggest ever survey of car buyers’ attitudes in Europe. The marketing of the 
campaign adopted a straightforward, homely, presenter-based style as opposed to 
involving fantasy driving sequences like so many other car marketing campaigns.
According to Daewoo, the survey revealed that customers are not happy with 
current system of independent franchised dealers:
• 63% of respondents found showrooms to be intimidating places;
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• a similar percentage thought that the salesman usually wins in the haggling 
process with the customer;
• 86% of respondents said that they would be prepared to travel up to 50 miles for 
a ‘better buying experience’.23
Coincidentally, these were all concerns that Daewoo was planning to address in its 
network of wholly-owned retail outlets ... A subsequent marketing campaign 
launched in late 1995 asked people who have suffered at the hands of the motor 
trade to come forward with their stories. The 100 people who come up with the 
worst horror stories would be given a car to test drive for a year. The clear message 
was that, for Daewoo, people were as important as cars, further reinforcing the 
marque’s commitment to customer care. At the same time, the campaign served to 
debase the traditional franchised dealer selling system, a tactic which has aroused a 
significant degree of hostility within the UK industry.
• A lack of willingness to sell through existing dealers
Initially, Daewoo was faced with the same problem as all new entrants; finding a 
high quality network of dealers willing to take a risk with an unknown make. The 
company was thus faced with the prospect of joining the back of queue, unless 
something more radical was tried. Once Daewoo has thought out its customer 
service philosophy, it felt that its needs could not be met by an independent 
franchised dealer, and was also unwilling to see its brand image become diluted 
through representation within a multifranchise dealer group. The only remaining 
option if its planned service levels were to be guaranteed was therefore to control 
its outlets directly, through ownership.
• The existence of the Halfords service infrastructure
Daewoo was already planning to split its planned wholly-owned retail outlets into a 
larger and a smaller type, so as to be able to provide the full range of services where 
they were needed, and more lightweight facilities where appropriate, when the deal 
with Halfords was struck. This therefore fitted in with their conception of an 
unbundled distribution network with services provided as close to the consumers as 
appropriate. For Daewoo, the Halfords deal provided a ready-made service network 
located in all the major towns and cities of Great Britain. This avoided the need for 
a great deal of investment. For Halfords, the deal would bring some rental income 
from the space Daewoo’s operations occupied, some captive custom for its service
Compiled from Daewoo UK marketing and a conference speech delivered by Marketing Director Pat 
Farell, also Marketing, 11/1/96
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bays and some additional traffic for the accessory superstores in the form of 
Daewoo owners waiting for their cars to be serviced. Furthermore, Halfords’ 
system of menu pricing for its workshop operations would fit in well with the 
Daewoo philosophy of transparency for the customer.
7-3-6-2 NETWORK STRUCTURE
Daewoo’s UK distribution system operates according to the three-tier structure shown 
below.
Figure 7-6













All of Daew oo's outlets display a number of common features:
• Large, open-plan format with relatively few cars on display;
• Interactive computer consoles using touch-screens to allow customers to investigate 
their own specification combination and finance options;
• Salaried sales advisors (with no commission incentives) who operate on a ‘no-hassle’ 
principle are used. These are the employees of Daewoo UK, not of each individual site;
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• Customers are greeted when they enter the facility, and are invited to approach a 
member of staff if they have any queries. Otherwise, they are left to browse unhindered. 
Free refreshments and play areas for children are included in the larger outlets.
At the start of 1996, Daewoo’s UK network comprised:24
• 7 Motor Shows:
These are the larger outlets, usually located in out-of-town retail centres, alongside 
electronics, or furniture superstores, etc. For example, the facility at Ealing in West 
London has a floorspace o f40,000 square feet, and a 70-seater cafe.
• 14 Car Centres:
These are the smaller outlets, usually located in similar areas.
Both Motor Shows and Car Centres have a variety of facilities according to the local need. 
For instance, only some of the Car Centres have their own service facilities.
• 134 Support Centres located within Halfords Superstores:
These are essentially service-only facilities, although they all display product 
information and have an interactive computer console for potential customers. 12 
of the Halfords facilities also have mini-showrooms employing sales advisors.
Daewoo is also experimenting with other retail locations. In March 1996, Daewoo 
commenced selling from a 500 sq. ft. site located within the 120,000 sq. ft. Sainsbuiy’s 
Savacentre hypermarket at Colney near the M25 north of London, which attracts 250,000 
shoppers per month. 3 Daewoo sales advisers are present on site, along with a reception 
desk, semi-private discussion area and a car on display. Daewoo literature is displayed in 
the shopping aisles and in the petrol station, and touch-screen interactive computer displays 
are located in the Savacentre restaurant and in the play area. 6 demonstrator cars are on 
hand outside the store.
Other detailed points of relevance include the following:
• Outlets are not set individual sales targets, nor are they measured against each other by 
Daewoo UK;
• Customers may telephone to bring a demonstrator car to their front door. Up to half a 
day’s driving, without a salesman, is allowed;
Source: Daewoo UK company information and retailer location brochures 
Source: Motor Trader, 8/4/96, Automotive Management, 8/4/96
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• Customer enquiries, service bookings, etc. are all handled centrally through UK 
headquarters at Rickmans worth using a free-phone service.
7-3-6-3 THE CUSTOMER DEAL
N ew  cars
The following graphic summarises Daewoo’s new car offer in Europe and the UK, which is 
significantly more ‘loaded’ than its rivals’.
Figure 7-7
DAEWOO’S CUSTOMER OFFER26
E urope-w ide ..
♦ 3 year/100,000 km 
warranty for any 
unscheduled work.
♦ 6 years anti-corrosion 
cover.
♦ 3 years roadside recovery
In th e  UK a s  well..
♦ Free servicing for 3 years
or 60,000 miles,. Includes: 
-* reminder call,
-  pick up and delivery
-  courtesy car.
♦ Free half-day test drive
♦ All delivery costs including 
12 months tax and 
number plates
♦ Free security registration 
with National Register
♦ Fixed sticker price
Furthermore, because of its fixed price selling strategy, Daewoo claims to make no 
differentiation between fleet and private buyers. However, it should be noted that a 
significant proportion of UK sales so far have been to daily rental fleets (Avis, Kenning 
and Hylton), to contract hire operators (Cowie, BRS, Lex, Hertx, Swan and Auto Lease), 
and to company fleet customers (McDonalds, Britannia Airways, the AA, Associated
Source: Daewoo UK marketing
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Newspapers, Panasonic, BHS, Canon, Mothercare, the CSMA, MacMillan Publishing and 
Orange). It can therefore only be speculated as to whether this fixed-price position does 
actually change in the event of a major customer placing a large order ...
When Daewoo launched in the UK in April 1995, the first 1,000 customers were offered a 
replacement N-registration new car the following August for a n om inal registration fee of 
£11. This served not only as a marketing tactic, but also provided the company with a 
ready stock of nearly-new vehicles with which to launch its used car operation.
Used cars
The company’s used car programme, called Daewoo Resale, displays a number of 
particular features;
• It differs from most other used car programmes in offering a company-backed guarantee 
instead of an insurance-underwritten warranty;
• All cars offered have independently-verified mileage, are screened for freedom from 
outstanding hire-purchase agreements and undergo a 116 point inspection to gain AA 
Quality Assurance certification;
• The price includes the promise of an exchange or refund within 30 days of purchase, a 
year’s mechanical and electrical guarantee, a year’s Europe-wide AA cover, six months’ 
road tax, a mobile phone, free MOT tests until the car is sold and a courtesy car during 
services;
• The guarantee can be extended to 3 years, and is transferable to subsequent owners, so 
long as the mileage does not exceed 100,000 miles and the car is serviced by Daewoo;
• All cars on the scheme are under 4 years old and have covered under 40,000 miles. In 
addition to the traded-in cars mentioned above, Daewoo also purchased a stock of used 
cars of a selection of makes with which to launch the scheme.27
7-3-6-4 THE COSTS
It is apparent that Daewoo UK have placed a very considerable amount of investment into 
building their UK distribution system;
Source: Daewoo UK marketing
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• The company spent £10 million in 1994 on marketing communications; building brand 
awareness before a single car had been sold;
• The 1995 UK marketing communications budget was £16 million;
• They spent the equivalent of £877 on above-the-line media advertising for every new car 
sold (note that this is approximately the equivalent to a 10% dealer margin - see table 
below);
• The overall budget for building the UK distribution system is understood to be £150 
million.28
Nor has this high rate of spending been restricted to the UK market. The French 
advertising budget for 1995 was between FF25 million and FF30 million. This set a new 
record at over FF 10,000 per car sold. Despite the corporation’s extremely deep pockets, 
and the potential it has for bolstering its expanding car operations through its successes in 
other sectors, it has to be wondered exactly how long such a rate of expenditure will be 
able to be maintained.
However, whilst the UK approach has been particularly expensive when compared to the 
more traditional routes adopted in other markets, it has provided Daewoo with a faster 
growth in market penetration than in any other of their European markets. By the end of 
1995, their sales figures were ahead not only of the other Korean makes, but also Mazda, 
Mitsubishi, Proton, Seat and Skoda ...
Figure 7-8
UK PAID MEDIA SPEND 199530







Daewoo 877 13,169 (Mar-Dee)
Source: Sewell’s Dealer Principal 
Source: L’Argus de L’Automobile 
Source: Nielsen Register / MEAL
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7-3-7 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DAEWOO APPROACH
Despite its early stage of development, several implications of the Daewoo approach are 
already becoming apparent.
7-3-7-1 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DAEWOO
• Daewoo has no direct control over service:
Daewoo’s customer care philosophy and almost all of its marketing strategy focuses 
on the brand’s service proposition, and yet the company has no direct control over 
most of the outlets contracted to service its products. Control over service channels 
was put forward by the industry as one of the key arguments in favour of the 
retention of the Block Exemption, but Daewoo’s approach would appear to 
undermine this concept entirely. This approach reduces Daewoo’s opportunity to 
use its service offer as a means of building a long-term relationship with its 
customers, as they will most likely buy and have their cars serviced at different 
locations. One potential future scenario may be for Daewoo actually to take over 
the Halfords superstore chain from its current owners Boots Pic, who are rumoured 
to be searching for a buyer.
• Used cars may prove to be a particular problem:
The somewhat outdated current Nexia and Espero models are expected to suffer 
from low residual prices in the marketplace. Furthermore, Daewoo owners may 
receive poor trade-in prices at dealers representing other franchises as these dealers 
try to extract some revenge for their very negative portrayal in Daewoo’s marketing 
campaigns. The Daewoo sales advisors’ inability to haggle trade-in values with 
potential customers under the fixed price system may also put the brand at a 
disadvantage when compared to other franchises who are able to haggle.
• The UK experiment may spread to other markets:
Existing dealer networks may be bypassed in a number of European markets if 
Daewoo were to move to establish new branch operations. Possible service 
partners for such a move already exist in France and the Netherlands. Daewoo 
already operates a number of wholly-owned outlets in Germany and France and is
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planning to open a facility in the Netherlands.
7-3-7-2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ‘LEAN’ AGENDA
• Different approaches to car retailing are emerging:
Daewoo’s UK network is a prime example of how different structures may emerge 
to target and to serve different areas and different population segments. The 
network also provides retailers with far larger market territories than has 
traditionally been the norm, gambling that customers will be prepared to travel 
further to buy or repair their car. It also answers one of the predictions concerning 
closer working partnerships in the distribution chain by being fully integrated, with 
many activities conducted from the centre rather than individually.
• Consumer expectations are increasing:
The Daewoo approach will further increase future consumer expectations, 
particularly regarding warranties, free servicing, and the overall quality of the car 
shopping experience. Consumers will legitimately be able to expect other dealers 
to match or to beat the Daewoo offer.
• The ‘no-hassle’ approach to selling does appeal to some sectors of the car-buying 
population:
The ‘no-hassle’, ‘no-haggle’ approach to selling, combined with a full specification 
and service package and predictable cost of ownership together do appear to hold 
more appeal for certain sectors of the population than the absolute dynamic 
capabilities of the vehicle. Daewoo has accompanied this with retail staff who 
operate entirely on salary as opposed to commission, and who are not pursuing 
specific sales targets. Beyond this, however, there is no reason why elements of 
this approach will not be particularly suited to much broader segments of the car 
market. For instance, complete predictability of running  costs will certainly appeal 
not only to fleet managers, but also to any cost-conscious private buyer.
From the perspective of the research agenda, it is interesting to see that a company which, 
for the short term at least (until its East European factories come fully on stream) will be 
unable to implement any significant amount of new thinking into its supply and stocking 
system because of the lengthy lead times involved in shipping the cars over from Korea, is
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nevertheless actively introducing new ideas which are attempting to optimise as many other 
elements of the car distribution value chain as possible.
7-4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has presented two brief case studies into two companies which are in the 
process of implementing many of the ideas which have been associated both in the 
literature31 and in other areas of the fieldwork32 with the notion of lean distribution.
Several important observations came to light during the two case studies:
Rover
• Lean distribution, particularly in the area of supply and stocking systems, is being 
implemented:
Implementation of lean supply and stocking systems has been taking place, initially 
in the UK, and then in continental Europe. The benefits of reduced lead times, 
guaranteed delivery dates, open order pipelines, integrated computer networks, etc. 
have already been felt by both the manufacturer and its dealers. The impact of such 
systems on consumer satisfaction will be observable soon.
• Product offerings are being rationalised:
The company is convinced that, if such supply systems are to be able to operate 
efficiently on an international basis, it is essential to achieve both common 
specifications and a significant reduction in the number of specification 
combinations within the model range, making the product both production and 
distribution ‘friendly’, but without sacrificing customer choice.
• New marketing styles are emerging:
Despite the belief that the European market is still not sufficiently integrated to
See Chapter 3 
See Chapter 6
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support a move to true fixed-price selling, marketing is starting to move away from 
dealer level ‘stock shifting’ towards more targeted regional, national and even 
international campaigns. The achievement of further developments such as fixed- 
price selling and a greater internationalisation of marketing strategy is being 
brought closer as obstacles across the European market continue to fall, but more 
progress, particularly towards a single currency, is needed before they can fully take 
hold.
• Lean distribution requires a focus on the entire value chain:
The successful introduction of new distribution systems such as Rover’s requires 
that the company focuses on and seeks to optimise all value-adding elements of the 
chain, including production, logistics, marketing, national subsidiaries, parts 
suppliers, dealer networks, etc. At the same time, however, the ability to introduce 
new systems will be conditional on the suitability of the particular market 
environment, which may require that solutions be tailored to meet these conditions.
Daewoo
• A new arrival in the European market has deliberately chosen to implement a new 
style of distribution system from the outset, prioritising the role of distribution 
within the whole chain and trying to ensure that manufacturing and retailing are 
‘pulling together’. This illustrates the emergence of new approaches to car 
retailing.
However, only one market has so far been deemed suitable for the new system, with 
traditional systems having been established in other European markets. 
Nevertheless, the possibility exists for these markets to adopt elements of the UK 
approach in the future, if market conditions prove appropriate.
• The stated driving force behind the new system is customer satisfaction.
The ‘no-haggle’, ‘no-hassle’ selling style, the moves towards fixed-cost motoring 
and the extensive warranty and support package offered all reflect the increasingly 
demanding nature of consumer expectations in certain market segments.
The next chapter draws these ideas together into a short-list of observed lean distribution 
‘ingredients’, the validity and implementation of which were subsequently tested in the 
final postal survey. They are returned to again in the research conclusions chapter, Chapter 
9.
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CHAPTER 8
FIELDWORK SURVEY: THE 
CONCEPTS OF LEAN 
DISTRIBUTION
"When the definitive history o f the 2Cfh Century is written, it will 
undoubtedly major on a number o f significant events. Two devastating 
world wars will feature prominently, as will the advent o f nuclear 
weapons. The development o f television and radio communication will 
be unfolded together with the advancement o f man’s ability to travel by 
land, sea and air. Space travel and early attempts at interplanetary 
exploration will also merit a few  pages fo r sure. Yet nothing has been 
quite so close to people during this momentous century than the 
development o f  the motor car. O f all modern inventions, it has 
probably had the greatest influence on how day-to-day life is led . "
Ernie Thompson and Roger King, Chief Executive of 
the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders and 
Roger King, Chairman of the British Motor Industry 
Centenary Trust, quoted in The Motor Industry of 
Britain Centenary Book, published by the SMMT, 1996
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8-1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the research model which was developed to test and to validate the 
most important concepts which emerged from the preceding sections of the fieldwork. 
Following on from the outline of the methods adopted which was given in Chapter 5, it 
initially draws up the list of nine ‘lean distribution factors’ and explains how they were 
built into the survey before going on to discuss the outcome of the statistical steps taken to 
validate the data collected and then finally to present the findings.
8-2 THE CONCEPTS OF LEAN 
DISTRIBUTION
8-2-1 LEAN DISTRIBUTION FACTORS
The following table outlines the nine postulated lean distribution ‘factors’ which were 
presented to industry respondents in the form of the postal survey. They represent a 
distillation of the themes which were the most strongly mentioned by all types of 
respondent in the pilot, interview and case study phases of the fieldwork within the context 
of the development of lean distribution structures and strategies.
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Figure 8-1
LEAN DISTRIBUTION FACTORS
FACTOR 1 Having the physical distribution chain and production planning driven by 
sold customer order pull, and not by stock push
FACTOR2 Having integrated computer systems which unite retailers, manufacturers 
and suppliers and which enable two-way order and information exchanges
FACTOR3 Reducing the number of model variants and specification differences
FACTOR4 The fragmentation of car retailing into a multiplicity of different 
approaches to meet the needs of different regions and vehicle types
FACTOR 5 Establishing closer relationships between manufacturers and retail partners
FACTOR 6 The rethinking of territorial coverage including market area approaches 
involving fewer individual main dealers and the dispersal of dealership 
activities according to local needs
FACTOR 7 The establishment of fixed-price selling
FACTOR8 Having a less confrontational selling style and different reward structures 
for customer-facing sales and service staff
FACTOR9 Conducting less outlet-level marketing and more customer retention and 
order generation campaigns with a national or regional focus
The first three factors are derived from the physical distribution activities section of the 
material, as presented in Chapter 6, factors four to six from the distribution chain 
organisation section, and the final three factors from the selling and marketing activities 
section.1 Furthermore, the first three factors came across particularly strongly from the 
case study on Rover’s distribution system. Equally, factors 4 to 9 all feature in Daewoo’s 
UK distribution network as presented in the second half of the last chapter. Together, they 
were all felt to be representative of the many developments underway in the European 
market which have been associated, both in the literature and by the industry itself, with the 
notion of lean distribution.2 The following table situates these nine factors according to 
their occurrence in the literature and according to their observation and discussion in 
previous sections of the research fieldwork.
See Chapter 6, sections 6-2 to 6-4 
See section 3-3
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Figure 8-2
DETERMINATION OF THE LEAN DISTRIBUTION FACTORS




Factor 1 3-3-1 and 3-3-2 6-2-2
3-3-6-2 7-2-3
Factor 2 2-3-5-3 6-2-3
1-2-3-2
Factor 3 3-3-3 6-2-4
3-3-6-1 7-2-7-1




Factor 5 3-3-5 6-3-9
3-3-6-1 6-3-10
7-2-4
Factor 6 2-3-5-2 6-3-4
3-3-6-1 7-3-6
Factor 7 2-5-1 6-4-3-2
3-3-6 1-2-1-2 
1-3-7-2
Factor 8 2-3-1 6-4-3
3-3-6 7-3-6
1-3-1-2
Factor 9 2-3-2 6-4-1
3-3-6 1-2-1-2
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8-2-2 SURVEY CONSTRUCTION
As was mentioned in Chapter 5, the survey was made up of two questions which asked 
respondents to assess the nine factors given above from two different perspectives; one 
relating to how they perceived the concept of lean distribution and the other to how they 
rated the application of these concepts in a variety of markets. A sample survey is included 
in Appendix XIII, and a flavour of the types of respondent who participated in the survey is 
given in Appendix XTV.
8-2-2-1 QUESTION 1
Question 1 asked:
“How do you rate the following statements in terms o f their 
importance to the overall concept o f  lean distribution in the motor 
industry? ”
Respondents then rated each of the nine factors by ticking a box along a five-point scale. 




Unimportant Indifferent Important Very important
X X X X X
The question would make it possible to assess the extent to which respondents thought that 
the concepts were central to how they perceived lean distribution, and also to view the 
concepts relative to each other.
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8-2-2-2 QUESTION 2
Question 2 asked:
“How well-established do you feel that these concepts have become in 
the world’s major car markets? ”
Respondents then rated each of the nine factors across a grid of nine different markets or 
groupings of markets. They were asked to score each from 1 to 5 where:
• 1 is ‘no elements of lean distribution have yet become established’;
• 5 is ‘lean distribution is fully established’.





X X X X X X X X X X
This question would allow both the implementation of these concepts across the range of 
markets to be assessed, and also the markets and regions to be compared against each 
other.
8-2-3 SURVEY RESULTS - QUESTION 1
8-2-3-1 DATA ANALYSIS
As was mentioned in the methodology section (Chapter 5), it was considered that ANOVA 
tests represented the most appropriate methods of data analysis for both the survey 
questions. Question 1 contained one variable, asking respondents to rank the given list of 
conditions (factors) along a five-point scale from ‘very unimportant’ to ‘very important’; 
for this question a one-way ANOVA test was used to analyse the 44 responses (all of them 
complete), and the outcome is presented in the following table.
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Figure 8-3
ONE-WAY ANOVA TEST FOR QUESTION 1
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 178.6364 8 22.32955 26.04476 3.49E-32 1.962341
Within Groups 331.7955 387 0.857353
Total 510.4318 395
As can be seen from the table, the F-statistic (26.044) is much larger than the critical value 
of F (1.962), indicating a significant level of variance between responses for each factor. It 
is thus possible to reject the null hypothesis, which is that there is no significant level of 
difference between the factors.
8-2-3-2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The following table summarises the responses to Question 1 by factor and by type of 
response.
Figure 8-4
SUMMARY OF QUESTION 1 RESPONSES (1)
% of
responses
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 Factor 9
Very important
(5)
72.73 59.09 4.55 9.09 43.18 25.00 6.82 20.45 4.55
Important (4) 20.45 40.91 27.27 31.82 54.55 50.00 13.64 40.91 52.27
Indifferent (3) 2.27 0.00 36.36 31.82 0.00 18.18 36.36 22.73 27.27
Unimportant
(2)




0.00 0.00 6.82 2.27 0.00 0.00 15.91 2.27 4.55
No response 
(0)
2.27 0.00 0.00 2.27 0.00 0.00 2.27 0.00 0.00
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This can be depicted graphically as follows;
Figure 8-5











FactorFactor Factor Factor Factor FactorFactor Factor
1 2
■  Very important (5) 
□  Unimportant (2)
I Important (4)
I Very unimportant (1)
□  Indifferent (3)
H  No response (0)
It is immediately apparent from these figures that there were clear differences between the 
factors in how they were perceived by the survey respondents. As the trendline inserted 
onto the bar chart after the ‘Very important’ and ‘Important’ categories shows, it is possible 
to split the factors into three divisions according to how central respondents thought they 
were to the concept of lean distribution.
Division 1 - Factors 1, 2 and 5
The greatest number of ‘very important’ scores was achieved by Factor 1, which is what 
would have been expected given the predominance of supply and stocking systems 
discussions in the lean literature^ and also given the frequency with which this topic 
emerged during the interview sections of the fieldwork; the achievement of customer-pull
3 See section 3-3-2
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physical distribution systems really was perceived of as being central to the notion of lean 
distribution. However, scoring even higher if ‘very important’ and ‘important’ scores are 
taken together are Factors 2 and 5 relating to integrated computer-based communications 
systems between different levels in the chain and to the emergence of closer working 
partnerships between manufacturers and retailers of cars. As is discussed again in respect 
of Question 2, Factor 2 could be seen as a relatively straightforward development which is 
well-advanced throughout the industry. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how central a 
role technology plays in the industry’s perception of lean distribution; this factor scored 
even higher than had been expected. Similarly, the highest overall score was obtained by 
Factor 5, which suggests that the notion of closer manufacturer-dealer partnerships 
discussed by a good number of interview respondents really does pervade all levels of the 
industry. However, just as with the research interviews, it is one thing to maintain that 
closer working partnerships are the way forward for the lean future of the industry, but 
another thing altogether to actually implement them. As one of the survey respondents 
commented:
“Closer relationships between manufacturers and retail partners 
depends on what is meant by ‘closer ’ -  *more dictatorial'  or *more 
participative *? ”
Survey respondent
Viewed together, these factors paint a picture of a highly integrated lean system very much 
instigated and controlled by the manufacturers.
Division 2 -  Factors 6, 8 and 9
The second division of factors contains those relating to the rethinking of dealer territories 
and activities and also to the evolution of marketing strategies. Factor 6 in particular 
scored highly in the ‘very important’ and ‘important’ categories, suggesting that the 
rethinking of dealer networks was being conducted as part of a positive strategy rather than 
as a reaction to many of their smaller numbers going out of business. This also suggests, 
particularly when viewed in the light of the low score achieved by Factor 4, that the 
industry is confident in the future of the franchised dealer system. It was also interesting to 
see that the two specifically marketing factors, which might not have been expected to 
figure so highly in perceptions of lean distribution, both scored highly, indicating that 
respondents consider the lean system to encompass all the value-adding elements of their 
distribution chains.
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Viewed together, this second division of factors shows that there is considerable change 
underway in both the dealer network management and marketing areas of the chain, and 
that these changes are occurring within the frame work of what the industry perceives of as 
lean distribution. It also suggests that franchised dealers will continue to play a part in this 
system, albeit operating in much closer partnership with the manufacturers.
Division 3  -  Factors 3, 4 and 7
The lowest scores were obtained by Factors 3, 4 and 7, meaning that these were the factors 
which respondents felt had the least importance to the concept of lean distribution. A fairly 
low score for Factor 4 was somewhat expected given that Factor 6 had scored highly, and 
that the vast majority of respondents had a professional interest in maintaining the current 
franchised dealer system. Nevertheless, there was still a very significant body of opinion 
(40% of responses if ‘very important’ and ‘important’ are taken together) which believed 
that different forms of car retailing were an integral part of the lean distribution concept.
“The most important element o f  lean distribution will be to see which 
new, more efficient distribution channels (such as the Internet or direct 
selling) will be used by manufacturers in the future. ”
Survey respondent
Bottom of the list were Factors 3 and 7; these two also had the highest proportion of 
‘unimportant’ and ‘very unimportant’ scores. The reduction in specification differences 
was viewed by many as being an important development in itself, but that is was not part of 
the concept of lean distribution.
“Model variants and fixed-price selling are factors which might or 
might not follow from the establishment o f lean distribution rather 
than elements o f the thing itself ” 
“The winners will be those who can combine leaner distribution 
methods with a product offer which is a choice not a compromise. ”
Survey respondents
Nevertheless, the proportion of those who scored the factor ‘very important’ or ‘important’ 
still totals almost 32%, so the factor is really not as unimportant as its ranking might 
suggest. Fixed-price selling scored lowest of all, with many feeling that as a development
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it would exist independent of the moves to establish lean distribution.
“Fixed price selling , a less confrontational selling style, and also a 
reduced number o f model variants, whilst all, are not necessarily a 
requirement o f  a lean distribution system. They may well, however, 
make one function more effectively. ”
Survey respondent
As also emerged from the interview fieldwork, this score was due to respondents being 
divided as to its actual value, with some believing that it was an integral part of moves 
towards build-to-order as well as towards improving customer satisfaction with the whole 
process, whereas others felt that the ability to vary both new and used prices was still an 
essential tool for manufacturers to be able to manage fluctuations and cyclicity in the 
market. As one respondent commented, it should be possible for the selling price to the 
customer to remain fixed throughout the transaction, as long as this price could be 
periodically varied by the manufacturer as necessary.




Several respondents offered further comments with regard to the matter of defining lean 
distribution. One offered a carefully thought-out definition of his own, which essentially 
summarises many of the factors which scored highly throughout the first question.
“Lean distribution is the current optimisation o f the distribution 
processes in the value chain by unconditional customer orientation 
and avoidance o f any wasted resources. It requires total system 
integration o f  the partners involved, with the manufacturer acting as a 
cooperative team/system leader as a result o f the complexity o f the 
product and the capital and know-how which is necessary to run the 
process. ”
Survey respondent
Another correctly pointed out that the concept could be interpreted differently according to
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one’s position within the distribution chain.
“From the logistics perspective, lean distribution means reduced order 
to delivery time. From the cost point o f  view, it means reduced dealer 
networks, and from the customer's point o f view it means getting the 
vehicle they have ordered to their exact specification requirements 
delivered at the right place, at the right time. ”
Survey respondent
A final comment worth mentioning here is from a respondent who underlined the need to 
consider lean distribution within the overall context of competitive pressures facing the 
industry on a global level. The most significant of these pressures, a point echoed in the 
literature,4 is persistent overcapacity at the production level.
“Lean distribution will have a chance to be in place only when over­
capacity has been dramatically reduced, and even at that time car 
manufacturers will need to explore new technologies for tooling which 
will enable them to follow unpredictable market fluctuations. This is 
not the case today in Europe, the US or Japan. What will happen to 
Saturn if  demandfalls below production capacity? ”
Survey respondent
8-2-4 SURVEY RESULTS - QUESTION 2
8-2-4-1 DATA ANALYSIS
As opposed to Question 1, Question 2 contained two variables, asking respondents to mark 
(again on a five-point scale) both the lean distribution factors themselves and also their 
implementation across a selection of global markets. To reflect the two dimensions of the 
question, it was decided to conduct a two-way ANOVA test (with replication) to assess the 
significance of the data collected. The outcome of this is presented in the table below.
4 See section 3-3-1
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Figure 8-6
TWO-WAY ANOVA TEST FOR QUESTION 2
Source of variation SS df MS F P-value F-crit
Between subclass 383.7665734
Rows 5.129537617 8 0.641 0.5765 1.94
Columns 10.02073717 9 1.113 1.0011 1.882
Interaction 368.6162986 72 24.96 22.444 1.293
Error 1797.282078 1616 1.112
TOTAL 2181.048652 1705
As can be seen from the table, the F-statistics for both rows (0.576) and columns (1.001) in 
the results table do not exceed the critical values of F (1.94 and 1.882 respectively), 
indicating an absence of a significant level of variance. This test therefore failed to reject 
the null hypothesis, which was that there was no difference between the subclasses in the 
data.
The reason for this failure is fairly straightforward; there were too many subclasses and not 
enough responses. The total number of subclasses, or possible responses in the survey was 
3960 (10 markets multiplied by 9 factors multiplied by 44 responses5), and the number 
actually received was only 1706. This response rate in itself was not so much of a problem 
as the actual pattern of the responses; respondents would either complete the question in its 
entirety, filling in the whole grid of boxes, or would only complete the column for their 
home market, plus maybe one or two other markets with which they were familiar. There 
was very little middle ground between these two extremes, and this led to some markets 
receiving many more scores than others.
This outcome was not at all unexpected given the challenging nature of the survey and this, 
combined with the high level of interaction reported by the two way ANOVA test, led to 
the decision to test the two dimensions of the survey (the factors and the markets) 
separately, again using one-way ANOVA tests. The results of these tests, which were 
successful, are given below.
5 See the sample survey in Appendix XIII
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Figure 8-7
ONE-WAY ANOVA TEST BY MARKET FOR QUESTION 2
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 180.4936 9 20.05484 16.92935 5.38E-27 1.885386
Within Groups 2010.299 1697 1.18462
Total 2190.793 1706
As can be seen from the table, the F-statistic this time (16.93) is much larger than the 
critical value of F (1.885), indicating the presence of a significant level of variance. It is 
thus possible to reject the null hypothesis in this case, which is that there is no significant 
level of difference in perceived implementation levels of the factors across different 
markets (regardless of factor differences).
Figure 8-8
ONE-WAY ANOVA TEST BY FACTOR FOR QUESTION 2
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 126.207 8 15.77588 12.97473 2.76E-18 1.943846
Within Groups 2064.586 1698 1.215893
Total 2190.793 1706
Once again, the F-statistic (12.97) is much larger than the critical value of F (1.94), 
indicating the presence of a significant level of variance. It is thus possible to reject the 
hypothesis that there is no significant level of difference in perceived implementation 
levels of the factors (regardless of market differences).
8-2-4-2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Overall question results
The following tables summarise the results of the second question. The first presents the 
score totals by factor and by country, the second presents the number of responses in each
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case, and the third presents the resulting average scores. 
Figure 8-9
QUESTION 2 SCORE TOTALS
FR GER IT UK B-LUX SCAN SP+P EUR JAP USA Factor
total
Factor 1 54 66.5 45 90 43 36 29 63 56 53 535.5
Factor 2 67 71 52 97 44 37 36 69 54 83.5 610.5
Factor 3 43 52 43 64 28 28 27 55 42 58 440
Factor 4 45 48 32 70 25 25 26 46 40 59 416
Factor 5 43 63 44 79 40 36 37 63 65 64 534
Factor 6 39 45 37 84 31 23 25 48 57 67 456
Factor 7 32 39 28 53 28 21 23 42 38 63 367
Factor 8 35 46 32 58 28 26 21 50 61 62 419
Factor 9 33 34 23 61 18 18 15 37 32 41 312
Market
total
391 464.5 336 656 285 250 239 473 445 550.5 4090
Figure 8-10
QUESTION 2 NUMBER OF RESPONSES
FR GER IT UK B-LUX SCAN SP+P EUR JAP USA Factor
total
Factor 1 25 28 21 31 19 14 17 25 20 26 226
Factor 2 23 26 21 29 17 13 15 23 16 23 206
Factor 3 20 24 19 26 12 12 13 23 17 21 187
Factor 4 20 23 16 28 13 11 14 21 15 20 181
Factor 5 22 25 20 28 16 13 16 25 18 23 206
Factor 6 21 21 18 25 14 9 13 22 18 24 185
Factor 7 20 22 18 26 15 11 15 24 15 24 190
Factor 8 19 22 17 25 13 11 12 23 17 25 184
Factor 9 16 17 14 24 9 8 9 17 10 17 141
Market
total
186 208 164 242 128 102 124 203 146 203 1706
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Figure 8-11
QUESTION 2 SCORE AVERAGES
FR GER IT UK B-LUX SCAN SP+P EUR JAP USA Total
factor
average
Factor 1 2.16 2.38 2.14 2.90 2.26 2.57 1.71 2.52 2.80 2.04 2.35
Factor 2 2.91 2.73 2.48 3.34 2.59 2.85 2.40 3.00 3.38 3.63 2.93
Factor 3 2.15 2.17 2.26 2.46 2.33 2.33 2.08 2.39 2.47 2.76 2.34
Factor 4 2.25 2.09 2.00 2.50 1.92 2.27 1.86 2.19 2.67 2.95 2.27
Factor 5 1.95 2.52 2.20 2.82 2.50 2.77 2.31 2.52 3.61 2.78 2.60
Factor 6 1.86 2.14 2.06 3.36 2.21 2.56 1.92 2.18 3.17 2.79 2.42
Factor 7 1.60 1.77 1.56 2.04 1.87 1.91 1.53 1.75 2.53 2.63 1.92
Factor 8 1.84 2.09 1.88 2.32 2.15 2.36 1.75 2.17 3.59 2.48 2.26




2.09 2.21 2.02 2.70 2.20 2.43 1.91 2.32 3.05 2.72 2.37
Analysis by factors
The following graph shows the average scores obtained by each factor, as taken from the 
table above.
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Figure 8-12
AVERAGE SCORES BY FACTOR FOR QUESTION 2
Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
H Factor average score
As can be seen from the graph, the vast majority of the scores were clustered around the 
average of 2.37. On a scale where 1 is ‘no concepts have yet become established’ and 5 is 
‘concepts are fully established’, this indicates that, according to the perceptions of the 
respondents, implementation still has a long way to go before it is fully complete for any of 
the factors. This fully mirrors comments collected throughout the fieldwork concerning the 
embryonic state of much lean distribution implementation.
The top division of factors from Question 1 also scored around the highest in this question, 
indicating that they are not just being perceived of as part of lean distribution, they are also 
considered to be implemented as such. The factor with the highest score here is Factor 2, 
which again suggests that putting in place the integrated computer-based communications 
and ordering systems is, compared to some of the other factors, a relatively easy task. This 
would reflect many of the comments which emerged during the interview phase concerning 
the difference between ‘back-office’ and ‘front-office’ activities. Factors 5 and 1 also 
score highly here which again, given the developments outlined in other areas of the 
fieldwork, is to be expected.
Factor 6 ranked third in this question, one place higher than in Question 1. This may 
reflect the fact that the rationalisation of dealer networks is fairly well advanced in many
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markets, whether respondents consider it to be a part of lean distribution or not. Factors 3 
and 4 scored slightly lower, although were higher up the ranking than in Question 1. This 
again suggests that both factors are being implemented in the markets in question, whether 
they are thought to be central to the notion of lean distribution or not.
Factors 8 and 9 on the other hand were ranked lower down, suggesting that, whilst 
respondents did think that they were important parts of lean distribution, they thought that 
their implementation was either more complicated than the theory or something that will 
only become established in the longer term. Finally, Factor 7 scored lowest here, as it did 
in Question 1, suggesting that it is neither thought of as important to lean distribution, nor 
is it considered to be widely implemented within the industry. This marks an area where 
research findings diverge from the expectations voiced in the literature, much of which 
heralds the fixed-price selling component of the Saturn example from the USA as a model 
for the rest of the industry to follow.6
Analysis by markets
The following graph shows the average scores obtained by each market, again taken from 
the averages table.
6 See section 3-3-6-1
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Figure 8-13
AVERAGE SCORES BY MARKET FOR QUESTION 2
■ Country average score
The results here show Japan leading the way in perceived implementation of all the factors 
taken together, and by quite a margin from the USA and the UK. This is an interesting 
result; Japan is considered to be the birthplace of lean production, but at the same time 
their car market is highly complex, with many distribution channels and even door-to-door 
selling, in other words, many potential obstacles to the implementation of wholesale 
change. Nevertheless, it was rated highest by the survey respondents. If the responses for 
Japan are broken down by factor, they appear as follows.
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Figure 8-14












These show a high score for Factor 5 and, to a lesser extent, Factor 6, which both reflect 
attempts by the domestic manufacturers to rationalise and to improve the efficiency of their 
(sometimes multiple) distribution channels. What is particularly interesting however, and 
the major contributing factors to Japan’s first place in the ranking, are the high scores for 
Factors 8 and 9, the two marketing-based factors which have been demonstrated to be 
among the most difficult to implement. Calculations show that these factors are relatively 
more important in Japan than in all the markets taken together (at a 5% significance level). 
Plausible reasons for this could include be the moves underway to end the expensive door- 
to-door selling activities and replace them with a more efficient form of customer contact, 
and also the high level of interaction between car owner and dealer staff in Japan due to the 
very strict periodic inspection and the subsequent short ownership cycles; the customers 
buy cars more often. Again, it would be interesting to see how these features of the 
Japanese market evolve over the next few years. One respondent backed this point up with 
the comment:
"The most important aspect o f lean distribution in Japan is that it 
would enable manufacturers to remove some o f their different 
distribution channels (Toyota has five channels) and dealers to be less 
subject to territorial restrictions. Restrictions over sales channels and 
territorial restrictions prevent sales activities from being lean in 
Japan. "
Survey respondent
CHAPTER 8 PAGE 265
The USA was ranked in second place by the survey respondents, which was to be expected 
given that much discussion of the implementation of lean distribution employs examples 
from the US market. However, it is again worth breaking this market down by factors, as 
doing so reveals the following.
Figure 8-15
QUESTION 2 RESPONSES FOR THE USA











The USA scores well on all of the factors (and particularly well on Factor 2) with the 
exception of Factor 1. Calculations show that Factor 1 is relatively less important in the 
USA than in all the markets taken together (at a 5% significance level). This suggests that 
perceived implementation is taking place for all the other concepts faster than it is for 
supply and stocking systems. This would reflect the fact that the market retains a ‘stock- 
push’ character, with large outlets serving their populations from large amounts of on-site 
stock, and customers quite accustomed to being able to take their new purchase home with 
them immediately. The large distances involved in supplying the market means that 
fundamental change in this area will not be easy to achieve in the short term.
The UK, ranked by respondents just behind the USA, also scores fairly evenly across all of 
the factors. Factor 6 has the highest average score of perceived implementation, which 
reflects efforts to rethink territorial coverage undertaken by many franchises in the market, 
as well as the strategies of some of the larger dealer groups, including the setting up of 
‘hubs and satellites’ structures within a territory.
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The Scandinavian region was ranked by respondents in fourth place, which is possibly 
higher than was expected. One possible explanation lies in the low volumes of cars sold in 
these markets and the relatively small dealer networks concentrated in the (few) major 
population centres; the smaller scale of operations means fewer obstacles and less cultural 
inertia to the implementation of new ideas, which are thus perceived to have been achieved 
faster. This region has also been the subject of attempts by several manufacturers to 
coordinate some activities (such as national distributor representation) at the transnational 
(or regional) level so as to avoid duplication of efforts and staff for relatively few sales. As 
has been illustrated elsewhere in the fieldwork, many of these factors have the potential to 
be administered from another level than the purely national.
Of the remaining markets, the lowest perceived implementation levels were scored in the 
southern European markets, Spain, Portugal, Italy and France. The reasons for this are 
again most probably due to the environmental characteristics of the markets in question; 
large territories with a few major centres and otherwise dispersed populations, tiers of sub­
dealers and agents selling few cars and operating far removed from the manufacturer’s 
influence and histories of trade barriers against imported cars (especially Japanese) which 
mean that many foreign makes are still catching up in terms of getting their dealer networks 
closer to their intended strategies. Together, these environmental complications make the 
implementation of new ideas and different working practices difficult, and also mean that 
many more chain actors need to be convinced of the value of the changes before they can 
gain a critical momentum.
A couple of these markets also reveal some interesting results when broken down by factor. 
The following table displays the factor scores for France.
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Figure 8-16












Calculations here reveal a particularly high score for Factor 4 (2.25), which is relatively 
more important in France than in the other markets taken together (at a 5% significance 
level). This is particularly interesting since the fragmentation of retailing into different 
selling formats was not rated as being central to perceptions of lean distribution in 
Question 1. One reason for this relatively high level of perceived implementation could be 
the growth in France of mandataires, resellers of cars who operate outside the dealer 
system and who source cars for individual customer orders, usually from any nearby 
market which may be cheaper than France. Although not perceived as being particularly 
central to lean distribution in Question 1, respondents nevertheless thought that different 
retailing formats were a particular feature of the French market.
Finally, the following table displays the factor results for Italy.
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Figure 8-17












Calculations here show that the perceived implementation of Factor 3 (ranked second) is 
relatively more important in Italy than in the other markets taken together (at a 5% 
significance level). However, Factor 3, which has to do with the reduction in specification 
variants, was not ranked highly as being important to perceptions of lean distribution. 
Again, some explanations could be provided here from the market environment: Italy only 
has one domestic volume manufacturer (albeit one which produces a number of different 
brands), and this company has been engaged in reducing the number of variants it offers of 
each model. Furthermore, Italy has a tradition of complicated and onerous tax laws, which 
manufacturers try to circumvent by producing ‘tax-break specials’, or models with different 
combinations of engines and equipment from the normal range offered in the rest of Europe 
so that they might fit into a lower tax banding. Many manufacturers have complained 
about the extra expense involved in producing such specification variants to meet tax 
regimes all over Europe, but the problem has been particularly marked in Italy, hence this 
is reflected in the score obtained here; respondents are obviously relatively confident that 
this situation is improving in Italy.
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8-3 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has presented the construction, data analysis and results of the postal survey 
examining the car industry’s perceptions of the theory and implementation of lean 
distribution.
It tested nine factors which had emerged from the other sections of the fieldwork 
programme as being central to the theme. Respondents rated these factors in terms of their 
centrality to how they perceived lean distribution and then of their implementation across a 
selection often market regions.
The results revealed the lean distribution factors to be divided into three divisions of 
importance, with the most important relating to supply and stocking systems, the 
achievement of integrated com m unications systems for vehicle ordering, customer 
information and chain interaction, and the establishment of closer working partnerships 
between manufacturers and retailers. The results also revealed a wide variance in 
perceived levels of implementation across the selection of markets, with the most advanced 
markets being Japan, the USA and the UK.
These results will be discussed further in the next chapter, which draws the research 
conclusions, and also in Chapter 10, which discussed some of the wider implications of 
change in this area of the industry.
CHAPTER 9 PAGE 270
CHAPTER 9
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
"This is not an innocent age. The car is now one o f the mature 
products o f Western civilisation and deserves no mercy from  
consumers. It doesn't matter that cars all look similar, for ultimately 
they will he killed by two things: uselessness and boredom. First, 
political apathy about traffic volume will ultimately cause massive 
disaffection among exactly the people the car was created to liberate. 
Second, boredom among consumers tired o f the complacency o f  
manufacturers who persist in doing exactly the same old thing, season 
in, season out, will have us all on bicycles."
Stephen Bayley, Car Magazine, December 1995
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9-1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter uses the research findings presented in the preceding chapters to answer the 
three research questions outlined in Chapter 4. It examines each question in turn and 
considers whether the hypotheses were confirmed or rejected by the course of the fieldwork 
which followed.
9-2 REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS
9-2-1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1
It is hypothesised that it will be possible to pick out, to observe and to 
categorise evolutions and new developments in: 
•  distribution chain structures and relationships across the European 
market;
•  industry perceptions o f  and attitudes towards the post-factory sector 
which correspond to the philosophies expressed in the literature on 
lean production and distribution, taking into account the context o f the 
(still imperfect) Single European Market in cars.
This question was specifically intended to guide the concept exploration and model 
development section of the research, which encompassed the pilot dealer surveys and the 
two interview programmes. As such, the material collected proved to be more than 
adequate for the purposes of conducting this task.
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As is illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, despite the many different types of respondent 
encountered during the research, a large amount of material was collected relating to the 
evolution of distribution chain structures and relationships across the European market, and 
also to general industry perceptions of the future prospects for the sector. This material 
served to frame the nine lean distribution factors submitted for testing in the final survey 
phase of the research, and also backed up the survey’s findings relating to differences in 
perception of lean distribution and in implementation of distribution chain developments 
across the European market.
For instance, in the whole supply and stocking and physical distribution area (Factors 1 to 
3), the overwhelming impression from both the interview programmes and the case studies 
was one of a mindset change underway in the European industry in favour of the adoption 
of order-pull distribution systems, integrated chain communications and reduced 
specification differences between markets.1 However, whilst many companies subscribed 
wholeheartedly to the principle of these developments, their perception proved to be less 
than fully uniform and their implementation less than complete for a number of reasons, 
which included differences in size and scope between wholly-owned and independent 
National Sales Companies, differing perceptions of the Single Market environment, and 
differing dealer attitudes towards their franchise and relationships with their manufacturer.2 
Nevertheless, examples such as Rover3 demonstrate that companies are changing their 
distribution structures within the context of a ‘lean’ philosophy, which in their case has 
permeated not only their ordering and physical distribution, logistics and IT activities, but 
also right back to the production planning stage in their recognition of the need to design 
new car models to be ‘distribution-friendly’.4
As well as learning how the industry perceived developments such as these, these areas of 
the research also gained an understanding of some of the practical problems in their 
implementation. For instance, Rover commented that the changeover to a built-to-order 
system would make the company highly vulnerable in the event of the most popular models 
not being available within the timeframe to which customers had become accustomed, and 
also that there would still be occasions, such as old model run-outs and new model 
introductions, when it would still be desirable for the manufacturer to be able to force cars 
down the distribution chain to the dealers.5 For these reasons, and others such as the time
1 See Sections 6-2-1 to 6-2-4
2 Which usually vary according to how well their particular franchise is performing in the marketplace 
- see Section 6-3-10
3 See Section 7-2-2
4 See Section 7-2-7-1
5 See Section 7-2-4
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needed to weed stocks out of the system, the need to train staff at the different levels and to 
overcome cultural inertia within the organisation, the costs of introducing new computer- 
based systems at central, National Sales Company and dealer levels, the need to deal with 
both cars and spare parts, and the need to accommodate differing national legal 
requirements and consumer tastes into product specifications, it quickly became apparent 
that, whilst all these changes were occurring, the complete ‘lean’ system cannot be put in 
place overnight, and that progress would vary both between markets and between different 
departments within different companies.6
The same was true of dealer network management and marketing; research in these areas 
both gathered the opinions of the industry towards current trends and possible future 
developments, and also investigated the example of a company (Daewoo UK) which has 
started with a fresh sheet of paper and set out to implement many of the ideas linked with 
the emerging concept of lean distribution, such as closer relationships with retailers and 
new approaches to territorial coverage, marketing and customer treatment, all based on the 
notion that their distribution system is as much a source of potential competitive advantage 
as their cars. Again, the research discovered that implementing new approaches such these 
is far from problem-free; in Daewoo’s case the cost so far has been enormous,8 and 
questions have also been raised over matters such as service control and trade-ins,9 and also 
that all elements of the system cannot be set up, or judged, overnight. Nevertheless, the 
attention being paid to the Daewoo ‘experiment’ by the rest of the industry demonstrates 
how important these developments are currently felt to be.
By grouping all this material thematically, and reviewing it in the light both of the literature 
and also of the two parallel case studies conducted, it was possible to distil all the findings 
down into nine closely-related but distinct factors. These were postulated for testing in the 
final survey as being the ingredients of a lean distribution system. The result was the list of 
factors given again below.
Such as the ‘back office’ - ‘front office’ split - see Sections 6-3-2-1 and 6-3-2-2. See also Sections
6-2-2-2, 6-2-3 and 6-2-4
See Sections 6-3 and 6-4
See Section 7-3-6-4
See Section 7-3-7-1
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Figure 9~1
LEAN DISTRIBUTION FACTORS
FACTOR 1 Having the physical distribution chain and production planning driven by 
sold customer order pull, and not by stock push
FACTOR2 Having integrated computer systems which unite retailers, manufacturers 
and suppliers and which enable two-way order and information exchanges
FACTOR3 Reducing the number of model variants and specification differences
FACTOR 4 The fragmentation of car retailing into a multiplicity of different 
approaches to meet the needs of different regions and vehicle types
FACTOR 5 Establishing closer relationships between manufacturers and retail partners
FACTOR6 The rethinking of territorial coverage including market area approaches 
involving fewer individual main dealers and the dispersal of dealership 
activities according to local needs
FACTOR 7 The establishment of fixed-price selling
FACTOR 8 Having a less confrontational selling style and different reward structures 
for customer-facing sales and service staff
FACTOR9 Conducting less outlet-level marketing and more customer retention and 
order generation campaigns with a national or regional focus
Given the high frequency with which these factors occurred in discussions during the two 
interview programmes, it was considered that the task set out in the first research question 
had been sufficiently well conducted to put the emerging factors forward for further testing 
in the final postal survey.
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9-2-2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2
It is expected that perceptions of the lean distribution paradigm and 
rankings o f these key areas in terms o f their perceived importance to 
the paradigm will display a significant degree o f variation across a 
sample o f the car industry. As it is predicted above10 that lean 
distribution will constitute a variety o f  distribution chain 
developments,11 so it is hypothesised here that the industry itself will 
assign differing priorities to each o f them.
There were strong indications, both in the literature12 and in the interview material which 
gave rise to the list of factors, that this research question could also be successfully 
answered, that a measurably significant degree of variation would be observable in 
perceptions of lean distribution across a sample of industry respondents, but it was unclear 
in advance of the final survey what the outcome would actually be.
This part of the research question was affirmed when statistical analysis of the survey 
results found significant levels of variance between the scores for the different factors.13 
Further analysis of the actual scores obtained by each factor revealed three clear divisions 
in the industry’s perceptions of lean distribution, as the following table summarises.
Research Question 1
Expressed in this research as the ‘factors’ of lean distribution
See, for example, Sections 3-2-2 and 3-3-5
See Figure 8-2
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Figure 9-2
THREE DIVISIONS OF LEAN DISTRIBUTION FACTORS
DIVISION 1 FACTOR 1 Having the physical distribution chain and production planning driven 
by sold customer order pull, and not by stock push
FACTOR 2 Having integrated computer systems which unite retailers, 
manufacturers and suppliers and which enable two-way order and 
information exchanges
FACTOR 5 Establishing closer relationships between manufacturers and retail 
partners
DIVISION 2 FACTOR 6 The rethinking o f  territorial coverage including market area approaches 
involving fewer individual main dealers and the dispersal o f dealership 
activities according to local needs
FACTOR 8 Having a less confrontational selling style and different reward 
structures for customer-facing sales and service staff
FACTOR 9 Conducting less outlet-level marketing and more customer retention 
and order generation campaigns with a national or regional focus
DIVISION 3 FACTOR 3 Reducing the number o f  model variants and specification differences
FACTOR 4 The fragmentation o f  car retailing into a multiplicity o f different 
approaches to meet the needs o f different regions and vehicle types
FACTOR 7 The establishment o f fixed-price selling
By ranking these 'factors ’ o f  lean distribution relative to each other 
according to how central to the notion o f lean distribution the industry 
perceives them to be, it will be possible to define the key elements o f  
what the industry feels to constitute lean distribution.
The factors in the first division shown above were thus those considered by the industry to 
be most central to the notion of lean distribution, and those in the third division the least. 
Thus it is possible to affirm the second part of the question; this table represents a ranking 
of the key ingredients of lean distribution, in their order of importance, as rated by a wide- 
ranging sample of the car industry.
Furthermore, even the factors at the bottom of the list were considered not to be a part of 
lean distribution by only a small proportion of respondents,14 meaning that all these
See Figure 8-4
CHAPTER 9 PAGE 277
categorisations were considered, in their own ways, to be features of lean distribution.
9-2-3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3
It is hypothesised that the industry will perceive that current and future 
implementation o f these categorisations is and will not continue to be 
uniform across European, or even global, markets. As a result o f their 
local needs and conditions, certain markets will be more advanced and 
face an easier task than others in the implementation of both the 
overall notion o f lean distribution and o f these categorisations 
individually.
Again, there were strong expectations from the rest of the fieldwork that the lean 
distribution survey would report a wide variation in implementation of these factors across 
the selection of markets, and this did indeed turn out to be the case.
Unfortunately, as is detailed in Section 8-2-4-1, the data collected in this part of the final 
survey was not sufficient in its volume or completeness to pass the two-way ANOVA test 
of variance. Consequently, it was not possible to confirm or deny this research question to 
as rigorous a degree as had been hoped. Nevertheless, the data was more than adequate for 
further one-way ANOVA tests to be conducted looking at the interactions between the 
responses by factor and by market, both of which contributed valuable results directly 
relevant to the research question; very much the ‘next best’ outcome.
Significant levels of difference were detected in the results in both the factor and the 
market dimensions. From this it was possible to draw up rankings of perceived 
implementation by factor and by market, as the following tables from the material 
presented in Chapter 8 show.
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Figure 9-3





Factor 2 2.93 Having integrated computer systems which unite retailers, 
manufacturers and suppliers and which enable two-way order and 
information exchanges
Factor 5 2.60 Establishing closer relationships between manufacturers and retail 
partners
Factor 6 2.42 The rethinking of territorial coverage including market area 
approaches involving fewer individual main dealers and the dispersal 
of dealership activities according to local needs
Factor 1 2.35 Having the physical distribution chain and production planning 
driven by sold customer order pull, and not by stock push
Factor 3 2.34 Reducing the number of model variants and specification differences
Factor 4 2.27 The fragmentation of car retailing into a multiplicity of different 
approaches to meet the needs of different regions and vehicle types
Factor 8 2.26 Having a less confrontational selling style and different reward 
structures for customer-facing sales and service staff
Factor 9 2.20 Conducting less outlet-level marketing and more customer retention 
and order generation campaigns with a national or regional focus
Factor 7 1.92 The establishment of fixed-price selling
Total 2.36
From the factor analysis results, it is possible to conclude that there were differences in 
perceived implementation between the factors, which could then be ranked as above. 
Comparisons could then be made between the rankings of the factors in this question and 
the rankings already obtained in the first research question.
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Figure 9-4











Iberia (Sp + P) 1.91
Total 2.37
The results from the market analysis showed that perceived implementation of all the 
factors taken together was higher in some markets than in others. It was thus possible to 
rank the markets as above. Some possible environmental explanations were put forward in 
the discussion in Chapter 8.
As was detailed earlier, these findings were backed up by the evidence gathered during the 
interview and case study phases of the research. These showed that the implementation of 
change is dependent on a whole range of factors such as:
• The state of development of the relevant supranational, national, or even regional 
market, including specific customer tastes and preferences, the structure of the car 
retailing sector (such as the number of dealer groups or the extent of multifranchising) 
and of vehicle sales (such as the proportion of new car sales going to company fleets).15
• The legislative and institutional framework that impacts on the industry at both a 
national and a pan-European level. One example discussed during the interview 
programmes was the continued lack of a single currency across the European market16 
providing an obstacle to more distribution chain activities being conducted at a regional 
or pan-European level. A further discussion of the legislative framework follows in
15 For example, see Sections 6-2-5 and 6-3-5
16 See Section 6-3-2-5
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Section 9-2-5 below, and in Chapter 10.
• The present structure of a company’s production and distribution chain across the 
European, and even global markets. This includes the location of production facilities, 
for example the problems faced by some Japanese and Korean makes in trying to 
integrate a distribution chain when the cars are produced in their home markets and are
1 7subject to long sea transit times, the establishment of pan-European ‘coordination 
centres’ and the rethinking of regional structures,18 and the ability or otherwise of 
companies to ‘start from scratch’ in introducing a new system to a particular market, 
according to the history of their presence there.19
All these factors may lead companies to adopt a tailored approach to introducing 
distribution system change, including prioritising certain activities and certain markets,20 
involving specialist partners in some activities it may no longer be efficient for the 
company to conduct itself,21 or even treating different areas within a market very
77differently (such as urban and rural regions).
Overall then, notwithstanding the failure of the first statistical test mentioned above, it is 
possible to affirm the propositions of this research question, namely that the 
implementation of these lean distribution factors is not perceived of as uniform across the 
selection of markets by the sample of industry respondents. Some markets are ahead of 
others in terms of perceived overall implementation, and the individual factors are being 
prioritised differently in the different markets. Some likely reasons for this have been 
discussed both here and in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
See Section 6-3-2-3
See Section 6-3-1-2
The research has postulated that it is easier for companies such as Daewoo, with no history of 
involvement in a market, to introduce a more radical approach to car distribution than it would be for 
a more established player. However, the costs of not calling on the assistance of the established 
national infrastructure are likely to be much higher than for a more ‘traditional’ approach. See 
Sections 6-3-2-3 and 7-3
See, for example, Sections 6-2-7, 6-3-2-4 and 7-2 
See Section 6-3-3-2 
See Section 6-3-8
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9-2-4 REASSESSING THE LEAN PARADIGM
Overall, this research has confirmed many of the predictions made in the academic 
literature concerning the spread of ‘lean’ thinking to the post-factory area of the industry.23 
However, at the same time, it has also added a great deal of detail and richness to the 
somewhat sketchy definitions of lean distribution contained in the key texts, particularly 
“The Machine that Changed the World’ (Womack. J.. Jones. D. and Roos. P .. 1990)24 
which, for the most part, were written before the phenomenon became truly established.
It has shown that the fundamental objectives of lean production, increased productivity, 
quality and flexibility (Womack. J.. Jones, D. and Roos. P .. 1990)25 have, as predicted, 
been carried over into the lean distribution paradigm, and has also confirmed that the key 
concepts in lean distribution are a focus on the value-adding activities throughout the 
distribution chain (Jones. P.. 1995) and a chain that will increasingly be driven by the 
customer rather than by the manufacturer (Womack. J. and Jones. P.. 1996). But as far as 
the actual ingredients of lean distribution are concerned, this research has shown that, in 
the perception of the industry, these extend beyond just that of creating customer-driven 
supply and stocking systems, which was the dominant factor in the literature.26 Because of 
the highly interconnected nature of the sector, other related areas such as product 
specifications, dealer territory planning and selling and marketing styles will all also be 
affected or required to evolve as part of the development of lean distribution.
This research has also added an insight into the implementation of lean distribution that has 
thus far been largely lacking from the literature.27 It has shown that the implementation of 
change involving the activities highlighted as the ‘Factors’ of lean distribution will be 
neither straightforward nor uniform across the European market not just because of the 
interplay of general ‘globalising’ and ‘localising’ market forces as mentioned in the 
literature (Colchester. N. and Buchan. P.. 1990; Calori, R. and Lawrence, P., 1991; 
Hiinerberg. R.. Heise. G. and Hoffineister. M.. 1995), but also because of the specific 
histories, characteristics and situations of the chain actors concerned (manufacturers, 
national sales companies, dealers, etc.). This will lead to a phased and customised 
implementation of lean distribution across the European market rather than the more
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uniform change that some predicted would follow from the movement towards a Single 
Market in cars (Commission of the European Communities/Ludvigsen Associates. 1988; 
Ouelch. J.. Buzzell. R. and Salama. E.. 1990; Bellenger. L.. 1986(a)). This point is 
discussed further in the following section.
9-2-5 THE PROBLEMATICAL NATURE OF THE 
EUROPEAN MARKET
To judge by the scores obtained in the final survey, and also considering the findings from 
the pilot survey and interview phases of the fieldwork, it appears that the real impact of the 
implementation of these lean distribution concepts has yet to be fully felt in more than a 
few of the franchise networks in the European market.
All this evidence also points back to the literature review, and to the first research question, 
which emphasised that the backdrop of continued attempts to create a Single European 
Market in cars is a highly significant mediating influence on sectoral developments. It is 
clear that the introduction of structural change in a distribution chain, whether it is aimed at 
the Euro-headquarters, national distributor or dealer level, and whether it is local, national 
or transnational in scope, will not result in uniform strategies across Europe for any one 
manufacturer, nor will it result in uniform situations in any one market.28 Certain 
structures and activities, and particularly those involving what we have termed ’back office' 
logistical skill, will be pan-European for some manufacturers, but others, in particular the 
'front office' activities involving a direct customer interface could usefully be even more 
differentiated than they are at present. This would suggest that common European best 
practice will only be possible in selected areas, with others requiring a more differentiated 
approach. For instance, in terms of the partnership between manufacturers and retailers, 
the interview programmes reported numerous sectoral developments and options that 
contribute to this notion of a multiplicity of approaches; a different approach to dealing in 
rural as opposed to urban areas, dual franchise dealerships for remote areas, multifranchise 
operations providing out-of-town convenience but urban exposure for makes (particularly 
the smaller ones) in areas where land is scarce or expensive, hubs and satellites to achieve 
coverage within a larger territory, or a growth in branch outlets in strategically visible
28 See Section 2-3-4
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locations. All these particular cases require different treatment and support on the part of 
the manufacturer or national distributor; no matter how difficult, this is support which the 
latter must give if they are to maintain their networks. What also emerged from the 
fieldwork was a tendency for manufacturers to concentrate their strategic energies on the 
markets they consider to be most critical or valuable, targeting them to receive any major 
changes first, and leaving the less important markets to be upgraded at a later stage.
Evidence of the existence of this two-speed approach suggests an interesting paradox with 
regard to the European market; was a difference in treatment for large and small, central 
and peripheral, important and less important markets really an expected outcome of the 
Single European Market programme? The ideology behind the European Union's attempts 
to liberalise the internal market, as outlined in Chapter 2, was to create equality of 
opportunity for all Member States and all consumers to achieve greater economic well­
being and competitiveness for all. This does not tally with a situation whereby companies 
maintain different facilities for different markets. Indeed, a parallel can be drawn here 
with the progress being made towards European Monetary Union, which is itself evolving 
along two-speed regional lines, with the first Member States to commit themselves fully to 
a single currency making up a relatively homogenous central core of countries, with the 
others being left to follow suit at a later point. This two-, or indeed, multi-speed approach 
does appear to be a reality for the car industry in its attempts to introduce distribution chain 
change across the European market, showing that pragmatic solutions do not always quite 
match up to the idealistic expectations of the proponents of the Single European Market.
It does appear that the Single Market in cars in Europe, particularly as far as the strategic 
development of its post-factory area is concerned, is developing along a comparable path to 
that reported in the literature as having been followed by the manufacturing side of the 
industry at a global level (Womack. J., Jones. D. and Roos. P .. 1990; Ohmae. K.. 1985; 
Calori. R. and Lawrence. P.. 1991).31 In the early days of internationalisation in the 
industry, the move was one towards pure globalisation, with manufacturers exploiting the 
economies of scale of their domestic mass production facilities to export to other markets. 
Indeed, this is a path which some manufacturers still follow to this day. In a way, this 
tallies with many of the predictions made for the large internal market in Europe, which 
were based around the efficiency benefits and potentially lower final prices that could 
follow from pure economies of scale.
Just as contemporary manufacturing theory and practice in the car industry has moved
29 See Section 6-3
30 See Section 2-4
31 See Section 2-2
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away from globalisation towards a more tailored, localised approach, albeit in accordance 
with an overall strategic plan and with clearly-defined mechanisms for sharing between 
regions, so this appears to be the scenario that is also emerging for the post-factory area 
of the industry in Europe. Specific approaches will be adopted to fulfil to market needs at 
as local a level in the chain as is deemed either appropriate or viable; this will be combined 
with a more concerted and more informed (thanks to lean distribution) overview of the 
European market from manufacturer headquarters and with a definite means of harnessing 
and diffusing best practice as conducted by whichever partner in the chain.
"Whichever market you look at, they are all different, which is a pain 
in the neck fo r the manufacturing people",
Distribution strategies manager, global volume
manufacturer
Traditionally, this tailored approach has been associated with the rationalisation of the
more unproductive structures, and this was what was predicted for the car industry
following the completion of the Single Market. The advent of truly open competition 
would increase the competitive pressure on the most inefficient manufacturers, prompting 
some of them to seek alliances with other companies and others to fold.33 It was also 
predicted that manufacturers would move to abolish the national distributor layer of the 
distribution chain, to conduct sales and marketing operations centrally for the whole of the 
European market, and to continue to reduce the size of their dealer networks.34 This 
research has shown that none of these predictions have turned out to be particularly 
accurate, that some form of national level in the distribution chain will be needed for the 
foreseeable future, and that the retention of as full a dealer network as possible is an 
important factor in keeping the vehicles, parts and after-sales areas of the manufacturers’ 
and dealers’ businesses flowing. In other words, rather than the overall chain
rationalisations that had been predicted, what has emerged has instead been a process of 
optimisation through the leaning of various activities within the distribution chain. As far 
as the overall number of manufacturers present in the European marketplace is concerned; 
this has actually increased rather than declined over the last few years,35 although the 
pressure on the least efficient manufacturers will increase again come the next market 
downturn or the advent of a still greater degree of transparency and comparability thanks to 




Mainly due to the arrival of the Korean makes
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However, from the perspective of the totality of attempts to create a Single Market which 
has helped to frame this research, it is important to remember that the ultimate influence of 
the European legislative framework on the shape of the industry is very difficult to 
quantify. It is thus hard to ascertain whether a sectoral development could be attributed as 
a direct consequence of the workings of the Single Market programme, or whether it would 
have occurred anyway as a result of global competitive pressures facing the industry. For 
instance, the emergence of the global manufacturing system depicted in the literature36 was 
only partly due to the flexibility of the lean production system enabling short, tailored 
production runs to be conducted efficiently; it was also motivated by political 
considerations, particularly on the part of the Japanese manufacturers who established 
assembly facilities in Europe partly to circumvent tariff barriers against their products. The 
question remains as to whether, had these trade barriers or more recently the threat of their 
renewal not existed, the Japanese manufacturers would have moved so quickly to build 
factories in Europe. Similarly, had the European Commission not moved to replace the 
remaining national quotas and VERs against Japanese imports with a Europe-wide 
arrangement as part of opening up the Internal Market, it is doubtful that the Japanese 
manufacturers would have been able to move into the European market so fast.37 It can be 
concluded that both factors, and the interaction between them, played their parts: global 
manufacturing logic suggested that a base on the European continent was a competitive 
necessity, and at the same time the fear of being shut out of the trading area and the 
replacement of the national trade barriers with a pan-European arrangement acted as an 
extra spur to hurry the process along. One interview respondent thought that
"the Single European Market has been helpful as part o f  the 
competitive environment, but it has not been the most dominant 
pressure on the industry; this has been and will continue to be the 
competition from the Japanese manufacturers; "
Pilot interview with policy director of UK trade 
federation
Similarly, the question that can be posed is whether, if the Single European Market, 
including a common currency, etc. had already been completed, the post-factory area of the 
European car industry would have continued to develop along the lines that have been
<3Q
suggested. For example, on the topic of specification variations, it is impossible to 
measure exactly to what extent national or regional specifications do need to differ to take 
account of local tastes and requirements, to what extent the differences are being sustained
36 See Section 2-2
37 See Section 2-5-2
38 See Sections 2-5-1 and 3-3-3 of the literature and Section 6-2-4 of the fieldwork
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by the continued lack of a single fiscal regime across Europe, or to what extent they are the 
result of deliberate manufacturer product and pricing policies to maintain market 
fragmentation. Questions like these are impossible to answer for certain and, as far as this 
research is concerned, it can be concluded that the developments observed and tested in the 
fieldwork have emerged in response to the continued reality of a European market still 
diverse in both its legislation and its people, and not as part of any grand scheme intended 
to operate in a truly liberalised internal market. Nevertheless, the facilitating role played by 
the European Commission’s efforts to free up the market should not be underestimated; had 
the Single Market programme not existed, it is highly unlikely that many of the 
developments in distribution chain activities observed during the fieldwork would have 
occurred as rapidly as they have. In other words, the legislative measures adopted over the 
last few years to open up the internal market in cars do indeed seem to have had the effect 
of accelerating the rate of change in the sector. The ability and willingness of companies to 
introduce change will necessarily be a function of their perception of the suitability of the 
trading environment.39
9-2-6 AN ENDURING ISSUE ...
Finally, many fieldwork respondents commented that the need for an efficient and effective 
distribution chain is not a new phenomenon; indeed, as the following quotation illustrates, 
some of the earliest industry leaders were acutely aware of the competitive necessity of 
satisfying their customers.
"The only foundation o f real business is service. A manufacturer is not 
through with his customer when a sale is completed; he has then only 
started with his customer. In the case o f an automobile, the sale o f the 
machine is only something in the nature o f an introduction. I f  the 
machine does not give service, then it is better for the manufacturer if  
he never had the introduction, for he will have the worst o f all 
advertisements - a dissatisfied customer.,r4°
Many of them were also convinced that this critical concern for the functioning of the
This point was precisely the one which emerged from the third research question - see Section 9-2-3 
Henry Ford, quoted in "Ford in Europe", corporate brochure
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distribution chain is not a matter of short term interest maintained out of a desire by all 
chain actors to make extra profit wherever possible, but genuinely an essential part of 
market competitiveness.
"Distribution will be the major differentiator for the manufacturers; it 
will be even more important in the year 2000 than it is now."
Chief Executive, UK trade federation
9-3 CONCLUSION
This chapter has returned to the three central hypotheses of the research, which were first 
framed in Chapter 4, and has concluded that, on the basis of the fieldwork conducted 
throughout the research project, it is possible to confirm all three of them. It has also 
debated the findings briefly against the established wisdom of the ‘lean’ paradigm as 
summarised in the literature review and also within the context of continued moves to 
create a Single European Market in cars.
The fieldwork programme has discovered a European industry conceptualising and 
implementing changes to their distribution systems which can be considered to constitute 
lean distribution, or at least steps towards the ultimate goal of putting in place a fully lean 
component supply - manufacturing - assembly - distribution chain.
However, this willingness to embrace the lean paradigm will only be part of the 
competitive armoury that all within the industry will require to meet the challenges that 
will face the sector in the future. As was mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, voices from all 
spectrums of European society are starting to call for a fundamental re-evaluation of the 
role of the motor car (and in particular those powered by internal combustion engines) 
within the overall transport system. The final chapter discusses in more depth some of 
these issues, which are themselves starting to have a considerable impact on company 
thinking, and thus ultimately on future manufacturing and post-factory chain strategies.
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CHAPTER 10
RESEARCH REVIEW AND 
FUTURE SCENARIOS
"The car has been through crises before. There have been oil crises 
from time to time ... there have been financial crises ... there have been 
safety crises and emissions crises ... and now we have a crisis o f  faith, 
in which people who forget how much they owe to the car dwell on how 
much they have given up for the car. They have not the vision to see 
how the car might and should evolve; instead they are ready to prey 
fo r  those who pretend to hasten the evolutionary process."
LJK Setright, Car Magazine, September 1995
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10-1 INTRODUCTION
This final chapter puts forward an assessment of the preceding research and discusses a 
number of related avenues for future research based around the likely future evolution of 
the post-factory chain of the car industry both in Europe and further afield.
It is divided into three sections; the first reviews briefly this research, considering its 
strengths and weaknesses and the extent to which its findings may be applicable to other 
situations. The second section moves on to propose some suggestions and modifications 
which could be incorporated into further research conducted within the same frames of 
reference as employed here. Finally, the third section looks at the wider picture of 
influences currently or imminently impacting on the sector, and explains how there are 
many areas in need of detailed exploration, areas which are set to grow in importance both 
for the manufacturers and for the users of cars. Whilst this research has shown that there 
are areas where manufacturers, national distributors or dealers can make immediate 
contributions towards the optimisation of the current distribution system, it has also turned 
up indications that far more far-reaching and fundamental changes will sweep through the 
sector, changes which will need to be evaluated both by academics and by the industry 
itself.
10-2 RESEARCH REVIEW
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, there is no single clear-cut conclusion to be 
drawn regarding either the evolution of the car industry distribution chain or the 
continuation of the process of European integration, but rather a myriad of scenarios and 
caveats relating to different actors and different markets. For instance, far from easing the 
task of companies trading internationally, the Single European Market appears to have 
thrown up a considerable number of complications to be overcome both by domestic and 
by outside companies. Certain developments can have both simplifying and complicating
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effects at the same time. For instance, the relaxing of border controls has removed many 
obstacles to shipping products across the Union, but at the same time it has contributed to 
the re-emergence of socio-cultural regions cutting across national boundaries, which 
complicates the marketing task. What is certain is that the Single Market has not resulted 
in a lowering of standards and preferences so that every country matches a lowest common 
denominator. The diversity and cultural embedment of the car market will ensure that this 
will not be the case. This research has illustrated that the companies that will have reached 
full competitiveness in this difficult arena (through the introduction of some or all of the 
agreed range of ingredients which go to make up lean distribution) will certainly be able to 
consider themselves well armed to venture onto, or in some cases, to re-enter, the world 
stage.
Simply predicting a future of fragmentation and diversity may be seen as a simple route to 
take, and yet, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, it is precisely this fragmentation 
which is somewhat surprising in the context both of the car industry and of the European 
market with their expectations of standardisation and homogenisation. However, the 
strength of this work lies in its exploration of the emerging concept of lean distribution and 
the elaboration of a list of key ingredients which may be applied, albeit in different ways, in 
this fragmented sector.
However, despite the data produced by the lean distribution survey, it is worth reflecting on 
the predominantly qualitative nature of the research design, and particularly the potential 
for errors or bias to creep in. For instance, there is the possibility that only the most 
progressive or research-friendly chain actors responded any of the three surveys, thus 
introducing a degree of bias into the results. Similar concerns could be voiced regarding 
the interview sections of the fieldwork; to what extent were the interview respondents 
telling the truth? Were they expressing their true opinions, or merely the public relations 
'face' of their company? Do the respondents actually fully understand all of the issues on 
which they were questioned? It is salutary to note that virtually none of the manufacturer 
or national distributor representatives interviewed actually had any recent experience of 
buying a car, and so were ill-equipped to actually understand the point of view of the 
consumer. One ICDP sponsor commented on his recent purchase of a car for his daughter;
"I hadn't realised the reality o f buying a car, it was an awful 
experience. "
Managing Director, publicly-owned dealer group, UK
As was detailed in Chapter 5, it is not possible to remove completely these and other
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concerns from any research plan, and thus the research tactics employed inevitably revolve 
around ’damage limitation'. It can reasonably be expected that the status of the ICDP and 
the high level of interviewees reached will together have helped to reduce some of these 
potential inaccuracies. On the one hand, the respondents were aware that the project had 
already amassed a large knowledge base, meaning that any blatant public relations rhetoric 
would be relatively easy to spot, and on the other, a high level executive would be unlikely 
to be prepared to devote two hours of his time or more to each interview unless he was 
prepared to have a meaningful discussion of the actual issues which concerned him. 
Further methods here included the use of as wide a range of different sources as possible, 
so as to achieve triangulation of the findings. Background information was gathered from 
open and private documentary sources, and also from other areas of primary research 
conducted as part of ICDP. Furthermore, a wide range of fieldwork respondents was 
selected, thus enabling perspectives from the whole spectrum of the distribution chain to be 
gathered. Together, this not only enabled a synthesis from both ends of the chain to be 
constructed, it also provided a background against which any surprising or potentially 
dubious information could be judged. The calibre of the respondents and the strongly 
grounded character of the research design and fieldwork questioning were judged to be 
more than adequate to enable a credible and worthwhile portrayal of the sector to be made. 
The results were then fully tested against a far larger sample of high-level respondents in 
the lean distribution survey, and the outcome found to be entirely complementary with the 
rest of the research. Again, the process of presenting the research findings back to the 
participant organisations and others at meetings and workshops acted as a complementary 
feedback loop which would also enable inaccurate findings to be highlighted.
One further concept to be addressed in any research assessment is its transferability, and 
again, this potential is limited in research of this nature by the overriding role played by the 
specific context within which the research is based (Lincoln. Y. and Guba. E., 1985). The 
fieldwork picked up upon established industry opinion that the UK sector is more mature 
and therefore more advanced than the rest of Europe (and behind Japan and the USA) in 
the implementation of the lean distribution concepts, but discovered that this does not 
necessarily mean that all the other continental European markets will develop in exactly the 
same fashion due to their specific situations. This does not, however, mean that it would 
be immediately possible to draw firm comparisons between these markets and other 
regions not included in the study, such as South-East Asia or Latin America. Whilst the 
same basic procedures could be followed in another research project to analyse the post­
factory distribution chains of the car industry in these regions, the specific lines of 
questioning would have to be adapted to reflect both the very different environmental 
backgrounds present in each market and also the local availability of material.
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For instance, looking at the dealer sector, it seems that certain characteristics of the UK 
market, such as the decline of indigenous manufacturing, the arrival of new makes from 
overseas and the ready availability of capital were all factors behind the growth of dealer 
groups over the last couple of decades; many of which developed from selling cars 
produced by the many small UK manufacturers to selling those of the new foreign arrivals 
once the British firms had been amalgamated into others or had died out. A completely 
different combination of the factors at play might come to light to explain the development, 
say, of the dealer sector in Italy or Spain, let alone in America or in Japan. Whilst, as has 
been identified during this research, many of these sectoral influences are global in nature, 
the different market structures and environments of each region will ensure that the 
influences are likely to be felt and responded to in different ways in each one. This is not 
to say that the research as it was conducted here could not be repeated elsewhere, but 
merely that it must be stressed that the specific contextual backgrounds of the markets or 
regions under examination will play a major role in shaping the finer details of such a 
research design. If this research were repeated in the same markets, even using exactly the 
same respondents, it is highly likely that a different conclusion could be reached simply 
because of the rate at which thinking within the industry is advancing. For instance, 
developments such as the provision of information concerning a car or a dealer and the 
possibility to conduct the purchase via the Internet were considered as 'pie-in-the-sky' as 
recently as when this research started, and yet are now taken for granted, certainly in the 
US market. As shall be discussed later in this chapter, the implications of this and other 
developments on the manufacturer-consumer relationship will be profound, and as such 
warrant being researched in their own right.
10-3 FURTHER RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
WITHIN THE SAME FRAMEWORK
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the most immediate suggestions for 
improvements to this research revolve around a wider exploration of lean distribution. An 
expanded survey would, given a bigger volume of returned questionnaires, enable a more 
detailed quantitative analysis of the material to be conducted, and would hopefully provide
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a wealth of additional material. Similarly, a wider sample of interview respondents would 
enable a fuller and more assured picture of their different roles within the European market 
to be drawn up. Again, this sample would need to be tackled in at least as much detail as 
that employed in this research if the variety of experiences and expectations were to be 
fully captured. As the implementation of lean distribution is still some way from being 
complete in any of the markets investigated, a repeat survey could usefully be conducted in 
a couple of years’ time to gauge the extent to which both perceptions of the concept and its 
implementation have evolved.
One further immediate suggestion related to building upon this particular research would 
involve an expansion or modification of its case study element. Given that the task of 
examining the distribution chains of every manufacturer present in the European market 
would be a mammoth one, a practical solution is to select a few specific cases for detailed 
investigation, as was the case here with Rover and Daewoo. A future study could usefully 
expand on the volume, specialist and non-domestic categories employed in this research by 
looking in detail at a selection of manufacturers or distribution chains from each category. 
In a situation where producer approaches to the European market appear to be fragmenting 
according to manufacturer and market as opposed to converging, such a research design 
would be well-placed to capture and illustrate this diversity, along with an examination of 
the environmental and sectoral forces at play to differing extents in these various 
categories. From this, it might be possible to draw up a forward timetable for the 
introduction of change within the sector, and along with it an assessment of which types of 
producer will find which kinds of change easiest to push through or to come to terms with.
Moving on to look at further research ideas which could be spun out of the topics covered 
in the preceding chapters, it is immediately clear that there exist a vast number of areas 
which could support valuable and fruitful research, such is the rich nature of the car 
industry and the competitive stakes of its post-factory area. The following discussion 
serves merely to highlight a few examples, and to illustrate that research could be 
conducted anywhere along the scale from the broad European, or even global perspective 
of, say, a manufacturer, right down to the local level environment of, say, an individual 
dealer.
For instance, one European-level area of investigation might be the extent to which nation 
state boundaries are indeed being replaced by more regional structures within the Union. 
This research identified instances where certain distribution chain activities have the 
potential to be more efficiently conducted on a regional basis across several markets; 
further research might seek to establish whether this is an emerging trend across several
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manufacturers or areas, or whether there are further activities where the 'back office - front 
office' split might apply, or where different rates of change may be appropriate for different 
activities, different companies or different market areas. As this research has stressed on 
many occasions, there are many links in the distribution chain between producer and 
consumer. The many challenges that will face the industry in the future, including mature 
markets, overcrowded roads and the need for new technology to reduce the environmental 
impact of the production and use of cars will together mean that a consideration of this 
entire manufacturer - retailer - consumer system can only grow in importance.
All this points to the fact that the consumer/dealer end of the industry is and will continue 
to constitute a rich seam to be mined in future research. The issues at stake are not only 
interesting and valuable in their own right, they are also of crucial competitive importance 
to the manufacturers (and indeed to the rest of the industry) who will value all well- 
researched contributions to an understanding of the sector and of its likely future evolution. 
Despite the pragmatic, cautious and often pessimistic public faces of the manufacturers, it 
is safe to assume that, because of the competitive stakes at play, privately they cannot 
afford not to consider any number of reasonably formulated scenarios for the future 
evolution of the sector.
"The fact is that vehicles will always require servicing, there are a lot 
o f safety, and environmental considerations related to them as well, so 
you will always have to have that provision, and the other element is 
the part-exchange consideration. We would tend to see things in terms 
o f evolutionary change, how many dealers we would require, what 
would be the objectives fo r these dealers to achieve - all these factors 
may evolve over time into different numbers o f  dealerships, but we 
would not see anything radical at this point. "
Marketing director, global volume manufacturer
There is great potential for immediate research to be conducted into the medium-term 
prospects for the franchised dealer system and into the consumer relationship to this 
system. Again, this research detected a certain fragmentation of selling approaches, 
possibly involving exclusive dealerships for high-price specialist and big-selling volume 
makes (at least in their more successful markets) only, and a differentiated approach for 
urban and rural areas, possibly with manufacturer-owned and multifranchise sites in the 
former and independent single and dual sites in the latter, each backed up by a tailored 
marketing and business support package. All the issues that are tied up with this, including 
aspects of group ownership of dealerships, territorial decisions such as the creation of
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larger market areas covered by a hubs and satellites system and the prospects for branch 
outlets or other retailing formats are all worthy of more detailed investigation than was 
possible in this research. The same is true of the customer relationship to the system; areas 
of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the current system, willingness to travel to buy a car 
or have it repaired or maintained, preparedness to wait for delivery and desires concerning 
financial and servicing packages are just some of the many aspects which require 
consideration.
All of these above-mentioned aspects will be thrown into even sharper relief according to 
the outcome of the next review of the European Commission's Block Exemption 
legislation, for which the process of consideration has already begun.1 Research into the 
future shape of the regulatory environment for the supply of cars should, in some senses, 
take precedence over all the other areas as they will all be conditioned by any changes 
which are introduced here.
"The Block Exemption in Europe is a strange requirement, an artificial 
imposition on a system o f operation that existed in this form anyway. 
It was put in place out o f the suspicion that consumers were being 
excluded from the profits being made out o f the system by 
manufacturers and dealers; everybody in the industry knows that, 
given the profitability o f new cars and the money invested in service, 
this is patently untrue. The legislation is only there because o f this 
suspicion. ”
Dealer planning director, global volume manufacturer
Another crucial area of influence at the European level are the moves towards the 
achievement of Economic and Monetary Union; many aspects of this programme will have 
profound implications for the operation of production and distribution chains both within 
the ‘first wave’ of participating markets and in the rest from both a practical and an 
economic point of view.2 Research in this area should be an urgent priority for the industry 
and its commentators.
A further suggestion would be a re-examination of the external trade aspects of the Single 
Market, and in particular the possible consequences for the industry of the ending of the
1 See Section 2-5-3
2 For instance, from a practical perspective, accounting systems and billing procedures will be affected
for all companies trading internationally, whether their market is part of the single currency or not. 
From an economic point of view, manufacturers will be obliged to review their pricing policies for 
the entire European market, which has knock-on effects for the running of the whole production and 
distribution system.
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‘Elements of Consensus’ agreement with Japan in 1999, when all restrictions on imports of 
Japanese cars will theoretically be lifted. Will these makes respond with true pan- 
European models and pricing strategies, and what implications would this have for 
distribution chain structures? How will the indigenous manufacturers need to respond? 
All these issues have been neglected by the industry for some time now, and a further 
investigation would be very timely.
Of course, the industry is now a global one, and this makes a whole raft of regional 
comparisons possible. The usual comparisons conducted are between the European, 
Japanese and American ways of doing things, although as we have seen these are far from 
straightforward given the individual characteristics and histories of each regional market. 
Perhaps the most interesting regions for study, though, would be the rapidly-expanding 
markets of the world; under this heading could be included Eastern Europe, including the 
issue of how these markets might be integrated with their West European neighbours 
(especially in the event of an enlargement of the European Union), Latin America, China 
and especially the so-called 'tiger economies' of South-East Asia. Given enormous market 
potentials and a relative lack of cultural obstacles to rapid change apparent in the more 
mature markets, it will be particularly interesting to study the extent to which new lean 
distribution concepts will or could be adopted in such markets, or whether the European, 
American or Japanese experiences (and some of their inherent shortcomings) will simply 
be exported to or copied in emerging markets.
"Because o f its maturity, Europe is not the market where the biggest 
investments will be made by the manufacturers in the future. These 
will come instead in the rapidly-growing markets o f the Asia-Pacific 
region and elsewhere. "
Chairman, manufacturer-owned National Distributor
Any of the above-mentioned topics would, because of their interlinkages within a crucial 
area for the future of the industry, make a highly interesting and valuable research project. 
Most could also be conducted without any fundamental modification to the frames of 
reference which defined this research. However, as the next section of this chapter 
discusses, certain fundamental environmental developments look set to 'shift the goalposts' 
of the industry, and therefore also of the research conducted into it.
3 See Section 2-5-2
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10-4 LOOKING AT THE BIGGER PICTURE
This research has concentrated on the post-factory area of the European car industry, and in 
particular the structural and strategic linkages between customer, dealer and manufacturer, 
the regulatory structure of the European market and the influence of specific global sectoral 
factors, chief among them the rise of lean production and distribution techniques. 
However, all the ideas which have emerged from the research relate to ways of optimising 
the dealer-manufacturer relationship under the currently-dominant car-trading paradigm. If 
one takes a step back and examines the wider industry context, it becomes clear that several 
imminent environmental developments will together not only call this relationship between 
users and producers of cars into question, but will also determine both the way the market 
operates in the future, and also our attitude to cars and personal mobility in general. 
Therefore, these developments will need to be, and indeed are currently being very closely 
monitored both within and outside the industry. This section puts forward some scenarios 
for the future, and highlights several potential areas for further research relating firstly to 
the external environment of the car industry and market, and then to the likely 
consequences for the product and for the consumer interface.
10-4-1 A SHIFTING EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the key influences on the industry over the next few years 
will be the further growth of environmental concerns and legislation, and the related 
'socialisation' process of the car within its crowded, mature markets.
Environmental legislation has already had a significant effect on changing the nature of the 
car that we drive over the last 20 years; indeed, just within the European Union, the 
Environmental Policy area is widely viewed as one of the Commission's most significant 
successes and is certainly one of its more active areas.4
"A new car today emits 93% less Carbon Dioxide and 85% less
4 For example, see the catalytic converter debate in section 2-5-1
CHAPTER 10 PAGE 298
hydrocarbons plus NOx than an equivalent vehicle in 1970. "5
As the quotation illustrates, advances in technology and materials have meant that the 
levels of pollution emitted by internal combustion vehicles have been cut dramatically, and 
manufacturers are actively applying a myriad of new or revived technical solutions to 
improving efficiency still further. In this sense, the product appears to be going through 
what could be termed its second childhood (Culture Technique. 1992).
However, this is far from the end of the matter. With the continued growth in the vehicle 
pare, air quality and emissions legislation related to vehicles has to become progressively 
tougher if overall targets are to be met. At the same time, environmental pressure groups 
and others continue (sometimes accurately, sometimes inaccurately) to highlight the 
damage being done to the planet by the use of the car. For instance, the OECD has 
estimated that the environmental damage of motor vehicles accounts for between 1 and 2% 
of the GDP of the developed nations of the world,6 and the European Commission that 
vehicles in Europe release 19 million tonnes of CO and 4 million tonnes of oxides of
n
Nitrogen into the atmosphere each year. Any further significant toughening of standards 
would however, hit the limit of what is thought possible with the current family of petrol 
and diesel powered engines; ultimately, much lower- or even zero-emissions vehicles will 
be necessary. The lead here has already been set in California, which passed state 
legislation requiring 2% of the 1998 model year offerings of the 7 largest sellers in the 
market (Chiysler, Ford, General Motors, Toyota, Nissan, Honda and Mazda) to be ZEVs.8 
This figure is to rise to 10% by 2003, when all other manufacturers selling in California 
(which means the Europeans amongst others) will be included. This law has provoked 
fierce opposition from the manufacturers since the day it was passed 5 years ago. They 
have maintained that the battery technology of the ZEVs was not sufficiently advanced, and 
also that the consumers would not want to purchase a slow electric car with a limited range 
when they could have a normal one instead. They considered it unfair that the state was 
trying to force 7 manufacturers to compete, using inadequate technology, in a new market 
segment that would not support more than 2 or 3 competing brands. Just recently, it seems 
that their complaints have been upheld, with a state-commissioned technological audit 
likely to conclude that battery and electrical transmission technology will not be 
sufficiently advanced for ZEVs to be brought to market until 2001 at the earliest.9 Despite 
the apparent victory for the manufacturers that a postponement of the legislation would
5 Jean-Pierre Reynier, secretary general of ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers' Association), 
quoted in the Financial Times, 15/03/1995
6 OECD. 1988: “Transport and the Environment”, Paris
7 Commission of the European Communities in the Official Journal, Cl 3 8,1993
8 Zero Emissions Vehicles
9 Financial Times, 20/11/1995
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constitute, what is certain is that this issue is not about to go away, and that the race is very 
much on amongst the world's manufacturers to develop lower- and zero-emissions engines 
using whichever power sources are most appropriate, and it is only a matter of time before 
such stringent legislation becomes the norm in all the developed markets of the world.
These various options for engine designs and new power sources, ranging from radically 
different petrol-burning to electric to hybrid arrangements all need to be evaluated by those 
concerned from a number of different standpoints. Current European legislation 
concentrates on the 'exhaust pipe' emissions, CO, HC and NOx, at the cost of actual engine 
efficiency, but in the future it could equally target C02 outputs via a 'carbon tax', which 
would force engines to become even more fuel-efficient, so both of these factors will be 
significant (ACEA, 1995). Then there is the overall 'environmental cost' of the particular 
solution; legislating for the introduction of electric cars would simply shift the emissions 
problem to the power stations generating the extra electricity needed unless they too are 
'clean' sources. Similarly, new materials employed to make the car more 'environmentally- 
friendly' may actually do more harm than good if they are either in scarce supply, costly to 
produce in financial and energy terms, or difficult to recover and recycle. Such is the case 
with the current generation of platinum-based exhaust catalysts, and also with some of the 
experimental types of battery. Finally, the consumer and social angles need to be included; 
will the technical solution meet their needs in terms of power, range and convenience? If 
not, can they be persuaded to use it anyway? Will the power source be safe to use (both 
every day and, say, in an accident), easy to replenish and cheap to maintain and to dispose 
of? How much new infrastructure will be needed to serve these consumers and support the 
products? Currently, many suggested technologies, and especially batteries, score badly on 
all these points. All these are issues that are currently taxing the brains of the industry and 
the regulators, and which look set to be debated for a long time to come. All of them, too, 
look set to have significant implications for the future development of distribution chain 
structures and activities.
Many of these developments would have significant implications for the future shape of the 
car distribution chain: for example, manufacturers may choose to move towards a closer, 
more direct relationship with consumers who would more than likely be leasing the new 
generation of vehicles; dealers may need to invest in new battery charging and testing 
infrastructure, and would have to strike up new supplier relationships; users may be obliged 
to alter their vehicle usage patterns and their relationship with their garage. Whether these 
developments would conflict with, or be complementary to the emergence of lean 
production and distribution systems remains to be seen, although much of the evidence of 
this research would suggest the latter; namely that a lean system would help chain actors to
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be more flexible to the changing demands of the market.
The other line of attack for legislators with environmental targets in mind is to seek to 
manage car usage; this is an area potentially even more sensitive than the environmental 
one mentioned above. Faced with impending major route saturation and urban gridlock in 
areas of all the developed markets, public perception is increasingly coming to the 
conclusion that space on our roads will simply run out if the growth of car usage is not 
checked (and similarly that there will be no green fields left if many more roads are built). 
Some form of road pricing, probably conducted electronically, is seen as an inevitability in 
Europe by early in the next century, but the task of implementing it is hardly one that will 
win votes for the governments concerned. The car manufacturers, given their contribution 
to the economy (and their often poor economic performance), constitute a very strong 
lobby; generations of consumers and the modem urban areas that serve them (out of town 
shopping centres for example) have grown up around the principle of freedom of 
movement and private, individual transport; and virtually all the freight transported in any 
Western economy makes at least part of its journey by road. So, whilst everybody hates 
being stuck in a traffic jam, nobody would be happy to see their individual right to own and 
use a car restricted, and for a country to do so would be to risk economic suicide.
Just as with the environmental pressures, finding a way to reconcile car usage with its 
surroundings involves adopting a more holistic view and examining its role within the 
context of the entire transport system. This means that public and private modes of 
transport should not be considered as alternatives at opposite ends of a scale, but should be 
considered together. So, attempts to manage the road use problem should revolve around 
ensuring that the existing infrastructure is put to the most efficient use possible, something 
which is patently not the case in most developed countries where new roads are built only 
to be jammed solid for four hours each day. Part of this means providing users with 
adequate information about congestion levels, parking availability, etc. which may 
influence their journey decisions, but the biggest contribution would come from ensuring 
that the different transport modes, both personal and collective, that go to make up the 
transport system complement each other efficiently and effectively. Whether it is train and 
lorry for a freight container, car, train and taxi for a business person or car and park-and- 
ride bus for a shopper, a growing proportion of even the most mundane journeys are, by 
definition, multi-modal, and as such it is essential that all these different modes be 
considered together and not in isolation as is currently the case. Currently, the average car 
occupancy in the urban areas of Europe is 1.2 people per vehicle,10 which clearly is far 
from efficient; improving matters may involve a range of solutions, such as a pool of hire
Mercedes-Benz / Swatch 'Smart' car publicity
CHAPTER 10 PAGE 301
cars to be shared for commuting purposes, which would all contribute to making a better 
use of the road space.
Again, the opportunities and threats for manufacturers, dealers and others in the current 
distribution chain, will be significant. Dealers may find opportunities to branch out into 
new service activities such as travel ticketing or taxi operations; equally, they may find 
their traditional activities coming under increasing threat from a whole range of new 
service providers as the number of private customers actually buying cars declines still 
further. It is clear that transport policy developments will definitely act as a spur to the 
further evolution of the car distribution sector in many European markets over the years 
ahead.
The sense of urgency for the industry, its commentators and those charged with formulating 
legislation to come up with workable solutions to these and other issues is illustrated by the 
ever more radical scenarios being put forward by pressure groups and other lobbies, 
particularly those of an environmental persuasion. For instance, in the UK, the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution recently published an extremely wide-ranging 
report on the environmental impact of the transport system, and included some highly 
controversial targets and recommendations, a summary of which are listed below.
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Figure 10-1
TARGETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION11
TARGETS RECOMMENDATIONS
Increase the proportion of journeys by public transport 
(in total passenger miles) from 12% in 1993 to 20% by 
2005 and 30% by 2020
Increase fuel duty year-by-year so as to double the real price of fuel by 
2005, and base the annual vehicle excise duty on the fuel efficiency of 
the car
Increase the proportion of freight transported by rail 
from 6.5% in 1993 to 10% by 2000 and 20% by 2010
Reduce planned spending on motorways and major roads to half its 
present level
Increase the fuel efficiency of new cars by 40% 
between 1990 and 2005
Introduce tougher emissions tests as part of the MoT test, which should 
become compulsory after one year of the vehicle's life as opposed to the 
current three
Cut the proportion of journeys in London using cars 
from 50% in 1994 to 35% by 2020
Reduce road tax for vehicles which already meet the more stringent 
pollution standards to be introduced in the next few years
Raise urban bicycle use fourfold by 2000 Ban sales of super-unleaded petrol because of its high content of 
reputedly cancer-causing benzene
Achieve full compliance with the World Health 
Organisation air-quality guidelines by 2005
Define severe government pollution limits, as well as temporary traffic- 
curbing measures for occasions when they are exceeded
Reduce road and rail noise Introduce stronger protection for cherished landscapes and wildlife sites 
from road-building
Increase the proportion of scrapped vehicles which is 
recycled or reused from 77% in 1994 to 95% by 2015
Enforce speed limits more strictly and fit speed govemers to lorries 
restricting them to 56mph
Freeze Carbon Dioxide emissions at their 1990 level by 
2000 and reduce them by 20% by 2020
Give bigger subsidies to railways and tramway schemes
Modify a Channel Tunnel - Scotland rail route to be able to carry 
standard freight containers
Give government grants to local authorities to create a network of urban 
cycling routes
Provide incentives to bus companies to switch their vehicles to natural 
gas
Give government support for the development of electric vehicles
Give noise insulation grants to people exposed to noise levels lower than 
those that now qualify
See Car Magazine, January 1995, and the Financial Times and the Independent, 27/10/1994. Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, Eighteenth Report, Transport and the Environment, 
HMSO
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Some quarters of the industry reacted very strongly to some of these suggestions, which 
they reckoned to be impossible, but the key point is that the car industry, rightly or 
wrongly, is now very much in the firing line concerning both its environmental and its 
social role. Scenarios and suggestions such as the above can only get more common right 
across Europe in the years ahead. There will therefore be a constant need in the years 
ahead for a significant body of well-grounded research to be conducted into all these areas, 
research which can accurately inform both the industry and the legislators. In a highly 
public forum, the task will be to cut through the rhetoric and the media hysteria to achieve 
a balanced view of these far-reaching matters.
10-4-2 A NEW WAVE OF PRODUCT INNOVATION
As has been mentioned above, parallel developments will mean that the actual nature of the 
product looks set to change somewhat. Public perceptions are starting to revolt against the 
idiocy, not to mention the waste, of sitting in a traffic jam each day with thousands of 
others all driving 2-ton cars with 150bhp internal combustion engines and sports-car 
handling. Whilst manufacturers have traditionally dismissed electric cars, claiming that, 
until the technology has been honed over at least two or three product generations, 
consumers will not want to drive a vehicle so dynamically inferior to their petrol-burning 
models, it seems to be precisely in these polluted, congested areas where small zero- 
emissions vehicles can, with the push of legislation behind them, come into their own. 
Experiments are already underway into pooled resources of electric cars in urban areas that 
would be available for users to hire for their trip to and from work.
This would tally with the notion, outlined in Chapter 1, that the traditional means of 
segmenting the car market according to size and engine capacity is becoming increasingly 
outmoded, and that cars will instead be categorised according to the use to which they will 
be put (Calori, R. and Lawrence, P., 1991). In a mature market situation, consumers are 
more likely to have more than one car at their disposal, and so will use different cars for 
different purposes. Thus, in the future, an electric car may be the norm for the daily 
commute to work, with a larger vehicle used for longer trips or for weekends. There would 
be significant consequences from this development for both product planners and 
marketers, and these are areas which could well be investigated. One argument could be
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that cars will not need to be so highly specified as they are at the moment, at least not in 
certain segments such as the commuting cars outlined above.
"We do not need to produce automobiles that are liked by Auto Motor 
und Sport and the other magazines. Buyers will not be prepared to pay  
more fo r technical superfluity."
Chairman, manufacturer-owned National Distributor
This would have implications for the marketing of the product, which under the scenario of 
usage segmentation and an integrated transport system would risk becoming more 
utilitarian, or even commodity-like. Manufacturers or their dealers could reply by offering 
a more individually customised product, particularly in the case of the 'weekend' car, with 
features, styling items, colours, etc. decided by each consumer. Such a system would be 
made possible thanks to the flexibility of full lean production and distribution, but would in 
turn render the current marketing system based around fixed model specifications, 
lifecycles and facelifts, more or less obsolete. This situation might play into the hands of 
the European manufacturers, who have recently been demonstrating an increased 
willingness to innovate in both the product and in its distribution and marketing, something 
which must be due in no small amount to the status the car still occupies in the 
consciousness of the European people.
"In America, cars are sold largely on price, whereas in Europe, 
emotion is still the key. Otherwise, the only cars on sale would be VW 
Golf Diesels and Mercedes E-200Ds, both in black or grey only."
Sales company director, European specialist 
manufacturer
Whilst these all constitute possible avenues for future evolution that could be explored, 
what is certain now is that the trend for cars to require less and less servicing will continue 
as technologies become more refined, no matter how the actual model ranges turn out. For 
instance, General Motors is now introducing gearboxes which are sealed for life, and which 
thus never need an oil change, and Ford has helped to develop platinum-tipped spark plugs 
good for 100,000 miles. With cars being more reliable, manufacturers and dealers can 
predict the service intervals and points when the car will come back to the network for 
servicing more accurately; if the service plans offered to customers cover the whole life of 
the car, the network will be able to predict more accurately the parts and consumables 
stocks that will be needed, thus enabling the whole parts system to become lean. However, 
whether this will ever be able to compensate for the loss of network income from the fewer
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visits to the dealer that will be needed is debatable. This will inevitably bring with it the 
need for dealer network facilities to be rematched to an evolving set of customer 
requirements, a process which is far from simple, or cheap, for the manufacturers or dealers 
concerned, and may help to further damage the economic viability of the weaker dealers in 
a network.
These two points concerning marketing and servicing needs, along with the environmental, 
social and car use factors mentioned above, all point towards further change in the nature 
of the interface between manufacturer and consumer, namely the post-factory distribution 
chain that has formed the centrepiece of this research. For instance, a reduction in 
'traditional' marketing activities would reduce one of the national distributor's areas of 
operation, possibly with the manufacturer or the dealer instead conducting more direct 
marketing techniques of their own to promote a more 'lifestyle-oriented' product. 
Similarly, a significant loss in service income for unexpected repair work would further 
damage the profitability of the individual franchised dealer if it continues in its current 
guise, and this would cause a knock-on effect for the national distributors in the form of 
lost parts sales. Developments such as these might be sufficient to remove the viability of 
the National Distribution franchise for a small independent operator, thus prompting a 
change of national franchise holding and/or retail site ownership into manufacturer hands.
10-4-3 TOWARDS A NEW MOBILITY SCENARIO
Despite the doom-laden predictions concerning the environmental impact of cars, and also 
despite the changes in life- and work-styles being brought about by the advent of new 
technology, including communications possibilities such as the Internet and home-working, 
it seems that the basic customer desires and requirements for a car, namely a combination 
of the aspirational and the functional within a specific brand image, are still relatively 
constant. What is changing, apart from the increased attention given to the use of the 
vehicle as mentioned above, is the level of expectation regarding the customer service that 
goes with the vehicle.
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"Two key events have marked the last decade: a rise in quality and in 
product choice . . .  customers want to see the same improvements 
introduced across the whole distribution process . "
Representative, European volume manufacturer
With product quality, integrity and reliability being largely taken for granted, and with the 
average customer being far more knowledgeable about the product (thanks both to the 
specific motoring media and to the Internet) than used to be the case, attention has turned 
to the services which surround it, including the quality and convenience of the dealer both 
in terms of buying the car and returning to have it serviced, the financial packages available 
to ease or enable the purchase and the after-sales support including warranties and 
maintenance packages. If needs regarding the product are relatively constant, then needs 
regarding these hitherto peripheral items have become far more important, and also far 
more individual. Customers now expect to have complete transparency and trust (and an 
absence of 'hassle') in their relationship with the dealer, they want to receive exactly the 
combination of specifications that suit them and their needs (formerly a problem; no longer 
so under lean distribution) and they want to have complete predictability of the cost of 
running the car throughout its life. This has been reflected in the significant growth of 
personal leasing plans and other rental-type schemes offered by the dealer networks and by 
others, with the subscribers to such arrangements increasingly moving to pay a fixed 
monthly charge for the complete 'mobility package' which could include the new car, its 
servicing and insurance and an agreed residual value at the end of the contract. It is not 
surprising that such a situation, where the user can acquire the car that suits his or her 
needs and aspirations with few of the traditional burdens of car ownership, is becoming 
increasingly attractive to certain types of consumer. For others however, the psychological 
aspect of actually owning the car that sits outside their window is not one that will be easily 
changed.
Two basic conclusions arise from this discussion, and both would be worthy of further 
investigation, confirmation or rejection. Firstly, a fragmentation of the total product 
offering is occurring, involving more customised production and individually tailored 
purchase or leasing packages. As mentioned earlier, this will have a significant effect on 
the wav marketing and product planning is conducted. Secondly, this development, 
combined with the decline in service income already mentioned, is causing the role of the 
dealer to change from one of a traditional retailer and repairer into one of a mobility service 
provider, matching customers to car and support packages. In conducting this, the dealer 
will in the future be brought into competition with an increasing variety of competitors, 
such as specialist leasing and rental companies and Internet-based 'home-shopping'
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providers. For instance, a convenient way for private owners to sell their cars in the future 
might be for them to be advertised at an Internet used car 'site': a video clip of the car could 
be included, along with security checks and even a link to a preferred financial services 
provider. With used cars also being more reliable, the potential for such a system to 
remove some of the risk from the used car purchase will limit the scope of the traditional 
dealer to add value by reassuring a less knowledgeable customer that they have made the 
right choice. This example goes to show that the number of routes to the consumer is also 
likely to fragment in the future into a myriad of different possibilities.
So, the car is in the process of being reconceptualised not as a product with four wheels, an 
engine and a status-enhancing badge on the back, but as a service, a source of individual 
personal mobility. This trend is not a new one, indeed it can be traced right back to Alfred 
Sloan's introduction of credit facilities at General Motors in the 1920s. Latterly, it has 
evolved as we have seen through the introduction of warranty packages, breakdown 
services and customer courtesy cars at dealers to the current situation, in which the majority 
of new (and nearly-new) private cars are or will soon be acquired through personal leasing 
packages which include lifetime guarantees and maintenance plans, not to mention 
upgrades to the latest model at regular intervals, free insurance and a mobile phone. The 
car will be delivered to the customer's door, and collected for maintenance, repreparation or 
recycling at the end of its life. Gradually, as described above, the burden, both financial 
and psychological, of car ownership is being replaced for those who so desire by a monthly 
direct debit payment in return for 'hassle-free' transportation.
Taking this scenario a little further into the future, consumers would no longer buy a car 
from a dealer, but would instead subscribe to a tailored mobility package from a service 
provider. One point of contact with the provider would remove all the remaining 'hassles' 
such as registration, insurance and repairs present in the current system; instead one outlay 
could possibly secure the use of the product the consumer most needed, be it access to a 
pooled electric car and a charging system for the daily commute or a traditional estate car 
for weekends. Cars could be swapped at short notice to cater for immediate needs, or users 
provided with models with interchangeable bodywork. As part of a total package, such 
service providers could also be expected to supply complete journeys, such as parking 
space and train ticket for commuters, or route information, parking facilities, airline tickets 
and hire car at the destination for a trip abroad.
It is by no means unfeasible that just such a system could develop alongside the traditional 
dealer networks; in the longer term, it could well replace them. The key question for 
dealers is not how they could resist such a challenge, but how they could become part of it,
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as many actors in the current distribution chain would certainly fancy their chances at 
becoming a fully-fledged service provider. Whilst the task may not require many of the 
dealer's traditional skills, it will certainly revolve around a need to know, understand and 
cater for a customer base, and this must be considered as the dealer's trump card. Just as a 
car manufacturer seeking to move into the production of electric vehicles will be obliged to 
become a lean 'process coordinator' assembling the inputs from many suppliers including 
some not previously connected with the industry, so a service provider will also have to 
posses a dealer's selling and repair expertise (although again possibly handling some 
unfamiliar products), and be able to interact with other specialists such as finance houses, 
electricity suppliers, providers of collective transport and travel agents. If dealers or dealer 
groups do not take up the challenge, other candidates to do so could include car rental 
companies, electricity companies or even the manufacturers themselves. Indeed, it is quite 
possible that this process could be instigated by a new arrival in the post-factory sector.
"Those who throw the grenades in are usually the outsiders."
Group planning director, independent National
Distributor (Interview Programme 1)
As mentioned earlier, such a scenario would have profound implications for the overall 
concept of the distribution chain as it has featured throughout this research. For instance, a 
system of pooled 'subscriber vehicles' would require a fundamental rethinking of the 
physical distribution process linking dealer, national distributor and manufacturer, right 
back to the production planning stage. Traditional instruments of chain control enjoyed by 
the manufacturers, such as sales and market penetration targets, would cease to function, as 
would the dealer - manufacturer (via the national distributor under a non-lean system) 
ordering process. It would also need to be decided which level in the chain would be 
legally and financially responsible for the stock of 'pool' cars both whilst they are being 
used and whilst stored.
Similarly, manufacturers would need to reevaluate how their brand image and values were 
represented in the marketplace, especially if the consumer's visit to the dealer forecourt 
became replaced by a periodic telephone call to a multifranchise service provider. It has 
already been suggested that traditional marketing practices may become superceded; if this 
is allied to a reduction in the need for such rigorous outlet network management (dealer 
standards and support), then the usual role of the national distributor may become further 
depleted unless these activities are replaced by new responsibilities. Service providers, 
which may well operate over much larger territories than the current individual dealer, may 
have no need of a national distributor in the traditional sense between them and their
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supplier, as they may be able to take care of all such activities themselves. The debate as to 
whether the manufacturers would be happy to see their control over the marketplace 
removed in this way will be an interesting one; it may be that they will have no alternative 
but to go along with such a scenario if they are to survive. Again, this would raise the 
question of whether a national-level supervisory or liaison structure (if it is needed at all)
would be the most appropriate, or whether sub-national areas or even 'Euro-regions' might
10become the norm in the future.
On another level, the predicted move away from consumers actually having ownership of 
the product could be argued to constitute a rupture of this notion of a 'chain', as the 
psychological tie between user and manufacturer might no longer be as strong in the future 
for those consumers using a variety of vehicles to meet their needs. Manufacturers might 
counter that brand image will always remain as powerful a factor in the consumer's 
selection process as it is currently, but some of the predicted developments for marketing 
or brand image projection through outlets mentioned above indicate that this will be a 
matter for considerable debate in the future.
Whatever the outcome, the 'unbundling - rebundling' process put forward as the defining 
feature of current evolution by this research can be expected to feature strongly in the 
formulation of new strategies and structures for the future (ICDP, 1995 (j) and (k)). 
Equally, it is clear that there will be no single unique strategic or structural model which 
will be followed by the industry in the future, but rather a variety of different approaches 
involving different levels and actors both within and outside the distribution chain as we
1 3know it today. Just as became clear throughout this research, different manufacturers and 
markets will evolve at different speeds, meaning that, in the medium term at least, the 
emergence of all these developments will further complicate the task of those doing 
business across the European car market.
For a discussion of these issues, see Tongue. A. in ICDP. 1995 (j) and (k) 
See section 9-2-5
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10-5 CONCLUSIONS
From the above, it can be seen that there are many challenges which the car industry, and in 
particular its post-factory area will have to face up to in both the medium and long term 
futures, and which therefore warrant investigation by interested parties. Some aspects, 
such as the evolution of the relationship between the user, the provider and the producer of 
the car, could follow on as a natural continuation of the research conducted during this 
project. Others, such as the way the car market might operate in a situation of restricted 
usage or with vehicles running a variety of power sources on the one hand, or the 
implications of these developments on our attitudes towards cars and personal mobility in 
general on the other, might require very different skills or approaches.
Two final propositions arising from the preceding research come to mind here regarding 
the future shape of the industry. Firstly, the task for car manufacturers will be to meet the 
economic, social and environmental challenges of the future, not by maintaining a system 
geared around the needs of the factory, but by putting the user of the product centre-stage. 
To achieve this, they will be obliged to replace fully the factory-push chain with a demand- 
pull system, with the manufacturer redefining its and its distribution chain partners’ roles 
as catering for the desire for personal mobility in whatever form it might take. This will 
also involve overcoming the significant amount of cultural and environmental inertia that 
has been highlighted in this research and the practical short term demands of keeping the 
factory turning14 if this final step along the path towards the goal of a fully lean value 
stream is not to be postponed.
Secondly, the fragmentation of customer requirements and product offerings, combined 
with the achievement of lean production and distribution goals could actually be seen to be 
returning the industry to a new era of craft production. As has been discussed earlier, the 
customer orders that drive supply in a lean system, the flexibility under lean production 
which means that each car coming down the factory line can be different and the potential 
for integrated logistics to allow special edition models to be produced at the distribution 
centre or the dealer together all mean firstly that the car of the future can be customised, 
individual, unique, and secondly that the industry can indeed overcome the conflicting 
forces of standardisation and differentiation that have featured throughout this work. Add 
to this both the introduction of high technology materials and common platforms which
14 And with it the thorny problem of dealing with overcapacity in the industry
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allow easy bodywork changes according to use, the tailored mobility packages specific to 
each consumer requirement, and an agile and responsive distribution system from factory 
gate to consumer (and back again), and arguably the result could be described as an 
industry which is starting to turn full circle, which is throwing off mass production and the 
principles of Fordism and which is returning to the craft system, the assembly of bespoke 
products for individual customers, which gave birth to so many of the great corporate 
names of today.
"It's the very success o f the car that has confronted us with the 
problems. I f  we're to keep a clear conscience about maintaining our 
personal transport, we’ve got to get the problems under control. Over 
the next 20 years, that’s the biggest challenge o f all. ”15
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APPENDIX III
UK RENAULT AND PSA DEALER QUESTIONNAIRE




Please answer the questions by ticking the boxes or adding comments where 
appropriate. Of course, additional comments may be added wherever you think they 
might be relevant! The initial questions are mainly factual in their nature, and the 
latter ones are intended to be more speculative and hypothetical. I hope you find 
them interesting.
1 Is the dealership wholly independent or part o f a dealer group?
a) Independent [ ]
b) Part of a group [ ]
c) Other (please state):









d) Over 50 [ ]
Manufacturers represented:
2 Do you represent any other manufacturers apart from Citroen at the address to
which this survey was sent, and if  so, which ones?
3 Did the dealership choose to represent Citroen at this site, or was the dealership
approached by Citroen?
a) Dealer chose manufacturer [ ]
b) Manufacturer approached dealer [ ]
c) Other (please state):
3.1 I f  you chose to represent Citroen, could you comment briefly on why.
Comments:
4 Does Citroen divide its UK sales territory up into regional groupings of 
dealerships?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
4.1 I f  yes, which grouping are you in? Does this mean that you have links to other
dealers which you would otherwise or previously not have had? Please comment.
Grouping and comments:
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4.2 I f  yes, are these regional groupings a recent development, or have they always
existed?
a) Recent development [ ]
b) Always existed [ ]
Comments:
5 Approximately how many new and used cars do you sell each year? How has the




6 Are any areas of promotional activity (as opposed to the day-to-day running of the 
dealership) left to the initiative of the individual dealership, as opposed to being 





7 Are there any areas o f marketing and promotional activity where you would like to
have more say over the contents of a campaign (such as a launch programme or 





8 Are you free to offer discounts at your own discretion, or is this strictly controlled 
by the manufacturer? I f  you are not free to do this, would you like to be? Please 
comment.
a) Free [ ]
b) Not free [ ]
c) Other (please state):
Comments:
9 Do stipulations concerning marketing and promotional activity emanate from the 
national importing company, or directly from company headquarters in France?
a) From importer [ ]
b) From headquarters [ ]
c) A mixture (please comment):
9.1 I f stipulations come from both sources (answer c) above), has the balance between
the two changed at all in the last few years, and in which direction is the general 
trend: towards the national importer level or the company headquarters level?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
Direction of trend:
10 Does the dealer play a part in determining the service "package” that the buyer 
receives with the purchase of a car, such as warranties, breakdown cover, financial 
services, other forms of'aftercare', etc.?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
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10.1 I f  yes, could you comment on this. For instance, is the dealer free to add or remove 
service features such as these independently? Are the contents o f the car- 
accompanying package determined by the national importing company or by 
company headquarters in France?
Comments:
11 What extra features (if any) would you like to include for your customers if  you 
were able to do so, and what new features (such as recycling arrangements) do you 
think might become a standard part of the "package" in years to come? Please 
comment.
Comments:
12 What other tactics do you employ to enhance the relationship between the
dealership and your customers (such as newsletters, open evenings etc.)? Are 
strategies o f this nature becoming more common, and how do you think this trend 
will evolve? Please comment.
Comments:
13 Would it be true to say that a customer's loyalty to a particular brand of car is
stronger than their loyalty to a specific dealer?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
14 Which national (or international) federations do you belong to (e.g. Retail Motor 
Industry Federation, SMMT, etc.) How long have you been a member?
15 What would be the most important services and facilities that each federation
provides you with (such as information service, lobbying activity, etc.)?
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16 Are you aware of the activities of CECRA, the European dealers federation?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
17 Does a UK dealer have any cause to deal directly with the European federation, 
and if  so, in what instances? Please comment.
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
Comments:
18 Do you think the role o f European-level federations will increase or decline in 
years to come, and why? Please comment.
a) Increase [ ]
b) Decline [ ]
c) Other (please state):
Comments:
19 To what extent is the general day-to-day operation o f the dealership left to the 
dealer's own individual initiative (as opposed to being specified by the 
manufacturer)?
a) Dealer completely autonomous [ ]
b) Dealer has a certain autonomy
within specified guidelines [ ]
c) All aspects specified by the 
manufacturer
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19.1 If you answered b) above, where do such stipulations come from: the national 
importing company, or the manufacturer's headquarters in France?
a) National importer [ ]
b) Headquarters [ ]
c )  A  combination of the two [ ]
19.2 If you answered c) above, could you comment on what sorts o f things are 
determined by each level.
Comments:
19.3 Has the balance between the national importer level and the headquarters level 
changed at all in the last few years, and if  so, could you comment on how?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
Comments:
20 Is it true to say that, in recent years, the manufacturers have been more prepared to 
listen to the concerns and opinions of the dealers than used to be the case?
a) True [ ]
b) Not true [ ]
c )  Other (please state):
21 Given the maturity o f the UK car market, and the subsequent need for 
manufacturers to maintain the loyalty o f their customers, is the relative power and 
influence o f the dealer vis-a-vis the manufacturer set to increase still further, or 
will the manufacturers instead seek to strengthen the control they exert over their 
distribution networks still further?
a) More influence for dealers vis-a-vis
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the manufacturers [ ]
b) More manufacturer control [ ]
c) Other (please state):
21.1 Could this then lead to manufacturers and distributors adopting more o f a 
'partnership' approach in the future?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
22 The European Community's Block Exemption governing the selective distribution o f  
cars is currently being renegotiated. Do you believe that any changes will be 
introduced in the way cars are sold, and if  so, could you comment on what these 
changes might be?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
Comments:
23 From a dealer's perspective, would you like to see the system o f selective 
distribution used in the car industry changed in any way? If so, could you comment 
on how? For instance, would you like to be able to sell several competing makes 
or models under the same roof?
a) Yes [ ]
b) No [ ]
c) Other (please state):
Comments:
24 On a purely subjective basis, do you think the ideal system o f distribution would
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therefore be an exclusive one, a non-exclusive "supermarket-style" one or a mixture 
of the two?
25 Which direction do you think automotive distribution is actually moving in, one o f  
more powerful, independent, dealer groups selling several makes o f car at once, or 
one o f more tightly controlled, perhaps even manufacturer-owned exclusive 
outlets?
And finally...
Can you think of anybody else, either within your organisation or working for Citroen, who 
might be interested and willing to answer a similar set of questions to these (either in the 
form of a questionnaire or an interview)? Any possible contacts which would help me 
further this piece of research would be very much appreciated. Would you be interested in 
answering a further set of questions? Please indicate also if you would like to receive a 








b) Manufacturer-owned outlets [ ]
c) Other (please state):
Thank you for taking the time to fill in this questionnaire.
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APPENDIX IV
FRENCH RENAULT AND PSA DEALER QUESTIONNAIRE
Nom de la concessionnaire: 
Adresse:
Numero de telephone: 
Nom du destinataire:
Veuillez repondre aux questions en cochant les cases at en ajoutant des remarques. 
Bien sur, d’autres annotations peuvent etre inserees n’importe ou sur les feuilles. Les 
premieres questions portent pour la plupart sur des details precis; par contre les 
dernieres sont plus speculatives et hypothetiques. J ’espere que vous les trouverez 
interessantes.
1 Est-ce que votre garage est un agent, une concessionnaire ou une succursale? N.B. 
Dans les autres questions de cette enquete, le terme "concessionnaire" comprend 




d) Autre (veuillez preciser):
2 A qui appartient la concessionnaire?
a) Au constructeur [ ]
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b) A un(e) grand(e) groupe/societe de distribution [ ]
c) A une famille/petite societe [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
3 Combien d'emplacements (salles de vente, ateliers, etc.) dirigez vous? Est-ce que 
vous vendez d'autres marques de voitures neuves a cette adresse ou ailleurs? 
Veuillez preciser lesquelles.
a) 1 [ ]
b) 2-5 t ]
c) 6-10 [ ]
d) 11-50 [ ]
Marques vendues et lieu:
4 Est-ce que le garage a choisi de representer XXX a cette adresse, ou est-ce que le 
garage fut selectionne par le constructeur?
a) Garage a choisi... [ ]
b) Constructeur a selectionne... [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
5 Comment le constructeur divise-t-il son territoire de marche? Dans quel 
decoupage figure la concessionnaire?
Remarques:
6 Est-ce qu'il existe des activites promotionnelles ou de marketing qui sont laissees a 
la seule initiative des concessionnaires, au lieu d'etre specifiees ou dirigees par le 







7 Est-ce qu'il existe des activites promotionnelles ou de marketing sur lesquelles 
vous desireriez avoir plus d'influence que vous exercez actuellement (par exemple, 
publicite locale, programmes de lancement, etc.)?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
Remarques:
8 Est-ce que la concessionnaire est libre de faire des remises sur les voitures neuves 
selon sa propre discretion, ou est-ce que les remises sont dictees par le 
constructeur? Si vous n'etes pas libre de le faire, desireriez vous Vetre?
a) Libre [ ]
b) Pas libre [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
Remarques:
9 Est-ce que la concessionnaire joue un role dans la determination des composants 
de "Vachat total" que le consommateur acquiert avec la voiture, tels que les 
garanties, les services d'assistance en cas de panne, les services financiers et les 
autres elements du service apres-vente?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
10 Quelles autres mesures utilisez vous pour renforcer les liens entre la 
concessionnaire et ses clients (par exemple, bulletins, journees "portes ouvertes", 
etc.) Est-ce que telles strategies deviennent de plus en plus repandues dans ce 
secteur? Comment voyez vous revolution de cette tendance?
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Remarques:
11 Est-ce que la fidelite du client est plus fort envers la marque de la voiture qu'il 
possede qu'envers la concessionnaire ou il Va achetee?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
12 Est-ce que vouz appartenez a des Federations (nationales ou internationales) ou a 
des Groupements des concessionnaires? Lesquels?
13 Quels sont les services principaux qu'offrent ces organismes (renseignements, 
representation, etc.)?
14 Est-ce que vous etes au courant des activites de la CECRA, la federation 
europeenne des concessionnaires?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
15 Esi-ce qu'une concessionnaire franqaise a lieu d'entrer en contact avec la 
federation europeenne, et sous quelles cirConstances?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
Remarques:
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16 Est-ce qu'une concessionnaire possede aujourd'hui plus de controle sur I'operation 
quotidienne de son garage que dans le passe, ou est-ce que les constructeurs 
cherchent par contre a renforcer Vinfluence qu'ils exercent sur leurs reseaux de 
distribution?
a) Concessionnaires ont plus de controle [ ]
b) Concessionnaires ont moins de controle [ ]
c) Pas de changement [ ]
d) Autre (veuillez preciser):
17 Est-ce que les constructeurs font aujourd'hui plus d'attention aux opinions et aux 
soucis de leurs concessionnaires que dans le passe?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
18 Vu la maturite du marche d'automobiles en France, et done le devoir des 
constructeurs de sauvegarder la fidelite de leur clientele, est-ce que la marge de 
manoeuvre et Vinfluence des concessionnaires vis-a-vis de leurs constructeurs sont 
destinees a augmenter davantage dans les annees a venir, ou est-ce que les 
constructeurs vont plutot chercher a renforcer encore le controle qu'ils exercent 
sur leurs reseaux de distribution?
a) Plus d'influence pour les concessionnaires vis-a-vis
les constructeurs [ ]
b) Plus de controle des constructeurs [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
18.1 Cettes eventualites pourraient-elles mener a Vadoption des relations "de 
partenariat" entre les constructeurs et les agents du secteur de la distribution 






c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
19 Le Reglement 123/85 gouvernant la distribution selective des voitures dans I'Union 
Europeenne est en train d'etre renegocie. Croyez-vous que des changements a cette 
legislation seront introduits en 1995, et si oui, lesquels?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
Remarques:
20 De la perspective de la concessionnaire uniquement, souhaiteriez-vous voir des 
changements quelconques dans le systeme de la distribution selective employe dans 
Vindustrie automobile (par exemple, Voccasion de vendre plusieures marques 
rivales a une seule adresse)?
a) Oui [ ]
b) Non [ ]
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
Remarques:
21 Selon votre avis subjectif, resteront les concessionnaires de I'avenir fideles a une 
seule constructeur, ou proposeront-ils plusieures marques de voiture a leur 
clientele?
a) Concessionnaires exclusives [ ]
b) Concessionnaires "multimarques" [
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
22 Quelles seront done les consequences pour I'ensemble des concessionnaires et 
agents en France dans les annees a venir? Vont-ils, par exemple, assister a une 
grande diminution de leur nombre?
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Remarques:
23 Quelle, selon vous, est la direction future de la distribution automobile: un 
ensemble de groupes et d'entreprises de distribution, independants, peut-etre avec 
plus de pouvoir vis-a-vis de leurs constructeurs et peut-etre aussi offrant plusieures 
marques de voiture a la fois, ou une serie de points de vente exclusifs, strictement 
diriges par le constructeur, et peut-etre meme appartenant dans un plus grand 
nombre a ceci?
a) Concessionnaires independantes [ ]
b) Points de vente appartenant aux constructeurs
c) Autre (veuillez preciser):
Et enfin...
Pouvez-vous nommer quelqu'un d'autre, soit au sein de votre entreprise, soit travaillant 
pour le compte de votre constructeur, qui serait peut-etre interesse et dispose a repondre a 
une serie de questions comme celle-ci? Je vous serais tres reconnaisant de tout contact 
eventuel qui pourrait m'aider avec cette recherche. Est-ce que vous seriez vous-meme 
dispose a repondre a une deuxieme serie de questions?
Je vous remercie d'avoir pris le temps de repondre a ce questionnaire.
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APPENDIX V
A SELECTION OF RESPONSES FROM THE UK RENAULT AND 
PSA DEALER QUESTIONNAIRE
UK DEALER OPINION ON NEW AND USED CAR SALES
Is the balance between new and used car sales in your 






Renault dealers 37.5% 37.5%
Citroen dealers 30% 20% 20%
Peugeot dealers 17.6% 23.5% 35.3%
Total 25.7% 25.7% 22.9%
UK DEALER OPINIONS ON MARKETING AND PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITY
Are there any areas o f marketing and promotional activity where 
you would like to have more say over the contents o f a campaign 
(such as a launch programme or local advertising for example)?
Yes No
Renault dealers 37.5% 62.5%
Citroen dealers 50% 50%




Solus dealers 43.8% 56.3%
Dealers with 2-5 sites 47.1% 18.3%
Dealers with 6-10 sites 25% 75%
Dealers with 11-50 sites - 100%
UK AND FRENCH DEALER OPINIONS ON CUSTOMER LOYALTY
Is a customer's loyalty to a particular brand of car stronger 






UK Renault dealers 37.5% 12.5% 37.5%
Citroen dealers 40% 20% 30%
Peugeot dealers 41.2% 41.2% 17.6%
Total 40% 28.6% 25.7%
France Total 42% 42% 17%
UK AND FRENCH DEALER OPINIONS ON SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION (1)
From a dealer's perspective, would you like to see the system 
of Selective Distribution changed in any way?
Yes No
UK Renault dealers 62.5% 37.5%
Citroen dealers 50% 50%
Peugeot dealers 58.8% 41.2%
Total 57.1% 42.9%
France Total 50% 50%
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UK AND FRENCH DEALER OPINIONS ON SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION (2)
Do you think that changes will be introduced as a result 
of the renegotiation of the Block Exemption?
Yes No
UK Renault dealers 50% 50%
Citroen dealers 30% 60%
Peugeot dealers 41.2% 47.1%
Total 40% 51.4%
France Total 42% 58%
UK AND FRENCH DEALER OPINIONS ON THE FUTURE OF INDEPENDENT 
VERSUS BRANCH DEALERSHIPS
Which direction do you think automotive distribution is moving in; 
one of more powerful, independent dealers (and dealer groups), 
possibly selling several makes of car at once, or one of 




UK Renault dealers 37.5% 37.5%
Citroen dealers 70% 20%
Peugeot dealers 76.5% 11.8%
Total 65.7% 20%
France Total 50% 33%
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UK DEALER OPINIONS ON THE NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR / 
HEADQUARTERS POWER BALANCE
Do you perceive any changes in the balance between the National Importer 
level and company headquarters in the last few years?
Yes No
Renault dealers - 62.5%
Citroen dealers 40% 50%
Peugeot dealers 11.8% 47.1%
Total 17.1% 51.4%
UK AND FRENCH DEALER OPINIONS ON MANUFACTURER - DEALER 
COMMUNICATIONS (1)
Is it true to say that, in recent years, the manufacturers have 
been more prepared to listen to the concerns and opinions 
of the dealers than used to be the case?
Yes No
UK Renault dealers 62.5% 25%
Citroen dealers 20% 80%
Peugeot dealers 82.4% 5.9%
Total 60% 31.4%
France Total 33% 66%
Yes No
Solus dealers 37.5% 43.8%
Dealers with 2-5 sites 75% 25%
Dealers with 6-10 sites 75% 25%
Dealers with 11-50 sites 100% _
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UK DEALER OPINIONS ON THE POTENTIAL FOR PARTNERSHIPS (1)
Given the maturity o f the UK car market, and the subsequent need for 
manufacturers to maintain the loyalty of their customers, is the relative power 
and influence o f the dealer vis-a-vis the manufacturer set to increase still further, 
or will the manufacturers instead seek to strengthen the control they exert over 
their distribution networks still further?
More dealer influence More manufacturer 
control
Renault dealers 12.5% 75%
Citroen dealers 10% 90%
Peugeot dealers 35.3% 47.1%
Total 22.9% 65.7%
UK DEALER OPINIONS ON THE POTENTIAL FOR PARTNERSHIPS (2)
Could this then lead to manufacturers and distributors adopting 
more of a 'partnership' approach in the future?
Yes No
Renault dealers 62.5% 37.5%
Citroen dealers 30% 60%




OBJECTIVES OF THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS 
RESEARCH PROJECT
• To analyse the operations and assess the effectiveness of National Distributors within 
the European market.
• To examine the ways in which the roles and situations of National Distributors are 
changing in response to local, national and EU-level market environments, and to 
industry-specific influences.
• To identify the key factors and decisions governing company strategy in this area of 
distribution management as 'lean' thinking takes hold.
• To construct future scenarios for the structure and operation of'National Distributors', if 
that is what they will be called in the future, within the distribution network.
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APPENDIX VII
COMPANIES PARTICIPATING IN THE ROLE OF NATIONAL 
DISTRIBUTORS RESEARCH PROJECT
Manufacturers Fiat Auto 





Volvo Cars Europe Marketing
National Distributors Berge et Cia. (independent) 
Inchcape pic (independent) 
Nissan Motor Deutschland GmbH 
(wholly-owned)
Other distribution
chain actors Castrol International
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APPENDIX VIII
NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR PROJECT DISCUSSION TOPICS
The following constitutes a brief outline of the topic areas used to frame the National 
Distributor project fieldwork discussions. As was discussed in Chapter 3,1 the interview 
sessions were at most semi-structured, and so this list served merely as a guide for the 
researchers and the respondents to use if required. It was not possible to cover every topic 
in every session, but this was consistent with the research plan which wished to ensure that 
the respondents had every opportunity to discuss the matters which they considered 
important under the overall project heading in as much detail as they saw fit. Similarly, not 
all the sessions followed the order laid out below, although for the most cases, it was 
employed as the logical framework for the discussions.
1. HISTORY
Historical background to the setting-up, organisation and environmental 
circumstances of the company's National Distributors
2. NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR ORGANISATION AND MANUFACTURER 
INVOLVEMENT
Ownership
Ownership of the National Distributors, including recent changes 
Current company structure
Organisation of the National Distributors, employment levels, etc.
'See Section 3-2-3-2
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3. NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR ACTIVITIES
Distribution
Supply and stocking systems 
Information systems 




Volume and mix objectives 
Brand image and positioning 
Advertising policy 
TV advertising and video promotion 
Market intelligence
Parts management and marketing





Dealer groups and multi-franchising
4. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
"Clusterisation " and the future
Company organisation and outsourcing 
European market 
Territorial divisions 
More radical distribution methods
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APPENDIX IX
SELECTED TRANSCRIPTIONS FROM THE FIRST INTERVIEW 
PROGRAMME
The following consists of three transcriptions from the first interview programme. These 
have been anonymised and, in some instances, edited in order to respect the confidentiality 
required by ICDP and its sponsors.
XXX (MANUFACTURER) - INTERVIEW NOTES
National Distributor organisation: divided into two types: countries that produce, and countries that 
only sell. Sales area, service and parts area, financial/supporting area. The bigger the market, the more 
people they employ
Legal entities in their own right - XXX is not really a legal entity, more a coordination point. XXX, 
XXX, XXX and XXX to a certain extent: the same set-up on the sales side, but manufacturing as well - little 
relationship to the sales side - just happen to be in the same country - sales and manufacturing not merged, but 
for PR purposes, "Mr XXX" there is the MD of the sales company, not the plant. The plant is, too, controlled 
from XXX. The smallest markets (Nordic) operate with a staff of around 30, XXX and XXX(sales company 
operations only), about 250
The big NDCs are subdivided into districts (Germany - XXX, UK - XXX, France - XXX, Spain, 
XXX) - a field sales organisation, district manager, to liaise with dealers on a regional basis, do get some 
merchandising help, more a question of operational staff - at the moment, Ireland separate from Britain and 
Portugal from Spain, but this will change ? Big 5 markets (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain), Managing 
Directors report directly to the XXX, the other 10 NDCs report to a group director, who in turn reports to the 
XXX. Used to be different in the past when had lots of different layers in between. If one of these other 
markets became sufficiently important/large, this might change so that they too would report to the XXX 
direct. 4 levels of management in this area at XXX - several fewer than there used to be... "lean and mean 
nowadays"
Supply and stocking: Direct order entry system both for vehicles and for parts - dealer inputs order 
via dedicated terminal, and XXX monitors vehicle allocations, stock levels, etc. centrally - bypasses National 
Sales Companies to arrive directly at XXX - orders used to be processed by National levels when paper 
based, but now can go directly to manufacturing, via the order bank. Sales and manufacturing logistics group
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manage sales order bank, orders go directly into plant. Sales company activity more the wholesaling of 
vehicles to dealers and working with dealers. Don't just order XXX and then decide where they are going to 
go, the whole process is now order-driven. Sales companies not concerned too much at all any more with the 
logistical side.
Pan-European specifications: Still a lot of difference, try to minimise differences every time they 
launch a new model, but differ mainly in response to differing customer demands, taxation, competition. 
Each manufacturer in each market watches each other like cat and dog, with regard to what equipment the 
others are offering (air conditioning, etc.). "Whichever market you look at, they are all different, which is a 
pain in the neck for the manufacturing people." We have come a long way - there used to be a lot more 
variety. Now have far fewer entities (variations, trim, colour and option combinations) than used to be the 
case, used to run into millions. There is some limited scope for orders to be switched between countries, such 
as an Italian market car being diverted to another market, but it would depend on the equipment levels in the 
car. All the cars are legal, they could be sold everywhere, but whether they would meet customer 
requirements... 10 to 15 years ago, a car sold in Italy would not be legal in other countries, but this is no 
longer the case. It does place some limitations: if production is being planned two to three months in advance 
and during that period the Italian market goes sour, unless you can change specifications, you are not in the 
position to say that unless you can divert those cars to Germany... "We have a great deal of flexibility now in 
our production planning, which I think is a competitive advantage. Contrary to the XXX, we can change the 
specification, we can even change the colour that the dealer has ordered, just three weeks before it is actually 
built, and we could not do that in the past". That is the big disadvantage that the XXX have, with a pipeline 
of 6 months.
Physical distribution also managed centrally. Some markets have one centre from which cars are 
sent to every dealer, in others dealers get supplied directly from the plant, essentially a region by region 
solution, purely whichever is the best logistical solution for hitting the dealer - according to a matrix, may go 
via two or three different points. Also the problem of passing through customs for non-EC markets
Information systems: Two different IT systems are used, one: two-thirds of the dealers operate a 
dealership management system, covers all communication with XXX - vehicle and parts orders. The others 
have a PC-based system which replicates the integrated set-up - both firing orders up to two central locations, 
one for vehicles and one for parts. Two parts depots, one in XXX, and one in XXX. Some national-level 
facilities too. such as in XXX and XXX, but their activities are being reduced quite rapidly. Scandinavian 
markets each used to have one parts depot each, but these have now been consolidated into one outsourced 
facility, with the parts being sourced out of XXX. Only the physical distribution of the parts is handled 
locally or outsourced, the whole system is managed centrally. Other markets, XXX handles physical 
distribution itself too.
Direct sales: Normally, direct sales are conducted to governments. Each of the 15 markets will have 
different traditions defining what categories of direct sales are accepted and which are not, and these differ by 
market. Polic\ here tends to be a national policy, and reflects what the competition is doing. If the 
opposition sells direct to rental companies, then XXX will too. The difference is that XXX does not own its
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own dealerships in the way others do (like XXX), company not involved in retail distribution. Have a 
European dealer agreement which specifies what can and cannot do with regard to direct sales. XXX is 
building up the capability to handle pan-European, even global fleet sales (i.e. to a company trading globally) 
- this means coordinating the conditions, not XXX conducting the selling - XXX and XXX are at the stage 
where they can do this as they are, with the actual sales being conducted by the National Sales Companies in 
each market.
Marketing: National Sales Companies have objectives for volume and for share, mix objectives by 
model, profit, expense, head count objectives, monthly and daily objectives: "We do like to try and keep track 
of what is going on." Major objectives agreed with the NSCs at the start of each year, with rolling 
"programme meetings" being held each month, where sales and production schedule for the next 12-18 
months is planned, depending on market shares, total industry volumes etc., but objectives for each market 
change monthly too.
Brand image not consistent, market leaders in XXX, leading importers in XXX, XXX domestic 
manufacturer has 60% market share etc., image depends on fortunes in that country. Market share varies 
between XXX % and XXX % in the 15 markets. So, image and positioning is different from market to 
market. Product and launch advertising done centrally, later advertising for current models done locally, to 
take account of market situation. When launch a new model, try to establish an umbrella image for that car, 
but that is subjected to modification over time as the segmentation in each market is different. Overall, 
corporate identity is consistent. "It is interesting that if you ask the question of XXX or XXX in each of our 
national markets: where do you think this company comes from, the answer will vary hugely by market.”
Advertising: Launch advertising is developed centrally with inputs from the markets, and they all 
have to use it. Usually three different campaigns, sometimes they manage to get it down to two. Usually a 
British version, and if lucky, can get German and rest of Europe into one campaign (otherwise two). Also 
different agencies Germany and the rest of Europe. So, even if do not end up with one campaign, the 
advertising is controlled and approved centrally. After a model has been in the market 2 or 3 years, we will 
probably see, particularly print media, more local modifications, not TV because it is expensive - TV 
campaigns usually are used in 2 or 3 markets ideally. Same agencies since XXX. Smaller markets do not 
usually feel constrained by having to use XXX advertising campaign because they do not have the resources 
to do otherwise, it would be an absolute waste of money for the minor markets to do their own advertising. 
Sometimes, however, they do feel constrained by having to work with one launch programme. Loyalty 
programmes done centrally, infrastructure central for all, video training material, launch material, etc. central. 
Brochures done centrally, apart from Britain which has XXX magazine. Market done centrally, virtually no 
market research done locally, some advertising research though. Statistical data, national industry 
comparisons, etc. come via NSCs. What competitors up to in the field more NSC concern. Participate in 
syndicated studies for consumer research. Customer satisfaction surveys done centrally, so can tell whether 
customers prefer service in Holland, UK, etc. So, is XXX a multinational staff? - a multinational mix, but 
local NSC will be called on to explain particular local problems
Parts: More European in parts than in vehicles in terms of pricing, as the product is easier, less
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variation, etc., and not priced in relation to what the opposition is doing so much, centralised too. Block 
Exemption parts stipulations will not change system significantly, will encourage others to move towards pan- 
European parts pricing. Parts marketing not a major activity, XXX brand particularly strong in France, less 
so elsewhere.
Dealer network: Network policy decided centrally, executed locally. Bigger markets better 
resourced for network planning/management activities, and smaller may need more assistance. 
Appointments, etc. done locally. Courses in representation, etc. done centrally. "Our principal role in this 
area is in establishing and maintaining the policies that apply, they become the operating rules within which 
the local companies operate.
Territorial segmentation: Do have dealer groups that operate on a trans-national basis, but not as 
much as had been predicted - found it harder than they thought it would be. Only in XXX are there public 
companies involved in dealerships, maybe one or two in XXX. Also most of multifranchise operations are 
British too, but UK suffers less from succursales.
Dealers elect representatives who sit on the dealer council, who talk with the national level and relay 
back to their members. Do not currently operate at a European level in the interface with dealers - there is no 
official XXX European dealer council. Some dealers might get together in a European council, but this 
would have no formal links with XXX (unlike some of competitors, who do operate formal, European-level 
councils) This will continue to be the case as long as there is no single thing called Europe
Multifranchising: Britain unique because multifranchising already operates here. Outside UK, 
different situation, e.g. in Belgium, the dealer agreement stipulates that the dealer is a XXX dealer within the 
European Union, which means that it should not be a non- XXX dealer within the Union, although there are a 
few exceptions. In future, decision would depend on critical size of territory within which dealer would 
operate, but XXX still remains concerned whether a dealer could act single-mindedly in their interest if they 
were also representing another make. As manufacturer becomes stronger, has greater ability to impose 
exclusivity on their dealers.
Future developments: XXX has the global responsibility for everything up to and including XXX - 
size. Once the Single Market, single currency, etc. is in place, then further moves can be made in the 
direction of clusteral organisation of activities. "It would make sense to do things on a language basis, if the 
countries get together, which is not always the case." - may no longer need National Sales Companies under 
these conditions. Actually do some things on a regional basis - a technical hot-line, one from XXX handling 
Germany, Austria and the German-speaking part of Switzerland, one from Italy handling Italy and Italian­
speaking Switzerland, France covers France and French-speaking Belgium and Switzerland - "not because we 
think this is right for the customer, but because this is the only way we can afford it". Also one Scandinavian 
technical line, handling all these markets in the different languages, the Spanish line handles Portugal too.
Subcontracting of activities: most manufacturers subcontract dealer business management anyway, 
and most of them to XXX. Advertising also outsourced to agencies - this is longstanding. Dealership 
systems support could be regional too. "Anything that does not relate to the customer directly, where the 
customers may still have a national preference, you could really do on a regional basis, the non-transparent
APPENDICES PAGE 344
things." "As long as the customer and country differences remain, we would still like a local presence, even if 
it is just 5 people controlling the work of 25 agencies or something."
More radical distribution methods: "The fact is that vehicles will always require servicing, there is a 
lot of safety, and environmental considerations related to them as well, so you will always have to have that 
provision, and the other element is the part-exchange consideration." "We would tend to see things in terms 
of evolutionary change, how many dealers we would require, what would be the objectives for these dealers 
to achieve - all these factors may evolve over time into different numbers of dealerships, but we would not see 
anything radical at this point."
XXX (MANUFACTURER) - INTERVIEW NOTES
All NSCs were independent to start with, before XXX bought out the importers in major markets. 
XXX, succession of independents, recently set up own company there. "Over a period of time, if the 
circumstances are OK, we would prefer to own our importers rather than stick with an independent." Will 
continue to have independents in the smaller and more difficult markets. Pattern still there outside Europe, 
own importers in XXX, XXX and XXX. Moving with XXX to set up a wholly-owned company in XXX. 
"Our trend would be toward manufacturer-owned importers". All the major European markets were taken 
over in the early 70s, previously distribution handled by independents, sometimes more than one in each 
country - historically, this was not necessarily done at franchise level, so in France, there were XXX 
distributors, then XXX separate, etc. XXX and XXX different - crises prompted change -manufacturing, 
markets opened up suddenly, etc. others linked to EC etc. "The EC has had quite a big effect on pulling out 
of CKD, and on the need for us to control our sales and marketing presence within those countries." Volumes 
much more marginal in smaller countries.
XXX and XXX used to be the same company, but agreed that it was not working, and XXX set up 
own company. Many independent NSCs are significant retailers in their own right, whereas the factory- 
owned operations, even if they own some dealerships, tend to keep a more arms-length relationship with 
actual retailing. Many of the set-ups derived from the way cars were transported across borders, customs 
formalities, etc.
Other major thrust of 70s changes was a move away from the wholesaling of relatively small 
numbers of cars to small markets. With the move to NSCs, some of the distributors remained as retailers (e.g. 
XXX).
All of own companies set up in same way, reporting lines to XXX, etc., independents relatively 
similar formats, part of agreement with XXX.
XXX, move from independent to manufacturer has not really meant a change in the number of staff, 
just general shift of better product and more information technology, less people fixing problems, etc., and
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emphasis will continue to shift.
Regional sections: none have regional offices, have regionally-based people. XXX used to have 
regional offices, but the last one was closed down about a year ago. XXX came closest to operating regionally 
in the late 70s, but it never took off.
Supply and stocking: the XXX system is intended to be extended across Europe. Same mechanism 
where possible. About to launch this, next 6 months. Same principles for Europe; XXX a dotted line 
between XXX NSC and service functions which support it (finances, invoicing etc.). Europe must still 
operate a triangle: factory taking orders directly from dealers a major step. Local tax, European law etc., 
makes concept of direct invoicing of dealers from the centre still some way off, dealers not ready for it, nor 
market. Moving vehicles across borders will come naturally under the new system, will require a greater 
degree of central coordination, but the NSCs will retain a key financial role for some time yet. Average 
dealer size in Europe much smaller than in XXX, so it is important to have somebody in between to watch 
over their finances, credit, etc. "We see this as a seamless process. The NSCs will have parallel sight of any 
information relating to vehicles in the system, will be able to track them, and to stop them in the event of any 
financial problem." The invoices, even the registration documents for the vehicles will come from the NSC. 
XXX see no reason why the system should not work for independent NSCs, although for the moment they are 
concentrating on their own operations. They all operate like communications systems (apart from one - 
XXX), and so the major task is modifying existing systems to work in a better way.
Orders switching between countries: XXX not looking at the system from the perspective of an order 
coming from a French dealer or the French NSC, but as a pipeline of supply taking in customer orders (not 
many manufacturers have adopted this mindset). But orders can be switched in the pipeline. Steps to get 
there: 1. get the stock in one place or less; 2. share the stock amongst the nations that are served by those 
distribution centres, 3. make the pipeline common, 4. stop tagging cars to nations, let alone dealers. 
Equipment differences: XXX will have self-levelling headlights across the range to satisfy the requirement for 
them in Germany. Specifications still differ, and XXX realise that some customer needs will differ, but 
reducing differences as much as possible. "Whereas in the past manufacturers were more or less forced into 
producing national specifications, what XXX are trying to move to now is a regional specification." Not 
trying to constrain availability by region: if a Northern customer wants air-conditioning, the car will have 
been engineered for it, so he can have it. "In essence, we want to take all those barriers away". Let the 
customer have what they want, even if it means having to wait for it.
Distribution centres: some shared, some national at the moment, but the intention is to regionalise 
things. "This is a slightly organic thing" - current distribution centres, contracts, etc. not necessarily in the 
right place, strategically, to move vehicles, but a storage problem is not the same as a forwarding problem. 
Build to order means less storage, so the emphasis changes - some centres may need to be relocated to points 
where they make sense logistically for forwarding purposes. Forwarding centres will be regional. Some 
current operations are (e.g. XXX, which also supplies XXX and XXX, with Chinese walls inside). Centres 
will be controlled by the centre, operated by a logistics company. There are certain markets in Europe where 
centres do more than storage and forwarding - preparation (XXX, XXX). Some markets (e.g. XXX), dealers
APPENDICES PAGE 346
do preparation. Ultimately, it will be the dealer's responsibility to finally prepare the product - the sold order 
arriving will be of sufficient quality that only the final pre-sale inspections, etc. will be necessary (because the 
cars will not be hanging around in centres). This makes quality more critical than if the dealers were 
operating with a buffer stock.
Direct sales: manufacturers dug their heels in over this at the Block Exemption renewal, as it would 
be a nonsense not to have them for certain contracts. So, the capability exists for direct sales in all the 
markets, but they are relatively small numbers, primarily government and military, with small numbers going 
to hire fleets. XXX is different, with many fleets having moved to direct supply. A lot of the sales are 
handled by the dealer, who is rewarded accordingly. Very few actually invoiced and delivered direct, these 
being primarily the daily rental fleets. Direct invoicing is a factor, direct supply more likely to go through the 
dealers in the future. Each NSC can conduct direct sales within strict guidelines. Not something XXX are 
going to rush out and expand, but would be stupid not to have the opportunity. Less of an issue for 
independent NSCs as most of them are involved in retailing anyway (more a question of their internal 
accounting as to what is or is not a direct sale). International fleet sales, etc.: small but increasing number of 
companies want to negotiate centrally to one point of contact, but all of them will leave their local markets to 
handle the actual supply of the vehicle, as their local subsidiaries will need to have a good relationship with 
the local NSC for the sake of service, etc. - cannot avoid the local network. Few companies actually seeking 
single marque deals, but several are consolidating the number of makes used across Europe.
Homologation activities: requirements still exist across Europe, and these, although less of a burden 
than they used to be, are still handled by NSCs. Still an issue in deciding which equipment to homologate 
etc., and a such makes the introduction of pan-EU specifications all the more difficult.
Marketing: "Our ambition is to reduce the amount of unnecessary additional work involved in the 
creation of a marketing campaign for the European market." Recognise the big differences in traditions and 
styles, such as reactions to discounts, etc. Want to establish quality image for XXX, to make the product 
worthy of carrying a premium price, and to do that requires a consistency of approach. Took a cross-section 
of adverts from different markets, and found no great consistency of message. XXX had the most consistency. 
More information sharing between NSCs now, trying to get more cross-fertilisation of ideas, and to ensure 
that everybody works within more specific guidelines. Beginning to get greater brand image consistency 
now. Increased investment in direct marketing. Greater care in product launches, TV footage that can be 
shared, etc., or modified, but retaining stronger core image.
Each market, within individual circumstances, can still create TV commercials locally, but they are 
being encouraged to do more than a local advert, but to create something that can be used, say in Spain, 
Portugal and across into Italy as well. More development work is done centrally, involving the NSCs in the 
process, spending more up front, but avoiding spending 7 times as much later by doing different adverts for 
different markets. (Menu approach). A difference between what trying to achieve strategically, such as brand 
image, awareness, etc. and tactical issues, such as the actual promotion of models, where NSCs tend to act 
more independently (even here, there is more sharing). " XXX " scheme - taking something that exists, that 
might have been produced by a neighbouring NSC, and adding to and improving it for another market.
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Media purchasing now coordinated to a greater degree than before. Currently evaluating the 
potential in this area that joint operations with XXX might bring - significant financial benefits.
Market intelligence, forecasting: trying to move away from numbers coming in from each country to 
a system based on areas of probability, bringing everything to the table, examining the whole picture, and 
then what the possibilities, and the risks, might be in each market. This gives everybody a wider perspective - 
part of being more open and honest. Still a tense operation though... Changes in distribution organisation, 
capturing the pull from the market, will themselves enable better forecasting.
Parts supply terms, etc.: terms of supply, like vehicle margins, do vary country by country. Starting 
to get more consistency across Europe now, driven by the need to get the part to the customer in the shortest 
possible time - making it as easy as possible for the dealer to get the part quickly, so as not to disappoint the 
customer who might be waiting, not penalising the dealers who might order parts only to find they were not 
necessary etc., in other words, not treating parts simply as a way of making profit, but taking a longer term 
view. Parts have become more competitive in the XXX market, partly as a response to the other suppliers - 
stressing the "genuineness" of the parts, and not over pricing them. In Europe, local taxation still plays a 
major role here - the customer needs to see value for money, so prices have to be adjusted to account for local 
VAT rates, etc.
Dealer networks: all dealer networks managed nationally by the NSCs - their prime area of 
responsibility in the future, including all the accompanying activities such as business management, sales 
development, market representation, franchise placement, within an agreed strategy. Clear franchise policy 
established with all NSCs, and then local franchise plan drawn up for each one locally with help from the 
centre. Implementation totally local. Principle of "a market for every dealer and a dealer for every market": 
the dealer's viability enough to sustain the dealer there - this to be balanced with he need to cover territory, 
with big differences in larger countries. Dealer viability the driving force behind the guidelines. Looked 
carefully at volume and service throughput to establish shape of local market. Will be a single-tier network 
across Europe in the future too, the XXX sub-dealers have been put under notice, some will be upgraded to 
main dealers, and some will be dropped. "Unbundling" scenarios: XXX are encouraging people to invest in a 
market area whose potential has been recognised and quantified. If at the moment it is served by more than 
one dealer, then this may need to be rectified; the major investor will be supported, and encouraged to set up 
whatever is necessary to cover the territory. So, under this scheme, they would have no problem with a main 
dealer setting up satellite operations elsewhere within the defined territory. The concept would include a few 
service bays, a used car display, no more than a couple of demonstrators, fast-moving parts delivered daily 
from the main site, with the regularly-used special tools in place but the major-investment items at the main 
centre. The customer would deliver his car locally, with the dealer moving it as necessary. Used car sales 
would be encouraged as a profit centre for the dealer, but there would be no new cars on site apart from 
demonstrators. The reception would have interactive computer displays, and a salesman would then call on a 
customer if an interest was expressed. "We have a clear view of what we want." Like this, not straight- 
jacketed by the satellite operation being just a service branch. Would want main dealer to have total 
ownership of these operations ideally, certainly above 50%.
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Territories crossing borders: trying to ensure dealers not facing up to each other across borders: do 
examine what goes on at the interface of markets.
Manufacturer-owned dealers: XXX own XXX dealer business in XXX, at XXX, but only to 
understand what goes on and to test ideas - just a one-off. Also own dealerships in a couple of other markets, 
but these too will act very much as pilot operations. Definitely no policy of seeking to expand wholly-owned 
retail chain. Also own some sites, which are independently managed, but these were generally bom out of the 
need to secure some representation in high-cost areas. Would want to retain importer-owned sites if took 
over the NSC (provided they are performing properly), but would not seek to purchase the operations. Some 
of the XXX -owned dealers in mainland Europe were bought out because they had financial problems, but 
such decisions were not taken locally.
Dealer groups and multi-franchising: only XXX which really has dealers representing XXX in more 
than one country. Others (XXX: XXX in France and UK, XXX: XXX and XXX dealers in Switzerland) 
almost accidents of history. There may be a few more examples in the future, such as XXX, which has 
bought a French dealer group. Multi-franchising regarded as inevitable. 3 years ago, allowed breaches of 
exclusivity in XXX, because were about to introduce the distribution changes which would mean fewer 
vehicles on dealers' sites, many of which were huge and located in city centres. Faced with the choice of 
being near to or away from the "motor alley" of a town, XXX would prefer to be near, because this is where 
the traffic goes. The following question was whether they could live with another franchise on the same site: 
yes given complete separation of the franchise (management, etc.). Of the XXX XXX sites which are now 
multi-franchise, none have seen a deterioration in XXX business, indeed, most have increased their sales, as 
the XXX facilities were redeveloped along with the rest of the site. In the other European markets, XXX is 
growing from a relatively smaller number of dealers, and so is in a position to demand exclusivity of its 
dealers, which it does. If the situation did arise, they would know how to deal with it as a result of the XXX 
experience. (Multi-franchising) "If everything else burnt down apart from the XXX business, could it still 
function, or is it dependent on something else? If it could then it would be acceptable." Can also work the 
other way round: it would be an opportunity for XXX to join say a XXX dealer whose site was too large. Are 
currently talking to a handful of XXX dealerships in Germany about developing multi-franchise sites. 
Generalh , would prefer to have exclusive representation for as long as could maintain it. No prospect of 
retail linkage with XXX in the major markets. In XXX, where new company has now been set up, both 
companies previously had weak dealer networks, and are now setting up a number of joint dealerships, and 
the same is true in New Zealand. Highest-level policy decision to keep the companies separate in the 
marketplace.
Future developments section: XXX used to have 5 regional offices, then 3, before the company 
realised that it could do without them. They were necessary when lines of communication different, travel 
times longer, etc. - the infrastructure is no longer needed, even if people "on the ground" are still necessary. 
In this way. the company interface with the dealer at a national level will have to continue, despite 
improvements in telecommunications, etc. But, provided that there are some people on the ground, and 
provided that the local needs of the market are taken into account in the promotion of the product, then it will
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not be necessary to have a large office block and many employees. The question comes back to finance: is it 
viable to run an accounting, a credit control relationship with a number of dealers spread across thousands of 
kilometres, taking into account local taxation, etc. from a distance? Company has already tried having NSCs 
managed together, regions operating above the national level, etc., with varying degrees of success, but the 
key aspect is always the financial one. "The opportunity does not seem to be there at the moment, not that 
this means that it will not be there in the future." National cultural barriers are not just a motor trade thing... 
Clusteral/regional approach - "don't think that the relatively small gains that would accrue would be worth the 
trip". At the end of the day, these are not matters that generally concern the customer, who is looking for an 
attractive product and a good dealer. Market intelligence too: it would be very hard for a company to have a 
handle on what is going on inside a market from outside that nation state. Similarly, the interactive customer 
displays, etc. can be common (with the various languages), but the selling effort that goes with it must vaiy 
("put across with castanets in Spain"). Driving force common, but the delivery adapted locally: "Esperanto is 
not the way out."
XXX (NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR) - INTERVIEW NOTES
XXX was originally set up in 1972, initially as a liaison office and type approval carrier, then 
replacing 4 independent distributors, each of whom had operated their own strategies, reflecting regional 
needs in different parts of XXX.
The contracts with these private distributors were terminated on XXX. One of the distributors went 
on to be the importer for XXX, and took several XXX dealers with him. So, the task facing the new 
manufacturer-owned National Distributor was a very hard one at the start. This task was complicated by the 
product - "the cars looked like electric shavers, but the quality - price relationship was excellent, and they 
were fully equipped, which was unusual for XXX ". A highly competitive price was possible at the time 
because of the XXX relationship.
Some of the former dealers were kept on for the new network, but usually they were relatively weak, 
with little business or financial know-how. This was because the independent distributors did not have any 
long-term objectives - 5 years was the contract norm. Fortunately, this was a weak period for the whole of the 
industry, and so dealers could be persuaded to change franchises. The target at the time was high quality 
dealers rather than quantity.
From scratch in 1978, by 1992, turnover had reached XXX with XXX dealers. Unit sales had 
increased by 632.5%, compared to a XXX importers average of 464%, in a market which had grown by 
47.9%. Net turnover in the same period increased by 1379.8%. Employment grew from 127 to 437 (930 
including subsidiaries).
Sees employees very much as a close-knit team, all skilled in trading. This is the biggest problem
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when manufacturers become involved in distribution with their own people - it is not their area of expertise.
Reckons that concentrating on the quality of the dealers has been the cornerstone to XXX success in 
XXX: ensuring that the dealers have a suitable sales territory where they will be able to invest themselves. 
XXX never invest in the dealers themselves, wanting the dealers to remain financially independent. Network 
has the highest turnover/dealer of all imported makes. The dealers were not leant on heavily to start with, and 
were not expected to start making profits straight away. XXX was also one of the first to establish dealers in 
XXX, which was a major advantage.
The major steps for XXX European expansion were firstly to build solid ground for the future, and 
then to move towards a more autonomous Europe-specific product offering.
Brand awareness is still a major problem in the XXX market (and others). XXX are, along with the 
others, still referred to as "the XXX ", much as the French and the Italian manufacturers were right up until 
the 1970s.
Creating brand awareness from scratch, especially when the manufacturer is offering a wide range of 
products, is "the hardest thing in the world". The image carried by a small car may be detrimental to the 
image of the luxury models in the range. This is "the miserable situation facing manufacturers who try to 
operate in all sectors" of the market. The example was given of XXX and XXX, whose big cars both do not 
enjoy a very positive image. XXX also believes XXX fits into this category, as the link to XXX is too 
evident. This also explains why XXX are so keen to keep XXX separate.
So, whilst XXX have been highly successful in XXX, they still have image and brand awareness 
problems.
The parent company in XXX has left things very much up to the National Distributors in Europe, 
and has not sought to interfere. The latter may report to XXX 2 or 3 times a year, and provided that XXX is 
happy with the figures, the National Distributors will be left to get on with it. The same principle is operated 
for the various departments within XXX. "Most of the manufacturers who try to interfere with their National 
Distributors fail. Manufacturers cannot ever hope to be truly global. They must set targets and then let their 
people do their jobs."
This has changed somewhat with the arrival of XXX Europe, and XXX does believe that XXX tries 
to interfere too much with the National Distributors. He also believes that XXX is wrong to try to concentrate 
too many of its activities in XXX, and also that XXX was also a bad idea - it is fine as a communication 
office, working at gearing the product to the European market, but it should not be involved in marketing or 
sales activities, which must remain local.
Dealer networks: not many dealers are now prepared to change franchises, and fewer and fewer to 
invest, because of the lousy potential for any return. XXX are still handicapped in metropolitan areas, 
compared to their relatively strong countryside coverage, for the reason that they came to the game too late, 
after urban land prices had started to rise significantly. There are also now too many restrictions governing 
dealerships in city centres: opening a showroom would be easy enough, but a workshop is much more 
complicated because of emissions, access, the paint shop, etc.
XXX sees this as a major problem for the new arrivals in the XXX market: they will find it almost
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impossible to establish dealerships in the metropolitan areas of XXX, where the XXX manufacturers, with 
their long-established infrastructure, dominate. Even if they have the buying potential, the newcomers will 
have great difficulty in finding partners. The only solution he sees would be manufacturers investing in 
branch dealerships, although, "whether this is the right solution or not is another question".
Supply and stocking systems: XXX system is "antique", with dealers ordering for stock. The dealer 
"puts his wet finger out of the window" and estimates demand in terms of colours, equipment levels, etc. 
Overall volumes are agreed yearly with XXX. Dealers are asked to fulfil their unit sales out of stock -10% of 
their annual volume is moved this way. At the moment, XXX is working on a more "customer-oriented" 
system, which will encourage customer ordering and supply the car in 3-4 weeks (privately, XXX thinks this 
is still too long). The real handicap will remain the 30 days lead time from XXX.
XXX reckoned that the introduction of new supply and stocking systems requires a major effort on 
the part of the manufacturers. Nevertheless, he is surprised that the European manufacturers do not make 
more advantage of their proximity to the market, and their consequent ability to supply cars quicker, as a 
competitive weapon against the Japanese, Koreans, etc., who will always have a much harder job.
As for actual direct ordering: this could be conducted on the distribution centre in XXX, but the 
latter would still have to be able to provide a buffer against fluctuations in demand and sales. Stock would be 
removed from the dealers, but the cars would just be elsewhere - at the distribution centre (or at an 
intermediate level). This is the problem facing the manufacturers supplying from outside Europe. XXX 
admits that the ultimate target should be direct customer ordering to the manufacturer, but for this to work, 
both customer and salesman behaviour have to change - the customer must be trained to accept longer 
delivery times. Any intermediate storage between manufacturer and dealer is ultimately costly and risky - 
there is more chance for the car to be damaged. However, the further obstacle to the XXX manufacturers in 
achieving this is the continued sourcing of certain component supplies for the European factories from XXX - 
the bottleneck still exists. Again, this is something the European manufacturers should take more advantage 
of than they seem to do.
Because of these handicaps, the XXX manufacturers therefore need a highly flexible system for the 
transferring of cars, and this in turn requires a big reduction in specification differences and model variants, 
which do little more than "irritate the customers". This in turn means fewer model platforms and a more 
accurate studying of the marketplace in terms of the equipment that is offered. Model ranges are still devised 
and oriented in accordance with what the opposition is doing, rather than directly for the customers. 
Specialist manufacturers will find it easier to work to longer lead times, as their customers are less flexible, 
and more likely to know exactly what they want.
Because of its maturity, Europe is not the market where the biggest investments will be made by the 
manufacturers in the future - these will come in the rapidly-growing markets of the Asia-Pacific region and 
elsewhere.
Orders switching markets: specifications still differ markedly between markets, primarily due to the 
persistence of national technical regulations. XXX believes that these will be harmonised, eventually... At the 
moment, he reckons that manufacturers can never really hope to meet all these requirements, "we cannot be
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everybody's darling". Consequently, he thinks that manufacturers should concentrate on satisfying the 5 big 
markets, with the others just having to follow. If potential sales are lost in these markets, it is not such a 
problem as it would be in the big markets. An analogy was made here to the "Model T" principle. Big 
savings could be made in the harmonisation of equipment levels.
A bigger role can be expected for XXX in the area of ordering and supply, but in return they should 
intervene less in marketing.
XXX is trying to unify its information systems, but each country has developed in its own way, and 
according to its own needs. The XXX system was built up around the XXX Bank, a subsidiary of XXX. 
They are currently looking into satellite transfer of information with dealers. The major problem regarding 
information systems is that the dealers need to be of a certain size in order to afford the equipment, and also 
for it to be used to its potential. However, this may not take into account the fact that a small dealer may have 
a large share of his local market, and so merits "the full treatment". There is no direct link between the 
dealers and XXX.
Physical supply: all cars (XXX, XXX, XXX) go to the distribution centre in XXX(60% by feeder 
service). Rail transport is rarely used, as it is still too inflexible. However, XXX doubts that companies will 
be able to rely on road transport in the long term. The problem with the move to customer ordering is 
ensuring that the lorries are full.
All physical supply and logistics, together with PDI and the preparation of special models, etc. is 
handled by XXX, which is wholly owned by XXX. As far as the centralisation of all physical distribution 
activities in XXX, XXX reckons that this offers "sunshine and shadow" - it will not actually help in getting 
the exact car the customer wants to the dealer, as the dealers are still ordering for stock a long time in 
advance. XXX also handles the independent importer markets.
Parts distribution: 5 depots are operated across XXX by private distributors in a 54%:49% joint 
venture with XXX. Next day delivery for urgent parts from XXX to the depots and on to the dealers. XXX is 
currently looking at whether these depots will be needed in the future - in theory they will not be needed, but 
if something went wrong in XXX, then the knock-on effect would be considerable. There is a definite degree 
of risk involved in changing the system, although this is difficult to evaluate. At the moment, the current 
system works well: dealers order to their local depot, which then puts the order in to XXX. The dealers are 
then invoiced from XXX in XXX. The result is, apparently, one of the best systems in XXX in terms of parts 
availability, because the depots are close to the dealers. The operators, being private (51%), are more 
flexible. Theoretically, further savings could be made from pan-European coordination, but they are 
impossible to quantify. Also inestimable is the effect on the customer or the dealer in terms of trust if things 
go wrong.
Direct sales: XXX has very few fleet customers in XXX, and the buying conditions for the fleet 
market as a whole are "terrible". As to the prospect of pan-European central negotiation/ordering: the dealer 
(and therefore the National Distributor) has to be involved, otherwise who would sell the used car afterwards? 
"Selling the car in the first place is the easy bit." The XXX manufacturers are becoming more and more 
resistant to the idea of direct sales.
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Marketing: cannot be fulfilled on a Europe-wide basis. "It will be another 30-40 years before 
Europe is really established."
XXX is (should be) more concerned with looking after the corporate brand image, and secondary to 
that, looking for areas where different markets might "get together". Global car campaigns are impossible 
because of differing buying and usage mentalities. In a buyer's market, a high degree of local flexibility is 
essential.
XXX was actually forced to learn this lesson the hard way: that markets will not necessarily follow 
the paths it suggests - its original ideas of how it was going to operate had to be modified.
Advertising: one of XXX problems is that it conducts more product advertising than overall brand 
advertising. Consequently, XXX position as the most successful imported brand is not widely known.
Once tried using film/video to improve communications between manufacturer and dealers: it failed 
completely.
The XXX market is moving away from large television campaigns, and there have always been more 
possibilities for print media campaigns there. XXX investigated central media buying at a European level, but 
saw no major advantage in doing so - the financial savings were veiy small.
Certain possibilities to operate centrally do exist: film production, photo shoots, etc. XXX likes the 
National Distributors to follow certain guidelines with regard to product advertisements (such as, why don't 
you use the same advert as the UK?), but the impression is that this is not always successful.
XXX conducts other activities itself, such as car clinics (these are often too late!), too much 
customer research. Dealer comparisons are conducted for them by XXX.
XXX believes that car companies usually undertake or commission customer research purely 
because they have no ideas of their own! Not that this is not necessary: an advertising agency is, after all, 
only as good as its brief.
Parts management and marketing: parts pricing is essentially set relative to the opposition, and the 
emphasis is put on the more competitive parts lines, insurance-related parts, etc. The aim is for the dealer to 
be able to satisfy fully the customer's repair demands with the minimum parts inventory, but achieving this 
needs considerable logistics expertise.
XXX differentiated between the marketing of parts and of accessories, reckoning that the two 
demand very different skills, and therefore also different people at dealer level. Accessories should be the 
task of the new car salesman, and, whilst the parts market is stagnating, there are still major profit 
opportunities in accessories. "Most manufacturers are not professional at all in this area." He pointed out 
that, whilst customers will haggle over the price of the car, they are happy to pay the list price for accessories. 
As mainstream cars grow more and more alike, people will look more to accessories to set their car apart. At 
the same time as working to reduce the number of model variants within a range, manufacturers must increase 
the size and quality of the accessories offer. Currently, this area is handled by the parts operation in XXX, 
but it should really be the task of the sales people.
Dealer networks: targets for dealers are set jointly with XXX. Dealer development activities are the 
task of the National Distributor, acting in accordance with the overall manufacturer philosophy. A lot of
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these activities will depend on the product strategy.
Dealers need to cooperate more with each other, including those across national borders. Inevitably, 
this cooperation will come first in metropolitan areas. The scenario was suggested of several dealers possibly 
sharing a city centre showroom, with service being located in the suburbs, or of manufacturers becoming 
more involved in sharing the leasing costs of urban premises. All these suggestions would require a major 
change of attitude amongst the dealers to become more cooperative, for instance, there is no need for every 
dealer to have his own paint shop, or even used car preparation facility. XXX predicts that manufacturers will 
soon become more directly involved in used cars.
Manufacturer-owned dealers: as many dealers as possible should be independent, with the 
manufacturer only becoming involved in problem areas. Such dealers often constitute direct competition to 
the rest of the network. XXX and XXX were cited as being not happy with their branch dealerships. 
Branches also suffer from the influence of unions, making them less flexible. XXX would prefer it that 
dealers cooperated more and retained their independence - this is a far healthier situation, and is in the interest 
of both dealers and manufacturers
Mega-dealers: XXX questioned whether taking on many more franchises would actually save a 
dealer money. More administration is needed to cover all the makes, along with bigger facilities and more 
training. The major problem is how to manage and organise the workshop and the parts department (XXX 
was thinking along the lines of car supermarkets rather than multifranchise dealers). Reckons the customer 
likes exclusive dealers. The healthiest dealers are the medium-sized ones. Reckons that he time is up for the 
very small dealers, although manufacturers will have a problem maintaining coverage in rural areas if they 
fold. Similarly, he cannot see any real future for really large single-site dealers, as their profitability is 
terrible. He subscribed fairly readily to the "unbundling" scenario, provided that the main dealers are ordered 
to keep the outlying service facilities open to maintain coverage. Overall, his biggest concern is that his 
dealers should make a profit.
XXX was convinced that manufacturers are now really thinking about the post-factory area. They 
have all changed their production systems, and have woken up to the fact that the distribution chain is where 
real cost savings can be made. However, the changes involve a big investment from all sides: the 
manufacturers in developing the new systems, and the dealers in training their staff and also their customers 
(this is less of a problem in XXX where the customers are more prepared to wait). Stock is the biggest 
burden in the current system, and XXX believes that changing the distribution system to eliminate it will 
bring a 25-30% cost saving for manufacturers.
XXX believes that the place of the National Distributor in the chain is "unavoidable", even if its role 
will inevitably change. It will not really be involved in the ordering or distribution processes, but will 
concentrate more on marketing, collecting information and "gearing and steering" the dealer body. This role 
"must change and will change", and the name "National Distributor" will become redundant. He also believes 
that the time is almost over for independent importing operations (certainly in the bigger markets): some will 
quit of their own accord, and many others will be taken over. Nevertheless, this path is still risky and 
potentially costly for the manufacturers, and they will inevitably have to concentrate on the more important
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markets, letting the others follow ("otherwise they will not survive").
XXX is changing its distribution chain as quickly as it can, and is reducing the number of platforms, 
etc. XXX reckons that the XXX manufacturers are still somewhat ahead of the rest on this latter point, and 
that the XXX have yet to really exploit this potential in their operations (which could be enormous for a 
company like XXX).
He sees the car of the future being much simpler to produce as manufacturers cut down on over- 
engineering. Why do they need to use a complicated technical solution for their everyday models when a 
simple alternative would be adequate. "We do not need to produce automobiles that are liked by Auto Motor 
und Sport." Special models, sportscars, etc. will still push technical excellence, superior performance and 
handling, etc., but this is not necessary for the more "normal" models. Instead, manufacturers should 
concentrate more on styling and colours to differentiate their products. "Buyers will not be prepared to pay 
more for technical superfluity." This ties in with environmental and road-use considerations (which were 
discussed at some length subsequently) and the overriding need for society to create a better combination of 
individual and collective transportation.
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Fiat Auto UK (wholly-owned)
Renault UK (wholly-owned)
Ixion Motor Group (private)
Lancaster pic (public)
Perry Group pic (public)
National Franchised Dealers Association 
Retail Motor Industry Federation 
Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders
Daewoo Car Centre (branch outlet), 
Coventry
Lex Volvo (group outlet), London 




SECOND INTERVIEW PROGRAMME DISCUSSION TOPICS
The following constitutes a list of the topic areas discussed in the final interview 
programme. None of the interview sessions actually covered all these topics, nor did they 
work through them in a chronological order. Instead, the lists were used, as in the National 
Distributor fieldwork above, as a guide and aide-memoire for respondents and 
interviewers, and the discussions were thus able to flow to cover whichever areas the 
respondents considered most interesting or which they were most prepared to discuss. 
Many of the more specific factual and background information questions were devised 
specifically by Professor Shioji to fill in his lack of knowledge of the UK market. In some 
instances, these questions were answered by the researcher, and thus did not need to be 
asked again in the interviews. Other matters which were raised during the sessions were 
answered by the provision by the respondents and the researcher of documentary 
information such as annual reports and ICDP papers. Interesting topic areas were pursued 
in as much detail as was appropriate for the situation, with some questions therefore going 
beyond the restrictions of these categories.
1. QUESTION LISTS FOR MANUFACTURERS AND NATIONAL 
DISTRIBUTORS
Dealer network
Name, models sold and brief history of each of the franchises operated 
Number of dealers in January 1995, and in 1970,1980 and 1990 
Single or multiple-tier networks
Assessment of numbers entering and exiting franchise each year
Breakdown of ownership of dealers (family, private group, public group, branch)
Average annual sales per dealer
Average percentage of dealers sales accounted for by new cars, used cars, service, 
parts sales
Regional offices to handle dealer management, number of offices, staffing levels,
APPENDICES PAGE 358
divisions of responsibility 
Franchise agreement
Nature of franchise agreements
Determination of territories, including areas of disagreement
Dealer standards
Type of sales targets operated
Termination of dealer contracts
Dealer support
Inventory control and physical distribution 
Rebate system
Dealer relations
Measures to evaluate dealer performance
Retail price setting and potential for volume discounts for major purchases 
Involvement in leasing, fleet sales and daily rental
Evolution of the franchise system
Dealer groups, including advantages and disadvantages, and optimal size 
Dual-franchise dealerships and multifranchising, including advantages and 
disadvantages, and the ’car supermarket’ scenario
'Auto park' concept, including advantages and disadvantages, and the UK 'motor 
alley' evolution
Dealer diversification and the prospect for new entrants
Manufacturer -  dealer relations
Overall opinion on manufacturer-dealer relationships 
Role of branch outlets
Financial and managerial support from manufacturers to dealers 
Suggestions for improving dealer profitability 
Role of dealer councils
Role of the manufacturer and dealer UK trade federations and the relationship
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between them
Modifications to franchise contracts to reflect the new Block Exemption
Other
Impressions of other markets
Impressions of the US-Japan auto talks
Prospects for further renewal of the Block Exemption
2. QUESTION LISTS FOR DEALERS 
Company profile
Dealer type, including size and ownership 
Sales activity
Sales performance, including sales by department (new cars, used, after-sales, etc.)
and approximate sales-profit ratio
Franchise portfolio of dealer, including future plans
Average salesman salary, including percentage based on sales commission
Recruitment and training methods
Franchise agreement
Nature of franchise agreements
Determination of territories, including areas of disagreement
Dealer standards
Type of sales targets operated
Termination of dealer contracts
Dealer support from the manufacturer
Inventory control and physical distribution, including lead times, stock levels and 
expected future changes 
Advertising types used 
Rebate system
APPENDICES PAGE 360
Manufacturer -  dealer relations
Retail price setting and potential for volume discounts for major purchases 
Involvement in leasing, fleet sales and daily rental 
Overall opinion on manufacturer-dealer relationships 
Role of branch outlets
Financial and managerial support from manufacturers to dealers 
Suggestions for improving dealer profitability 
Role of dealer councils
Role of the manufacturer and dealer UK trade federations and the relationship 
between them
Modifications to franchise contracts to reflect the new Block Exemption
Evolution o f the franchise system
Dealer groups, including advantages and disadvantages, and optimal size 
Dual-franchise dealerships and multifranchising, including advantages and 
disadvantages, and the 'car supermarket' scenario
'Auto park' concept, including advantages and disadvantages, and the UK 'motor 
alley1 evolution
Dealer diversification and the prospect for new entrants
Other
Impressions of other markets
Impressions of the US-Japan auto talks
Prospects for further renewal of the Block Exemption
3. QUESTION LISTS FOR TRADE FEDERATIONS
Background information
Membership details 
History of the federation
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Evolution of the franchise system
Dealer groups, including advantages and disadvantages, and optimal size 
Dual-franchise dealerships and multifranchising, including advantages and 
disadvantages, and the 'car supermarket' scenario
'Auto park' concept, including advantages and disadvantages, and the UK 'motor 
alley' evolution
Dealer diversification and the prospect for new entrants
Franchise agreement
Future prospects for exclusivity 
Nature of franchise agreements
Determination of territories, including areas of disagreement
Dealer standards
Type of sales targets operated
Termination of dealer contracts
Modifications to franchise contracts to reflect the new Block Exemption
Manufacturer - dealer relations
Overall opinion on manufacturer-dealer relationships 
Role of branch outlets
Financial and managerial support from manufacturers to dealers 
Suggestions for improving dealer profitability
Retail price setting and potential for volume discounts for major purchases 
Inventory control and physical distribution, including lead times, stock levels and 
expected future changes
Prospects for in leasing, fleet sales and daily rental markets
Role of the manufacturer and dealer UK trade federations and the relationship 
between them
Future of the franchise system
Other
Impressions of other markets
Impressions of the US-Japan auto talks
Prospects for further renewal of the Block Exemption
APPENDICES PAGE 362
APPENDIX XII
SELECTED TRANSCRIPTIONS FROM THE SECOND INTERVIEW 
PROGRAMME
The following consists of three transcriptions from the second interview programme. 
These have been anonymised and, in some instances, edited in order to respect the 
confidentiality required by ICDP and its sponsors.
XXX (TRADE FEDERATION) - INTERVIEW NOTES 
OPINION ORIENTED QUESTIONS
B. Evolution o f the Franchise System
The development of dealer groups has been a UK phenomenon - they are not numerous in 
continental Europe - this has been due to the investment climate in the UK, and to the availability of capital in 
the City.
The advantage to the business, especially if the group has volume franchises in a number of 
locations, is that they can capture large sections of the market and the population as customers. The top 200 
groups represent 30% of franchise coverage and 47% of new car registrations - these figures are increasing at 
the moment.
The groups will continue to grow according to the typical business pattern of merger and acquisition. 
For some, such as Inchcape, the number of outlets has stabilised despite the group having continued to take 
over smaller operations - a process of rationalisation has led to the disposal of peripheral outlets - the groups 
are finding the critical level of dealers necessary to operate effectively.
Do the manu facturers restrict the number o f franchises any one group can have?
This is outlawed in the new Block Exemption, although several companies used to do it (Ford had a 
2% limit). The original rationale was to prevent the distributors from becoming too powerful, but in reality 
the groups want to have a portfolio of different franchises anyway - some of them will be doing well and some 
badly at an> point in the cycle.
Multitranchising has clear benefits to the dealer in terms of profitability, and manufacturers have 
now come to accept that some of their dealers may turn dual, providing that there is no clash with the other 
brand offered. For instance, not many volume franchises would allow a dual with another volume brand.
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Multifranchising is expressly allowed in the Block Exemption anyway, so the major impact will be 
in continental Europe where dualling has yet to develop.
In 1994, 18% of sites were multifranchise (2 or more franchises) - the prediction for 2000 is 30%. 
However, the number of sites with 3 franchises or more is still relatively low - 3-4%, so the vast majority are 
2-brand outlets. A lot of the manufacturers have encouraged their dealers into other programmes, such as 
used cars, in order to try to keep them profitable and therefore exclusive - trying to put off the day when their 
dealer has to take on another franchise.
Experience suggests that car supermarkets would not work in the UK - the Asda experiment failed, 
and a similar experiment in Germany has not been very successful.
There is a split view concerning autoparks. They are certainly better for the consumers, allowing 
easy access and the chance to compare different makes, but does the customer actually buy like that? 
Believes that the majority of customers have already made most of their decision of what they want to buy - 
price range or model - before they come to the dealer, so it is not possible to assume that they will naturally 
pick and choose from the different makes at the autopark. Many of these developments have occurred 
because the dealers have been forced to move to the edge of town by town-centre planning restrictions (noise, 
building use, etc.). The biggest problem is intra-brand competition, and customers will shop around between 
different dealers of the same make looking for the best deal. Very large autoparks, say with 13 franchises, 
would not work unless they have something special to offer to the whole family that would make it worth 
them having a day out there - consumer add-ons like shops and restaurants that would make it more than just a 
trip to a dealer.
There is confusion amongst the consumers as to whether they would get a good deal at such an outlet 
- the majority at the moment prefer to go to their local dealer, who they know, for local service.
C. Franchise Agreement
The Selective Distribution debate has been a very European phenomenon - the system is accepted as 
a fact of life elsewhere in the world.
The XXX believes very strongly in the system as a means of protecting the dealer's investment and 
the customer's level of service.
There is still a big power differential between manufacturers and dealers - manufacturers are now 
global and so even more powerful than they used to be.
XXX is not convinced that the option of using a pure franchise agreement (like McDonalds) would 
be beneficial for the consumers - even though, in the UK, BMW would like to try it. Many dealers now 
resemble a pure franchise operation as the manufacturers have stipulated that all of the network should use the 
same sort of name - Nissan Coventry, Nissan Birmingham, Nissan Warwick, etc. - and look identical. This 
pure franchise option has been outlawed in the new Block Exemption.
It is inevitable that territories will have to grow larger if dealers are to be profitable, with certain 
guarantees and restrictions, like the Saturn arrangement. But Saturn was a completely new product and a
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limited range and given to a dedicated network starting from scratch. Certain elements of the Saturn approach 
have been adopted already - fixed prices with no Tiaggling' and restricted model ranges with tailored 
specifications - this type of operation will be increasingly used here.
The advantages of the current franchise system are that it provides for the dealer secure product 
supply, marketing support for the brand, other support services from the manufacturer and uniform trading 
terms. The dealer has his own territory meaning preferential rights to develop sales, after-sales, used car and 
parts operations there, free (in theory) from competition from the same brand - scope for individual initiative 
in most business areas. On the other hand, the manufacturers demand considerable investment from the 
dealer, and generating a reasonable return on his assets demands a lot of work from the dealer. Furthermore, 
two key elements of the business are beyond the dealer's control - the wholesale price of the product and its 
quality and consequent level of acceptance amongst the consumers. Are cars the only product in the 
marketplace where the wholesale price is non-negotiable?
So, being a successful dealer is a question of balance, but it has been proven that there is still money 
to be made. The most profitable dealers tend to be those selling either specialist makes (Mercedes-Benz, 
BMW, Jaguar) or the cheapest brands (Skoda, Lada). The hardest franchises are therefore the volume brands, 
especially for an independent dealer - groups are however starting to make good money again out of volume 
cars now.
Contract termination is easier here that in the US.
The notice period in the new Block Exemption is 2 years.
Termination is still a problem for dealers - the manufacturer can demand that they invest £100,000 in 
facilities computer hardware, etc., and then can turn round and terminate their contract. An international 
manufacturer can absorb a lot of damage, whereas an independent dealer who is terminated gets no 
compensation and cannot sell the franchise - this can cripple a dealer unless they are fortunate enough to get 
another franchise quickly.
The Block Exemption debate is largely finished now - the definitive version of the legislation was 
released on 21 June.
The XXX will spend the next 3 months looking at the legislation in close detail to be sure of what 
the European Commission means. For instance, regarding the dealer's ability to take on a different franchise, 
the new regulation requires 'separate sales premises', but nobody is sure what this means - does it mean the 
showroom has to have a dividing wall?
The dealers are largely happy with the clauses on exclusivity.
Regarding the negotiation of sales and stock objectives in the legislation, there is broad acceptance 
of the idea of referring to an independent expert in the event of a disagreement between manufacturer and 
dealer, but nobody is sure who this 'independent expert' will be. Could it be conducted by the XXX? 
Clarification is needed. XXX believes that manufacturers will find ways to get around these provisions as 
they do not break down the objectives into how they might be based - the manufacturers might for example 
weight targets in different ways for different calendar months, which might be unfair for dealers.
The XXX did not agree with the clause allowing manufacturers to alter territories if they had an
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'urgent need' at 6 months notice - they thought that this would have been an unwelcome opportunity for the 
manufacturers to take advantage of their dealers. Their lobbying was successful - this was extended to 2 years 
in the final version of the legislation.
A major concern still exists around the clauses on the dissemination of technical information to 
independent repairers. There is a degree of protection built in to the legislation such as the ability to charge 
for the information and to retain intellectual property rights, but at the end of the day, it is a question of 
standards - there is nothing in the legislation that will guarantee the necessary standards for the operators 
using this information, or anything requiring them to buy the correct equipment.
The section of the legislation on the prevention of abuses now stops the manufacturers insisting that 
the dealers have to take on their finance package or computer systems. This would have been an area of 
conflict for the groups - many operate their own group computer network which may be different from each 
manufacturer's system. This is an important issue given the growth of lean distribution and computer-based 
interactive selling methods.
D. Manufacturer Dealer Relations
Whether manufacturer-owned dealers should be accepted or not depends on the motives and 
objectives of the manufacturer behind them. In the majority of cases, manufacturers have developed these 
sites in order to cover potential gaps in their coverage - such as in urban areas (London, Birmingham, Leeds, 
etc.) where property is at a premium. Generally, they are short-term arrangements until an alternative 
independent candidate comes along.
Manufacturer-owned dealers do not have a history of being very successful - most manufacturers 
would admit that it takes at least 5 years to get a return from a new wholly-owned operation, and also that 
they, as manufacturers, are not terribly good at retailing.
The XXX is concerned at the increase in manufacturer-owned outlets in the UK, especially if they 
are used for channelling direct sales or nearly-new cars (usually direct sales coming back from the customer) - 
in other words, as a mechanism for inflating the manufacturer's registration figures. The General Motors 
'Motor Holdings' shared equity system is preferable - a short term equity holding which the dealer buys back 
over a period of time once they have become successful.
The manufacturers would say that no priority is given to their branch outlets - this is difficult to 
prove. Members of the dealer councils are concerned because the key people on these councils are often 
those who run the branch outlets, and so the council is not a true reflection of the dealer body.
What about XXX plan to channel 35% o f its sales through its branches?
This, if it happens, would cause a major problem, and would alter the balance of power between the 
manufacturer and the independent dealers - this is already a problem for XXX in France.
At the end of the day, manufacturers should stick to what they do best, which is producing cars.
XXX does not really approve of the Daewoo experiment, and does not know if it will be a success. 
In terms of registration, it has been a success so far - they are now selling more cars than Hyundai (imported
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by Lex) - in July 1995 they sold over 1000 units for the first time, and now have a 0.5% market share. 
However, they are buying their business - such as very favourable deals with rental companies in order to get 
their cars into the marketplace, and interesting consumer offers (such as replacing the car with a new one after 
one year) - buying market share - will this last beyond the initial 'honeymoon' period?
Cannot see that many benefits for the consumer. The advertising is 'brilliant', but the actual product 
and the pricing is nothing very special. Their only unique attribute is that they are 'cutting out the middleman, 
the dealer', but in doing this, they are not passing on any cost saving from this to the consumer in the form of 
dramatically lower prices.
What about the issue o f direct sales?
Believes that direct sales should be prohibited - and that around 500,000 units per year are sold in
this way.
Also believes that there are around 150,000 artificial or forced registrations each year - 50,000 
dealer self-registrations and 100,000 done by the manufacturers - this feeds on into the supply of nearly-new 
cars, etc.
The XXX maintains the view that the retail customer is paying the price for the discounts given to 
the direct customers - the XXX would not agree! - so far this year, the fleet market has grown by 11% and the 
retail market has declined by 8%. Even independent analysts from outside the industry would now agree that 
new car prices have increased a long way ahead of inflation over the last few years, especially in the light of 
the abolition of the 10% special car tax - so manufacturers must be compensating for these discounts. The 
benefits from this tax reduction were not passed on to the dealers in the form of bigger margins or profits - the 
manufacturers are instead keeping for themselves a bigger proportion of the final selling price of the car - they 
used to get around 60% of the price, now that the average dealer margin is 10% rather than 17.5%, it is nearer 
to 80% of the price. In the long term, this can only damage the industry - however, some of the more 
enlightened manufacturers are starting to realise the need for their dealers to be profitable, and are starting to 
raise margins again (Daihatsu is one).
The nearly-new car programmes started as a marketing idea copied from the US about 6 years ago. 
In the US, they have declined again now, and this will happen in the UK as the manufacturers come to realise 
that by artificially inflating the used car market they are damaging new car sales.
Direct sales are effectively volume discounts given to fleets - some dealers are suspicious that a few 
selected (branch?) dealers are also getting volume discounts, but the XXX does not believe this is the case - 
does not think that the manufacturers could afford to give any more discounts - even though they are keeping 
more of the price!
Instead of volume incentives, the car industry operates by the manufacturers holding back some of 
the rebate from the sale of the car to give to the dealer if they meet quality and customer service targets - this 
is a lot of money in some cases. It is the only industry where there is no wholesale price negotiation - in a 
free market economy, perhaps it is logical that there should be a volume discount...
Direct sales are not so bad in the case of supply to the government or to the armed forces - what the 
XXX takes exception to are the sales to fleets where the dealer is losing out of all profits or benefits (even
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servicing). Needs to be a system forcing these cars through the networks for a start.
The average lead time varies significantly from manufacturer to manufacturer - between 6 weeks and 
3 months.
At the end of the day, dealers are in business in order to make money, so the single biggest problem 
at the moment is the lack of profitability in new car retailing - this situation is actually getting worse not 
better. To improve things, there has to be a better working relationship between manufacturer and dealer - at 
the moment there is still a large amount of distrust between the two sides.
At the moment, the UK industry is going through an interesting period - there are still new franchises 
coming into the marketplace - XXX believes that there will be a greater number of manufacturers selling an 
average number of cars in the future - the major volume sellers will see their sales decline, and some of the 
smaller operations and specialist makes will experience a growth in sales - leading to more companies around 
the median mark.
Overall, there has to be a recipe for a closer working relationship - the market is getting even more 
competitive, and the number of outlets will continue to decline (especially in continental Europe - the UK 
already has a relatively lean distribution structure) - the dealers who remain will inevitably have to maintain a 
better relationship with the manufacturers.
XXX (DEALER GROUP) - INTERVIEW NOTES
OPINION ORIENTED QUESTIONS
A. Evolution o f the Franchise System
Is each dealership a separate company? Is this the same for all dealer groups?
There are two schools of thought on this - and this question helps to explain the difference between 
the way most big dealer groups operate and the way XXX wants to operate.
Most dealer groups do not understand the scale dynamic involved in selling cars - scale has arrived 
in other areas of retailing, but is still relatively new in cars - you need to think big but act small. Most dealer 
groups think big and act big - XXX likes to disassociate itself from them.
Large groups usually start from the premise of how they can avoid losing money, not how can they 
make money, so their whole culture is based on mistrust - driven from the centre, not allowing people on the 
ground to make mistakes and to learn. They think they need to have a standard way of doing things across the 
group so that they know they are in control - so they try to make things uniform - this means they have to feed 
in expertise from headquarters into each branch to make everything uniform. In practice, what this 
concentrating on cost instead of value leads to is a restraint on what they can actually pay to their people -
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eventually, following this route leads them to want to cut costs. XXX, for instance, is constantly looking for 
ways of cutting costs, like having functional managers or getting the sales managers at the dealerships to do 
the administration - this stops them from concentrating on their local market and how many sales managers 
are good at paperwork? Then for (XXX group for instance) they try to cut the number of actual salesmen by 
employing staff who 'meet and greet1 the consumer and then pass then on to the 'deal facilitator1 for the actual 
sale (like Daewoo does) - they are doing this because they want to take costs out, but in doing so they are 
deskilling their business - the good people leave, sales go down, so they have to look to reduce costs even 
more. XXX also had 65 dealer principles reporting straight to the director - this proved to be impossible to for 
the director to cope with, so they had to introduce sub-directors to cover each activity area (sales, after-sales, 
IT support, etc.). All that this does is to alienate the centre from the dealerships, increasing the distance 
between the two. For XXX, success means reducing the number of people employed at headquarters from 
240 to 160, XXX has 178. These groups therefore have a culture that is remote from the customers.
The XXX philosophy is very different - a local market approach - the centre develops a business 
blueprint, an advisory collection of best practice ideas for the dealers to use if they want to relating to sales, 
after-sales, used cars and marketing, and a standard way of accounting across the group, but that is all. They 
then require each dealership manager to own his local business, be the champion in his own area. Whilst 
XXX may pay its dealer principles £30,000 per year, XXX may pay a basic salary of £45,000, perhaps 
£25,000 more if the he performs, but along with that he owns the problem - the dealership is his responsibility 
alone - this way he needs less managing. There are also cluster managers for each area where a number of 
dealers are owned (XXX, XXX), and this will be extended to XXX for example when the group has more 
dealerships there. These local area managers know the market intimately, are part of the golf club, the 
football club, etc., and so really know what that local market needs - supports local activities, etc. In the 
future, the group will move to having 6 or 7 of these clusters, so 6 or 7 cluster 'kings' who will each be 
responsible for the group dealerships in that area. They will in turn have very powerful local champions 
owning their franchises.
Each individual dealership therefore recruits its own people, fires them, deals with its own 
marketplace, manages its own advertising, produces its own advertising, etc. - and the 'champions' are profit 
accountable. If they do badly, headquarters will try to help them, if they do well, they keep the winnings...
So, the normal dealer group operates like a pyramid structure - XXX does not. XXX will not get rid 
of a dealer if it does not immediately make a profit or take money off the dealer if it earns too much. The 
whole philosophy is based around local ownership and local territory - and so not relying on fleet sales like 
XXX or XXX or XXX do.
The number of single owner-driver outlets will continue to decline - especially in cases where the 
brand is not selling enough to make a profit - these brands will need strong relationships with the public 
dealer groups - they feel that the large groups have more capability to cope with the lower profitability. The 
quality brands usually perform better in this respect - have better profits on sales - they are becoming very 
critical of the public groups. This is because the manufacturers evaluate dealers by measuring registrations 
and market share, and also customer satisfaction (CSI) - owner-driver outlets consistently perform better at
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CSI than the groups - the large public groups come out with grand plans each year saying how it will all get 
better, but it never does get better because of the philosophy problem - a remote dealer with no power and a 
distant headquarters ordering him around has little incentive to perform well. If the dealer is well-looked 
after, empowered and respected - set free and managed as a portfolio of individual business as with XXX, 
then he likes it and performs much better - and customer satisfaction goes up as well.
XXX goal is to be in the top 10% of CSI-rated dealers for all the franchises they represent (they are 
nearly there) - this makes the manufacturers come back and ask them to take on another site... The group 
already sells 2.2% of all X X X  in the UK, and XXX wants them to increase this to 5% - by terminating some 
of the public dealer group franchises because they are simply not delivering private sales in their own territory 
(as opposed to fleet sales) nor high CSI ratings.
Following this trend, the public groups will likely be left with the non-performing volume franchises, 
as the specialist manufacturers will see that the owner-driver type outlets can perform better - if they can find 
a way of solving their cash shortfall problems. This is where XXX can step in and take over the dealer, 
providing the money needed to get things moving. For instance, XXX is currently targeting a XXX 
dealership which has 2 good sites, but cannot afford to fill its used car lot with cars - it has no money. XXX 
knows XXX is a good brand (XXX is developing the models), so wants to take over the dealer and build up 
the sites, maximising the used car potential etc. Unless the individual owner-driver is very fortunate in 
funding terms, they will have real problems in the future - it is not possible nowadays to set up an operation to 
represent a quality brand for under £1.5 million.
The XXX and XXX operations across the road have separate showrooms, but a shared workshop. 
The group is also due to open a XXX and XXX satellite operation covering 2 territories housed together in 
one building, but the facilities will look like 2 dealerships with 2 parts desks, 2 service receptions, etc. - the 
customer-facing aspects will look separate.
XXX has yet to see a successful selling concept which blurs the edges of the brands - brand A versus 
brand B (i.e. putting different brands together under the same roof). For instance, Volkswagen and Audi 
dealers were never very successful when they were together, but are much better now that Volkswagen have 
decided to separate them. The staff had fallen into the way of thinking that the cars were all the same, just 
with different prices - this sells both brands short. It is possible to combine administration and parts 
operations, etc. - XXX parts van have the brands of all the dealers on them. Otherwise the salespeople are 
selling more of a commodity and less of a dream, which is what retail customers really want to buy - and 
dealers are giving their margin away if they do this.
XXX runs two sorts of used car operations depending on the age of the car. The first is dominated 
by the brand at the franchise, the cars are between 1 and 3 years old, below average mileage, with long 
guarantees and everything checked over - used car selling with the fear taken out - but this makes the prices 
higher. The second is a higher mileage, lower price operation called XXX - cheap cars, short guarantees, 
cheap finance, all the advertising is price-related (monthly or weekly payments, etc.) - a different market.
At the sites, each brand has its own premium used car operation, and when there is room there is a 
separate XXX area with its own colour scheme and signage - aggressive green and yellow.
APPENDICES PAGE 370
Believes that the manufacturer used car packages are good for laundering self-registrations, but do 
nothing to help for example, a XXX dealer who has a used XXX to sell - the customers will not go to a XXX 
dealer to buy a XXX.
XXX is a fan of having a dedicated area in the town for motor retailing - such as the motor alley 
concept that has grown organically. When he was at XXX, they thought that if a rival retailer set up in an 
out-of-town unit, it would kill their sales, whereas the best thing to do was to join them - 2 stores together 
would pull customers from further afield - volume would increase.
With this in mind, 2 more dealerships will open within 1 mile of the XXX 4 in January 1996 - 
customers will come to the motor area of town and look at several dealerships - it is more convenient for 
them.
Do people shop between your brands?
If a customer leaves XXX and heads across the road to XXX, all we do is telephone them to let them 
know what part-exchange has been offered! Developments like Lakeside have been oversold, will drive 50 
miles to look at the different brands and talk prices - but they will then return to their local dealer and ask him 
to match the price. People will not travel 50 miles to actually buy - they would not want to drive 50 miles 
every time they wanted to have the car serviced. This is why we prefer to be attached to a local area.
The XXX multifranchise operation will succeed because the group is part of the XXX local fabric, 
and the group is a massive employer there - but this branding can only work locally - it would fail as XXX 
Birmingham because nobody would know them there. In this way, some similar experiments such as the 
XXX (another pic dealer group) 'motor villages' have not succeeded because the brand meant nothing where 
they were. The retail concept is a good one, but you have to be careful with the brands - a ' XXX Automall' 
would be doomed! This is why we prefer the natural motor alley or sites with separate brands. The group is 
happy to locate in motor alleys, even if their is competition there - because it makes the customers come.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
E. Manufacturer Dealer Relations
If volume discounts were given, the marketplace would change very significantly - however this is 
very unlikely. The manufacturers are paranoid about power and control - they would not want to give a 
discount to 5% of the biggest sellers as it would disadvantage the remaining 95%, who would go into a 
decline or abandon the franchise - the network would fall apart. However, can understand the temptation for 
the manufacturers, especially if the groups were performing as well as the independents.
However, even a group like XXX is largely inconsequential in the grand scheme of retailing. A 
retail chain in the UK needs at least 450 outlets in order to get economies of scale on the advertising it will 
need to drive customers through the outlets and to sustain a profit. XXX has 120 outlets, and this may well 
decrease as the manufacturers get more concerned about power and not wanting any one group to become too
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powerful in their network - and XXX also only has one outlet in each town (mainly) compared to a local 
group like XXX, they will never have the same influence on the local market.
What about direct sales?
XXX thinks he is one of the founder members of the UK direct sales complainers club! All the 
volume manufacturers like to talk about how they are moving to lean distribution - but in conducting direct 
sales they are showing themselves to be still dominated by stock-push - product viability is still evaluated in 
terms of units that will be sold. This is easy if the product is competitive, but when it is not, they are pushed 
into self-registrations, and into giving big discounts to fleets and rental companies. What is wrong is the 
degree of difference in the margins - XXX gave a XXX % discount to XXX who thus became car launderers 
for XXX, "whilst the dealers operate on 10%.
Direct sales are like a drug - the manufacturers have become dependent on them - and they push 
prices of private cars up and displace sales from a new car to a 2-week old car - destroying the market. These 
discounts should be rebalanced, but this would need to be multilateral (all the guilty manufacturers would 
have to do it at once) - and this would never happen because each headquarters would come back and say 
they wanted to wait until next month, or that they needed a bit more volume - their circumstances would 
always be different.
The release of these cars as nearly-new used cars through the networks is a help.
It is noticeable how the quality franchises - BMW, Mercedes-Benz and Land Rover for example, 
have never acted in this way. For instance, BMW is currently running out the old 5-Series, but this is being 
down by raising equipment levels to attract customers, not by offering discounts - in this way the brand is not 
devalued when the new model comes along. XXX is suspicious that XXX may be about to start 'tactical 
bonuses' as they chase volume for their XXX, and is concerned about it.
The August registration system does not help - just as retail customers wait until the January sales to 
buy electronic goods despite all the 'good' deals available in the run-up to Christmas, or the way people now 
book their holidays as 'last-minute' bargains instead of months ahead, so car buyers have become educated 
and no longer flock to the dealer to get their car on 1 August, but come along a few weeks later to get a good 
deal on the stock that the dealer had got in supposedly to cover the early August rush - the impact of 1 August 
is decreasing. All the manufacturers come up with great schemes, but they have no effect because everybody 
is doing it, so they knock some more off, and then some more... August is therefore a giant contest for the 
manufacturers and dealers - not to increase their market share overall, but just to prevent losing sales to 
another brand or to the neighbouring dealer of the same franchise - treading water. Some order needs to be 
brought into the marketplace to stop margins being destroyed in this way and to stop intra-brand competition.
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OPINION ORIENTED QUESTIONS
B. Manufacturer Dealer Relations
A lot of manufacturers are trying to help their dealers build their profitability - but the dealer's 
biggest competitor is the next dealer of the same franchise.
The manufacturers are therefore slowly learning that this will mean fewer retailer relationships with 
the right kind of retailer - larger territories, tougher measurements of success (customer loyalty and 
satisfaction and market share) to ensure the remaining dealers are top quality. This is easier for the specialist 
franchises like Volvo or Land Rover who only have relatively few dealers - the volume franchise dealers are 
often far too close together - the customers wander round getting £50 pounds more here, £100 there - it is 
very difficult to add value in this situation.
The relationship will always be imbalanced - the manufacturers holds all the shots, but it is how they 
use the bullets that matters - managing the relationship properly. The more enlightened manufacturers are 
moving towards a more participatory role for their retailers. XXX believes the manufacturers should allow the 
dealers to be in full ownership of their operation, but that they should be set tight conditions.
This means larger territories and insisting on a proper system of hubs and satellites. The dealers can 
then put in the sophisticated systems at the hubs, modem links to the satellites - taking costs out of the 
satellites by reducing their overheads - these could then make £100,000 each per year and the hub can make 
£400,000. This needs the dealers and the manufacturers to plan together. The customers get better service - 
the dealers are under heavier threat from the manufacturer if they do not deliver, but they will want to deliver 
because the profitability is there - the right basis for a good relationship. This is coming more and more from 
some of the specialist brands.
However, those manufacturers which are just chasing market share at all costs - be it new cars, used, 
after-sales, including all tactics like direct sales - then dealer profitability is destroyed. For example, XXX 
will say that they are doing well because their market share has increased, but this has just been during the 
good times, and their dealer profitability is dreadful. They want their net profit on sales to be 1.5% - 
currently it is 0.7% - and they are pushing their sales through the branch outlets, which just makes things 
worse. We can deliver 3% with a manufacturer when we work together. XXX and XXX are the same - 
despite the promises about customer service, what they really want is market share, mostly to keep the 
factories going - dealers too close, etc.
The XXX branch dealer in XXX started advertising 1 XXX direct cars' (without XXX approval) - 
until the rest of the dealers complained and it was stopped.
So, branch dealers can be a dangerous phenomenon of they are not well controlled, but XXX is not 
too worried about them because they are usually sloppy - another matter if they are getting preferential 
treatment.
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XXX (NATIONAL SALES COMPANY) - INTERVIEW NOTES
B. Franchise Agreement
XXX does not object to 'semi-detached' dual dealerships - if an individual owner-driver approaches 
them wanting to take on another dealership, they will work through the issue with him - but would object to a 
dealer selling another make from the same showroom.
Around 10% of XXX dealers are multifranchise - there is no one predominant partner, although 
Rover, Seat, Nissan and Citroen are examples - Rover is the brand most often seen alongside XXX.
Selling to customers outside the territory is allowed, advertising activities outside the territory are 
currently prohibited, but will be allowed under the new Block Exemption.
Do you have a different rebate for a sale to a customer from inside as opposed to outside the territory?
No - this would be illegal under the Block Exemption.
Territories are generally organised along post-code boundaries (like most manufacturers), although
there are some 'open' areas where dealers have left or where there is a history of non-representation. XXX will 
confer with the dealer if they want to alter the territory. There is no real friction with dealers regarding 
territory.
XXX do have dealer standards relating to signage, furniture, etc. - they do not require that their 
dealers get BS5750 certification, although one-third have got it anyway - believed to be more than any other 
network.
XXX will only consider terminating a dealer's contract if they consistently perform badly or do not 
show full commitment to the franchise - just missing targets would not be enough.
C. Dealer Support
XXX are currently rethinking their distribution system - they currently operate a 'traditional' system - 
3 import centres (XXX, XXX and the XXX) which receive and forward the cars on to the dealers, who still 
carry the burden of physical stock. Changes will be introduced, but not before 'sometime next year'.
Incentives are offered to dealers for achieving volume targets, and also for achieving quality and CSI 
(customer satisfaction) target.
D. Dealer Relations
Customer standards and business standards.
XXX conducts test-shopping on all their dealers. Every dealer is visited a number of times per year 
(which is divided into 3 four-month segments) depending on the size of the dealer - the dealers are warned 
beforehand that they will be visited soon, and the visits (to the showroom) and telephone calls (to all
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departments of the dealer) are not made when the dealers are likely to be at their busiest. The results of these 
visits are linked to that dealer's CSI score and are published to the network - they are then discussed with the 
dealer if problems are highlighted. XXX believes that this system is fair on both sides - for example, if the 
dealer passes the test shopping exercises, yet its CSI rating is low, then XXX standards must be wrong! - the 
system runs in a similar way to pure franchising in this respect. Most manufacturers just rely on CSI, which 
does not highlight areas where the dealer was not at fault - the dealers have reacted positively to this system, 
which was only started this year - and aims to get closer to what the customer is looking for.
Dealers are also measured in terms of their local market penetration for new car sales, service 
penetration, parts turnover and used car volume.
XXX does not control the real retail price at which the dealers sell the car to the customer - they just 
ask their dealers to be sensible with the discounts they offer, but the market pressures dictate this - XXX 
would prefer that these discounts are not too high, so that the dealer can make some money.
All the dealers receive the same margin no matter what their annual volume, and all pay one 
transportation fee for their cars wherever they are located (except the Highlands and Islands of Scotland).
Fleet sales do get 'different' discounts.
What level of discount do you offer to the fleet customers?
XXX does not conduct many direct sales as such - approximately 5,000 out of 114,000 annual sales - 
these are to rental companies and are decided at a European level by XXX. Everything else is conducted 
through the dealer network.
The level of additional margin that the fleet customer might get would depend on the size of the 
order, how long they will keep the car, whether XXX are going to buy the car back, etc.
Leasing activities are conducted by a sister company, XXX, which is a partnership with XXX and 
the XXX - they have a leasing and contract hire arm. Dealers also sell a lot of cars to other leasing 
companies.
Around 15,000 cars are sold to rental companies annually - this includes local rental fleets. This is 
difficult to determine because the dealers can sell to whoever they like.
Do you buy the cars back?
XXX only buys back cars when they were sold directly - these cars are then either sold through the branch 
dealers or auctioned to the rest of the XXX dealers. When the car was supplied by the dealer, the dealer has 
the choice of whether he wants to promise to buy the car back or not.
OPINION ORIENTED QUESTIONS
A. Evolution o f the Franchise System
XXX has a good relationship with the dealer groups, and thinks that their franchise is currently a 
desirable one for the groups. They have not experienced any great disadvantages.
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XXX believes that the groups will grow bigger in the future - certainly by another 10% - the total 
number of outlets will also increase, but the number of dealerships will decline (more outlets per franchise - 
hubs and satellites).
XXX would not be supportive of the car supermarket idea - believes that the concept would not be 
good for the customers - they would not want to choose cars like they choose white goods - the message for 
the customer is unclear.
Does not think that there have been many successful autoparks yet (several different dealerships at 
the same site), but does not have any real objection - XXX would only refuse if the cars were going to be 
placed under the same roof - otherwise, if an autopark represents the best opportunity for XXX to be 
successfully represented in that area, then they would go along with it. For instance, they have an independent 
dealer in Northern Ireland who has an 18 acre site and 8 franchises in separate buildings, including 
motorcycles and used cars. The concept is also much less developed in continental Europe.
B. Manufacturer Dealer Relations
XXX believes in manufacturer-owned dealers - this is obvious as they have their own! In the UK,
and in Japan, the issue has emerged recently within the context of trying to limit the power of the
manufacturers.
What about the Daewoo system in the UK?
XXX believes that Daewoo's experiment is a brave one, and that they have the best chance of 
success of any of the manufacturers because they are able to start with a clean sheet. However, he does not 
quite understand the shared servicing deal with Halfords - it is usual for the manufacturer to want to protect 
its own brand, not see it subservient to another - he does not believe that the customers are being given a clear 
message when they go to a Halfords superstore to get their Daewoo serviced (the 'motor shows' are much 
clearer in this respect), or a particularly differentiated brand - they run the risk of diluting their brand.
The relationship with the independent dealers used to be pretty bad because of the presence of
branch operations - today it is much better - the dealers would dislike the branch's aggressive selling
activities. The branch dealers tend to be very large, selling 3000 cars a year each (so they are bound to be 
aggressive), but they are treated in exactly the same way as the independents - they are part of the area 
system, and are also members of the dealer association. They are now seen as professionally-run, and 
suspicion and thus friction has reduced. XXX wants to increase marginally the number of branch dealers in 
the future. "We try not to work behind closed doors and in secrecy any more."
XXX franchising policy is to have independent retailers wherever they can find them, but wherever 
this is impossible (major urban centres), they will have branch operations instead - independent dealers are 
the preferred option.
Will more manufacturers become involved in branch selling?
The manufacturers are already involved, even if it is hard to tell in some cases exactly what their 
involvement is (XXX, for example). XXX was one of the first, along with XXX and its XXX chain (which
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even has a XXX dealership now!).
Manufacturers should assist the network to develop dealership expertise in all areas of business - 
new car sales will not return to being profitable in the short term - by increasing parts turnover, service 
penetration, etc. - and improving customer satisfaction - the aim is to get more from the dealer's assets, so that 
the dealer company grows, but the asset base does not, so that they can deliver more profit.
Changing the supply system would help - moving away from holding stocks of cars at the dealer. At 
the moment, a large proportion of XXX dealers are on a daily stock order system - fewer stocks and quicker 
turnover. It is only a matter of time before an international pipeline is set up, and the dealers have direct 
contact with the factory for ordering. Already they can amend orders until relatively late in the cycle.
What about the unbundling o f dealerships into hubs and satellites? Is this a rebirth o f the two-tier system that 
some manufacturers, including XXX, still have? Will the independent second-tier dealers operate satellites 
for the main dealers?
XXX had a true two-tier system until 1978, with distributors and dealers.
Manufacturers like XXX and XXX are now encouraging their main dealers to set up and to own 
satellites - this is the main difference from the old two-tier system, where the sub-dealers were separate. XXX  
is not actively pursuing a policy regarding the ownership o f the outlets, but the system is partly in place for 
this to happen.
This trend has grown from a need identified in the mid-1980s for. additional service bays - XXX had 
some service only ' XXX ' - but when these type of operation opened, they generally discovered that they had 
some demand for new car sales as well - thus they became retail dealers. These are generally in Wales, 
Scotland and around London - and so are strategically-placed.
XXX has produced its new dealer agreement in draft form, and is currently discussing it with the 
dealer association.
Dealers are not forced to join the dealer association.
Each area o f the 11 has one representative of the dealer association who meet with the area 
operations manager 4 times per year.
XXX also has a dealer panel, which consists of the 11 dealer association area representatives plus 
the 8-person dealer bureau - they interacts with the board of XXX. The dealer bureau's members are each 
responsible for one activity, and interact with the specific board member for that activity - the member 
responsible for sales interacts with XXX, the dealer association chairman interacts with the managing 
director, etc. This system is known as the 'shadow government' - there are regular ad-hoc talks, once-a-month 
bureau meetings with the board of XXX and the panel meetings (with the board and some XXX managers) 
once even 4 months. One of the bureau members also represents the UK dealer council on XXX.
XXX is trying to make the dealer agreement as common as possible across Europe - does not foresee 
any real problems with the terms o f the new Block Exemption, as the dealer recruitment is sufficiently 
thorough - dealers are recruited for the long term.
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APPENDIX XIII
POSTAL SURVEY: THE CONCEPTS OF LEAN DISTRIBUTION
For reasons o f page layout (the survey was originally in landscape format), it is impossible 
to reproduce the look of the survey exactly here. The following is the text lifted from the 
survey document, as it was distributed to respondents.
LEAN DISTRIBUTION COULD BE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS 
(WORKING DEFINITION):
“The provision o f a complete customer-determined and customer-driven 
mobility package, including sales, after-sales and service support, at the 
right place, at the right time and at the minimum cost. ”
1) How do you rate the following statements in terms of their 
importance to the overall concept of lean distribution in 
the motor industry? Please tick the boxes




Unimportant Indifferent Important Very
important
Having the physical distribution chain 
and production planning driven by sold 
customer order pull, and not by stock 
push
Having integrated computer systems 
which unite retailers, manufacturers 
and suppliers and which enable two- 
way order and information exchanges
Reducing the number o f model variants 
and specification differences
The fragmentation o f car retailing into 
a multiplicity of different approaches to 
meet the needs of different regions and 
vehicle types
Establishing closer relationships 
between manufacturers and retail 
partners
The rethinking of territorial coverage 
including market area approaches 
involving fewer individual main dealers 
and the dispersal o f dealership 
activities according to local needs
The establishment o f fixed-price selling
Having a less confrontational selling 
style and different reward structures for 
customer-facing sales and service staff
Conducting less outlet-level marketing 
and more customer retention and order 
generation campaigns with a national 
or regional focus
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2) How well-established do you feel that lean distribution has 
become in the world’s major car markets?
Please rate the following markets from 1 to 5 where:
- 1 is ‘no elements o f lean distribution have yet become 
established’
-  5 is ‘lean distribution is fully established ’
- x is ‘don’t know /  no opinion ’
FACTORS Fr Ger It UK B-Iux Scand SP/P Eur Jap USA
Having the physical distribution chain and 
production planning driven by sold 
customer order pull, and not by stock push
Having integrated computer systems which 
unite retailers, manufacturers and suppliers 
and which enable two-way order and 
information exchanges
Reducing the number of model variants and 
specification differences
The fragmentation of car retailing into a 
multiplicity of different approaches to meet 
the needs of different regions and vehicle 
types
Establishing closer relationships between 
manufacturers and retail partners
The rethinking of territorial coverage 
including market area approaches involving 
fewer individual main dealers and the 
dispersal of dealership activities according 
to local needs
The establishment of fixed-price selling
Having a less confrontational selling style 
and different reward structures for 
customer-facing sales and service staff
Conducting less outlet-level marketing and 
more customer retention and order 
generation campaigns with a national or 
regional focus
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The survey then provided a third page for comments and suggestions, as follows.
COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS
PLEASE USE THE SPACE BELOW FOR ANY COMMENTS AND 
SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE:
• If you disagree with any of the factors listed
• If you would like to suggest any further ingredients of lean 
distribution, along with your assessment of their state of development 
in the European market
• If you would like to put forward your own definition of lean 
distribution
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
Please return com pleted questionnaires to A ndrew  Tongue:
F ax  +44 (0)1225 826135 or Mail School of Management, University of
Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK 
I f  yo u  have any queries, please contact:
Tel +44 (0)1225 826826 ext.4745 or E-mail mnsagt@bath.ac.uk
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APPENDIX XIV
POSTAL SURVEY: THE CONCEPTS OF LEAN DISTRIBUTION - 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE TYPES
For reasons of confidentiality, as explained in section 5-S-2-2, the survey was conducted 
anonymously, and it is thus not possible to give a full breakdown o f respondents. 
Nevertheless, the following is intended to provide an overview o f the 44 responses 
received.
Responses were received from:
• manufacturers
• wholly-owned national distributors
• independent national distributors
• trade federations
• dealer groups
• a computer company
• consultants
• researchers.




Respondents job titles included (in no particular order):







• Used car marketing manager
• Project director































•Chrysler. Chrysler and Jeep are separate franchises, but 
are nearly always combined at distributor and dealer level 
•Isuzu: not shown as a separate franchise, since products 
are sold through Opel in all markets except UK 
•Rover, most markets have combined Rover and Land 
Rover dealers, although in 3 markets Land Rover has 
separate distributors
•Very low volume specialist franchises (such as Ferrari, 
Lotus or Rolls Royce) are not included
Categorisations from Harbour Wade. 1993
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APPENDIX XVI
NATIONAL DISTRIBUTOR STATUS 
BY MANUFACTURER IN EUROPE, 19923
Company A B Dk Fin F D Gr Irl It Nl Nor P Sp Sw Ch UK
Alfa Romeo M M M I M M M I M M I I M M M M
BMW M M I I M M I I M M I I M M M M
Chrysler I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Citroen M M M I M M I I M M M M M M M M
Daihatsu JV I I JV I M I I I JV I I I I I I
Fiat I M M I M M I M M M I M M M M M
Ford M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
GM M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
Honda M M I I M M I I M M I JV M JV M M
Hyundai I I I I I JV I I I I I I I I I I
Jaguar I I I I I M I I M JV I I M I I M
Kia M I Maz I
Lada 1 M I M I I I I I I I M I I I I
Lancia 1 M M I M M I M M I M M M M M
Mazda JV I I I I M I I I I I I I I I I
Mercedes JV' M M I M M M I M M I M M I M M
Mitsubishi I I M I I M I I JV I I M M I I I
Nissan 1 I I I M M I I M M I I M I M M
Peugeot M M I I M M I I M M I I M M M M
Porsche I I I VW I M I M JV I I M JV VW I M
Proton I I
Renault M M JV JV M M I I M M JV M M Volv M M
Rover j I M I I M M I M M M I M M I I M
Saab 1 1 M M M M I I I I M I I M I M
1
Seat 11 I Saab I M M I I M I I I M I I M
Skoda 11 1 I I M JV I I M I I I M I I I
Subaru 11 M I I I M I I JV M I I I I I I
Adapted from Harbour Wade. 1993
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Company A B Dk Fin F D Gr Irl It N1 Nor P SP Sw Ch UK
Suzuki M I I I M I I I I I I I JV I I I
Toyota I I I I I M I I M I I JV M I I JV
Volvo I M M M M M I M M M M I M M M M
VAG I I I I M M I I M I I I M JV I M
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